ISBN: 978-3-031-50457-0, Palgrave MacMillan: Cham, Switzerland, 2024, 244 pages, $95.42 (hardcover)
“Ethical decision-making does not have to be risk-free; it just has to be prudent.”This might be the central governing principle that Anthony Pfaff advances in his moral analysis: Proxy War Ethics: The Norms of Partnering in Great Power Competition. Pfaff’s burden is to show that the principles of the Just War Tradition are applicable to 21st-century proxy warfare.
The argument is made in six chapters. Grounding his ethical paradigm in the Just War Tradition, Pfaff considers the principles of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello as they apply to proxy war. In the first chapter, he clarifies the central notion of a proxy relationship by contrasting it with allies and partners. To do this, he employs four relational concepts: power asymmetry, interest alignment, benefits, and control. Pfaff contends that a sponsor-proxy relationship is a principal-agent relationship wherein contingent interests can and do diverge, benefits are transactional and indirect, and principals control agents through withholding resources. Understanding the nature of the relationship allows him to shed light on the moral hazards inherent to both sponsor and proxy and to subsequently develop a set of ethics for operating with unique risks. It is important to note that Pfaff does not see all principal-agent relationships as sponsor-proxy relations. He excludes those actors that work within the same constitutional framework, e.g., private military contractors, and he excludes robots as non-moral entities.
The second and third chapters provide a historical case study analysis to identify ethical conditions and moral hazards involved in proxy war. Pfaff treats case studies from the Peloponnesian War through recent civil wars in South America. These case studies show the central ethical problems of proxy war: divergence of interests between sponsor and proxy makes the relationship unstable, perhaps even incoherent—the commitment of the sponsor to the proxy is uncertain; controlling the proxy is not only operationally difficult but the lethal support to the proxy might end up in the hands of actors that sponsors do not intend to support; moreover, a proxy might violate norms or rights, raising questions of sponsor responsibility; introducing sponsorship risks prolonging a war or even starting one that might not have otherwise begun; non-vital interests may become amplified, possibly leading to a quagmire; and postbellum questions of sponsor withdrawal emerge.
To address these problems, Pfaff examines seven Jus Ad Bellum principles applied to proxy wars in his fourth chapter. The main concerns for the sponsor are: Is the proxy’s cause just? Will supporting a proxy initiate a war that would have otherwise not come about? Will supporting the proxy prolong a war? Pfaff categorizes all proxy wars as a form of intervention and relies on Michael Walzer’s norms for guidance. However, he uses Walzer’s doctrine to render the justness of the proxy irrelevant, arguing that this approach results in endless escalation. Therefore, the sponsor ought to support only a just proxy. Regarding proportionality, Pfaff’s sponsor must ask how sponsorship will affect proxy proportionality calculations. The principle of legitimate authority poses a problem for proxies that may not be stated. Here, Pfaff relies again on Walzer in locating authority in the ability of a political community or group to gain the assent of its people and effectively govern, though Pfaff is willing to extend legitimate authority to non-state international organizations like Hezbollah, so long as they meet a set of criteria showing the assent of the people and the necessity of the assent. The Just War principle of public declaration creates a thorny problem for clandestine or low-visibility military assistance. Pfaff responds that proxy relationships should be public, but that secrecy is permissible when “human rights and human well-being are concerned.” Nonetheless, Pfaff calls for some form of oversight. Proxy war challenges the right intention because the dual intentions—of proxy and sponsor—can and often diverge. Pfaff responds that the right intention is achieved when both proxy and sponsor have just causes; they need not align perfectly. The last resort in proxy war becomes a matter of sponsors’ understanding of the proportionality calculus of the proxy. The sponsor has alternatives; the proxy may not, but sponsors should understand what moral hazards increase by offering the proxy a war option. Finally, sponsors “should intervene with proxy success in mind.” This wards off the moral hazard of abandonment.
In chapter five, Pfaff turns to five Jus In Bello considerations. First among these concerns is interest divergence and the threat of sponsor betrayal. In other words, once a sponsor’s war aim has been achieved, it is possible that the sponsor will reduce costs by exiting the war—a move that can be understood as a betrayal to the proxy. Sponsors must recognize the moral hazards involved in exiting the war. Regarding proportionality, Pfaff is concerned that sponsors alter calculations of the cost of violence. Moreover, they increase the threat of escalation as counter-sponsors respond tit for tat. Pfaff calls for just sponsors to develop plans for “escalation dominance.” Such a plan commits the sponsor to the success of the proxy force, a commitment that, as readers of Walzer will recall, is prohibited in the interest of the sovereignty of the supported political community. Another plan demanded by an ethical approach to proxy war is the control of lethal support to prevent the diffusion of arms to unintended recipients. Finally, Pfaff addresses the problem of dirty hands, arguing that it is permissible to support morally compromised proxies so long as “proxy failure represents greater injustice than dirty hands represent.” Of all the claims in the book, this probably is the most debatable. It seems to invite a realist calculation that the Just War Tradition rejects. There is no true Doctrine of Double Effect that one can rely on to account for unintended human rights-violating proxy actions. Proxies are morally responsible agents, not weapon systems. Rather, it seems that the arguments against utilitarianism are appropriate here: we should not be willing to accept an evil in order to achieve a greater good—or, in this case, a lesser evil.
Pfaff’s final chapter revisits the opening account of the geopolitical situation of the 21st century and shows that today is a continuation of the history recounted in earlier chapters—the world is ripe for proxy warfare; it is happening now and will likely happen in the future. The author’s clear presentation of the Just War principles applied to the situation of proxy warfare is a testament not only to the book’s analytic rigor but also to the enduring value of the Just War Tradition. Scholars at the graduate level and higher working in the Just War Tradition will benefit the most from this book, though mid-to-senior-grade security professionals studying and practicing international relations, ethics, and policymaking will also find it profitable. If there is any form of warfare that lends itself to the realist vision of warfare, it is proxy war with its assumption of realist geopolitics. Pfaff shows that a Just War ethicist need not eschew proxy war; he should simply be prudent about it.
LTC Joshua Lehman, PhD is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the United States Military Academy at West Point.
