ISBN: 978-0-19-891700-7, Oxford University Press, 2026, 368 pages, $34.99 (Hardcover)
Reviewed by: Lawrence E. Cline, Colorado State University Global, Denver, Colo, United States
Fakers tells the story of the British Information Research Department (IRD), founded in 1948 and lasting until the 1970s. The IRD specialized in gray and black propaganda. During its existence, it provided “off-the-record briefings for trusted contacts, confidentially written material for journalists, and secretly sponsored publications of books,” with some 400 active operations. At its peak, it had 217 employees, 23 of whom specialized in black propaganda. The focus of this book is on the black propaganda campaigns and the people who ran them. The author, Rory Cormac, is a professor of international relations at the University of Nottingham specializing in the study of covert action and secret statecraft, making him uniquely qualified to write this book.
The IRD ran operations in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. It used a wide variety of methods, including writing forgeries, establishing purportedly independent committees and research groups, and founding book publishers and news agencies that could feed information to established media sources. One of the news agencies, the Near and Far East News Agency, was particularly successful. Its services went to 173 subscribers in India in five languages, as well as additional subscribers in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Rangoon, Saigon, Sarawak, and Colombo. In several cases, the IRD created “hostile” front groups to discredit opponents. One advantage the IRD had was that Britain was viewed as something of a secondary player during the Cold War. This deniability was easier to maintain because Britain’s lower profile meant its covert activities attracted less scrutiny than those of the superpowers. When some of the British propaganda efforts went wrong, the Soviets and others would blame either the Chinese or, more often, the CIA.
An example of how convoluted black propaganda can become was the Loyal African Brothers. This was an entirely fictitious group created by the IRD to create dissent among opponents in Africa. Not long after the British campaign began using this “group,” the Soviets used the same attribution for propaganda against CIA activities in the region. In other cases, as the Soviet-Chinese rivalry became more heated, Soviet propaganda in Africa began using themes similar to those of the IRD to discredit the same targets, who were viewed as being too pro-Chinese.
Many of the issues surrounding the IRD’s operations are now mostly of historical interest, but they are still covered well in the book. One such issue is how the IRD acquired the materials needed to create its fakes. In particular, obtaining the correct typewriters became a problem. In the days of manual typewriters, most could be “fingerprinted” by the country in which they had been manufactured. Those of a certain age might, in fact, remember intelligence operations involving the smuggling of typewriters out of countries with denied access. Likewise, even the type of paper, along with how it was printed, could be critical to making documents look authentic.
Although published by an academic press, the book is not a dry academic tome. In large measure, this is due to the author’s engaging writing style. Beyond this, the cast of characters in the IRD was interesting. As one example, the wife of one of the key members correctly thought that he was having an affair and hired a private investigator, who subsequently reported that “he was too busy drinking in Fleet Street pubs to be having an affair and thought it more likely that he would die of alcohol poisoning.” Other members engaged in dalliances and heavy bouts of drinking. Overall, both the leaders and workers in the IRD would send shivers up the spines of security officials. This might lead to the larger question of whether those who are both creative enough and devious enough to produce this type of propaganda are ever going to be particularly “clean” in terms of the lifestyle component of security vetting.
Beyond the historical issues, this book offers some continuing verities for those engaged in information operations and propaganda, particularly on the darker side. The first is probably the most critical: trying to measure the actual effectiveness of such campaigns. Although the IRD could point to the number of forgeries, the items it placed in friendly press venues, and the like, it proved virtually impossible in most cases to demonstrate their actual impact.
Leaders of the IRD continued to stress the importance of using native speakers who were well versed in the societies they were targeting; on the occasions when they neglected this maxim, the results were usually failures. As one IRD leader argued, propaganda is a “support weapon,” and it cannot be relied on to counter larger military or political failures. It certainly can play a critical role at the strategic level, but it must be well integrated into larger efforts.
The final issue that may or may not continue to be valid is one that helped lead to the demise of the IRD. The group was formed as essentially an anti-communist body, with its focus on countering the Soviets. In many cases, the validity of the underlying assumptions about communist influence over the IRD’s targets was debatable. Nevertheless, the IRD and its masters in Whitehall tended to view the world in very black-and-white terms. Ultimately, the IRD leaders were anachronisms, most of whom could not adapt to a greatly changed international environment. A primary example was the IRD’s effort in the Caribbean to discredit the Black Power movement, which proved to be a total failure. This example demonstrated how, in many ways, the world simply passed the IRD by.
Fakers’ coverage of British disinformation campaigns during the Cold War is the most detailed yet presented, and it will likely stand as the definitive work on the topic. It ends with the dissolution of the IRD, with follow-on British efforts by other agencies only briefly mentioned. More recent British campaigns using black propaganda are likely covered by the Official Secrets Act and therefore inaccessible to researchers. As materials on these campaigns become subject to release, they will present a rich field for further research.
For those interested in the subject, this book might be paired with Ladislav Bittman’s The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider’s View (New York: Pergamon, 1985) for a view of operations from the other side. Although Fakers is limited to the history of disinformation during this period, many of its underlying lessons continue to be valid. The primary audiences for this book are those interested in the larger fields of information operations and propaganda, whether historical or current, and they should gain much from reading it. It is highly recommended.