

Inter Populum

Journal of Irregular Warfare and Special Operations



Jedburgh Teams

Lessons for
Unconventional
Warfare

by J. Paul de B. Taillon

Secret War in Cuba: The Bay of Pigs
Invasion

by Robert Burrell

The Liberator's Dilemma: The Paradox
of American Leadership

by Joseph Long

"Merrill's Marauders:" SOF Strategic
Success in Burma

by Stephen Hill

Optimizing the Stalemate

by Leo Blanken, Jason Lepore, and Kai Thaxton

INTER POPULUM:

The Journal of Irregular Warfare and Special Operations

Inter Populum: The Journal of Irregular Warfare and Special Operations, published by Arizona State University, is an academically rigorous, peer reviewed publication focused on furthering studies, thought, and discussion on special operations and irregular warfare topics. It is published once a year in print (ISSN: 2836-5496), and twice a year online (ISSN: 2836-6034).

To request a printed copy or inquire about publication consideration, contact our team at interpopulum@asu.edu.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editors:

Christopher Marsh, U.S. National Defense University, christopher.marsh.civ@ndu.edu
James Kiras, U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, james.kiras@us.af.mil
Ryan Shaw, Arizona State University, Ryan.Shaw.1@asu.edu

Managing Editor:

Lisa Sheldon

Book Review Editor:

Mark Grzegorzewski, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, grzegorm@erau.edu

Editorial Board:

Leo Blanken, Naval Postgraduate School
Patricia Blocksome, Joint Special Operations University
Paul Brister, U.S. Naval War College
Carolyn Davidson, U.S. National Defense University
David Ellis, New College of Florida
Ken Gleiman, Arizona State University
Stephen Grenier, Johns Hopkins University
Nikolas Gvosdev, U.S. Naval War College
Will Irwin, Joint Special Operations University
Jaroslaw Jablonski, Joint Special Operations University
Martijn Kitzen, Netherlands Defence Academy
Nina Kollars, U.S. Naval War College
Jeffrey Kubiak, Arizona State University
David Maxwell, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Aleksandra Nesic, U.S. Department of State
David Oakley, University of South Florida
Ulrica Pettersson, Swedish Defence University
Linda Robinson, RAND Corporation
Richard Schultz, Fletcher School, Tufts University
Kalev Sepp, Naval Postgraduate School
Emily Stranger, Indiana University-Bloomington

Copyright © 2023 Arizona State University. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, transmitted, or disseminated in any form, by any means, without prior written permission from Arizona State University

INTER POPULUM:
The Journal of Irregular Warfare and Special Operations

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the authors and do not reflect the views, policy, or position of Arizona State University, United States Government, U.S. Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government entity.

Table of Contents

Articles

Jedburgh Teams – Lessons for Unconventional Warfare by J. Paul de B. Taillon	1
Secret War in Cuba: The Bay of Pigs Invasion, 1960-1961 by Robert S. Burrell	25
Optimizing the Stalemate: Limited Conflicts and the Use of Special Operations Forces in the Context of Global Competition by Leo J. Blanken, Jason J. Lepore, and Kai Thaxton.....	41
The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) “Merrill’s Marauders:” Special Operations Force Strategic Success Through an Operational Concept in Burma by Stephen Hill.....	61
The Liberator’s Dilemma: The Paradox of American Leadership by Joseph Long	83

Book Reviews

<i>The (In)visible Hand: Strategic Sabotage, Case Studies</i> Edited by Colonel (Ret.) Bernd Horn, James D. Kiras, and Emily Spencer Reviewed by John Longshore	97
<i>War of Shadows: Codebreakers, Spies, and the Secret Struggle to Drive the Nazis from the Middle East</i> by Gershom Gorenberg Reviewed by Stone Holden	101
<i>The Digital War: How China's Tech Power Shapes the Future of AI, Blockchain and Cyberspace</i> by Winston Ma Reviewed by James Raub.....	105
<i>The Insurgent’s Dilemma: A Struggle to Prevail</i> by David Ucko Reviewed by David P. Oakley	107
<i>Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence</i> by Amy B. Zegart Reviewed by Mark Grzegorzewski	109
<i>T-Minus AI: Humanity’s Countdown to Artificial Intelligence and the New Pursuit of Global Power</i> by Michael Kanaan Reviewed by Jake Keplar.....	111

Intentionally Blank

Jedburgh Teams - Lessons for Unconventional Warfare

J. Paul de B. Taillon, Samuel Associates, Ottawa, Canada

ABSTRACT

This article provides an overview of the concept, development, deployment, and validation of the multinational Jedburgh concept that was conceived by Major General Sir Colin Gubbins, head of the Special Operations Executive (SOE). This concept consisted of inserting three-man teams into France who were specifically recruited, trained, and designed to assist resistance forces in the conduct of unconventional warfare in the wake of D-Day 6 June 1944. These teams provided communications, coordinated aerial resupply, equipment, and helped, if needed, provide direction for the French resistance known as the Maquis. The success of these teams and their operations laid the foundation for the U.S. Army Special Forces, as well as provided important insights as to the criticality of incorporating language and culture within future similarly tasked military teams assisting and supporting irregular/unconventional operations.

KEYWORDS

Jedburgh,
Resistance Forces,
Maquis,
Major General Sir
Colin Gubbins,
Special Operations
Executive,
multinational special
forces teams,
irregular warfare,
language and culture,
unconventional
operations,
Jedburgh training
Office of Strategic
Services

In no previous war, and in no other theater during this war, have resistance forces been so closely harnessed to the main military effort.

- General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1945)

When Great Britain entered the war on 3 September 1939, and the United States later 7 December 1941, both militaries were designed for conventional conflict and focused essentially on attritional warfare. Interestingly, both countries had substantial experience in what was respectively described as imperial policing and small wars. For the professional soldier prior to World War II, the type of operations that would theoretically take place in the enemy's rear area, now formally recognized as unconventional warfare (UW),¹ was neither a focus of mainstream professional military thought nor a concept demanding any formal study.

CONTACT Paul de B. Taillon | Taillon@magma.ca

An earlier and shortened version of this article was published by *The Dorchester Review*, Autumn/Winter 2022, vol. 12, no. 2, 26-34.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or the Canadian government or military. © 2023 Arizona State University

Notwithstanding, these described “behind enemy lines” UW operations are presently captured under the umbrella of the term irregular warfare (IW), which embraces a spectrum of activities to include counterterrorism (CT), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN) and Stability Operations (SO). There were a number of proponents and practitioners who conducted UW during the world wars of the twentieth century.² The UW experience demonstrated the substantial advantages that these operations offered particularly in the forced dispersal of enemy troops, the requirement to secure and effectively protect the population centers, vital governmental, economic and military installations, as well as the lines of communication amongst others within the target country. For some military professionals, twentieth century UW campaigns highlighted the most effective force structure, as they are considered to be “relational-manoeuvring forces.” These effective guerrilla organizations were adept at ascertaining the enemy’s weaknesses or vulnerabilities and then adjusting their internal composition, enabling them to engage and attrit the enemy effectively.³

Britain’s Great War experience in the employment of the Arab revolt to assist conventional military operations during their Middle East campaign (1916-1918), under the auspices of Lieutenant Colonel T. E. Lawrence, whose guerrilla army of Arab tribesmen created havoc throughout Ottoman occupied territory in Arabia, was notable. As well, the Imperial German campaigns in East Africa (1914-1918), General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and his force of 14,000 Askaris held in check a military force of 300,000 consisting of Indian, British, Belgian, and Portuguese soldiers who were much-needed on other fronts set a standard never before realized in UW. Both officers epitomized the economy of effort in their respective application of guerrilla strategy. The UW concept was further explored and applied in World War II through a panoply of Allied Special Forces (SF) and special operations organizations developed to oversee UW in the form of raising and facilitating guerrilla organizations and to support and coordinate their operations.

This article focuses on the concept of supporting resistance groups, in this case the French Maquis, by multinational Jedburgh teams consisting of British, American, and French personnel who were to be deployed in the wake of D-Day on 6 June 1944 within the German rear echelon. The terms guerrilla, resistance, resistance fighters, paramilitary, and Maquis will be used interchangeably.

Background

By mid-March 1943, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and its joint staff commenced planning for the strategic inevitability of an invasion of the European continent. At this time both the United States and Russia were heavily involved in this global conflict and an invasion of occupied Europe was politically and militarily envisioned and being forcefully pressed. Understandably, the location of the invasion and the preparation for subsequent follow-on

operations were in the nascent planning stages as it would take time to formulate, coordinate, and execute the myriad of preparations necessary for an opposed landing in Europe.

Predicated upon ongoing intelligence and low-level guerrilla operations being conducted from 1941 by the British in Europe, there were strong indications—indeed optimism—that an Allied force would encounter a friendly population actively interested in supporting their liberators.

The Assessment Challenge

Planners realized that these emerging resistance organizations were already providing smatterings of intelligence, conducting sabotage and small order paramilitary activities in some German-occupied countries mainly under the auspices of the British clandestine services, particularly the Special Intelligence Service (SIS), also known as MI6 and the newly created Special Operations Executive (SOE). The question arose: If properly organized, equipped, and trained, could these resistance elements effectively assist Allied efforts in the post-invasion campaign?

As with any resistance movement, certain challenges would have to be recognized and addressed to ensure that the resistance could be assisted and equipped to undertake a spectrum of operational initiatives in support of the Allied forces during the liberation of the continent.

One of the initial questions to be addressed was what assistance would the French resistance, known as the Maquis, require to undertake effective guerrilla operations against their German occupiers? Another critical issue was how could the Allies employ the Maquis to the best advantage? Should these resistance organizations be restricted to undertaking sabotage operations, directing local populations away from danger areas, or should they be assigned to assist the civil authority or was there a more important and effective way to participate in the Allied plan? Another perplexing concern for the staff was: Could these resistance groups pose an additional planning and organizational dilemma in an already complex multidimensional military operation? If so, should they be directed to abstain from activities, thereby keeping them completely out of the fight?⁴ These questions and many others had to be surfaced and examined by the Allied senior staff, as well as the leadership and planners of the British SOE and the American counterparts of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

Gubbins the Visionary

Major General Colin Gubbins was a well-regarded British regular officer and avid student of UW. He was one to promulgate these “unconventional ideas” about the potential application of resistance forces where he soundly and persuasively argued for the exploration of the theory of creating military teams assigned specifically to liaise, assist, coordinate, and, if necessary, direct indigenous guerrilla forces.

Gubbins was specifically selected for the position as head of the SOE, predicated on his experience with UW in the form of terrorism and guerrilla activity in Ireland and Russia, as well as his intellectual curiosity and broad mindedness to ponder new ideas and concepts. He drew from the experiences of the Second Anglo-Boer war, combating highly mobile and effective Boer guerrillas, the exploits of Lieutenant Colonel T. E. Lawrence⁵ and the highly successful German guerrilla campaign in East Africa led by General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck.⁶

Gubbins noted the dearth of study of UW, or as it was described at that time IW, which had an impact upon the development of the SOE:

“To anyone who has studied the Russian Revolution or, nearer to home, the Sinn Fein insurrection, or the Palestine rising, or the Spanish Civil War, the crippling effect of subversive and para-military warfare on regular forces was obvious. Yet these campaigns, or nationalist risings, were not studied at any of the higher colleges of war; they were irregular and not really deemed worthy of serious attention. This was the root of SOE problems.”⁷

Through his wide-ranging and intensive study, he amassed many of the basic principles of UW that embraced the importance of sound and effective organization, the importance of situational awareness, the criticality of intelligence, the recognition of local operational requirements pertaining to language and culture,⁸ and the necessity of effective leadership. His intellectual independence departed from some of the students of IW/UW, as he sought a coherent strategic vision that would see the integration of resistance efforts to facilitate and support aims and objectives of a conventional military campaign.⁹ This integration and concentration of effort, as well as appreciating the economy of force of UW underlines important aspects represented in the principles of war, amongst others.¹⁰ Gubbins believed that all necessary means within his purview should be directed and massed for a concentrated effort in support of maximizing the opportunities for success for the Allied liberation.¹¹

To achieve this, the French resistance would have to be coordinated in sequence with the Allied ground campaign. The quandary for the conventional and special operations planners was how the Allies could employ such guerrilla forces to the best advantage during the post-invasion campaign.

Supporting the Maquis

The SOE had, since its creation on 22 July 1940 by the Minister of Economic Warfare Hugh Dalton and supported by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who famously said, “set Europe ablaze,” built up a network of Allied contacts and operators conducting intelligence

gathering and sabotage activities while managing a variety of low-level psychological operations within France and parts of occupied Europe.

The question was: Should the SOE network and operators continue with these tasks or should they embark upon the development of expanding links with the Maquis, who were operating mainly in the French countryside? Should the liberation of the continent begin, the expectation was that the resistance, if properly prepared and equipped, might successfully rise up. Their objectives would be to attack German communications and logistics hubs and interdict and attrit their ground units which would inevitably be hurried to the invasion site with the objective to thwart the amphibious landings on the water's edge, thereby nullifying the invasion and any possibility of subsequent follow-on operations. Understandably, the former strategy already in operation would have a high nuisance value in the practice of mining roads, bridges, and power stations but realistically such operational initiatives were seen as providing little tactical impact on the military outcome. Another conundrum for planners was the apprehension that large formations of untrained, ill-disciplined resistance fighters would be expected, indeed urged, to engage experienced German military units. Understanding that the resistance fighters would have the advantage of local knowledge and the likely succor of the resident population, another issue arose. It was the view that French resistance fighters without support and guidance would quickly be engaged and eradicated by the more tactically practiced German units that had the advantages in armored vehicles, artillery, mobile reserves, and air support. The conflict confronting Allied planners was essentially the choice of "pinpricks" in the form of sabotage, minor interdiction activities, psychological warfare upon the Germans, but also the potential of dislocating local French support due to the likelihood of indiscriminate massacres¹² that would likely occur as such punishment be a by-product of Maquis activity. The other option was harnessing the resistance as a coordinated support element to assist the Allied conventional forces in their ground campaign.

Gubbins and his staff recognized the advantages that would accrue should the Maquis orchestrate the destruction of German telephonic communications thereby forcing the Germans to revert to radios. This would enable their signals to be intercepted and jammed by the Allies. Meanwhile, the well-orchestrated destruction of German fuel and logistics stocks, as well as the delay, interdiction, and attrition of supply convoys and vitally needed reinforcements would have a material impact upon the battlefield, as well as inflicting serious psychological effect on the German soldiery. Such assignments were considered a priority for the Maquis.

There was, however, a subtle yet important complication that haunted this plan, predicated on the domestic frictions of French politics, especially between the resistance elements who supported General Charles de Gaulle's Free French¹³ or the Vichy regime of Marshal Philippe Petain¹⁴ and those who were inspired Communists. It was recognized that political obstacles would have to be handled gingerly by those assigned to work with these

respective resistance groups; appreciating the inevitable invasion of the continent and the importance of making sure that the Maquis would be capable of partaking effectively in such a mission set.

Gubbins penned a note to SOE's Security Section outlining in brief the concept and requesting a cryptonym:

A project is under consideration for the dropping behind of enemy lines, in co-operation with an Allied invasion of the Continent, of small parties of officers and men to raise and arm the civilian population to carry out guerrilla activities against the enemy's lines of communication. These men are to be recruited and trained by SOE. It is requested that 'Jumpers' or some other appropriate code name be allotted to this (sic) personnel.¹⁵

Soon after this request, the SOE's Security Section assigned the codename JEDBURGH to this SOE initiative.

The Jedburgh Concept is Put to the Test

As the Jedburgh concept paper was being disseminated and navigated through the British, the Commander in Chief Home Forces, General Sir Bernard Paget was orchestrating a comprehensive and demanding exercise codenamed Spartan. Taking place in the early spring of 1943, this exercise comprising some 250,000 men and 72,000 vehicles would not only test the capabilities of Allied ground forces but would also be the first field test on the efficacy of the embryonic Jedburgh concept.

This was an important conventional exercise as it was formulated to assess the ability of an Allied invasion force confronting experienced German defenders who were in well-prepared defensive positions. After four years of occupation, the German troops intimately knew the terrain and could expect the "possible reinforcement" by armored and mechanized panzer grenadier reinforcements from their reserves.

When General Headquarters Home Forces (GHQHF) command and staff requested that the SOE provide twelve Jedburgh teams for Spartan, it provided Gubbins, his staff, and official observers an ideal opportunity to fully evaluate the Jedburgh concept. It would further enable them to ascertain what missions would be appropriate for these teams, to magnify their tactical and operational level impact when inserted into the opposing force's (OPFOR) exposed echelon.

Adding to the complexity, at this time there were no Jedburgh teams in existence and no associated command, control, and communications elements available for deployment. To fulfil the headquarters prerequisite for this now critical confirmation exercise, a hastily organized staff was summoned, consisting of SOE staff officers supported by instructors and wireless operators, many of whom were assigned for exercise purposes as Jedburgh team operators. This rapid assembly group enabled the provision of a command

and liaison team for the 1st Canadian Army Headquarters (1CAHQ) as well as generating eleven 3-man operational teams assigned for the exercise under the codename of BOYKINS. Participating as resistance fighters were 400 soldiers from the Royal Welch Fusiliers who were keen to participate in their new role.

To assist in the deployment of the Jedburgh teams, SOE staff officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Wilkinson, were charged with drafting a spectrum of real and notional incidents and activities to be incorporated into Spartan. It must be acknowledged that the Jedburgh teams and supporting elements at this time had been “cobbled together” and some SOE staff elements had never had the advantage of operating within higher formation headquarters.

From a command and SOE point of view, this was a tremendous act of faith which provided the opportunity for the application of a new and untested concept within a major exercise. In a more peripheral way, it indicates how special operations visionaries, operators, and supporters are arguably, in many cases, strategic change agents.¹⁶

One of the key players in Spartan was the Canadian Army General Andrew McNaughton ¹⁷ who was willing to experiment and embrace new and untried tactical concepts.

The exercise comprised an advance to contact, as well as a scenario devoted to the conduct of mobile defense against an Allied army group which included a breakout phase. Of note, both the Allied and OPFOR forces were not permitted any aerial or ground reconnaissance beyond the forward edge of the battle area; hence both Allied and OPFOR commanders had to plan and conduct their respective operations with no detailed topographic, terrain information available other than what could be gleaned from the maps provided to them.

