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Book Review

The Struggles for Taiwan: A History of America, China, and the Island Caught Between by Sulmaan Wasif Khan Reviewed by: Rabia Anwar

ISBN: 978-1-54160-251-9, Basic Books, May 2024, 336 pages, $32.00 (Hardcover)

Reviewed by: Rabia Anwar, Lahore College for Women University, Lahore, Pakistan

Sulmaan Wasif Khan’s The Struggles for Taiwan is an exhaustive work covering eight decades of triangular relations among the United States, the People’s Republic of China, and Taiwan. Khan describes the Taiwan issue as not merely a political matter but a much deeper struggle involving history and humanity. He asserts that the current situation between China and Taiwan is the product of deliberate human decisions, strategic drift, recurring miscalculations, and continued reliance on luck—not deterrence alone. Khan rejects deterministic approaches to international relations, emphasizing the importance of historical contingency and human agency as they relate to Taiwan. Using a multiperspective historical approach, he draws on primary and secondary sources from the United States, China, and Taiwan to study the viewpoints of figures such as Roosevelt and Mao.

The book focuses on core issues marked by “mendacity, amnesia, and half-truths,” contending that decision-makers cannot effectively address contemporary problems unless they understand past traumas. Khan argues that all three parties involved—China, Taiwan, and the United States—manipulate history for their own ends. Beijing maintains that Taiwan has always been part of China, while the United States, in advancing the cause of democracy, overlooks its past connection with Taiwan’s former dictatorship. Khan further rejects the notion of historical inevitability by presenting other possible historical paths, such as a UN trusteeship in the 1940s or a more comprehensive rapprochement in the 1970s.

In this comprehensive analysis of the events that led to the Taiwan crisis, the journey begins with the Cairo Conference of 1943, when the Americans and British casually gave away the island—a former territory of the Qing dynasty then under Japanese colonial rule—to the Republic of China (ROC), led by Chiang Kai-shek, while ignoring the will of the people living there. This imperialistic distribution was the first step toward creating layers of deep-seated trauma, a process that began with the transition in 1945. Although native-born Taiwanese (benshengren) initially welcomed the arrival of ROC forces, their trust deteriorated rapidly because of the new government’s corruption, incompetence, and abuse, ultimately resulting in the “White Terror” that followed the 1947 massacre. This was a period of absolute totalitarianism, during which many Taiwanese people were jailed or killed on Green Island. It established a tradition of oppression and torture that haunted the population and led to the independence movement, which was initially aimed at ending “colonization” by the Kuomintang. For the Taiwanese people, it was more than a question of territory; it was about their identity.

In the 1950s and 1960s, a triangular relationship emerged that was characterized by brinkmanship and strategic meandering. Initially, U.S. President Harry Truman attempted to let “events take their course,” but he then became “alarmed at Korea and felt compelled to stabilize the Taiwan Straits.” Under President Dwight Eisenhower, the United States was pushed “inch by inch relentlessly” to defend small islands such as Kinmen and Matsu, twice bringing the world to the brink of nuclear conflict. During these crises, Mao Zedong capitalized on the tension to unite his people behind revolutionary policies such as the Great Leap Forward, while the Americans legitimized the perilous notion that nuclear weapons could be employed to secure their interests. This period reinforced the “Taiwan issue” as an equally perilous combination of great-power rivalry, “injured pride,” and impulsive “toughness.”

Nixon and Kissinger’s rapprochement in the 1970s resulted in a temporary “bonhomie” by “fudging” the issue of Taiwan through the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. The United States acknowledged that all Chinese on either side of the strait maintained that there was only “one China,” but it did not officially recognize Beijing’s sovereignty over Taiwan, leaving the issue for the future. This diplomatic shift occurred as Taiwan, shaped partly by waves of immigrants from mainland China (waishengren), began creating a new democratic order on the island. During the Lee Teng-hui era, Taiwan emerged as a democracy that leveraged the legacy of the 228 Incident to develop its own sense of nation-statehood based on liberty. Under such a democratic system, the PRC’s “one country, two systems” policy, which Khan attributes to Deng Xiaoping’s time in Tibet, became increasingly unacceptable to a people who would not be used as pawns.

At present, firm lines have been drawn on all fronts because of the conflicting policies of the governments involved. China considers Taiwan an integral part of its territory. The dismantling of Hong Kong’s autonomy under President Xi Jinping has reinforced the Taiwanese people’s concerns about eventual unification. China also uses military actions and propaganda as leverage to coerce Taiwan. Conversely, the United States is attempting to uphold its global power, and Taiwan serves as an instrument through which it can assert itself against China. This has culminated in what is referred to as the “new normal,” in which U.S. Representative Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit led to fierce retaliation from China and brought the opposing sides closer to confrontation. Taiwan’s current priority is not to pursue any fanciful notion of reclaiming the mainland but to survive by balancing freedom and dependency.

With ships and aircraft from both sides maneuvering in such close proximity, Khan argues that we exist in chaos and that any accidental collision, either in the air or at sea, could start an unintentional war. The future remains uncertain, with possibilities including a friendly “divorce,” commonwealth statehood, a successful “silent coup,” or “nuclear holocaust.” Khan argues that, in the event of a Sino-American war, “Taiwan will be a pile of ash and rock” and that deterrence will be incapable of averting such a disaster.

In the end, Khan emphasizes the need for dialogue that moves beyond pointless symbolism and strutting. To stop the “headlong rush to war,” the militaries of the great powers must resume communicating with one another. Previously, both countries sought friendship; now, each considers the other its greatest enemy. Khan cautions against the use of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, which he calls “misguided and dangerous,” and exhorts the United States’ political leadership to initiate a debate about “the staggeringly high price”—namely, “unprecedented sanctions” and economic hardship—that Americans would have to pay. Since this crisis was created by humans, the only way out is through informed decisions aimed at guaranteeing the survival of the Taiwanese people.

The book identifies several significant gaps in our understanding of the Taiwan issue. One problem is the limited availability of official documents, including insufficient official information from the United States concerning the Cairo Conference. Communication regarding Chiang Kai-shek’s ambitions to colonize Korea is also unclear, while the KMT regime successfully concealed the costs of the White Terror, thereby obscuring the true human toll of the issue. Currently, neither the United States nor China has clear military objectives, and the domestic costs of confrontation remain unclear. The post-1945 transition of Japanese residents back to Japan is another understudied topic. This book will appeal to audiences ranging from academic researchers to global readers seeking to explore Taiwan’s historical background and the complex triangular relationship among the United States, China, and Taiwan.

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