ISBN: 979-8411286298, Self-Published, February 2022, 225 pages, $17.16 (Paperback)
Reviewed by: Tim Pappa, Federal Bureau of Investigation (former), Washington, D.C., USA
This rare diary of a psychological warfare officer in World War II conducting influence operations against the Japanese military is an important historical account; however, the lack of firsthand descriptions of how this officer designed psychological warfare campaigns and narrative content is disappointing.
There are some valuable contributions for practitioners, however, such as the work’s commentary on leadership personalities and operational constraints throughout the war—factors that may have been the greatest challenge to effective psychological warfare. These lessons are relevant in today’s operational and organizational environments.
Richard Duckett, a Burma specialist known for his prior work on the British military intelligence Special Operations Executive (SOE) during World War II in Southeast Asia, provides commentary throughout the independently published diary of Captain Alfred Trutwein. Trutwein was a psychological warfare officer in the SOE who organized influence operations against the Japanese military in Burma and across the region during World War II. Trutwein’s grandson began reading through the diary after his grandfather’s death, having heard some of the same stories growing up from his father. He never met Trutwein in person and only spoke with him once on the phone as a child. He later connected with Duckett online based on Duckett’s research in this same area and their shared family background of fighting in Burma during World War II. Duckett wrote in the preface that he considers this diary important because it establishes the role of the SOE in several conflicts in Burma that have not been previously highlighted in official records or histories of that campaign. Trutwein’s unit participated in the Battle of Imphal—considered a turning point in the fighting against the Japanese in Burma—but the unit appears to have been overlooked in official records. Duckett also noted that this diary challenges some of the established narratives of the Japanese fighting in Burma: Trutwein’s unique firsthand experiences highlight how Japanese soldiers were influenced by his unit’s propaganda in several instances. Most historical accounts suggest otherwise.
Duckett provides much of the institutional background from referenced military records, such as the development and testing of the newly formed Indian Field Broadcasting Units (IFBU) during early SOE campaigns in Southeast Asia, and Trutwein’s initial involvement with these units in combat operations. Duckett noted in the first section that a review of experimental IFBU operations in Burma included the use of loudspeakers to broadcast to Japanese soldiers from approximately 50 to 400 yards. News was broadcast in Urdu and English to Allied military personnel to boost morale. Leaflets were also distributed in Japanese and local Burmese dialects, and markets opened for selling salt and oil to “win over the local population” (p. 57). Duckett added that the military records noted there was “no way of knowing the impact of this work as there were no surrenders or prisoners captured, but neither had there been any military success for the Allies in the offensive,” which might have resulted in surrenders or prisoners. Duckett’s commentary is useful background information, but practitioners would have benefited more from any explanation by Trutwein of how these broadcasting and leaflet campaigns were designed or what kinds of narratives were crafted into the leaflets distributed to Japanese soldiers. Despite this shortcoming, Duckett does reference a detailed firsthand account of psychological warfare targeting Japanese soldiers—particularly describing how narratives are designed—in OSS Operational Black Mail: One Woman’s Covert War Against the Imperial Japanese Army.
Not until more than halfway through this work are there any general references to themes or narratives used in the content created, broadcast, or distributed by Trutwein’s units. Again, these references are derived from military records that Duckett included in his commentary to contextualize Trutwein’s diary notes. Duckett cited a report that highlighted examples of Japanese narrative “impossibles,” claims designed to undermine morale, such as broadcasts stating that the Japanese military could not take Burma because Japanese soldiers had failed even to take a small city (p. 142). Historical records also note other broadcast tactics, including highlighting local weather conditions such as coming monsoons and mentioning Western military customs of taking prisoners who want to surrender. These efforts appear to reflect attempts to craft narratives that would resonate with Japanese soldiers fighting there. The tactics also suggest attention to countering Japanese narratives that depicted Western soldiers as cruel and unwilling to take prisoners alive. This same military record noted that when Japanese soldiers at one point did raise a white flag near a bunker, Allied soldiers shot up the flag—an example of the real-world challenges common during combat.
In this same section, a historical military record describes the units placing speakers within 80 yards of a Japanese light machine gun post (p. 143). A Japanese prisoner was given a microphone and encouraged his peers to surrender, including through nostalgic references and assurances that they would not be fired on. These insights are valuable for current practitioners. They demonstrate the use of influence techniques such as scarcity and social proof, incorporate emotional appeals through shared nostalgic memories, and strategically select both the messenger—a fellow Japanese soldier—and the proximity of the broadcast location. This case serves as a strong example of persuasive communication in a fluid, high-stakes environment. While few such examples exist today, the underlying approach remains effective in online settings as well. Unfortunately, this work does not explicitly provide any of this kind of analysis, and only rare references to this perspective appear in Trutwein’s actual diary content.
In the final section of the book, Trutwein provides thorough diary entries related to an operation along a river in Burma that he largely commanded, establishing pop-up markets in more remote but significant regions to sell locals rare goods (p. 149). While this operation was not focused on communication or narrative design, he highlighted how effective providing these services to locals was in generating support for the Allies and in gathering information. This example is important to highlight. Psychological operations should involve more than leaflets and narrative content. In this case, the dynamic approach demonstrates that building goodwill in remote communities can result in increased information collection and actionable intelligence, and may prompt more positive responses from locals when Allied soldiers needed assistance. This is also arguably the most detailed chapter in the work, as Trutwein played a major role in planning and managing the operation.
There are limited works on psychological warfare and influence operations in World War II in South and Southeast Asia, in contrast to better-known British and American military intelligence and deception operations in the European theater. This work contributes to that limited collection, despite offering limited insight into the design and creation of narratives used in broadcasts and leaflets. Few people will have access to the military records Duckett included, and there is limited broader commentary on the actions of these psychological warfare units. The work certainly provides a fuller historical account. However, it would have been improved with Trutwein’s commentary on how he responded or adapted to the challenges he faced, but it appears much of his diary focused on personal experiences and sketches of moments during combat and throughout the war. Trutwein also may have kept details limited out of concern that his diary might fall into Japanese hands during the conflict.
Today’s psychological warfare and influence operations practitioners could have benefited from more detailed accounts in Trutwein’s diary of how these units designed their narratives and content, rather than the shorthand battle notes that dominate the book. At times these accounts appeared stream-of-consciousness, and the sequence of deploying leaflets seemed to be simply noted rather than explained in terms of behavioral effects on Japanese target audiences. That said, I would recommend this work. There is still value in understanding these historical psychological warfare campaigns—campaigns we are generally less familiar with—and the administrative and personality challenges Trutwein faced in attempting to develop and manage these influence efforts.