McNaughton was assigned the command of the Allied Second Army comprising of 1st and 2nd Canadian including 12 Corps, consisting of one armored brigade and six divisions. Also allocated to McNaughton were 11 Jedburgh teams. McNaughton, a former artillery officer with a strong scientific and engineering bent, was an advocate, and his openness to the Jedburgh concept aided in ensuring a fair test of this new and unproven concept. In tandem, GHQHF supported the employment of espionage and counterintelligence activities in the exercise, as well as the incorporation of a guerrilla force that would have to be addressed by the OPFOR commander and his subordinates. Throughout the exercise, Gubbins’ staff officer Lieutenant Colonel Peter Wilkinson, kept 1CAHQ commander McNaughton and his staff fully briefed as to Jedburgh exploits and their aid to the resistance.

For the purpose of the Spartan exercise, the teams were assumed to have been inserted prior to and in the wake of the invasion. Throughout the course of the field test, the assigned Jedburgh teams monitored road activity, reporting the volume and nature of traffic

and, when opportune, conducted interdiction missions. The teams were also tasked with demolishing bridges and installations, planning and coordinating attacks upon demolition guards, conducting direct action missions against headquarters and communication centres, as well as the interdiction and destruction of supply convoys. The targeting of OPFOR personnel assigned to traffic control was also within their exercise remit.

One of the objectives was to establish the survivability of the Jedburgh teams and their designated resistance fighters who would be operating with little support behind enemy lines. It was assumed that the resistance would continually be challenged by an aggressive, robust, and effective German signals and intelligence¹⁸ capability specifically focused on locating and severing Jedburgh communications.

Throughout the duration of exercise Spartan, the resistance elements and Jedburgh personnel were continually gauged on their tactical value in interdicting the OPFOR while, concomitantly ascertaining how these teams could best be employed to maximum tactical effectiveness. The exercise and SOE command element needed to ascertain timing i.e., when best to deploy the teams to utmost effect upon the lines of communication and, importantly, ascertain the Jedburgh operators' longevity against an occupation force that embodied a highly effective intelligence, counterintelligence, and radio interception capability combined with an aggressive battle-hardened enemy in pursuit.

During exercise Spartan, McNaughton and his Chief of Staff Guy Simmonds, a favorite of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, fully appreciated the potential of the Jedburgh concept.¹⁹ The teams were assessed as having successfully attacked, disrupted, and destroyed a number of headquarters, having demolished numerous supply dumps, compounded with the destruction of several important bridges and the obliteration of numerous enemy vehicles and other important OPFOR installations. As Colin Gubbins biographer put it: "The concept was validated at the Spartan wargames of March 1943, which convinced the British Army that SOE could, with limited expenditure, stimulate resistance and provide reliable support to an advancing conventional force."²⁰ For Gubbins, Wilkinson and his staff, the Jedburgh concept was a proven success.

Lessons of Spartan

The post-operational report brought to the surface several important observations and conclusions²¹ that were extracted from the deployment of the Jedburgh teams.

Firstly, it became quite clear that these teams should be assigned a specific area of operations, as well as the precise tasks that would assist the Allied ground force operations. Moreover, these teams would have to be inserted near the respective operational area. Furthermore, timing was recognized as a significant factor, as the time span between the Army commander designating and assigning Jedburgh missions had to account for the respective initiation, planning, and execution phases of a task which required a 72-hour mission cycle. This was predicated upon the time requirements of preparing the personnel to

be inserted, contact, and liaison with the local Maquis organization, set up communications and request supply drops of weapons, ammunition, and other stores, if necessary. This cycle would include the conduct of ground/target reconnaissance that would enable the planning, briefing of resistance members, rehearsals, and finally mission execution.

From the staff point of view, it was recognized that the immediate rear area of the German lines would be well monitored and patrolled by the occupation forces, hence the Jedburghs and the Maquis should operate deeper in the exposed flanks and rear echelon where there would be a smaller German presence. Another lesson drawn from Spartan was that commando and airborne forces could be employed to execute a *coup de main* mission, if deemed necessary. It was the command perception that their fitness, training, discipline, and tactical prowess to work effectively under operational duress could augment and/or address missions of complexity beyond the capability of the Jedburgh teams and their associated resistance forces. Finally, the invasion planners argued for the preparation of a contingency plan for the evacuation of the Jedburghs should the Allied post-invasion campaign encounter serious difficulty or, in the worst-case scenario, face defeat. Thankfully such a plan was never required; nevertheless, it was prudent of the planners to be prepared for such a contingency and note it in the lessons learned.²²

Team Selection and Training

The lessons drawn from Spartan formed the basis of a secret document that was promulgated on 6 April 1943 by the head of SOE's Planning Section, Colonel M. W. Rowlandson. This document became the Jedburgh basic directive that was issued on 20 December 1943, formalizing the intention of producing 300 Jedburgh teams by 1 April 1944.²³ This number of teams was never realized, arguably due to time and dearth of qualified personnel with the requisite language and cultural skills, notwithstanding an intensive program of selection and operational training that commenced with the subsequent "marrying up" of 3-man Jedburgh teams drawn initially from within the SOE and OSS, and other select volunteers.

The primary selection understandably sought military personnel with recent combat experience who knew how to handle small arms²⁴ and were proficient in instructing others in weapons, basic demolitions, and tactics. In tandem, an important practicable requirement was that radio operators had to be exceptionally proficient in their signals trade. The Jedburgh teams had an additional imperative to incorporate one French-speaking teammate, ensuring that at least one Jedburgh member could communicate in French to liaison, instruct, coordinate, train and, if necessary, direct Maquis members. Hence the ability to communicate effectively in the French language and for a lesser extent cultural understanding, was seen as mission critical. This requirement and others were clearly specified in the OSS Special Services Field Manual which states that:

SO agents and operatives are selected for their intelligence, courage, and natural resourcefulness in dealing with resistance groups. In addition (sic)

they must have stamina to be able to live and move about undetected in their area of operations. Normally, they should be fluent in the local language and be a native of a nationality acceptable to the authorities and people of the area.²⁵

Before the first teams were to be formed in mid-March 1944, the SOE/OSS were confronted with a serious challenge as there was a shortage of French-speaking personnel to be incorporated in the Jedburgh teams. Fortunately, this gap was remedied due to the reinforcement from North Africa and the Middle East of 73 Free French officers. This timely and operationally critical addition added significantly in French language capability and cultural awareness, and improved the Jedburgh credibility once they deployed, as the Maquis would be now working hand-in-hand with their fellow countrymen.

One interesting peculiarity that was contrary to the disciplined mindset, so typical of conventional military organizations of the era, was the evaluation of personnel who would, as required, question authority and have no compunction in speaking up when necessary. It was assessed that this personality quirk or characteristic was a quality that would foster activities in line with the Jedburgh mission.²⁶

Those interested in volunteering for the Jedburgh assignment commenced their journey with an extended and intensive interview with three psychiatrists focused on ascertaining the personality type and mental fitness for this specific UW mission. This was followed by preliminary training in Scotland consisting of physical hardening, demolitions, weapons, and tactics and by technical courses in Gloucestershire, Leicestershire, and Woking. This preparation continued until 3 February 1944 when Milton Hall became the main Jedburgh training facility. Radio operators continued their intensive wireless training and instruction, as well as a parachute course, and for those qualified, a para refresher that was run at Altrincham, Manchester. In the wake of the training, the graduates were given an arduous five-day field test exercise in Sussex under simulated combat situations.²⁷

The final selection of Jedburgh personnel initially was made by Lieutenant Colonel Spooner, a British Army officer and first commandant of the Jedburgh training school. It is notable that attention was also paid to the opinions and preferences of the Jedburghs as to the selection of fellow teammates. It was assumed that enabling the operators to choose their teammates would facilitate and enhance harmony amongst and within the teams.²⁸

The preparation for the Jedburgh missions continued unabated focusing upon “guerrilla warfare tactics and skills: demolitions, use of enemy weapons, map reading, night navigation, agent circuit operations, intelligence, sabotage, escape and evasion, counterespionage, ambushes, security, the use of couriers, and hand-to-hand combat”²⁹ in anticipation of their demanding assignment. A valuable insight comes from a base document entitled the “Jedburgh Tasks and Training Priorities” which bluntly identifies the training priorities of the Jedburghs and likely mission set.

Training Priority A

1. Rail cutting
2. Attacks on enemy road vehicles and transport parks.
3. Misdirection and dislocation of road traffic.
4. Delay and dislocation of panzer divisions.

Training Priority B

1. Destruction of telecommunications.
2. Liquidation of enemy commands and staffs.
3. Interference with enemy's logistics.
4. Attacks on Luftwaffe.

Training Priority C

1. Destruction of electric power facilities used for military purposes.
2. Demolition of minor bridges, or major bridges already prepared for demolition by the enemy.
3. Prevention demolitions by the enemy.
4. Observation reporting of enemy positions, headquarters, military supply dumps, and installations.

Training Priority D

1. Attacks on railway facilities such as roundhouses and turntables.
2. Attacks on railway engines and rolling stock, without causing long-term damage.³⁰

This training list clearly illustrates the expectations in the mission set for the Jedburgh teams' assignment.

Clandestine Services – Mission Coordination Issue

In the run-up to the invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944, British intelligence and military leaders were confronted with a serious dilemma. The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and the SOE were challenged with how to work together effectively and concomitantly assist the upcoming invasion in France given their seemingly overlapping responsibilities and competing missions. The Jedburgh concept and mission were seen to be problematic by various MI6 bureaucrats and their operators, as well as within SOE itself, as their respective personnel were already engaged in operations in the field. To clarify and address these concerns, Gubbins promulgated the idea that satisfied the Allied objective of harnessing the French resistance while responding to the objections of those clandestine services already operating on the continent. Gubbins' compromise ensured there was no confusion with ongoing MI6 and SOE missions already in place.

While MI6 focused on deriving intelligence from occupied Europe, the SOE had created a number of networks in the urban areas of France enabling them to provide logistical support to local resistance and undertake clandestine operations such as military, transport and industrial sabotage missions designed to annoy, frustrate and vex the German occupiers. An exploration of this mission set did not, however, embrace or reflect the type of mission undertaken by the Jedburgh missions during Spartan which demonstrated that this new concept was seen as an exceptional 'economy of force' operation while considered to be potentially valuable force multipliers.

To differentiate these missions from ongoing MI6/SOE clandestine operations, the personnel assigned were to be in military uniforms. These teams by necessity evolved to be a unique multinational force with an American, British (Commonwealth) or French member, with a trained wireless operator.

Gubbins soundly argued the components of this concept to obtain an appropriate undertaking for the Jedburghs – to seek out and liaise and support the Maquis who were conducting operations throughout the French countryside. The Jedburgh teams would be positioned to conduct liaison, undertake as necessary the supply and training of the French Maquis and the setup communications to Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) and facilitate, coordinate and, if necessary, direct Maquis operations. In short, to lay the groundwork for the day when the French resistance would surface and conduct a spectrum of military activities such as interdicting and severing lines of communication, delaying and destroying reinforcements and hamstringing German logistical support. Such activities, if well-orchestrated and aggressively pursued, would necessitate the German forces to disperse much-needed military personnel destined to reinforce the front, instead they would be assigned to rear area security.

Another more subtle yet effective aspect of conducting UW in the depth of the German rear, was the ability to impart a degree of fear, paranoia, and psychological

dislocation amongst the German rank-and-file, promulgating the notion that no one was safe even in rear. This facet of psychological warfare has an important feature in the conduct of UW.

Change of Role

The Jedburgh concept was a dramatic shift for the SOE in tasking, tactics, organization, personnel, and operational design. This UW concept demanded the adoption of a much more overt (uniformed) and fulsome support role to an indigenous resistance movement than had been previously envisioned since its inception in 1940.³¹

Consistent with this, the teams were inserted well behind enemy lines, sometimes up to 40 miles, and with little combat power due to the small numbers within each team. Teams were provided with a variety of small arms for protection and demolitions to be distributed to facilitate the disruption of enemy lines of communication, which required little training on the part of the French Maquis.

The Jedburghs were able to maximize their tactical effectiveness through their ability to communicate with SFHQ to prompt weapon and supply drops to arm and sustain their Maquis comrades. This facility brought the realization and recognition that the Jedburgh teams were true force multipliers in the unconventional sense. Predicated upon their innate capabilities and the insignificant numbers of Jedburgh personnel, their operations were proven to be low cost in terms of the human resources invested and the supply of arms and ammunition provided, in comparison to the activities generated by the Maquis which was considered to be highly effective.

Thirteen Jedburgh teams were para-inserted behind German lines post-invasion in June 1944, ten of them in Brittany, which General Eisenhower declared was a priority area for Allied operations, hence a priority for Jedburgh teams to support the resident Maquis. Another 70 teams were inserted between July and September, with the majority to the areas of the northeast and northwest of the Massif Central. This is the mountainous region of central France from where resistance units of the now named Free French Forces of the Interior (FFI) effectively harassed withdrawing German troops who were falling back from the Allied forces who invaded southern France towards the French-German border. There were 286 Jedburgh operators consisting of 90 British (Commonwealth), 103 French, 83 Americans, 5 Belgian, and 5 Dutch who were infiltrated into France and then into Belgium and Holland between June and October 1944.³²

The Jedburgh Teams are Brought into Play – OPERATION FRANCIS

Commencing the night of 5 June and 6 June 1944, Jedburgh teams began their respective deployments throughout occupied France, up to the German withdrawal in September 1944. To garner an insight as to the typical challenges that a Jedburgh team had to overcome during the post D-Day time period, this article shall highlight the activities of one Jedburgh team:

Operation Francis was inserted on the night of 9 July and 10 July 1944 with the designated area of operations being the Finistere region of Brittany, France.

The team was commanded by 33-year-old Major Colin Ogden-Smith,³³ who had previously served in the SOE's Small Scale Raiding Force (SSRF). Married with a small child, prior to the War he had managed his family's business and subsequently joined the British Army, gaining combat experience during his service with 7 Commando. By the spring of 1943, the SSRF was stood down and he was assigned to the SOE in North Africa; by October that same year he had been repatriated to England. Although Ogden-Smith was not a fluent French speaker, he was nevertheless talent spotted and recruited for the teams due to his substantial military experience, understanding that he would have a French speaking teammate. His team consisted of Sergeant Arthur Dallow, the British radio operator, and a third member, French Lieutenant Guy Le Borgne, known by his nom de guerre, Guy Le Zachmeur. In the wake of their selection and training, the 3-man Jedburgh team assigned to Operation Francis was para-inserted at 0210 hours on 10 July 1944. Although the drop zones were usually well marked, these initial insertions were always of concern. Some members of the team landed in the woods while Ogden-Smith became separated from his teammates. A reception committee from the local Maquis rendezvoused with the Jedburghs but unfortunately Ogden-Smith could not be located and was separated for four days. He cunningly went to ground, managing to evade numerous German patrols that seeded the area. Fortunately, he was discovered by the Maquis and reunited with his teammates. A focal point for their area of operations was the town of Brest where many of the German troops (Russian mercenaries) were garrisoned. Undertaking a survey of the resistance groups in his area Ogden-Smith quickly ascertained that the local resistance was ill-equipped to undertake guerrilla operations against the local occupation forces as they had few small arms and equipment. He signalled back to SFHQ requesting an urgent weapons and supply drop.

Although the communications between SFHQ and London were described as "patchy," enough detailed information enabled a three-airplane resupply mission to drop a large quantity of small arms and munitions on the night of 15 July. As the weapons canisters were being collected, a contingent of 300 Russian mercenaries under German command arrived and launched a concerted attack upon the local Maquis. Although the resistance fighters were able to retrieve the weapon canisters under fire and quickly evade their pursuers, 24 resistance fighters and an estimated 50 Russians lost their lives in the short but intense contact.³⁴ This surprise encounter was highly suspicious, and likely this resupply mission had been compromised. The Germans had an effective German counterintelligence network and their operations leveraged spies and informants throughout the region, including some that may have had connections to the local resistance and their local activities.

In concert with their primary tasking, Ogden-Smith's team carefully navigated their way through the locale, distributing weapons while conducting a needs analysis for further resupply of the local Maquis. During this period, his team had a number of encounters with

local German units and a deadly game of hide and seek became a potentially deadly feature of their presence. This situation became acute in the wake of 26 July when German forces continued to aggressively seek out the Jedburghs and the accompanying Maquis elements operating within the German rear area. Fortunately, Ogden-Smith, his teammates and the Maquis remained successful in evading their German pursuers, all the while patiently waiting direction from London.

Allied orders arrived on 3 August, when Ogden-Smith's 3-man team was fortunately joined by a detached French Special Air Service member Sergeant Maurice Miodon, along with three French resistance fighters who took shelter in a farm situated in the small village of Querrien in Finistere.

Similar to the suspected compromise of Ogden-Smith's initial resupply drop, the team and their accompanying personnel were believed to be betrayed to the Germans who rapidly responded with a company size reaction force and immediately surrounded the farm where they were hiding. During the ensuing firefight, Ogden-Smith took a serious wound to the stomach while his comrade Miodon was wounded by grenade shrapnel, shattering both his arm and leg. Although in pain and seriously wounded, Miodon bravely provided enough suppressive fire to cover the withdrawal of the remaining team members and dispatched a number of German attackers before he ran out of ammunition. Miodon subsequently surrendered to the Germans and was summarily executed. Meanwhile, Ogden-Smith self-administered a strong dose of morphine, and being mortally wounded, succumbed to his wounds.

In reprisal, the Germans killed the farmer and burned the farm after ransacking the buildings and bodies. The bodies were left on display, then buried where they fell. Due to the heroism of Miodon, the others were able to escape.

In the wake of this attack on the Jedburghs, the Maquis were well supplied with arms and ammunition and commenced operations on 3 August. Predicated upon the efforts and activities of Ogden-Smith and his teammates in Operation Francis, a well-armed and substantial force of 700 Maquis fighters could now be put in the field to undertake their assigned operations. The task of this resistance group was to harass and interdict the German forces in retreat from Lorient. The Maquis besieged and subsequently liberated the town of Quimper on 8 August while conducting operations until 25 August when their assigned area was deemed secure, but not before the destruction of a number of German convoys, equipment, and installations. The support and sacrifice provided by the Jedburgh team assigned to Operation Francis enabled the resistance in their area of responsibility to successfully undertake operations, facilitating the Allied post-invasion ground campaign. It became quite clear to the proponents of this UW concept as well as their conventional counterparts that the ability to liaise, supply, mobilize and assist French resistance fighters enabled them to conduct a spectrum of successful rear area operations against the German occupation forces and their lines of communication.

Of the more than 90 teams deployed to France, the Jedburgh concept was proven to be an operational success.

