Edited by Ofer Fridman, Vitaly Kabernik, and Francesca Granelli
ISBN 9781626379954, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2022, 287 pages, $38.50
Reviewed by: James F. Slaughter, Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia, USA
Info Ops discusses and debates the nature and evolution of information warfare from the early twentieth century to the present conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. After an introduction by the editors, the work is divided into four sections: Formation, Evolution, Adaptation, and Conclusion. The framework of the book is well-structured, easy to follow, and flows well, allowing readers of all knowledge levels on the subject to engage with relative ease.
In Part I, Formation, Ofer Friedman discusses “British ‘Front Propaganda’ in World War I,” Vitaly Kabernik discusses “Soviet Information Operations in World War II,” and Aidan Winn discusses “Inducement Strategies in the Vietnam War.” In all three instances, the authors analyze the creation and structure of information (read: propaganda) campaigns designed to affect both civilian and military attitudes toward various war efforts. The authors detail the efforts to create an information machine that produces quantifiable results and the difficulties of creating information warfare tools in an age where rapid media expansion, increased literacy, and access to technology that spread media faster and further than ever before served as both offensive and defensive weapons beyond the battlefield.
In Part II, Evolution, Igor Orlov and Mikhail Mironyuk discuss “Soviet Propaganda in the War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989,” Brett Boudreau discusses “NATO’s Information Campaigns in Afghanistan, 2003-2020,” and Vitaly Kabernik, Igor Orlov, and Mikhail Mironyuk discuss “Russian and Georgian Operations in South Ossetia, August 7-12, 2008.” In all three instances, these chapters examine the difficulties of evolving information warfare in especially challenging environments with more easily served ‘domestic’ targets and more challenging ‘foreign’ targets with vastly differing socio-cultural backgrounds in an age of rapidly evolving technology. The authors discuss the challenges of balancing military operations with information operations in planning and execution. Outside civilian media, in an age of almost instant dissemination and feedback with the rapidly evolving state of technology, are also taken into account.
In Part III, Adaptation, Michael Milstein discusses “Hamas’s Strategy Against Israel: From Information Ops to Influence Ops,” while Roy Schulman and David Siman-Tov discuss “Israel’s Information Operations in Gaza: The Rise of the Digital Age.” This chapter is the leading edge of current developments beyond the speculative. In it, the authors discuss the dynamic nature of current operations and the rapidly evolving means of delivery in a pervasive environment of established media outlets, rapidly evolving social media with almost daily additions or improvements in platforms, and influencing the outside world amid a pervasive media environment with largely entrenched yet shifting public opinions internationally. This chapter helps make sense, especially on a technical level, of the information currently being proffered in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, considering the October 7, 2023, attack and Israel’s response.
Finally, in Part IV, Francesca Granelli discusses “The Future of Information Operations.” In this section, the author critically analyzes past information operations. Considering the fluid nature of public opinion and rapidly evolving technology, the author effectively argues that any information operation must be well-planned, well-structured, and have clearly defined and measurable goals.
To offer ‘positive’ criticisms of the book, it should have been published long ago, and it should be two to three times its current length. The material is easily digestible, provides a logical and mostly consistent framework for understanding information operations, and is useful for military and civilian consumption alike. The authors provide multiple examples of effective and ineffective information operations spanning more than a century, and the reader is left with a good foundation to understand the historical context and the current issues and debates in ‘official’ information and the influence of evolving media, social media, and technology.
The book (or a subsequent volume) could improve by offering consistent contrasts as are found in Section III, where the reader is given a clear overview of both sides conducting information operations in a specific conflict. Sections I and II focus heavily on Soviet/Russian information operations. While the material is excellent, including contrasting chapters on allied and opposing information operations in each conflict would provide deeper insight into why some strategies succeed while others fail.
This work fills a significant gap in historiography. It is extremely useful for military historians trying to understand the development of information operations over the course of the twentieth century, particularly for those studying Soviet/Russian information operations and for readers seeking to understand the complex conflict between Israel and Hamas.
James F. Slaughter is an Adjunct Professor at Marshall University.
