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Book Review

Non-State Special Operations: Capabilities and Effects (Cass Military Studies) by Ian Rice & Craig Whiteside Reviewed by: Zachary Z. Horsington

ISBN: 978-1032594514, Routledge, July 2025, 192 pages, $233.99 (Hardcover), $64.99 (eBook)

Reviewed by: Zachary Z. Horsington, Small Wars Journal, El-Centro/Dublin City, Dublin, Republic of Ireland

Ian Rice and Craig Whiteside’s Non-State Special Operations: Capabilities and Effects is a fantastic compendium of case studies and analysis that pertinently argues that non-state actors can and have organized special operations. Ian Rice is a senior lecturer in defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School and a retired U.S. Army officer who served with special operations forces. He was also involved in Operation Inherent Resolve. Craig Whiteside is a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, a retired U.S. Army infantry officer, and an Iraq War veteran. Both authors have immense experience within security studies academia, and their book represents the natural evolution of their insightful journal article with Daniele Raineri, “Black Ops: Islamic State and Innovation in Irregular Warfare,” published in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.

While their original article focused on only three case studies associated with the Islamic State, this book goes well beyond that and analyzes multiple case studies across four distinct group types: militant groups; proxy groups; organized criminals and cults; and mercenaries. After explaining the logic behind non-state special operations, the authors develop a framework for isolating and classifying case studies using a three-test approach:

Test 1: Is this event distinctly different from the norm for this group?

Test 2: Does this unique event qualify as a specialized tactical action?

Test 3: Is there a premeditated operational or strategic effect that outweighs the value of the tactical action?

This method is initially benchmarked against Hamas’s 2023 Al-Aqsa Flood operation and the 1942 British raid on St. Nazaire. The distinction between Special Operations Forces and Special Operations is also made clear from the outset, and the authors provide a thoughtful discussion of the differences between these terms. Once this foundation is laid, they justify their two-by-two typology for discerning the four group classifications based on actor motive and agency.

The subsequent four chapters dive deeply into each category of actor. Each chapter begins with a fascinating vignette that entices the reader, followed by a dissection of the operation types unique to that group classification. For each operation type, an exemplar is analyzed, followed by verification of the actor category, comparison with du jour operations, evidence of specialized tactics, desired outsized outcomes, additional associated examples, a few cross-category examples, and some non-examples.

The consistency and robust analysis associated with each group chapter and its operation types definitely lend the book credibility in substantiating the authors’ arguments for reconceptualizing and reframing special operations to include non-state actors. More than that, their typology of operation types successfully establishes a strong foundation for further study in this area.

In the case of militants, Rice and Whiteside identify large-scale raids, prison breakouts, and plunging attacks as unique operations. In the case of proxies, deep operations, the spectacular gambit, and the hostage snatch are identified. It should be mentioned, however, that the cross-category example associated with deep operations in this section is the hijacking of the M/V Galaxy Leader by Houthi forces. Considering that Houthi forces deployed against an unarmed civilian vessel close to Yemeni waters, this example is comparatively weaker than the other cross-category examples. Nonetheless, the diversity of case studies analyzed throughout the book is commendable and indispensable to any reader interested in non-state actor capabilities. Regarding criminal groups, leadership decapitation and monopoly moves are analyzed, while apocalypse-triggering events are attributed to cults. Finally, for mercenaries, coup de main assaults and assistance activities are analyzed.

The final chapter of the book usefully invites further research on the subject and appropriately describes institutional tunnel vision and bureaucratic biases, although the authors’ further justification of their typology deserves scrutiny. Rice and Whiteside argue that they “see value” in their group discrimination, “even if it is counter to the trend of creating categories of blended actors like criminal insurgencies, of depicting hybrid warfare as mélange of activities, even the watering down of important distinctions between war and peace (e.g. gray zone).” They argue that “the popularization of these terms serves political purposes” and that “they harm analysis by purposefully conflating and confusing, even refusing to define terms because they are supposedly self-evident or because vagueness serves a purpose.”

While Libiseller (2023) has convincingly argued that hybrid warfare is an academic fashion, Sullivan’s (1997; 2020; 2022) theory of Third Generation Gangs, which has evolved into a concept of criminal insurgency, is neither politically infused nor vague. Organized criminals have reached a noticeable and unparalleled level of sophistication, whereby they now delineate de facto zones of autonomy and pseudo-sovereignty. Bunker’s (2012; 2019) concept of plutocratic insurgency blends nicely with Gilman’s (2014) concept of twin insurgency, and this fusion represents more than conceptual convenience or political promotion: it is the dire and tangible reality in certain areas. Sullivan and Bunker have written extensively about North, Central, and South America and beyond, and it seems disingenuous for Rice and Whiteside to characterize their work, and its popularization, as politically motivated, harmful, and imprecise.

More than that, this characterization is counterproductive to their invitation for further case studies and analysis concerning non-state actor special operations, considering that both Sullivan and Bunker have published insightful and detailed case studies of the sophisticated capabilities of organized criminal groups, terrorists, and other violent non-state actors. While Rice and Whiteside’s comment on criminal insurgency is obviously a tiny note in what is overall a great book, it somewhat soured the reading experience toward the end.

While their broader point regarding politically charged vagueness is definitely salient in certain contexts, it is also highly dubious in others. The diversity of non-state actors and the sophistication of their capabilities, along with historical contexts and political framing, blur and shape our understanding of non-state actor motivations and agency. This exposes how the book’s typology, while definitely useful, should neither be relied upon nor defended as gospel.

To some, the Houthis are an Iranian proxy group. To civilians living in Houthi-controlled territory, they are not a non-state actor; they are the state. Likewise, the Viet Cong were once considered not part of a monolithic banner of Vietnamese militant self-determination but rather a proxy group of North Vietnam. Hezbollah’s political power and criminal activities also deserve mention regarding its status as a non-state actor or proxy, along with questions concerning its motivations and self-interest. Beyond the case groups mentioned in the book, its framework has difficulty reconciling the ideology and self-interest underlying criminal activities by Irish republican groups or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, as well as the independence or patronage of groups such as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and the Ustaše.

This is to say that non-state actors’ motivations and agency are not as clear as this book delineates, and Rice and Whiteside should not shy away from nuance and complexity either. Their book is a brilliant compilation of case studies, and they identify and explore a breadth of operation types. Nonetheless, if they want to invite further study of non-state special operations, their publisher might consider lowering the price of the book in the future to make it more accessible to professionals and academics, whose input could advance the field, and to laypeople, thereby broadening understanding. Likewise, the authors might take more time to study relevant non-state actor theories, namely criminal insurgency, so as not to unnecessarily disavow possible alternative avenues for further research

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Inter Populum: The Journal of Irregular Warfare and Special Operations is seeking book reviews on published works relevant to special operations, irregular warfare, and strategic competition. We welcome reviews of theoretical, historical, operational, or policy-oriented books with a regional or global focus.

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