Gubbins, in a lecture, postulated that the Jedburgh success was predicated on the fact that:

“Our plans, worked out in the greatest detail with his (Eisenhower) staff, involved over a 1, 000 attacks on the German lines of communication through-out Belgium and France in the first week. These were to start on the night of 5/6 June before even a single Allied soldier had landed. For our part, this meant expanding our field force to meet this plan, parachuting the necessary arms and explosives, and allotting individual targets to the various networks we had established. We also had to present the plan to our field force in such a way that capture of any part of it by the enemy would not give away the vital sector where the initial bridge-head was to be secured. Of the thousand or more targets aimed at more than nine hundred were destroyed. These were mainly rail, bridge, viaducts, and tele-communication centres, which put the whole enemy system in chaos.”³⁵

Direct Communications

A critical aspect that impinged upon the potentially broader success of the Jedburgh missions was the scarcity of communications between the Jedburgh teams in the field and the conventional ground forces they were to support. It was the opinion of planners at that time, that a direct command, control, and communications relationship could result in the misuse of the Jedburghs. The requirement was for the field army commanders' requests to be directed to London and from London to the fielded Jedburgh teams and the reverse for any response communication. This resulted in lost time and lost tactical opportunities.

Appreciation of Innovation

Throughout the Jedburgh concept, many of the key commanders, concept supporters, and special operations personnel were intellectually open and courageous enough to explore new venues in the application of UW. The ability to challenge traditional military thinking and the doctrinal approach of the time underlined the importance of independent thought, critical thinking, and the exploration of new ideas, methodology, and technological innovation and application. Gubbins acknowledged:

To the initial lack of imagination in government circles generally as to the potential of this 'fourth arm', if I may call it so, and to the hostility both veiled and open which not surprisingly followed the creation of SOE, when at best it was not taken seriously and at worst it was snubbed.³⁶

Psychological Operations

One of the more subtle aspects regarding the effectiveness of Jedburgh teams was that it is a form of psychological warfare and inhibited the degree that the Germans had the ability to operate freely throughout what was deemed to be the security behind the front lines. The German vulnerability throughout the rear area created a sense of psychological displacement, fear, and to some extent, paranoia with the accompanying erosion of morale within the occupying forces. This was combined with the production and distribution of French leaflets,³⁷ exploiting the underlying hatred by the average Frenchman against their Germanic occupiers. This psychological effect in concert with Maquis operating throughout the French countryside highlighted in the study entitled “The Jedburghs,” which noted:

In a telephone conversation with a general on Hitler’s staff, just five days after the Normandy landings, the German commander-in-chief in the West explain how the morale of his troops was suffering as the FFI (Free French Forces of the Interior), ‘feeling the end approaching, growing steadily bolder.’³⁸

Mission Focus

The success of Jedburgh operations in France in the wake of the Normandy invasion was appreciated by the American General Dwight Eisenhower who, prior to the invasion, clearly established that these 3-man units were to concentrate upon designated operational areas in France. This concentration of effort enabled the teams to successfully undertake the mission set assigned. The success provided by the Jedburghs had unforeseen consequences when the Allied concentration of effort was redirected towards Germany in 1944. The SOE/OSS had little ability in providing a comparable level of support nor the quality of intelligence and UW assistance for Allied operations as there was a shortage of German resistance prior to and when the Allies pushed into the heart of the German Reich.³⁹

Importance of Counterintelligence

The experiences of Operation Francis and similar missions for this period demonstrated that the potential for “security compromise” was a constant in France and elsewhere. German military intelligence/counterintelligence capabilities were effective and, combined with rear area security and German field police operations, posed a persistent threat to Allied intelligence and special operators throughout the war. The potential and ever-present compromise of drop zones, safe houses, secure caches, contacts, clandestine agents and operators reinforced the importance of maintaining secure communications, formalized cell structures, secure vetting of all personnel, strict operational security and the operational requirement of “need to know.” SOE/OSS agents and resistance elements faced challenges and risks from double agents, compromised or faulty communications, and even rival political actions. For the Jedburghs in France, this included pro-de Gaulle, pro-Vichy or Communist elements amongst others which at times became political competitors. In certain

cases, these factions were not above entering or sabotaging each other in the hope of garnering future political advantage. The situation underlines the importance of sound and robust intelligence and counterintelligence capability to foil potential infiltration and compromise.

The Advantage of Time

Although the achievements of the teams were substantial, the Jedburgh operations in France and elsewhere could have been capable of achieving more had they been inserted some weeks earlier. This would have provided abundant time for the Jedburghs to liaise, assess, assist, coordinate, and plan assigned missions. Moreover, it would have furnished opportunities to nurture important personal relationships, enhance situational awareness as it relates to the Maquis unit and their members, as well as identify notable personalities, key players, garner insights as to local politics and assess targets in the designated operational area.

As one author argued:

Their (Jedburgh) achievements were substantial ... but it was generally agreed in post- operational reviews that they could have achieved far more if they had been dropped in some weeks earlier. The delay was due to doubts about the survival capacity of small groups in uniform if dropped in some weeks before the anticipated date of enemy withdrawal from France.⁴⁰

Personnel Selection

The Jedburgh operations in France should be viewed in strategic terms as a capital investment. A total of 278 operators were infiltrated into France and assisted in training, supplying, and advising—some have estimated 100,000—French resistance fighters against German occupation forces.⁴¹

The Jedburgh operators were physically fit and highly trained for their missions. They underwent rigorous physical and psychological testing prior to their selection and deployment. Careful attention was paid to ensure that recruits incorporated mental resilience and motivation to undertake the assigned mission. Jedburgh personnel acknowledged that they had volunteered for a very dangerous assignment and that their success and personal valour would be kept classified. They were well advised that should they be captured the likely outcome was their death.

Importance of Support

Drawing from the Jedburgh success as well as other corresponding UW campaigns, no resistance organization can be sustainable and successful against an effective military without outside assistance. This embraces the spectrum of advisors, financial support, food, intelligence, training, provision of secure areas, weapons, and equipment amongst other

operating necessities. There is also the historic realization that the conduct of UW may bring about massive retaliation against the civilian population, and this was a concern and reality that Gubbins acknowledged.

Importance of Language and Culture

The SOE and OSS Jedburgh experiences emphasize the importance of personnel having a substantial understanding of the language and culture of their area of operations. The SOE/OSS had the advantage of talent spotting many regional and technical experts, as well as recruiting a broad range of individuals having skills, capabilities, backgrounds, and experiences that were seen to be potentially employable in UW operations. Through family, social institutions, universities, and networks, the SOE and OSS recruited far and wide for their managers, experts, and operators.

What is striking about the Jedburgh concept was the cost-benefit analysis which came from the creation of small multinational teams each with a specific mission set. A particularly vital addition to the Jedburgh team was the valuable incorporation of an officer native to the area of operations. Although this had not been originally planned, there was a realization that teams composed mainly of British or Americans could be made more effective with a native language speaker. It was the staff assessment that a native speaking officer would greatly assist in the establishment of good working relationships with the respective resistance groups in France and elsewhere.

Talent Spotting Expertise

In the future, it may behoove special operations communities to expand their ability to reach out to rapidly acquire new expertise or exploit existing skillsets and experience that reside in individuals retired from the active/reserve force or through civilian/government/academic networks. The importance today of cyber operations, financial tracking, social anthropology, regional expertise, amongst others, may necessitate approaching experts in these fields above and beyond those within public service or governmental or contracting agencies. It would be prudent to ascertain their interest in assisting government/military/intelligence organizations through the provision of advisory services, informational, or expertise reach back as required. Although this initiative would require a thorough vetting of selected personnel, it would provide a depth of skillsets and knowledge that could be vital in the nation's defense. It must be remembered that neither special operations nor expertise can be mass-produced nor competently created after an emergency occurs. Moreover, it may be required to recruit people older than 39 and be gender blind to achieve what is deemed to be an operational/information requirement.

As many Western nations open their doors to immigration, the multicultural/multinational make-up provides an ideal recruitment opportunity. The Lodge-Philbin Act passed on 30 June 1950, allowed the recruitment of foreign nationals into the U.S. military. This enabled 2,500 non-resident aliens, subsequently increased to allow

12,500, to enlist. These volunteers were guaranteed U.S. citizenship and an honorable discharge upon the successful completion of five years of service. Hence there may be a requirement to extend and expand the current American legislation entitled Military Accessions Vital to National Interests (MAVNI) law which encourages the recruitment of foreign nationals or recent immigrants who seek American citizenship through volunteering for military service. This could expand recruitment into special operations and is reminiscent of the SOE and OSS who sought to recruit native speakers to bring these vital operational skills into the fight. Concomitantly, it would be utilitarian to have potential candidates undertake the appropriate psychological and aptitude assessments to ascertain if their characteristics would meet the special operator profile. The continuous strengthening of recruitment efforts to promulgate the word specifically through ethnic neighborhoods and enclaves in the West could generate substantial interest particularly when matched with opportunities such as officer training and private educational programs such as ROTC or military academies.

The employment of women and those of the LGBTQIP2SAA⁴² community should not be overlooked as skillsets and talent are found throughout all society. The extraordinary women of the OSS/SOE, who undertook vital operations with intelligence and special operations organizations in World War II brought unique skills to the teams that contributed to their success.

Reflecting The Jedburgh Experiment

The Jedburgh concept was a bold experiment designed to conduct UW in a post-invasion scenario—supporting and intimately operating with a resistance organization within an occupied country. This concept was a strategic departure from the essentially attritional Anglo-American warfighting tradition. This now well proven UW concept remains strategically significant as it is recognized as an important dimension of IW.

The experience of the Jedburghs still resonates today in the way contemporary militaries recruit, train, select, and employ special operators in UW. It also supports the concept of retaining a core competency in unconventional operations, not only within the Special Operations Forces but in the Profession of Arms writ large. To do so, it is important to develop a broad appreciation and expertise in UW by institutionalizing the lessons learned from past conflicts and through the preservation of a baseline of UW expertise amongst the military, intelligence, and academic communities, amongst others.

As noted in Operation Francis, an early insertion and deployment may have provided the time necessary to gather, assess, and share a better understanding amongst the Jedburgh teams as to who they were supporting while enhancing their understanding of the operational environment. The inability to communicate directly with the conventional forces that the Jedburghs were supporting was problematic. It is most likely that such communications would have facilitated the overall coordination and synchronization of the Jedburgh/Maquis

operations in respect to the Allied ground force. Direct contact would likely have provided better intelligence and local and regional knowledge that could have been exploited in the expediting operations.

In contemporary terms, as it relates to the hybrid threat, it was quite clear that in Operation Francis the Jedburghs should have been given adequate time to garner a more comprehensive understanding as to some of the local political, cultural, and historical factors under which they were operating. It was important for them to conduct a more fulsome assessment of their area of responsibility—intelligence preparation of the battlefield—and to better assess the requirements of the resident Maquis.

One of the Jedburgh veterans, the American Aaron Bank, was so impressed with the concept in the training he received, he employed them in the training of U.S. Army Special Forces units. Moreover, a number of the 10th Special Forces Group who were displaced persons, in the wake of World War II were recruited into the U.S. Army under the Lodge-Philbin Act.

The 2021 departure from Afghanistan underlines to the casual observer that after 20-plus years of war, the West did not have a complete understanding of the complexities of this ancient tribal society, nor its environment, nor our enemy and their capabilities and objective. For the most part, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other Allied forces did not encourage, develop, or retain a functionally effective ability to communicate with the population that came from diverse ethnic and cultural groups.

As witnessed with the Jedburghs, the language and cultural expertise provided direct tactical and operational advantages, which has since become the *sine qua non* of Special Forces involved in supporting and conducting UW. The opportunity was not afforded in Afghanistan to provide a truly comprehensive cultural and language training program over the two-plus long and costly decades of innumerable deployments and operations. Had NATO and its deployed Allies taken the opportunity to garner a comprehensive insight as to U.S. operations, as they related to the strategy and their relationship with Afghan societies, maybe the U.S. military departure might not have been so hasty.

For nations and Allies to be ready to address both anticipated and unanticipated threats, the U.S. military needs to learn from the Jedburgh experiment to leverage citizenry and harness unique skills and knowledge. The U.S. military needs to have well-trained and deployment-ready specialists in place who are fluent in multiple languages and knowledgeable about multiple cultures, who have the adaptability and courage to help the U.S. win the next conflict, and not be left unprepared or make hasty retreats.

Endnotes

¹ Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 8 November 2010 (Amended as 15 November 2014). According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms (Joint Pub 1-02) the current definition of Unconventional Warfare (UW), approved by USSOCOM in 2009, is: Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. UW is one of five core activities of Irregular Warfare (IW). The other activities are Counter-Insurgency (COIN), Counter-Terrorism (CT) Foreign Internal D (FID) and Stabilization Operations.

² Two of the greatest practitioners in modern time were Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence who was renowned for his role in the Arab Revolt (1916-1918) and the Sinai and Palestine campaign (1915-1918) against the Ottoman Empire, and the arguably equally prominent practitioner of irregular warfare, the famous 'Lion of Africa' German General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck whose small force of 14,000 held in check 300,000 Allied troops in German East Africa.

³ Jay Jakub D. Phil, *Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-45* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 22-23.

⁴ Francis Mackay, *Overture to Overlord: Special Operations in Preparation for D-Day* (South Yorkshire, England: Pen and Sword, 2005), 143.

⁵ A. R. B. Linderman, *Rediscovering Irregular Warfare: Colin Gubbins and the Origins of Britain's Special Operations Executive* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), 61-67.

⁶ Linderman, *Rediscovering Irregular Warfare*, 67-71.

⁷ Major General Sir Colin Gubbins, *SOE and the coordination of Regular and Irregular War in The Fourth Dimension of Warfare, Volume 1 Intelligence/ Subversion/ Resistance*, ed Michael Elliott-Bateman (Praeger Publishers, New York NY. 1970), 86.

⁸ Linderman, *Rediscovering Irregular Warfare*, 63.

⁹ Linderman, *Rediscovering Irregular Warfare*, 39.

¹⁰ The British Principles of War are Selection and Maintenance of the Aim, Maintenance of Morale, Offensive Action, Security, Surprise, Concentration of Force, Economy of Effort, Flexibility, Cooperation and Sustainability. See <http://www.incommand.co.uk/ten-principles-of-war> (accessed 12 December 2021).

¹¹ Linderman, *Rediscovering Irregular Warfare*, 39. See also, Brian Lett, *SOE's Mastermind: An Authorized Biography of Maj. Gen. Sir Colin Gubbins KCMG, DSO, MC* (South Yorkshire, England: Pen and Sword, 2016), 82-96.

¹² Linderman, *Rediscovering Irregular Warfare*, 61.

¹³ Linderman, *Rediscovering Irregular Warfare*, 164.

¹⁴ Linderman, *Rediscovering Irregular Warfare*, 164.

¹⁵ Nigel West, *Secret War: The Story of SOE Britain's Wartime Sabotage Organization* (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire, Frontline Books, 2019), 231.

¹⁶ See Jessica Glick Turnley, *Special Operations Forces as Change Agents* (JSOU Press, March 2017).

- ¹⁷ John Nelson Rickard, *The Politics of Command: Lieutenant-General A. G. L. McNaughton and the Canadian Army 1939-1943* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 150-159.
- ¹⁸ For a contemporary overview of counterintelligence and irregular warfare see Graham H. Turbiville, *Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing Adversary Intelligence Operations* (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU report, 09-01 2009).
- ¹⁹ Mackay, *Overture to Overlord*, 153.
- ²⁰ Linderman, *Rediscovering Irregular Warfare*, 166.
- ²¹ Mackay, *Overture to Overlord*, 155.
- ²² Mackay, *Overture to Overlord*, 154-155.
- ²³ Nigel West, *Secret War: The Story of SOE Britain's Wartime Sabotage Organization* (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire, Frontline Books, 2019), 231.
- ²⁴ John Mendelsohn, ed., *Covert Warfare: Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989), ii.
- ²⁵ Office of Strategic Services, *Special Services Field Manual-Strategic Services (Provisional)* (Washington, DC: Office of Strategic Services, 1944), 5.
- ²⁶ Wyman W. Irwin, *The Jedburgh: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2005), 34-39.
- ²⁷ Nigel West, *Secret War: The Story of SOE Britain's Wartime Sabotage Organization* (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire, Frontline Books, 2019), 233.
- ²⁸ John Mendelsohn, ed., *Covert Warfare: Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989), 1.
- ²⁹ S.J. Lewis, *Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1991), 11.
- ³⁰ Special Operations Executive and Special Operations, *Basic Directive on Jedburghs* (OSS, SO Working Document: December 1943), Vol.12, 38-39.
- ³¹ Wyman W. Irwin, Zoom Interview (6 December 2021). Retired Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel and author of *The Jedburgh: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces*.
- ³² Albert Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines-Europe, World War II* (New York, NY: Arcade Publishing, 2016), 155.
- ³³ Brian Lett, *SOE's Mastermind: An Authorized Biography of Maj. Gen. Sir Colin Gubbins KCMG, DSO, MC* (South Yorkshire, England: Pen and Sword, 2016), 233-234.
- ³⁴ Brian Lett, *SOE's Mastermind: An Authorized Biography of Maj. Gen. Sir Colin Gubbins KCMG, DSO, MC* (South Yorkshire, England: Pen and Sword, 2016), 233.
- ³⁵ Major General Sir Colin Gubbins, *SOE and the coordination of Regular and Irregular War in The Fourth Dimension of Warfare, Volume 1 Intelligence/ Subversion/ Resistance*, ed Michael Elliott-Bateman (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970) 96-97.
- ³⁶ Gubbins, *SOE and the Coordination of Regular and Irregular War*, 97-98.
- ³⁷ Benjamin F. Jones, *Eisenhower's Guerrillas: The Jedburgh, the Maquis, and the Liberation of France* New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 4.

³⁸ Harry Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Capt. Harry C. Butcher*, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942-1945 (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1946). As quoted in Irwin, *The Jedburghs*, 241.

³⁹ Richard H. Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 221.

⁴⁰ J. G. Beevor, *S0E: Recollections and Reflections 1940-45* (London, UK: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1981), 160.

⁴¹ James Stejskal, *No Moon as Witness: Missions of the S0E and OSS in World War II* (Oxford, UK: Casement Publishers, 2021). Extract from <https://www.casematepublishing.co.uk/blog/2021/06/02/jedburgh-team-and-operation-overlord-the-battle-of-normandy/> accessed 15 December 2021.

⁴² Stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, questioning, queer, intersex, pansexual, two-spirit (2S), androgynous and asexual.

Secret War in Cuba: The Bay of Pigs Invasion, 1960-1961

Robert S. Burrell, Joint Special Operations University, Tampa, Florida, USA

ABSTRACT

While the 1961 U.S. invasion of Cuba—dubbed the “Bay of Pigs Invasion”—has received much public scrutiny, academic scholarship on this topic has lagged. One of the obstacles to scholastic investigation derived from the classification of primary material, which remained unattainable to academia for decades. Consequently, first accounts on the Bay of Pigs Invasion initially emerged under a cloud of secrecy and with some confusion. In contrast, this essay principally relies on primary sources from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), some declassified in 2016. The article argues that when sponsoring an indigenous resistance on the island proved unachievable, the CIA grew to favor an amphibious invasion made up of a proxy land force of Cuban exiles. This important historical case study in unconventional warfare, contrived and executed in an era of strategic competition, stands apart as a failure, but with applicable lessons in the modern era.

KEYWORDS

bay of pigs,
Cuba, guerrilla
warfare, covert
action

Overview

In the early 1960s, the United States backed several Cuban resistance movements to oust the communist dictator, Fidel Castro. The culminating event of this support resulted in what is more commonly known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion. This historical case study stands apart as a disastrous failure due particularly to the poor strategic concept adopted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA’s approach evolved into a conventional land force made up of Cuban exiles who would then attempt to reinsert themselves into Cuba via an amphibious invasion. When executed, Fidel Castro responded quickly in a matter of days with ten times the number of troops, killing and capturing the entire CIA-backed force. As a case study on U.S. support to resistance, this article addresses how and why the Secret War in Cuba developed and eventually failed. It principally utilizes declassified sources.

Background

The United States relationship with Cuba became inextricably linked following the Spanish-American War in the late nineteenth century. Cuba fought a third war for independence from

CONTACT Robert S. Burrell | robert.burrell@jsou.edu

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of the Joint Special Operations University, United States Special Operations Command, or Department of Defense.

© 2023 Arizona State University

Spain in 1895 to 1898. Watching its small neighbor fight European imperialism, the United States enthusiastically intervened in Cuba, commencing the Spanish-American War. A few months later, at the Treaty of Paris in 1898, Spain relinquished all rights to the territory.

After two years of military occupation, the U.S. Congress signed the Platt Amendment in 1901, which created an unequal treaty between the United States and Cuba. While the United States withdrew its Army garrison, the Platt Amendment allowed for U.S. dominance over Cuban policies and markets. Through the Platt Amendment and later treaties, the United States maintained its authority over Cuban sovereignty until 1934.

For sixty years, the Cuban economy became dominated by American companies, including those in the retail, banking, oil, food, and trade industries. Meanwhile, income generated for Cubans primarily was derived from tourism and sugar exports. A growing number of Cubans held animosity towards the United States as interfering with their sovereignty and dominating the economy. With the rise of Marxist ideology during the Cold War, Cuba grew ripe for revolution.

Fulgencio Batista

Fulgencio Batista came to power in 1933, dominating Cuban politics for two decades. He had previously served as Chief of Staff of the Cuban armed forces. Batista held two terms as president, from 1940-1944 and, after a successful coup d'état, from 1952-1958. Batista's primary external support came from the United States—the U.S. government, U.S. business, and the American mafia. In accordance with the Truman doctrine and a strategy to contain communism, the CIA assisted Batista in building a secret police force designed to eliminate communist movements. Batista reigned through fear and retribution and a number of resistance movements sought his overthrow. On New Year's Eve 1958, as his legitimacy plummeted, Fulgencio Batista fled the country and his government collapsed.¹

Fidel Castro

Fidel Castro was a lawyer and politician in Havana. He formed a group called “the Movement” in 1952, which published an underground newspaper called *El Acusador*. A revolutionary with socialist ideology, Castro, nevertheless, avoided an alliance with the growing communist party in Cuba—the Popular Socialist Party. The CIA and State Department feared Castro was communist and began investigating his ongoings from 1948 onward.²

On 26 July 1953, Castro, with his brother Raul and 150 armed comrades, attacked an army barracks in Santiago in an overtly iconic attempt to free political prisoners. Castro failed miserably. Half of his forces were killed during the fighting and most of the remaining were executed. Castro was publicly tried as a criminal, but due to domestic concerns and the popularity of what Castro had attempted, he only served two years in prison. Additionally, Castro's public trial only served to grow his popularity among dissidents. His followers became known as the 26 July Movement (or M-26-7).

Directly after his release from prison in 1955, Castro left Cuba and established a headquarters in Mexico.³ Three years later, he returned with eighty highly motivated supporters. Most of Castro's force did not survive initial contacts with Batista's army, but he then embarked on a guerrilla warfare campaign—attacking Batista's government at weak points, followed up with a highly successful media campaign. While his resistance only consisted of a small armed component, he simultaneously allied itself with vibrant undergrounds in urban centers. The declared aim of Castro and M-26-7 was put in simple terms—revolution—for which the many Cuban resistance groups could agree.

By the CIA's estimates, the majority of Cuban public opinion supported a revolution by 1957. Batista was no longer able to restore order to the mounting unrest. Opposition included rebels supporting the previous President Carlos Prío, Castro's guerrillas, domestic political opposition parties, workers' unions, and even some in Batista's military.⁴ By August, the capital in Havana was rife with public demonstrations, strikes, and publicized terrorist attacks.⁵ After only a short time in power, Batista had proven himself very unpopular with many segments of the population. By default, Castro absorbed widespread popularity through resistance to Batista. Castro also wielded two strong subordinates who proved themselves central to his revolution: one was his brother Raul; and the other was Ernesto Che Guevara, a Marxist revolutionary from Argentina.

Castro's revolution succeeded in 1959, triumphantly marching into Havana unopposed. Afterward, he consolidated his power and control as a dictator. One of Castro's immediate goals was the nationalization of foreign-owned businesses, principally those owned by persons in the United States. America responded with sanctions and denunciation of Castro's regime. Castro reciprocated by establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. To America's alarm, the Soviet Union became an overt external sponsor to Cuba, both economically and militarily.

Diaspora

Once Castro consolidated power into a dictatorship, he immediately alienated many other revolutionaries, some of whom opposed communism and desired democracy and continued relations with the United States. Others wanted socialism and not a dictatorship. As summarized by one scholar, "a number of leaders who shared power with the 26th of July in Castro's early governments held democratic, liberal principles; many of them had fought dictatorship in Cuba even before Batista."⁶ In 1959 and 1960, Cuba realized a large exodus of dissidents. A diaspora comprising influential Cubans, of over 100,000 settled primarily in Miami, Florida.

Hundreds of political movements evolved within the diaspora, with divergent aims against the Castro regime. Their ambitions ranged from regaining privileges (like family estates) to complete regime change. Cuban exiles included right-wing supporters of Batista, as well as democratic enthusiasts who opposed both Castro and Batista. However, none of

the dissidents had enough charismatic leadership to unify resistance to Castro abroad, let alone at home.⁷

Although there were hundreds of groups, several primary ones emerged as important to the eventual invasion. These groups would tentatively unify under the Cuban Revolutionary Council.⁸

Cuban Revolutionary Council

The Cuban Revolutionary Council (or *Consejo Revolucionario de Cuba*) was formed in March of 1961, just three weeks before the invasion. Its formation was highly influenced by the desire of President John F. Kennedy to demonstrate united opposition to Castro. Consequently, this organization served as the organization to represent the confederation of the various resistance movements. Some of these movements were actually pro-Batista and sought to reinstate the Batista regime. José Miró Cardona, the former Prime Minister of Cuba, emerged as the central leader whom the groups could agree on supporting. While Cardona was marked as the provisional president following Castro's demise, the disparate groups actually had a number of other objectives, many incongruent with one another.

People's Revolutionary Movement

The People's Revolutionary Movement (or *Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo*) consisted of former 26 July Movement members who had thereafter become dissatisfied with Castro after he assumed power. It formed in May 1960 under the leadership of Manuel Ray, a former government Castro official and Minister of Public Works who disagreed with the increasing communist ideology of the Cuban government. Ray eventually joined the Cuban Revolutionary Council just prior to the invasion.

Democratic Revolutionary Front

The Democratic Revolutionary Front (or *Frente Revolucionario Democrático*) was a resistance led by Miro Cardona. This organization was initially headquartered in Mexico but eventually founded a chapter in New Orleans, Louisiana. It consisted of five major anti-Castro groups, and opposition to Castro may have comprised its singular identifying theme. U.S. statesman Charles Thayer would describe it as a "highly artificial organization without any genuine political solidarity and the tendency to fall apart at the slightest provocation."⁹ In October 1961, the Democratic Revolutionary Front finally merged with the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

Movement for Revolutionary Renewal

As Cuban resistance attempted to centralize, the Democratic Revolutionary Front aligned with the People's Revolutionary Movement and the two formed the Movement for Revolutionary Renewal (or *Movimiento De Recuperacion Revolucionaria*). The leader of the

Movement for Revolutionary Renewal was Manuel Francisco Artime, a former Castro supporter. As it received CIA sponsorship, the Movement for Revolutionary Renewal took on more of an armed component structure and would form the basis for Brigade 2506 which would invade Cuba.

Brigade 2506

Brigade 2506, sometimes referred to as the Cuban Brigade, as well as the Blindado Battalion, evolved into the armed component of resistance. Recruitment for the Cuban Brigade began in May of 1960 from anti-Castro organizations like the Democratic Revolutionary Front. It consisted of “students, workers, former Castro supporters, former Army personnel, professionals, the rich, the poor, and the middle class.”¹⁰ The number 2506 represented the secret identifier for Carlos Rafael Santana Estavez, a member who died in a training accident in Guatemala in September 1960.

At first, the CIA sent forty men from Brigade 2506 to train on a small island in the Caribbean. Initially, the training focused on guerrilla warfare. Then, in the summer of 1960, the CIA began airlifting Brigade members to training camps in Panama and eventually later to Guatemala. Training was supervised by American professionals, and the volunteers received excellent equipment.¹¹ By November 1960, the plan changed entirely from guerrilla warfare to a conventional invasion. This transformation may have occurred due to the large numbers of available Cubans recruited by the Brigade.¹² As the Brigade grew and formed, political leadership remained with Manuel Artime. Artime also led the Movement for Revolutionary Renewal organization. Military command fell to José Alfredo Pérez San Román, commonly referred to as Pepe.

Recruitment was overt. The Brigade made public statements about their undertakings, which, in hindsight, appear incongruent with the secrecy required for the upcoming invasion. On 6 February 1961, Artime held a news conference in his house in Miami. He stated that the United States was training Brigade 2506, made up of 1,400 to 1,500 members. He also confirmed that the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force were conducting the training in various locations within the United States.¹³ In short, it was no secret to Castro that the United States was planning an invasion.

Officers in Brigade 2506 consisted of about 375 personnel. Each received about 13 weeks of training, which initially included guerrilla warfare. Additionally, many of these officers already had guerrilla warfare experience from their fights against Batista. As time progressed, the CIA attempted to train Brigade 2506 to operate as a conventional force and “wean” the officers from their “marked inclination to guerilla operations.”¹⁴ Table 1 indicates the general organization of the Brigade prior to the invasion.¹⁵

Ground Forces (1,511 persons)		
Unit	Personnel	Weapons
Headquarters and Service Company	156	Rifles
Heavy Weapons Company	114	50 caliber MGs 81 mm mortars 4.2" mortars 75 mm recoilless rifles Flamethrowers 2.5-ton trucks
(5) Infantry Companies	175 each	30 caliber MGs 60 mm mortars 57mm recoilless rifles Browning Automatic rifles ¼ ton trucks
Airborne Infantry Company	177	Browning Automatic rifles Rifles
Tank Platoon	24	M41 Tanks
Boat Section	36	Unknown
Intelligence/Recon	68	Rifles
Air Forces		
15 x B-26 light bombers		
10 x C-54 transports		
5 x C-46 transports		
Sea Forces		
(2) Landing Craft Infantry		11 x 50 caliber MG each 2 x 75 mm rifles each
(3) Landing Craft Utility		2 x 50 caliber MG each
(4) Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel		50 caliber MG each
(7) Chartered commercial freighters		3 x 50 caliber MG each

Table 1. Brigade 2506 Ground, Sea, and Air Forces

The closer the invasion became, the more the CIA advocated for a conventional defeat of Castro in pitched battle. In the five months of training leading up to the operation

(between November 1960 and March 1961) conventional tactics became prioritized over everything else. The concept of operations included insertion by sea and air, constitution of a land force, and then a conventional fight to defeat Castro's army. By one CIA estimate, "at no time did the Brigade once organized receive training to fight as a guerrilla force."¹⁶ However, should the desired direct confrontation result in defeat, one secondary course of action included dispersion into the hills and countryside, including the Escambrays, Pinar del Rio, and the Oriente. Nevertheless, the CIA offered little-to-no training on the secondary option.

Unconventional Warfare

President Dwight Eisenhower's Anti-Castro Program started 17 March 1960 and was eventually codenamed JMATE.¹⁷ The principal U.S. agent supporting Cuban resistance remained the CIA. Due to Castro's very effective intelligence efforts, the CIA kept the operations close hold, leaving a number of important players out of the planning, including large segments of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, and even the American Embassy in Havana.¹⁸

The CIA's "Anti-Castro Program" had four main lines of effort:¹⁹

1. Create a unified opposition to the Castro regime within the Cuban diaspora.
2. Conduct psychological operations and mass propaganda waged on the loyalties of the indigenous Cuban population to create opposition to Castro.
3. Create resistance on the island who can work in concert with the resistance in the diaspora.
4. Form an armed component of resistance, a paramilitary force made up of members of the diaspora.

In order to fund its efforts, the CIA requested monies in 1960 and 1961 for five principal activities. It requested \$950,000 to support opposition elements in the Cuban diaspora; \$1,100,000 for radio broadcast operations directed against Castro; \$600,000 for publications and press; \$250,000 for intelligence collection; and finally, \$1,500,000 for maritime and air training and equipment to enable a paramilitary force.²⁰

The CIA established a network of U.S. bases and stations to support Brigade 2506 activities. It established a forward operating base in Miami, Florida, at Opa Locka Naval Air Station. The airfield served as a storage point for arms and equipment, as well as the port of embarkation for personnel flights to Central America. It also operated a field and facilities in the Florida Keys, due to their proximity to Cuba. Eglin Air Force Base in Florida supported logistics flights to Central America. Additionally, Vieques, Puerto Rico, provided the original training base for maritime activities.²¹

Support to Resistance

The CIA's initial plans for JMATE mirrored the Jedburgh program utilized in France during World War II. It contemplated the training of small units of two to three persons: (1) a communications expert, (2) a guerrilla warfare trainer/advisor, and (3) possibly a native Cuban from the diaspora. Such a plan, conceived as Jedburgh, should come as no surprise. The CIA agent in charge of training during this period was Gerry Droller (code name Frank Bender), a former member of the French resistance in World War II.²²

From September 1960 through April of 1961, the CIA began inserting agents into Cuba. Seventy personnel deployed in small teams, including nineteen radio operators. All but two of the radio operators succeeded in establishing communications following insertion.²³ However, in the following weeks and months, most were killed or captured.

Material support to resistance had uneven results. Air delivery of support was generally unsuccessful. As a result of poorly trained Cuban pilots, only four of twenty-seven missions achieved their objectives. In comparison, supply runs via sea fared better. Boats from Miami to Cuba delivered 40 tons of arms and equipment.²⁴

The most prominent resistance element by the CIA was identified as a 600 - 1,000-person force operating in the Escambray Mountains of Las Villas Province. However, the CIA never made direct radio contact with these guerrillas and could only relay information through underground organizations in Havana. Due to Castro's well-organized intelligence apparatus both in Cuba and Miami, the armed component in the Escambray Mountains never succeeded in gaining popular support and apparently lasted only for about six months.²⁵

The CIA supported a rather extensive sabotage campaign. Much of this was industrial disruption, including sugar cane fields, warehouses, refineries, railroads, and power stations. The targets were selected to disrupt Castro's support and cause confusion, but, by the CIA's own admission, they had no substantial direct impact on the regime.²⁶

Invasion by Proxy Forces

The real nail in the coffin in the CIA's support to resistance lay in a number of factors. Firstly, the CIA maintained little direct interaction with indigenous resistance—a situation that exacerbated Castro's effective counterintelligence efforts. And secondly, the failure of arial resupply made effective support to armed resistance elements impossible. With little perceived progress in support to indigenous resistance, the Jedburgh approach was generally shelved in favor of an amphibious assault of a proxy army. Planners began to fixate on counting the number of troops, tanks, vehicles, and seacraft required to establish a foothold on the island.²⁷ By November 1960, the plan gelled as a "conventional amphibious assault force of least 1,500 infantrymen."²⁸

In 1961, the CIA established a base of operations in Guatemala as a staging point for the invasion. It also utilized Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua. Invading from Central America

would maintain the covert sponsorship of the United States. Brigade 2506 stood up its forces for the invasion from bases in Guatemala and Nicaragua from 25 March to 7 April.

Guatemala had officially severed relations with Castro. President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes offered the CIA use of his nation for conducting psychological operations, establishing training areas, and operating a staging base. Ydígoras' government was quite unstable, and he desired U.S. support to shore up his domestic popularity. Castro may have been sponsoring resistance to Ydígoras at the time. For the President's support, he received a number of payouts in loans and aid, as well as arms and equipment. The CIA actually planned to use Brigade 2506 to back Ydígoras' regime, if needed, and did fly air sorties in support of the Guatemalan army during a revolt in late 1960.²⁹

The CIA chose an airstrip in Guatemala near the city of Retalhuleo for renovation so as to make it large enough to accommodate C-54 aircraft. By 30 September 1960, the U.S. engineers had extended the airstrip to 5,000 feet. The B-26 and C-46 aircraft utilized in JMATE were sold to the Guatemalans as a cover, with Guatemalans then returning these aircraft to Brigade 2506. As sub-components within the JMATE program, the ground training program was code-named JMTRAV, while airfield operations were code-named JMADD (these operational names also served as geographic designations).³⁰

Cuban ground forces in Brigade 2506 received some training by U.S. Army Special Forces. Initially, this occurred at Fort Randolph in the Panama Canal Zone. Training generally consisted of communications and sabotage. Later, in December 1960, the training moved to Guatemala, at which point twenty-one agents and five staff personnel had joined the JMATE project. At this point, the CIA requested 38 Special Forces personnel to assist in training requirements. The U.S. Army was concerned about the legal status of its Soldiers and desired Guatemala to sign a Status of Forces Agreement, which it eventually did. While CIA agents provided a large part of the paramilitary training, Special Forces also conducted training of the Brigade, but they also trained a "Guatemalan Battalion" to "deter the revolutionary activities against the Ydígoras Government."³¹

The CIA maintained considerable interest in roping in Guatemala as a regional sponsor of the Cuban resistance. It wanted both Guatemalan pilots, as well as soldiers, integrated within Brigade 2506. The CIA also desired recruitment of foreign mercenaries to supplement the Cuban ranks, including "Germans, Greeks, and Turks."³² The U.S. State Department vehemently opposed these ideas, and they never took root. In fact, the State Department opposed the invasion of Cuba throughout the planning, primarily based on the potentially negative repercussions to the U.S. reputation internationally.³³

Castro was well aware of the CIA activities in Guatemala. Castro likely had operatives within the diaspora, or at least was collecting intelligence from them. He requested support from the Organization of American States to inspect Guatemala and ensure it was not being used as a staging area for a future invasion. The Organization of American

States agreed but never found any evidence.³⁴ CIA concerns on maintaining secrecy around the future invasion likely hampered its ability to share information with many important U.S. partners.

The tentative diplomatic situation in Guatemala gave rise to the idea of also utilizing Nicaragua as a second staging area. The CIA negotiated with President Luis Somoza Debayle. Somoza was an unpopular dictator, so the CIA kept negotiations clandestine to maintain the U.S. image within the international community. Eventually, in late 1960, Somoza agreed to the use of the airport at Puerto Cabezas. Additionally, he allowed Brigade 2506 airplanes to use Nicaraguan Air Force insignias to mask their origin. CIA operations in Nicaragua became known as JMTIDE, (indicating both the operational designation as well as the geographic location).

The Invasion

In early 1961, the CIA briefed the newly inaugurated President John F. Kennedy on JMATE and the upcoming Cuban invasion. To establish air and maritime control, the U.S. Navy had been tasked to deploy a large amphibious force near Cuba under the guise of a training exercise. In reality, this armada was forward postured to support Brigade 2506. The CIA envisioned the U.S. amphibious component as directly supporting the invasion, with direct use of military capabilities, if required.

While Kennedy gave the go ahead to proceed with JMATE, he subsequently grew increasingly concerned about the ability of the United States to maintain a covert status. The upcoming invasion increasingly relied on U.S. military support, both in terms of air strikes, as well as resupply. As Kennedy's concern over international implications grew, he would become increasingly reluctant to offer direct U.S. support, even the support the CIA had planned. The following map portrays the region and operational situations regarding the invasion.³⁵




Figure 1. Map of Brigade 2506's Invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, 15-20 April 1961 (closeup of the Bay of Pigs map data from Google, @2023 INEGI)

On 15 April 1961, the invasion began with Cuban pilots flying air strikes flown in CIA procured planes. These departed from Puro Cabazas Nicaragua. Eight aircraft (half of the 16 originally planned for but scrubbed by Kennedy) left from Puerto Cabezas to drop bombs on airfields in Cuba at Santiago and Ciudad Libertad. These air strikes damaged a number of Cuban planes, but not enough to impede Castro's air force from gaining air supremacy during the invasion.

On 17 April, Brigade 2506 launched four battalions in amphibious assaults on Red Beach and Blue Beach (Red Beach was Playa Larga, and Blue Beach was Playa Giron). Simultaneously, a fifth battalion of paratroopers seized key terrain at Jocuma and San Miguel do Pita. Once Brigade 2506 established the beachhead and the airfield was secured, its forward momentum stalled, and it established a defensive posture. Accounts differ but Brigade 2506 insists that the CIA told them to halt and wait for U.S. air and naval support.

For certain, the United States had promised resupply of the Brigade via air and clandestine maritime aircraft. These did not arrive. While the aircraft carrier USS *Essex* and accompanying task force had deployed to support the invasion force with tactical air support, President John F. Kennedy decided not to utilize overt U.S. military force, and the USS *Essex*, as well as other aircraft in the United States, were told to stand down. With no air cover, two

support ships—the *Houston* and the *Rio Escondido*—were sunk by Cuban planes. Castro maintained air supremacy over the invasion area, as well as artillery fires for which Brigade 2506 had no response. Meanwhile, the Brigade increasingly ran short on ammunition, a situation that exacerbated in the following days.

In a short three days, Castro had mobilized thousands of soldiers in an aggressive counterattack, a force which included members of his Cuban Revolutionary Army Forces, as well as the National Revolutionary Militia. In the preceding years, the Soviet Union had poured 40,000 tons of military equipment into Castro's regime, which he used to organize his army, as well as militia forces.³⁶ Total strength of the attacking forces was overwhelming, including men, tanks, bombers, jets, and artillery. Running short on ammunition and with no U.S. support forthcoming, Brigade 2506 surrendered on 20 April. Casualties included 118 killed, 360 wounded, and 1,202 captured.

Of the captured personnel, a number were executed. For the majority, Castro put on trial 1,189 soldiers from Brigade 2506 and sentenced them to imprisonment for 30 years. Twenty months later, the United States paid \$53 million in food and medicine for their release and return to Florida.³⁷

Aftermath

David had defeated Goliath. The botched invasion of Cuba provided Castro more popular support at home and abroad than ever. The invasion also ensured Castro's cooperation with the Soviet Union and precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Many of the members of the Cuban Brigade blamed the United States for the disaster: no air support came, no resupply occurred, and no promised reinforcements arrived. Additionally, some of the U.S.-provided equipment failed to work properly, including the landing boats and tanks.³⁸ The CIA became especially critical of the Kennedy administration in not providing air cover to the Brigade. As summarized by case officer E. Howard Hunt, the Cuban exiles "were betrayed by America."³⁹

The blame placed on President Kennedy remains misplaced. He inherited a plan with many shortcomings. Castro successfully carried out a popular revolution in Cuba. Ousting Castro would require a similar grassroots effort. Castro's dictatorship alienated many Cubans, and the opportunity certainly existed for a counterrevolution.⁴⁰ However, the title "Bay of Pigs Invasion" implies everything that was wrong with this operation. "*Bahia de Cochinos*" indicates a geographic reference, and the term "invasion" entails a conventional military maneuver. Successful resistance has little to do with either geographic terrain or military maneuver. Instead, resistance competes over human terrain instead of geography; and the population, not armies, remains the center of gravity.

The United States failed to develop support to indigenous resistance in Cuba. Instead, it defaulted to its own proclivity for conventional warfare. By the time Brigade 2506 arrived

in Cuba, it no longer resembled the organization needed to inspire a Cuban uprising. Armed Cuban exiles had become a U.S. surrogate force, rather than an indigenous resistance.

The CIA had grossly underestimated Castro's army and militia, including their strength, capabilities, and morale. It conducted little psychological operations on the population to influence their loyalties. In fact, the CIA appears to have had little access, knowledge, or placement within the Cuban population. Consequently, optimistic assessments that the Cubans would rise up to oppose Castro following the invasion did not have any basis in evidence. An additional criticism of the CIA, which has merit, is that the Agency could not handle an operation of this size and magnitude and simply became overwhelmed by events.⁴¹

Endnotes

- ¹ Jack B. Pfeiffer, *The Official History of the Bay of Pigs Invasion: Volume III, Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies*, 1959-January 1961, (Central Intelligence Agency, 1979). Found in CIA Archives. Between 1979 and 1984, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) staff historian Jack Pfeiffer prepared five volumes of the Agency's Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation. The titles of the five volumes were *Air Operations, March 1960-April 1961*; *Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy*; *Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, 1951-January 1961*; *The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs*; and *CIA's Internal Investigation of the Bay of Pigs*. Another historical account from the CIA was written by J. Hawkins, *Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba, 17 March 1960 – May 1961*, (Clandestine Services History, 5 May 1961). Hawkins' history was sanitized and declassified in 1997.
- ² Pfeiffer, *The Official History of the Bay of Pigs Invasion: Volume III*, 1.
- ³ Michael Dunne, "Perfect Failure: The USA, Cuba and the Bay of Pigs, 1961," *Political Quarterly*, vol. 82, 3, July 2011, 448–58.
- ⁴ Memorandum for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, "The Situation in Cuba," *Central Intelligence Agency*, 13 June 1957. Found in CIA Archives.
- ⁵ *Central Intelligence Agency Bulletin*, 6 August 1957, 5. Found in CIA Archives.
- ⁶ Victor Andres Traiy, "Castro's Agenda Prompted the Formation of the Anti-Castro Militia," in Haynes Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506*, (Greenhaven Press, 2004), 18.
- ⁷ Charles W. Thayer, *Guerilla*, (Harper and Row: New York, 1963), 16.
- ⁸ Dunne, Perfect Failure, 452-453.
- ⁹ Thayer, *Guerilla*, 17.
- ¹⁰ Traiy, *Castro's Agenda Prompted*, 23.
- ¹¹ Manuel Panabaz, "The U.S. Betrayal of the Cuban Militia Caused Heavy Losses," in Haynes Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506*, (Greenhaven Press, 2004), 45.
- ¹² "The Real Story of the Bay of Pigs," *U.S. News and World Report*, 7 July 1963. Accessed from CIA archives.
- ¹³ "U.S. to Train Members of Cuba Brigade," *AP Press*, 6 February 1961. Found in CIA Archives.
- ¹⁴ "What Briefing, if Any, Was Given the Brigade or the Brigade's Staff on Going Guerilla," *Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum*, 22 May 1961. Found in CIA Archives.
- ¹⁵ Information in this table drawn from Hawkins, 25-26. I've made some assumptions about which weapons Brigade 2506 assigned to individual companies.
- ¹⁶ "What Briefing, if Any, Was Given the Brigade or the Brigade's Staff on Going Guerilla," *Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum*, 22 May 1961. Found in CIA Archives.
- ¹⁷ Jack B. Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations: Volume II, Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy*, (Central Intelligence Agency, 1979), footnote on page 4.
- ¹⁸ Dunne, Perfect Failure, 453.
- ¹⁹ Jack B. Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations: Volume I, Air Operations, March 1960 – April 1961*, (Central Intelligence Agency, 1979), 408-410.

- ²⁰ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations: Volume I*, 417.
- ²¹ Hawkins, *Record of Paramilitary Action*, 2-4.
- ²² Panabaz, 46.
- ²³ Hawkins, *Record of Paramilitary Action*, 7-9.
- ²⁴ Hawkins, *Record of Paramilitary Action*.
- ²⁵ Hawkins, *Record of Paramilitary Action*.
- ²⁶ Hawkins, *Record of Paramilitary Action*.
- ²⁷ Pfeiffer, *The Official History of the Bay of Pigs Invasion: Volume III*, 143-144.
- ²⁸ Pfeiffer, *The Official History of the Bay of Pigs Invasion: Volume III*, 147.
- ²⁹ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations: Volume II*, 35-38.
- ³⁰ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations: Volume II*, 1-28.
- ³¹ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations: Volume II*, 93.
- ³² Pfeiffer, *The Official History of the Bay of Pigs Invasion: Volume III*, 118.
- ³³ Haynes Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506*, (Greenhaven Press, 2004), 11.
- ³⁴ Pfeiffer, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operations: Volume II*, 1-28.
- ³⁵ Map created by author. Map created by author. Base map of the Caribbean found at <http://alabamamaps.ua.edu>. Closer map of the Bay of Pigs from <https://www.google.com/maps>. For similar maps, see Norman Friedman, "Debacle at Bahía de Cochinos," *Naval History Magazine*, April 2021. Also see Maria C. Werlau, "The Bay of Pigs – 50 Years Later," *SFPPR News and Analysis*, 20 July 2011. Graphic from Werlau originates from the *Miami Herald*.
- ³⁶ Hawkins, *Record of Paramilitary Action*, 6.
- ³⁷ Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506*, 11-13.
- ³⁸ "The Real Story of the Bay of Pigs," *U.S. News and World Report*, 7 July 1963. Accessed from CIA archives.
- ³⁹ Matthew C. Quinn, "Fiasco of 1961 Regretted by New, Young President," *Washington Times*, 17 April 1986.
- ⁴⁰ Thayer, *Guerilla*, 15-16. Also see Chesly Manly, "Donovan Acts as Plan Fails at Bay of Pigs," *Chicago Tribune*, 11 January 1966.
- ⁴¹ Lyman Kirkpatrick, "The CIA Could Not Adequately Handle the Bay of Pigs Operation," found in Haynes Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506*, (Greenhaven Press, 2004), 71-74.

Intentionally Blank

Optimizing the Stalemate: Limited Conflicts and the Use of Special Operations Forces in the Context of Global Competition

Leo J. Blanken, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA | Jason J. Lepore, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, California, USA | Kai Thaxton, U.S. Army, Fayetteville, North Carolina, USA

ABSTRACT

We propose a novel framework for asymmetric militarized conflict within the context of strategic competition. We do so by exploiting the concept of tacit collusion from economic theory of oligopolistic competition among firms. Our contributions are twofold. First, we formalize a model of protracted conflict and characterize a collusive subgame-perfect equilibrium that is Pareto superior to continued fighting in stalemates. In this equilibrium, actors not only reap the benefits of tacit collusion but are incentivized to invest in jointly regulating unsanctioned violence in the battlespace, thereby tempering the scope and intensity of the conflict. Second, we provide an analytic foundation to contend with the emerging strategic concept of “competition.” Our model provides a scalable logic for crafting campaign-level strategies in a resource-constrained, globalized contest. Finally, we use our model to critically evaluate the failed war in Afghanistan.

KEYWORDS

asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, strategic competition, special operations forces, game theory, Afghanistan

Introduction

The ignominious end of the war in Afghanistan raises many questions about what could have been accomplished there and, more importantly, what the future holds for the efficacy of limited armed conflict as a viable instrument for great powers.¹ The disastrous nature of the American withdrawal, however, has overshadowed deeper debate concerning the purpose and sustainability of any future such conflicts. One month after the last troops departed Kabul International Airport, President Biden's top generals publicly contradicted him, saying that they had recommended maintaining a reduced military force as opposed to complete withdrawal.² What was not articulated by these military leaders, however, was any fresh thinking to optimally employ such a small military footprint. We offer one here. Though our

CONTACT Leo J. Blanken, ljblanken@nps.edu | Jason J. Lepore, jlepore@calpoly.edu | Kai Thaxton, kaionathaxton@gmail.com

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the Naval Postgraduate School, California Polytechnic State University, the U.S. Army, United States Government, Department of Defense, or United States Special Operations Command. © 2023 Arizona State University

prescriptive model comes too late to change the outcome of Afghanistan, it is relevant for any future asymmetric military conflicts engaged in by the United States. More specifically, our model of tacit collusion (a) provides specific prescriptions for sustaining and managing limited armed conflict within the context of global competition, and (b) provides a scalable logic that can be extended to other domains of global competition. In brief, we examine conflicts in which neither side can defeat the other and bargained settlements are not possible. Our model shows that actors in such conflicts can arrive at an equilibrium where they refrain from wasteful fighting, but rather identify a mutually acceptable state of affairs in which each actor uses limited applications of pain to maintain the equilibrium. It is even possible to identify additional points of shared interest among warring actors around which limited cooperation may be fostered.

This model is designed to provide novel strategic concepts for “unwinnable” conflicts—when victory is not possible, and resources are limited. Beyond stalemated armed conflicts, our model also seeks to provide a logical basis for grounding the emerging doctrinal concept of “strategic competition,” which is defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as “an enduring condition to be managed, not a problem to be solved.”³ Further, our model has significant implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). If our arguments have merit, then U.S. SOF forces would seem to be well-suited to engage in the types of activities suggested here. This is due to their ability to plan and conduct strategically oriented operations with a minimal footprint, as well as their pre-existing skillsets in irregular warfare and familiarity with politically sensitive activities. In sum, this model would provide a novel blueprint for U.S. SOF activities within a global competition environment.

To contextualize our model, let us consider why the United States chose to abandon the war in Afghanistan. By the last few years of the two-decades-long conflict, critics often decried the war as a “stalemate,”⁴ with that term even becoming regularly used by U.S. military leadership.⁵ This criticism even dominated the debate on Afghanistan in the 2020 presidential election as both candidates promised to end the war, due to its stalemated condition.⁶ Donald Trump referred to the war as “ridiculously endless,”⁷ and Biden referred to it as a “forever war.”⁸ In the words of one critic:

The trouble is that continuous war violates a core precept of strategy, which, at least as presently understood, involves the relation of means and ways to defined ends, not indefinite pursuits. If a campaign has no end, it can have no objective; if it has no objective, it cannot be won.⁹

But do all conflicts need to be “won” for military activity to have purpose? If Clausewitz is correct in asserting that there is “a whole category of wars in which the very idea of defeating the enemy is unreal,” then can strategies be developed to pursue goals while eschewing traditional concepts of “winning?”¹⁰

Not only did Afghanistan appear to be “unwinnable,” but the enormous costs associated with the war began to be seen as a liability, as adversarial peer powers began to

rise and the opportunity cost of pouring money into the Afghan stalemate began to elicit concern at the grand strategic level. How might the United States have optimized the war within this set of conditions? By drawing on the logic of tacit collusive models from oligopolistic competition among firms, we propose a reconceptualization of comparative strategies for managing such stalemated conflicts. To do so, we construct a model that escapes the constraints imposed by the pursuit of either military "victory" or a formal diplomatic conclusion. More specifically, we explore the possibility of identifying and fostering equilibria that are Pareto superior to continued active warfighting. The strategy to achieve such an outcome builds on the dynamics of oligopoly; how do rival firms engage in price fixing in the face of anti-trust laws? They use tacit mechanisms to arrive at mutually beneficial outcomes in which actors coordinate on equilibria without overt contracts with one another. In terms of military strategy, the advantage of such an approach is that it defines practicable goals in unwinnable conflicts, it logically nests tactical lines of effort underneath a well-defined strategic vision, and it entails relatively low costs and risks.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the relevant literature on bargaining and war outcomes, and then focus particularly on the problematic aspects of internal wars. This provides a conceptual foundation upon which to build our treatment of asymmetric military interventions. We then discuss the use of the "Tullock contest" as the most common framework currently chosen for the formal modeling of war termination and why it is inappropriate for our needs here (due to its supposition of a clear winner and loser in the modeled contest). We then proceed to construct and solve an alternative model based on oligopolistic competition; using such an approach allows us to provide the formal characterization of an equilibrium in which actors may optimally stabilize a conflict and even foster cooperation on other mutually desired outcomes despite neither being able to dominate the battlefield or engage in diplomatic bargaining. Finally, we return to the case of Afghanistan and counterfactually apply some of the model's implications to that forsaken war.¹¹

Bargaining and War Outcomes: Unexplored Equilibria for Unwinnable Wars

To build our argument, we first review the application of bargaining models to the puzzle of war termination. We then narrow our discussion to the dynamics of war termination for intrastate conflicts. More specifically, we focus on this subset of conflicts to highlight four commonly observed aspects of internal wars that are also found in the population of protracted asymmetric military interventions that are relevant here.¹² These four aspects are: the inability for either actor to achieve decisive military victory, inherent instabilities that hinder negotiated settlements, the frequent presence of "profitable" rent-streams that sustain the conflict, and the often fractured nature of the warring actors. After discussing each of these attributes in turn, we then set the stage for their employment in our model.

The study of war termination has a relatively short and thin history. As late as 2009, Reiter could still lament that "[w]e know relatively little about how wars end, in contrast to

the mountain ranges of ideas and scholarship we have about how wars start ... war termination must receive closer attention.”¹³ Kecskemeti and Ikle began the modern agenda on war termination by examining the strategic nature of surrender and how prewar visions of quick victory often diverge from the duration and costs of actual wars.¹⁴ More recent efforts, such as Stam, Goemans, and Reiter build on the seminal work of Wittman and Pillar and emphasize war termination as a bargaining process.¹⁵ As actors fight one another the conflict may culminate in a total military victory in which one side is completely disarmed and left at the mercy of the other, but it is more likely to result in a diplomatic settlement somewhere short of total subjugation, with the exchange of violence serving as a form of bargaining that drives the terms of the settlement. This logic can be seen to reflect Clausewitz’s famous dictum that war is a continuation of politics and those political aims are often limited.¹⁶ In typical analyses of inter-state war outcomes, wars can be decided militarily (either side wins through force of arms), or a “draw” can occur when “both sides are willing to accept [an] ... outcome through some form of negotiated settlement.”¹⁷ Within this framework fighting serves two purposes: it can reveal information about the likelihood of either side winning the war, and it can also serve to change that likelihood (by degrading the capabilities of the actors at varying rates).¹⁸ In other words, a “military contest is like a very costly experiment that tests competing theories as to how the war will unfold.”¹⁹ Internal wars, however, often confound this characterization.

First, is the inability of either side to achieve decisive military victory in the conflict. The inter-state war termination literature centers on the use of fighting to reveal information to the participants.²⁰ As they fight, their expectations about outcomes become more consistent with one another, allowing settlements to be achieved. But as Fearon points out, grinding civil wars confound this story as “it strains credulity to imagine that the parties to a war that has been going on for many years ... can hold any significant private information about capabilities or resolve.”²¹ As a result, internal wars can end up frozen in place, and “parties can be locked in a completely unwinnable war despite the presence of mutually preferable deals.”²²

The second feature is the commitment problem that hinders the likelihood of stable, negotiated settlements in internal conflicts. Schmitt argues that one of the greatest achievements of early modern Europe was the capacity for wars between sovereign states to be “bracketed” by the resumption of peaceful coexistence.²³ In other words, besides outright military victory, warring sovereign states can also choose to diplomatically terminate conflict and reestablish normal relations.²⁴ The dynamics of intrastate wars, however, differ significantly; since both actors are struggling to occupy the same sovereign space, it is usually the case that one actor needs to be utterly extinguished for the conflict to end.²⁵ Fearon shows why this is such a significant problem for negotiated war termination in civil wars, namely that any outcome in which one actor ends up fully subordinated to the other begs for reneging and is hence unstable.²⁶

A third feature of internal wars is relevant for our analysis: making the war itself “profitable.” Fearon shows that this outcome is particularly likely to occur when both actors can make the civil war “pay” (usually through the exploitation of some appropriable rent-stream, such as drug trafficking or valuable natural resources).²⁷ There is often a mutually reinforcing relationship between conflict and appropriable rent-streams as wealth can be generated as a flow of private goods that are easily controlled by force.²⁸ The relevant aspect of this feature is that oftentimes the wealth associated with the rent-stream becomes highly valued by the conflict’s participants, in some cases arguably more so than the nominal goals of the actor.²⁹ Since these sources of rents are highly valued, threats to these streams provide a potential “lever” to shape actors’ behavior (a feature we exploit below).

Finally, rather than a bargaining problem among unitary actors, as is normally the case in inter-state war termination, the conflict may be more complicated. Since the conflict takes place within a non-functioning state, violence may be exercised by any number of players.³⁰ This may be due to the breakdown of command and control among factions or the proliferation of additional actors taking advantage of the opportunity to exploit the political vacuum created by war.³¹ In other words, events may occur within the conflict environment for which it is not clear who is responsible. This complexity makes bargaining processes significantly more difficult.³²

What does this body of work imply for asymmetric military interventions? If these four factors are pernicious features of intrastate conflict, why is our model not one of civil wars? The answer is that asymmetric interventions have an additional feature, one that is not common in civil wars. In asymmetric interventions, the conflict is an external and (often) trivial endeavor for one of the combatants.³³ Despite the asymmetric resource endowment, however, often the “powerful” intervenor fails to achieve victory; in fact, forty percent of asymmetric conflicts result in failure by the more powerful side.³⁴ If these well-resourced intervenors are unable to achieve “victory” through such costly activities as large-scale counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine,³⁵ what other strategies exist that might be sustained for lower costs? Answering this question is critical for American foreign policy, given the failures of the last two decades.

Our tacit collusive model provides a new strategic logic for stalemates by highlighting a mostly overlooked type of equilibrium that may exist within this class of conflicts. Beyond the three outcomes that have been the focus of the existing literature -- (1) win/lose (one side militarily disarms the other), (2) draw (formally negotiated political settlement), or (3) continued fighting -- we focus on a fourth: tacit collusion.³⁶ This equilibrium enables an outcome that is Pareto superior to continued fighting and would be a feasible outcome when victory or negotiated settlement are not attainable. It constitutes a relatively attractive form of coexistence within which both actors coordinate in refraining from overly injurious actions. In sum, a tacit collusive outcome is optimization within a stalemate.

Optimizing the Stalemate: Tacit Collusion

We now turn to an alternative way to conceive of strategies and outcomes in limited armed conflicts within the context of wider competition. To develop a useful model of such conflicts we need to diverge from the standard assumptions of a contest with a decisive culminating point and, instead, utilize a framework that allows for endless competitive interactions. Models of tacit collusion among firms provide an attractive set of tools for such an endeavor.

Our modeling choices diverge from the standard approach to formally modeling conflict: a Tullock contest.³⁷ In such a contest, participants exert costly effort and victory is decided by a random variable with its distribution determined by the efforts of the participants. This framework presupposes that one actor in the conflict eventually “wins” (or at least the conflict is neatly settled).

In many recent and ongoing military conflicts, however, there is reason to believe that this framework is an ill fit. In asymmetric interventions, for example, the militarily powerful state may be too constrained by political considerations to bring their resources to bear, while the weaker side is simply incapable of destroying the forces of the invader; hence, a military resolution is rarely possible. Consequently, we have a very different operational environment than that described by a Tullock contest. When stylized, the static equilibrium of a ‘stalemate game’ is essentially the outcome of a prisoners’ dilemma each period; costly battles—even when repeated over and over again—result in little real movement in territory. This setting shares key abstract features of price competition between rival suppliers in an industry in which neither firm will ever be able to eliminate the other. For this reason, we are able to utilize analytical tools from the literature on industry dynamics. Particularly, we show that in this setting there is a dynamic equilibrium that is better for both actors. In this equilibrium, each actor refrains from defection and is, further, incentivized to exert resources to prevent disruption by outside forces.

The idea that firms can use dynamic strategies to sustain supra-competitive profits is very old and based on the “folk theorem” in game theory. This idea was first formalized in a noncooperative repeated game setting by Friedman.³⁸ The literature on tacit collusion is now extensive and includes some powerful results.³⁹ The basics of tacit collusion are as follows: Actors play a particular collusive path of strategies. In any given time period, there is a short-term benefit from defecting from the collusive path. The key to sustaining collusion is a punishment that is enacted if an actor defects from the collusive path. For a collusive path to be an equilibrium it must be that the short-term gain from defection is outweighed by the expected future punishment of taking such an action. Abreu established the idea that carrot-and-stick punishment paths can be optimal.⁴⁰ This is a punishment that involves a brief hit of a “stick” and then returning to the collusive “carrot” path. Green and Porter and Abreu et al. expand this reasoning to a model of incomplete information and imperfect observability.⁴¹ In a setting when defections are not perfectly observable a carrot/stick form

of collusion with periods of punishment (the stick) are on the equilibrium path. The finite periods of punishment are enacted after harm occurs to an actor and the actor cannot determine if the harm was intentional or not. These short-term punishments are essential to keep the players from taking actions that harm the other actor. The model we construct is built upon the results of this literature and includes periods of punishment on the equilibrium path.

Our choices build on previous work designed to model the interactions among terrorist groups and state actors.⁴² This work seeks to reveal the dynamics that unfold between an irregular opponent that can leverage asymmetric informational advantages to inflict damage on a materially superior state.⁴³ Jacobson and Kaplan, for example model the exchange between targeted killings employed by the state versus suicide bombings employed by terrorists, focusing on the impact of relative patience between the two actors.⁴⁴ Bueno de Mesquita examines the tension between moderate and extremist factions common within terrorist groups and models the conditions under which the government may induce cooperation from moderate terror faction to aid in the contest with the extreme faction in infinitely repeated interactions.⁴⁵ More recent work, such as Baron, Berman, and Gaviious, build on this work by analyzing empirical data of terror attacks and then building models to explain the observed patterns.⁴⁶

Such an approach has the novel implication of turning uncertainty on its head: Traditional military strategy emphasizes the need to “keep the enemy guessing” and maximize uncertainty, disruption, and surprise.⁴⁷ This model, rather, seeks to find a stable equilibrium that is a mutually acceptable and sustainable outcome; players have a common understanding that unacceptable actions trigger swift, proportionate punishment while acceptable behavior goes unpunished. In the following section we provide a model of repeated conflict for a territorial space with the possible occurrence of unidentifiable acts of violence. We then characterize dynamic collusive strategies, and derive the conditions based on the model primitives for these strategies to be a mutually beneficial equilibrium.

A Model of an Unwinnable War

Consider two actors that are in a long-term conflict such that neither actor can hold territory without costly effort. The game takes place over discrete time periods $t = 1, 2, \dots$, which go on indefinitely. Here we use the word “territory” to denote multidimensional span of control over the conflict environment. We use $i \in \{1, 2\}$ to denote an arbitrary actor and j is used to index the actor other than i . Actor i takes actions to fight for territory in time period t , $x_t^i \geq 0$ that costs $c^i x_t^i$ to the actor, where $c^i > 0$. Denote by $x_t = (x_t^1, x_t^2)$, the vector of territorial fighting actions at time t . The total value of holding control of the territory for each actor i is R^i . For simplicity we assume that regardless of the territorial distribution in the preceding period, it is just as difficult to hold or gain territory in the following period. Territorial distribution is determined for period t by military effort according to the function

$$L^i(x_t) = f^i(x_t)/(f^1(x_t) + f^2(x_t)),$$

where each f^i is a continuously differentiable, bounded, concave and strictly increasing function from $\mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$. Further, $f^i(0) = 0$ for $i \in \{1,2\}$. We allow a territorial split at the discontinuity point $x_t = (0,0)$ to be split such that $L^1(0,0) + L^2(0,0) = 1$, and $L^i(0,0) \geq 0$ for each actor i .

The two actors can also take military actions that do not impact the territorial distribution but cause direct harm to the rival actor j and create some positive effects for the actor i taking the actions. We call these actions non-territorial military actions. For each actor i , a_t^i is used to denote non-territorial actions, with $a_t^i = 1$ meaning the actions are taken and $a_t^i = 0$ meaning they are not taken. Denote by $a_t = (a_t^1, a_t^2)$, the vector of actions at time t . The utility from taking these actions to actor i is denoted by $v^i(a_t^i)$, with $v^i(0) = 0$ and $v^i(1) = v^i \geq 0$. These action cause harm to the other actor j specified by the function $h^j(a_t^j)$, with $h^j(0) = 0$ and $h^j(1) = h^j > 0$. The last inequality imposes that the net benefit to both actors from the non-territorial military actions is negative.

There is also a positive probability that a non-territorial “terror” attack happens to actor i by some rogue elements not following the instructions of actor j .⁴⁸ This type of attack occurs to actor i with probability $\mu^i(\cdot) > 0$. This probability of an outside strike to actor i can be reduced by the costly effort of actor j : e_t^j . This is specified by $\mu^i(e_t^j)$, a continuously differentiable, concave and strictly decreasing function from $\mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow [0,1]$. The effort level of actor i is unobservable by the rival actor j . This function $\mu^i(\cdot)$ captures the control each actor j has of their own forces as well as non-state actors in conflict environment. An environment with many rogue actors who are not controlled by actor j involves a function $\mu^i(\cdot)$ that are larger at every effort level. We assume that the probability of an unauthorized terror strike hitting each actor is independent. A terror strike to actor i causes that harm h^i . There is no way for actor i to know if the strike was a deliberate action of actor j , or an action by some other external actor in the conflict environment.

Actor i 's expected payoff of a particular time period t is:

$$U^i(x_t, a_t, e_t) = R^i L^i(x_t) - c^i x_t^i + v^i(a_t^i) - h^i(a_t^j), -\mu^i(e_t^j)h^i - e_t^i$$

Each actor i has a geometric discount factor $\beta^i \in (0,1)$. The expected payoff of actor i at any time period t is written

$$V^i = \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} (\beta^i)^{\tau-t} U^i(x_\tau, a_\tau, e_\tau)$$

Next, we consider equilibria of this repeated game.

All Out War

To begin the analysis, we focus on the equilibrium of the repeated game that does not involve dynamic strategies. This will be denoted as the War equilibrium and is composed of the repeated play of the static or one-shot Nash equilibrium from each period. Since the same one-shot game is repeated for each period t , we are free to suppress the time subscript in our analysis. The additive separability of the payoff functions makes each player i 's choices of each the variable a^i , e^i , and x^i independent of each other. Let us begin by analyzing the static equilibrium choices of a^i and e^i , which are just basic optimization problems in which the optimal choice is not impacted by the other player j 's choices. Player i 's first order condition for effort e^i is

$$\partial U(x, a, e)/\partial e^i = -1,$$

and consequently, the equilibrium involves each player picking the minimal effort $\bar{e}^i = 0$. The binary choice a^i is also straightforward since $a^i = 1$ gives an addition of utility $v^i > 0$, while the choice of $a^i = 0$ results in zero added utility. Therefore, the optimal choice is $\bar{a}^i = 1$.

Each period t static game has the following unique one-shot Nash equilibrium in territorial actions $\bar{x}$ that satisfy the following expression from the first order condition of each player i .⁴⁹ For each i , $\bar{x}$ is implicitly defined by the expression

$$\partial L^i(\bar{x})/\partial x^i = c^i/R^i.$$

The one-shot Nash equilibrium expected payoff of player i for any period t is:

$$U^i = R^i L^i(\bar{x}) - c^i \bar{x}^i + v^i - (1 + \mu^i(0)) h^i,$$

Each actor i has a common geometric discount factor $\beta^i \in (0,1)$. Then actor i 's discounted expected payoffs of the war equilibrium starting at any period t can be written:

$$V^i = (1/(1 - \beta))U^i$$

Dynamic Equilibrium: Tacit Collusion

In this section, we consider dynamic strategies that can improve the expected payoffs of both parties. The subgame-perfect equilibrium that we focus on has the following character:

The equilibrium strategy involves each actor using the no war actions $\hat{x}^i = \hat{a}^i = 0$, and the territorial split is $L^i(\bar{x})$ until a punishment is necessary.⁵⁰

Each actor puts in effort $\hat{e}^i$ to prevent outside actors attacking their rival defined by $-\partial \mu^i(\hat{e}^i)/\partial e^i = 1/\beta^i h^i$.

For notational simplicity we write $\hat{\mu}^j = \mu^j(\hat{e}^i)$. Clearly, $\hat{\mu}^i < \mu^i(0)$ for both actors i .⁵¹

The strategy we propose is based on each actor i playing actions $(\hat{x}^i, \hat{a}^i, \hat{e}^i)$ each period until a defection from x or harm to an actor is observed. We label the actions of actor i playing $(\hat{x}^i, \hat{a}^i, \hat{e}^i)$ from period t onward is called the initial path of actor i starting at period t . The strategy we propose begins with each actor playing the initial path at time $t = 1$.

On this equilibrium path, there are two types of punishments triggered by two different events.

Punishment type 1: If either actor i defects from $\hat{x}^i$ at time t , then a punishment is triggered. This action is perfectly observable so if the punishment path is sufficiently harsh, then it will never be observed on the equilibrium path. For simplicity we have each actor impose the punishment of forever (since it will never appear on the equilibrium path) non-collusive reversion U^i for any such defection.

Punishment type 2: The second punishment type is triggered if an actor i is harmed from a non-territorial attack. This punishment is triggered regardless of who caused the harm to actor i . If the actor i is on the actor i 's initial path at time t and actor j receives harm at time t , then actor j switches to single period of punishment at time $t + 1$. The punishment is to play $\bar{a}^j = 1$ for period $t + 1$. As long as there is no harm to actor j at period $t + 1$, actor j plays j 's initial path from $t + 2$ onward.

Notice that during a period of actor j punishment by playing $\bar{a}^j = 1$, actor i is still on i 's initial path. Thus, if harm is inflicted to actor j in this period, then another period of punishment by actor j will follow.

The single period expected payoff of these actions for actor i is

$$U^i = R^i L^i(\bar{x}) + \hat{\mu}^i v^i - (\hat{\mu}^1 + \hat{\mu}^2) h^i - \hat{e}^i,$$

Given the implementation of this by both actors within the dynamic strategy with regards to actions x and a , each actor i maximizes her own discounted expected payoff by picking $\hat{e}^i$. This is an important feature of these dynamic strategies: each actor i puts in effort to stop terror attacks on the other actor j , because they internalize some of the cost of the terror attack to their rival via an increased probability of the punishment type 1. The incentive to minimize terror attacks to your rival is a distinct feature of this dynamic strategy.

The statement of the following proposition includes the conditions such that this dynamic strategy is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Proposition 1 The dynamic strategy is a subgame-perfect equilibrium if for both actors i ,

$$\beta^i \geq \max \left\{ \frac{v^i}{h^i(1-\hat{\mu}^i)}, \frac{R^i(1-L^i(\bar{x}))}{R^i(1-L^i(\bar{x})) + c^i \bar{x}^i - v^i + h^i + (\mu^i(0) - \hat{\mu}^i) h^i + \min \{0, (\mu^i(0) - \hat{\mu}^i) h^i\} - \hat{e}^i} \right\}.$$

The inequality in the proposition highlights that the key to these strategies being a subgame-perfect equilibrium is that each actor must be sufficiently patient. That is, the value of utility tomorrow compared to today must be high enough that a defection today is not

worth the punishment tomorrow for either actor. This must be true for both types of defections. First, the gain to an actor from terror type attacks is outweighed by the punishment of a retaliatory attack next period. Second, the short-term gains from fighting for territory are outweighed by resulting punishment of battles in the future. Given these dynamic strategies are a subgame-perfect equilibrium, the equilibrium effort to mitigate terrorism on the other actor e^i is an optimal choice for actor i at each time period t . This effort weighs the cost of effort against the decreased probability of being punished by the other actor next period for a terror attack that came from a rogue element.

Conclusion: Rethinking Afghanistan

The model presented here provides general prescriptions for an entire class of conflicts: limited armed conflicts where neither actor is capable of defeating the other. By moving beyond the assumptions built into the Tullock contest and borrowing the architecture of tacit collusion among oligopolistic firms, we have identified optimal strategies for an entire class of conflicts that have befuddled military planners in recent decades. As such, we contribute to a growing literature that leverages insights from the folk theorem for better understanding armed conflict. Our model suggests that conceiving of strategy in such conflicts as tacit collusive equilibria would not lead to "victory" but would rather achieve valued results at much lower cost.

We began this article with reference to Afghanistan. How could this conflict have been approached differently once the war sank into stalemate? We explore this question with some counterfactual reasoning here.

First, it is easy to establish that altering the territorial division of the conflict for either side became cost prohibitive as the conflict dragged on.⁵² By the last few years of the war United States forces were limited to operating within "med rings" (rings determined by the ability to transport wounded soldiers to surgery facilities within one "golden" hour).⁵³ This had been true since the cessation of direct American combat operations and the failure of the "Village Stability Operations" campaign (2009-2014) to contest Taliban control in the hinterlands of Afghanistan.⁵⁴ Conversely, it was also exceedingly difficult for the Taliban to have made significant gains within these rings and they rarely sought to do so. Once the territorial fighting effectively stopped, the essential conditions of the tacit collusion equilibrium were set and understood by both sides. This is an important component of the tacit collusive strategies we are exploring, that actors come to recognize the futility of spending additional resources to change the territorial distribution within the context of an "unwinnable" war.

The second component of the model concerns the capacity for each actor to inflict punishments on the other that are not designed to contest the territorial division - what we have labeled as "terror attacks." The model speaks to the conditions under which these "terror attacks" form part of the collusive strategy, particularly when there may be attribution

concerns around terror strikes from “rogue” elements within a confusing operational environment. In the case of Afghanistan, the Taliban had the capacity to conduct terror attacks within the urban areas.⁵⁵ Less well known, however, was the American capacity to inflict non-territorial punishment on the Taliban. Rather than inflicting additional casualties on the Taliban forces (they were largely insensitive to such killing and were regularly able to turn such strikes to their advantage through propaganda) the “terror strike” tool available to American forces was the painful disruption of the Taliban's heroin industry through the targeted bombing of the presses which processed opium into heroin. Over the course of the war, the Taliban had grown into the world's largest exporter of heroin⁵⁶ and disrupting the processing of their heroin production provided an exceedingly attractive lever to be pulled by U.S. forces. Bombing the heroin refining locations cut into the Taliban's profits; it also generated friction between the Taliban cartel and the rural Afghan poppy farmers upon whom they relied for political support and the supply of opium.⁵⁷ To be clear, disrupting heroin production in the context of our proposed strategy would not be intended to cripple or eradicate the heroin trade,⁵⁸ but would rather be used sparingly and instrumentally to maintain tacit collusion.

Building on the stability of territorial distribution, the strategic use of such “terror” strikes by both sides could have allowed both actors to develop a tacit collusive relationship that identified a mutually acceptable state of affairs within Afghanistan, as well as low-cost tools to maintain that outcome in an endogenously binding equilibrium. This could have set the stage for an even more attractive form of mutually beneficial cooperation concerning rogue elements within the operational environment. Consider that the original purpose of the American invasion of Afghanistan was ending Taliban support for trans-national terrorism. The Taliban seemed to have never been terribly interested in global Jihad and had shown itself to be quite uncomfortable with ISIS militants operating in the Eastern regions of the country.⁵⁹ The model presented here serves to exploit such antipathy through discrete punishments. It prescribes strategic actions in light of information asymmetries regarding the attribution of terrorist attacks and amplifies existing shared interest in “policing” such trans-national terrorist groups that operated in Afghanistan.⁶⁰ If fully realized, the framework presented here illuminated a path towards achieving this central goal of the 2001 invasion – the prevention of Afghanistan reemerging as a base for transnational terrorism – at a fraction of the cost of a counterinsurgency campaign.

The greatest challenge to implementing the strategic concepts posited here is the political appetite to sustain a military conflict -- even a minimally costly one -- for an indefinite period of time within the domestic American arena. The political pressure around military commitments tends to vary with the size of the forces deployed, with the deployment of large, conventional forces significantly increasing the “flow of sand through the political hour-glass.”⁶¹ Given this constraint, U.S. SOF forces have the capacity to deploy small numbers of troops while retaining the ability to plan and execute sensitive and strategic operations in semi-permissive or non-permissive environments. Therefore, U.S. SOF units

seem best suited to operationalize the concepts outlined here in a manner that might sustain political will.

To summarize the application to Afghanistan, the model presented here would not have offered a path to military “victory” in Afghanistan. It rather would have provided fresh strategic thought for the small footprint of forces that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Central Command's Commanding General claim to have advocated to President Biden in the wake of the controversial withdrawal from Afghanistan.⁶² It does so by providing a logical basis for cheaply sustaining armed conflicts to achieve limited aims; this is particularly attractive in the context of managing wider competition and resource constraints for an indefinite period. Further, if one assumes that the United States will face similar militarized conflicts in the future—and based on the record of American interventions since the Second World War, this is a safe bet⁶³—then the model presented here provides a novel strategy for cheaply managing them. In an oncoming era in which both fiscal constraints and the rise of peer competitors may make “winning” strategies prohibitively expensive, the “management” strategies presented here will become more attractive. Finally, we suspect that the logic offered here can scale to other domains of strategic competitions that last for indefinite periods and in which all out conflict is prohibitively costly and the likelihood of ultimate victory is very small or absent. Future work will explore such extensions of the model.

Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1

We now show that this inequality is sufficient to guarantee that neither actor will defect from the dynamic strategy outlined in Proposition 1. The proof is done by verifying these dynamic strategies are in fact a subgame-perfect equilibrium for any discount factors weakly larger than the bound in the statement of the proposition.

We begin by showing that, given $\hat{x}$ is played in each period, choosing $\hat{a}$ each period is supported by the dynamic strategy.

First, we denote by V_t^i actor i 's discounted expected payoff of the stable peace strategy starting at any period t . At an arbitrary time period t the stable peace has expected payoff for period $t > 1$, $U^i + \mu^i v^i$ since with probability μ^i actor j was harmed last period. Thus, we can write for $t > 1$

$$V_t^i = \frac{1}{1-\beta^i} (R^i L^i(\bar{x}) + \hat{\mu}^i v^i - (\hat{\mu}^1 + \hat{\mu}^2) h^i - \hat{e}^i),$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} V_1^i &= R^i L^i(\bar{x}) + \hat{\mu}^i v^i - \hat{e}^i + \frac{\beta^i}{1-\beta^i} (R^i L^i(\bar{x}) + \hat{\mu}^i v^i - (\hat{\mu}^1 + \hat{\mu}^2) h^i - \hat{e}^i) \\ &= \frac{1}{1-\beta^i} (R^i L^i(\bar{x}) + \hat{\mu}^i v^i - \beta^i (\hat{\mu}^1 + \hat{\mu}^2) h^i - \hat{e}^i), \end{aligned}$$

Now we consider the case that actor i defect from her initial path. This defection can only occur if last period ($t - 1$) no harm was inflicted on actor i . The single period defection profit minus collusive profit is v^i . The future loss from this defection is the harm of $-h^i$ for sure next period instead of the expected harm of $-\hat{\mu}^i h^i$. The incentive compatibility constraint for not defecting to $\bar{a}^i = 1$ is

$$\begin{aligned} v^i &\leq \beta^i (V_t^i - V_t^i + (1 - \hat{\mu}^i h^i)) \\ &\leq \beta^i (1 - \hat{\mu}^i h^i). \end{aligned}$$

Rewritten in terms of a bound on the discount factor we have,

$$\beta^i \geq \frac{v^i}{1 - \hat{\mu}^i h^i}.$$

Second, we consider defections from $\hat{x}$. Given such a defection at time t , the actors switch to the static Nash equilibrium from $t + 1$ onward. The upper bound of the gain from defection for either actor i happens at the limit of $x^i > 0$ as $x^i \downarrow 0$. The incentive compatibility constraint for collusion must cover all $x^i > 0$, which means it must cover the upper bound gain $U_b^i - U^i = R^i(1 - L^i(\bar{x}))$. The incentive compatibility constraint for actor i non-territorial action in all periods $t > 1$ is:

$$\begin{aligned} R^i(1 - L^i(\bar{x})) &\leq \beta^i (V_t^i - V_t^i) \\ &\leq \frac{\beta^i}{1 - \beta^i} (U^i - U^i) \\ &= \frac{\beta^i}{1 - \beta^i} (R^i L^i(\bar{x}) + \hat{\mu}^i v^i - (\hat{\mu}^1 + \hat{\mu}^2) h^i - \hat{e}^i - R^i L^i(\bar{x}) + c^i \bar{x}^i - v^i \\ &\quad + (1 + \mu^i(0)) h^i) \\ &= \frac{\beta^i}{1 - \beta^i} (\hat{\mu}^i v^i - (\hat{\mu}^1 + \hat{\mu}^2) h^i - \hat{e}^i - c^i \bar{x}^i + v^i - (1 + \mu^i(0)) h^i). \end{aligned}$$

Rewritten in terms of the discount factor we have,

$$\beta^i \geq \frac{R^i(1 - L^i(\bar{x}))}{R^i(1 - L^i(\bar{x})) + c^i \bar{x}^i - v^i + h^i + (\mu^i(0) - \hat{\mu}^i) h^i + (\mu^i(0) - \hat{\mu}^i) h^i - \hat{e}^i}.$$

For time period 1, this constraint is slightly different

$$\begin{aligned} R^i(1 - L^i(\bar{x})) &\leq \beta^i (V_1^i - V_1^i) \\ &\leq \beta^i (c^i \bar{x}^i - v^i + h^i + (\mu^i(0) - \hat{\mu}^i) h^i) + \frac{(\beta^i)^2}{1 - \beta^i} (c^i \bar{x}^i - (1 + \hat{\mu}^i)(v^i + h^i) + \\ &\quad + (\mu^i(0) - \hat{\mu}^i) h^i). \end{aligned}$$

Rewritten in terms of the discount factor, we have

$$\beta^i \geq \frac{R^i(1-L^i(\bar{x}))}{R^i(1-L^i(\bar{x})) + c^i \bar{x}^i - v^i + h^i + (\mu^i(0) - \hat{\mu}^i)h^i + \min\{0, (\mu^i(0) - \hat{\mu}^i)h^i\} - \hat{e}^i}.$$

The discount factor bound for period 1 is larger than in any period $t > 1$ and is the bound used in the statement of the proposition.

Finally, we verify that each actor picking $\hat{e}^i$ at every time t is an equilibrium. We write the discounted expected payoff for player i from time t onward given the dynamic equilibrium by both players for all $s \geq t$, except any effort e_t^i can be picked in period t .

$$V_t^i(e^i) = R^i L^i(\bar{x}) + \hat{\mu}^i v^i - (\hat{\mu}^1 + \hat{\mu}^2)h^i - e^i + \beta^i(R^i L^i(\bar{x}) + \hat{\mu}^i v^i - (\hat{\mu}^1 + \hat{\mu}^2)h^i - \hat{e}^i) + \sum_{s=t+2}^{\infty} (R^i L^i(\bar{x}) + \hat{\mu}^i v^i - (\hat{\mu}^1 + \hat{\mu}^2)h^i - \hat{e}^i)$$

Then maximizing $V_t^i(e^i)$ with respect to e_t^i we attain the first order condition

$$\frac{\partial V_t^i(e^i)}{\partial e_t^i} = -1 - \frac{\partial \hat{\mu}^i(e^i)}{\partial e_t^i} \beta^i h^i = 0.$$

The unique solution to this problem is $\hat{e}^i$.

Endnotes

¹ This research grew from the direct experience of two of the authors who analyzed these issues on the ground in Afghanistan during the Fall of 2016.

² Rebecca Shabad, "Contradicting Biden, top generals say they recommended a small force stay in Afghanistan," *NBC News*, 28 September 2021, <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/pentagon-leaders-austin-milley-face-questions-chaotic-afghanistan-withdrawal-n1280230>.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Concept for Competing* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022), iii.

⁴ Ali Wyne, "In Afghanistan, A Protracted Stalemate," *The RAND Blog*, 26 February 2018, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/02/in-afghanistan-a-protracted-stalemate.html>; Christopher D. Kolenda, "Slow Failure: Understanding America's Quagmire in Afghanistan," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42:7 (2019): 992-1014.

⁵ Ellen Mitchell, "Afghanistan War at a Stalemate, Top General Tells Lawmakers," *The Hill*, 4 December 2018, <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/419739-afghanistan-war-at-a-stalemate-top-general-tells-lawmakers>.

⁶ James M. Lindsay, "Campaign Foreign Policy Roundup: What to Do About Afghanistan?" *Council on Foreign Relations: The Water's Edge Blog*, 16 October 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/campaign-foreign-policy-roundup-what-do-about-afghanistan>.

⁷ Reuters, "Trump Pledges to Withdraw Troops from Afghanistan by Christmas; Taliban Cheer," *NBC News*, 8 October 2020, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-pledges-withdraw-troops-afghanistan-christmas-taliban-cheer-n124259>.

⁸ Joshua Keating, "The Forever War Won't End Until Congress Ends It," *Slate*, 5 May 2021, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/05/biden-afghanistan-aumf-forever-war-power-congress.html>.

⁹ Ali Wyne, "The Risks of Permanent War," *The RAND Blog*, 28 September 2018, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/09/the-risks-of-permanent-war.html>.

¹⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. M.E. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 91.

¹¹ This prescriptive application of our model accords with Aumann's insights on game theory that "the distinction between the descriptive and the normative modes is not as sharp as might appear... solution concepts will often have both descriptive and normative interpretations." Robert Aumann, "What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?" in *Frontiers of Economics*, ed. K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 13.

¹² We follow the usage of the term internal war as Eckstein: "The term 'internal war' denotes any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, rulers, or policies ... Nor does it mean quite the same thing as certain more commonly used terms, such as revolution, civil war, revolt, rebellion, uprising, guerrilla warfare, mutiny, jacquerie, coup d'etat, terrorism, or insurrection. It stands for the genus of which the others are species." Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," *History and Theory*, 4:2 (1965): 133-163, 113.

¹³ Dan Reiter, *How Wars End* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2009), 1.

- ¹⁴ Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
- ¹⁵ Allan C. Stam, *Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); H.E. Goemans, *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Reiter, *How Wars End*; Donald Wittman, "How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 23:4, (1979): 743-763; Paul Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
- ¹⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, 69; R. Harrison Wagner, "Bargaining and War," *American Journal of Political Science* 44:3 (2000): 469-484.
- ¹⁷ Stam, *Win, Lose, or Draw*, 35.
- ¹⁸ R. Harrison Wagner, *War and the State: The Theory of International Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 150.
- ¹⁹ Wagner, *War and the State*, 153.
- ²⁰ Robert Powell, "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting," *American Journal of Political Science*, 48:2 (2004): 344-361; Branislav Slantchev, "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations," *American Political Science Review*, 97:4 (2003): 621-632.
- ²¹ James D. Fearon, "Why do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research*, 41:3 (2004): 275-301, 290.
- ²² Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars," 294; see also Jean-Pierre Langlois and Catherine C. Langlois, "Does the Principle of Convergence Really Hold? War, Uncertainty, and the Failure of Bargaining," *British Journal of Political Science*, 42:3 (2011): 511-536.
- ²³ Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum* (Candor, NY: Telos Press, 2006).
- ²⁴ Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito, "Introduction," in *The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Liberal War, and the Crisis of Global Order*, ed. L. Odysseos and F. Petito (London: Routledge, 2007).
- ²⁵ Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A. Harrison, "Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars," *Third World Quarterly*, 28:2 (2007): 321-367.
- ²⁶ Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars"; Barbara F. Walter, "Bargaining Failures and Civil War," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12 (2009): 243-261.
- ²⁷ Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars," 294.
- ²⁸ Jeffrey Frieden, "International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation," *International Organization*, 48:4 (1994): 559-593; Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, "Why is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?" *American Economic Review*, 83:2 (1993): 409-41.
- ²⁹ Michael Ross, "A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9 (2006): 265-300.
- ³⁰ Peter Rudloff and Michael G. Findlay, 2016. "The Downstream Effects of Combatant Fragmentation on Civil War Recurrence," *Journal of Peace Research*, 53:1 (2016): 19-32.

- ³¹ Michael Burch and Leslie Ochreiter, "The Emergence of Splinter Factions in Intrastate Conflict," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 13:1 (2019): 47-66; Mohammed M. Hafez, "Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 32:3 (2020): 604-629.
- ³² Gordon H. McCormick and Guillermo Owen, "Factionalism, Violence and Bargaining in Civil Wars," *Homo Oeconomicus* XX:4 (2004): 361-390.
- ³³ Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson, and Larry Berman, eds, *Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- ³⁴ Patricia Sullivan, *Who Wins? Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4; see also Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics*, 27:2 (1975): 175-200; Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security*, 26:1 (2001): 93-128.
- ³⁵ David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
- ³⁶ Although repeated prisoner's dilemma games, which focus on dynamic equilibrium that qualify as "tacit collusion," have been used to understand international conflict since Shubik, dynamic strategies using these insights have remained on the sidelines with regards guiding strategy in asymmetric conflicts. See Marin Shubik, "Game Theory, Behavior, and the Paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma: Three Solutions," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 14:2 (1970): 181-193.
- ³⁷ For a review of this literature see Erik O. Kimbrough, Kevin Laughren, and Roman Sheremeta, "War and Conflict in Economics: Theories, Applications, and Recent Trends," *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 178 (2017): 998-1013.
- ³⁸ James Friedman, "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," *Review of Economic Studies*, 38:1 (1971): 1-12.
- ³⁹ Feuerstein provides an excellent survey of the theoretical literature on tacit collusion. Switgard Feuerstein, "Collusion in Industrial Economics: A Survey," *Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade*, 5 (2005): 163-198.
- ⁴⁰ Dilip Abreu, "Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 39:1 (1986): 191-225; Dilip Abreu, "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," *Econometrica*, 56:2 (1988): 383-396.
- ⁴¹ Edward H. Green and Robert J. Porter, "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," *Econometrica*, 52:1 (1984): 87-100; Dilip Abreu, David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti, "Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 39:1 (1986): 251-269; Dilip Abreu, David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti, "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," *Econometrica*, 58:5 (1990): 1041-1063.
- ⁴² For surveys of this work see Todd M. Sandler and Kevin Siqueira, "Global terrorism: Deterrence versus pre-emption," *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 39:4 (2006): 1370-1387; Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, *The Political Economy of Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
- ⁴³ B.J. Brophy-Baermann and A. C. Conybear, "Retaliating against terrorism: Rational Expectations and the Optimality of Rules versus Discretion," *American Journal of Political Science* 38:1 (1994): 196-210.

⁴⁴ D. Jacobson and E. H. Kaplan, "Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings in (Counter-) Terror Games," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51:5 (2007): 772--792.

⁴⁵ Ethan B. Bueno De Mesquita, "Conciliation, counterterrorism, and patterns of terrorist violence," *International Organization*, 59:Winter (2005): 145-176.

⁴⁶ Opher Baron, Oded Berman, and Arie Gavious, "Game Between a Terrorist and a Defender," *Production and Operations Management*, 27:3 (2017): 433-457. In two other closely related papers, Acemoglu and Wolitzky and Yared, use repeated games with imperfect observability to provide new understanding on the nature of international conflict. Acemoglu and Wolitzky provide an "overlapping generations" model conflict spirals in which agents eventually learn that the conflict began based on a misperception and switch back to good actions, thereby restarting the cycle. Daron Acemoglu and Alexander Wolitzky, "Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model," *American Economic Review*, 104:4 (2014): 1350-1367. Yared provides a model of conflict with an aggressive and non-aggressive county in which the efficient outcome can only be sustained by equilibrium strategies that involve temporary wars. Pierre Yared, "A Dynamic Theory of War and Peace," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 145 (2010): 1921-1950.

⁴⁷ For a critical analysis on this topic, see Leo J. Blanken, "Reconciling Strategic Studies... with Itself: A Common Framework for Choosing Among Strategies," *Defense and Security Analysis* 28:4 (2012): 275-287.

⁴⁸ We use the term "terror" in spite of the fact that these strikes do not necessarily fit the formal definition of terrorism. The accepted definition of terrorism from Enders and Sandler is "the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence or brutality to obtain political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience." We do not specify the purpose of the attacks or that they involve extra-normal violence. The term is only used informally because what we call terror attacks includes the case of terrorism. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Terrorism: Theory and Applications," in *Handbook of Defense Economics, Volume 1*, ed. K. Hartley and T. Sandler (New York: North-Holland, 1995), 213.

⁴⁹ Uniqueness of equilibrium follows from Proposition 1 of Takashi Yamazaki, "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent-Seeking Contests," *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, 10:2 (2008): 317-327.

⁵⁰ Although the territorial split or "sharing rule" at $\hat{x} = (0,0)$ can be an endogenous part of the dynamic equilibrium we fixed it at the split of $\bar{x}$. The intuition for this procedure is that we are assuming the two actors retain the existing distribution of territory when foregoing "all out" conflict. Conditions for similar dynamic equilibrium to the one we outline can be constructed for a range of similar territorial distributions.

⁵¹ Note the $\hat{e}^i$ is simply the solution to each actor i 's discounted expected utility maximization problem given the dynamic strategies outlined below.

⁵² Anthony H. Cordesman, "The State of the Fighting in the Afghan War in Mid-2019," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/state-fighting-afghan-war-mid-2019>

⁵³ Ben Barry, "Battlefield Medicine: Improving Survival Rates and the 'Golden Hour'," *International Institute of Strategic Studies*, 2019, <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/04/battlefield-medicine>

- ⁵⁴ William Knarr and Mark Nutsch, *Village Stability Operations and the Evolution of SOF Command and Control in Afghanistan: Implications for the Future of Irregular Warfare* (MacDill AFB: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2020).
- ⁵⁵ Andrew Wilder, "What's Behind the Spike in Deadly Terror Attacks in Afghanistan?" *United Institute of Peace*, 2018, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/01/whats-behind-spike-deadly-terror-attacks-afghanistan>.
- ⁵⁶ Alfred W. McCoy, "How the Heroin Trade Explains the US-UK Failure in Afghanistan." *The Guardian*, 9 January 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/09/how-the-heroin-trade-explains-the-us-uk-failure-in-afghanistan>
- ⁵⁷ Dan Lamothe, "The US begins bombing Taliban drug labs as Trump's Afghanistan strategy takes hold," *Washington Post*, 20 November 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/11/20/the-u-s-begins-bombing-taliban-drug-labs-as-trumps-afghanistan-strategy-takes-hold/?utm_term=.c8831b8efa66
- ⁵⁸ David Mansfield, "Bombing Heroin Labs in Afghanistan: The Latest Act in the Theater of Counternarcotics." *London School of Economics Drug Policy Unit*, 2018, <https://www.lse.ac.uk/united-states/Assets/Documents/Heroin-Labs-in-Afghanistan-Mansfield.pdf>
- ⁵⁹ Wesley Morgan, "Our Secret Taliban Air Force: Inside the Clandestine US Campaign to Help Our Longtime Enemy Defeat ISIS," *Washington Post*, 22 October 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/22/taliban-isis-drones-afghanistan/?arc404=true>
- ⁶⁰ Shawn Snow, "ISIS Loses More than Half of Its Fighters from US Airstrikes and Taliban Ground Operations," *Military Times*, 27 February 2020, <https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/02/27/isis-loses-more-than-half-its-fighters-from-us-airstrikes-and-taliban-ground-operations/>
- ⁶¹ John Bleigh, Justin Hufnagel, and Curt Snider, "Institutional Challenges to Developing Metrics of Success in Irregular Warfare" (master's thesis, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011).
- ⁶² Leo Blanken and Stephen Rodriguez, "The Strategic Logic of a Forever War," *Foreign Policy*, 8 September 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/08/afghanistan-biden-sunk-costs-forever-war/>
- ⁶³ Barbara Salazar Torreon and Sofia Plagakis, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2022* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2022).

The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) “Merrill’s Marauders:” Special Operations Force Strategic Success Through an Operational Concept in Burma

Stephen Hill, Independent Scholar

ABSTRACT

After being forced into World War II, by the violent acts of the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, the United States faced a two-theater war that would test the country’s resolve. Of those two theaters, the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater, a subset of the conflict in South East Asia, stood as an increasingly important area of responsibility for the Allies. The capture of Burma, by the Japanese, threatened to suffocate China’s limited supply, thus snuffing out Chinese military resistance and any hope of expelling the Japanese war machine.

Bent on keeping China in the war, the United States and Britain looked for a solution that would push the Japanese out of Burma and reestablish supply routes into China. The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), based on rudimentary British success in long- range penetration operations, was authorized, staffed, and forward deployed. Through their efforts, the 5307th, one of America’s first Special Operations Forces, had a strategic effect on the CBI theater.

KEYWORDS

Merrill, Marauders, Burma, 5307th, Composite, Operational Concept, China-Burma-India (CBI), Stilwell, Wingate, 75th Ranger Regiment, Long-Range Penetration Unit

Introduction

On 7 December 1941, when the Japanese flew kamikaze attacks into the naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the United States could no longer stand by and watch as the events of World War II consumed the globe. American Service men and women set sail for the European and Pacific theaters. While the grueling battle to unseat Hitler from power in Germany and beat back his Nazi forces took center stage, the Pacific theater saw some of the most violent fighting of the war. Inside the Pacific theater, inundated with Japanese forces was Burma.

The only land link remaining to China, the liberation of Burma, and the reopening of the Burma Road that led into China, became a strategic objective for the United States. Japanese forces in Burma had already pushed the British and American-led Chinese troops out of the country, using the dense jungle and rugged terrain to their advantage. A new

CONTACT Stephen Hill | Stephen.D.Hill40@proton.me

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of United States Government, Department of Defense, or United States Special Operations Command. © 2023 Arizona State University

operational concept was required to take on the expanding Japanese empire in Burma and reopen supply lines to a faltering China.

Developed by British Brigadier Orde Wingate, long-range penetration was just the operational concept needed. American and British leadership believed in Wingate's theory and made available resources in both men and treasure with the aims of pushing Japan out of Burma and reestablishing the land link with China. The American fighting force created has gone by many names including Galahad, 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), Merrill's Marauders. Names aside, one thing is for sure—the men of the 5307th made a strategic impact on the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater while utilizing the operational concept of long-range penetration.

Merrill's Marauders earned their spot in history through dense jungle, unforgiving terrain, a multitude of illnesses and injuries, fierce combat, and a relentless enemy. It is through all this hardship that the legacy of American special operations was born.

The China-Burma-India Theater

By December of 1941, Germany had been able to blitzkrieg its way across Europe. Hitler's Third Reich had rolled through Holland, Belgium, Norway, Yugoslavia, Greece, and were well on their way to taking what remained of France.¹ The Germans, however, were not the only ones occupying large swaths of land. By the same time, the Japanese had invaded an area twice the size of Germany's wartime footing.²

China was the crowned jewel of the Imperial Japanese. The expansive country could provide the Japanese with an enormous market for their goods, a wide array of resources ripe for the taking, a number of shipping hubs that could further facilitate Japan's rise, and a buffer between the island and the Soviet Union.³ Japan chose a tactic of isolation and began to envelop China.

The imperial forces captured Indochina (present day Vietnam) effectively closing the land-based supply lines into China. The only remaining supply route was the Burma Road.⁴ In quick succession, Japan took Hong Kong, then Borneo and Thailand. The noose was tightening around China. The Allied forces, having previously decided on a "Europe First" strategy in World War II, were forced to place more thought into the CBI theater as Japan moved through the Burmese capital of Rangoon.

Just days prior to the Japanese capture of Rangoon, and subsequently the rest of Burma, the U.S. had sent 440 military personnel, under the leadership of Major General Joseph Stilwell, to help train and equip the over three million Chinese troops.⁵ Stilwell's efforts, however, were to be thwarted initially and by mid-1942 the Japanese had established themselves in Burma and driven American, British, and Chinese forces out of the country.

The isolation of China took on greater importance as the last land route to supply the country was closed by Japanese forces in Burma. The U.S. could not stomach the thought

of losing China in the war efforts, nor being bested by the Japanese. Gavin Mortimer explains, “Roosevelt was determined not just to restore the prestige of the Allies, but to keep China an active partner in the alliance. It was envisaged that further down the line, China would provide American bomber aircraft with the bases from which to attack the Japanese mainland.”⁶ The U.S. had to act fast or else risk losing China. Multiple Allied conferences were conducted regarding the CBI, and slowly a strategy began to develop.

The Strategic Aims of the U.S. in Burma

The termination of the Japanese forces’ insurmountable push across the Asian continent was of grave importance to the United States. Fear of Japanese expansion drove the CBI theater into focus in mid-1942. Donovan Webster, in his work *The Burma Road*, explained the Allied approach to the theater writing:

the entire point of the China theater and, later, CBI was to protect what remained of Asia for Britain, China, and the United States. Initially, however, its sole objective was to keep China in the war and India under colonial British rule, since both nations functioned as the gateway not only to Central Asia, but as the obvious path for a land-based link between Japan and Germany.⁷

Keeping China in the war would turn out to be more difficult and time consuming than U.S. strategists planned.

The U.S. viewed China as an untapped resource in the fight against Japanese forces. The country’s geographic position and vast pool of manpower to draw from was seen as an asset by American planners.⁸ All that was required for Chinese forces to meet muster was some training and equipment. Initially, U.S. efforts were geared towards this end. Even before reluctantly entering the war after the events of Pearl Harbor, the U.S. had been sending lend-lease material to China;⁹ with training, conducted by General Stilwell, soon to follow.¹⁰

The U.S., however, was not only pitted against the Japanese in the CBI, but also British and Chinese reluctance and lack of support. The British, who’s primary focus was on the conflict in Europe and the Mediterranean, initially showed little interest in liberating Burma and opening a route to China. British leadership did not hold the same optimism towards the potential professionalization of the Chinese military as the Americans did. As such, the efforts placed into opening a land link with China would do little to aid the fight against the Japanese, or so was British sentiment.¹¹

For the Chinese, internal struggles between the established Kuomintang party, presided over by President Chiang Kai-shek, and communist factions in the country betrayed American efforts. Even though, a truce was formed between the Chinese factions when Japanese expansionist elements thrust Japan’s armed forces into a “full-scale but undeclared

war against China,” in 1937, it was not long before infighting resumed.¹² The turbulence internally resulted in a defensive posture from Chinese President K’ai-shek.

Bjorge articulates Chinese apprehension, writing:

China’s position was that of Chiang K’ai-shek, president and commander of the Chinese Army. His government was weak and faced many internal challenges, especially from the Communists. He did not want to see his military forces consumed in battles with the Japanese because he would then have fewer troops to support him in internal disputes...As Stilwell told General George C. Marshall, Chief of staff of the U.S. Army in mid-1943, ‘[Chiang] did not want the regime to have a large, efficient ground force for fear that its commander would inevitably challenge his position as China’s leader.’^{13,14}

The reluctance of the Chinese to provide significant numbers, and British indifference to the Burma theater, weighed heavily on the ability of the U.S. to produce results; and with the European theater monopolizing much of the country’s resources, a solution in Burma was sought, but on a shoestring budget. Regardless, the U.S. endeavored to reopen supply lines to China.

The Japanese control of Burma and the ports surrounding China effectively cut off supply to the country. Japanese aircraft patrolled aerial supply lines while ground forces barred vehicle borne resupply. Without the healthy supply of lend-lease materials flowing into China from the U.S., the giant of the Asian continent was withering. Plagued by internal turmoil and strife between current leadership and communist factions, China was in no condition to fight off the encroaching Japanese threat. The U.S. feared that if China fell, the Japanese would be insatiable in their expansion.

One aerial route was available to the Allied forces. Known as the Hump Route, the airbridge from Ledo to Assam provided minimal supplies to the beleaguered Chinese.¹⁵ The 700-mile route, which took aircrews over the Himalayas, was treacherous and could not fulfill the required tonnage of supplies to successfully maintain Chinese forces under Stilwell.¹⁶ The only conceivable way to deliver the 45,000 tons of lend-lease material was via land. Reopening the Burma Road was imperative.¹⁷

The U.S. championed the retaking of Burma during the coalition conferences held in 1943. At the Casablanca Conference, U.S. Joint Chief of Staff “put an offensive to retake Burma high on the conference agenda and obtained British agreement to conduct the operation in winter of 1943-1944.”¹⁸ Developments in the European theater, however, saw an agreement during the Trident Conference that only Northern Burma would be the objective of the coming offensive. U.S. strategists impressed on the attendees the importance of a land link to China regardless.¹⁹

It was not until the Quadrant Conference of August 1943 that a final strategy was put to paper. Four objectives were established (as shown in figure 1) which would result in the creation of an American ground force tasked with the retaking of Northern Burma and the reopening of the Burma Road.




Figure 1. The Quadrant Conference, August 1943. Source: Joint History Office, Government Publishing Office, October 2017

Merrill's Marauders

The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), known shortly after its formation as Merrill's Marauders, a moniker hung in honor of the unit's initial commander Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill,²⁰ was brought into existence in August of 1943. The unit, initially code-named Galahad, was formed on paper at the Quebec Conference, also referred to as the Quadrant Conference, when the need for an American ground force in Burma was pressed upon the Allied leadership.²¹

One of America's precursors to modern Special Operations Forces, the 5307th owes its genesis to a British Officer. Then Brigadier, Orde Charles Wingate, on the invitation of Winston Churchill,²² presented to the attendance of the Conference an operational concept he had experimented with in Northern Burma earlier that year. The use of long-range penetration groups, in concert with conventional ground forces, could provide the foothold required to drive the Japanese out of Burma and re-establish supply lines to China.

The minutes of the Quebec Conference explain:

The British Chiefs of Staff had considered proposals put forward by Brigadier Wingate for the increased employment of long-range penetration groups in conjunction with the main advances. These groups relied on the Japanese out-flanking tactics but whereas the Japanese outflanking movements consisted of four or five mile sweeps, Wingate's method used 40 or 50 miles sweeps and used units of the size of a brigade group. These groups took pack transport and wireless and could, when necessary, be maintained from the air. They would reach far into the area of the Japanese lines of communication in conjunction with the main advances ... He [the British Chief of Staff] felt that the United States Chief of Staff might wish to hear from Brigadier Wingate his views on the use of long-range penetration groups.²³

As a result, American leadership, impressed by Prime Minister Churchill's confidence in Wingate's proposal and in need of a tactic to turn the tide in Burma, authorized the creation of a three-thousand-man strong long-range penetration group to be trained by Wingate and operate in the thick jungles of Burma to unseat the Imperialist Japanese.²⁴ Initial planning also had Wingate commanding the American force. However, subsequent changes placed the Marauders under American General Stilwell's command.²⁵

Thus, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), code name Galahad, was born. The operational concept pitched by Brigadier Wingate was not, however, developed solely in the jungles of Burma. Wingate had been slowly building his concept for long-range penetration groups since his first command as a British officer. It was this drawn out vetting period, conducted by Orde Wingate, that laid the foundation for Merrill's Marauders successes in the CBI.

The Makings of an Operational Concept

The inspiration for the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) was drawn from the tactics of one British officer who endeavored to rid British Burma of the Imperialist Japanese.²⁶ Orde Charles Wingate, an ardent believer of the Old Testament and ardent champion of long-range penetration operations²⁷, set in motion an operational concept that he had been working to develop since early in his military career.

Wingate first pondered the effects of small groups of soldiers conducting long distance foot-born operations well outside the reach of conventional lines of communication while he was a Lieutenant, filling a Major's billet, commanding an infantry company composed of Sudan Defense Forces and the East Arab Corps, in the Kassala Province of Sudan.²⁸ The remote location and lack of accountability to the higher command headquartered in Gedaref afforded Wingate an unprecedented amount of leeway whilst conducting operations for the Crown.

Jon Diamond explains,

the 'isolated backwater allowed Wingate to exhibit command initiatives and develop military principles about small groups of soldiers surviving in a desolate, inhospitable environment, which would have been almost impossible for his rank in the regular British Army. Training, fitness and field craft became his credos, which would enable his troops to remain afar from garrison without [lines of communication] LOC.²⁹

Wingate even experimented with ground-to-air control with the Royal Air Force, a tactic that would be expanded and utilized by both Wingate and the Marauders in Burma.

Wingate further refined his concept while leading anti-poaching patrols in Ethiopia and combating Arab revolt in Palestine. Wingate was impressed by the poachers' ability to scatter and reform when threatened by attack. As a Brigadier, Wingate would implement this tactic in Burma, dubbing it *dispersal and rendezvous*.³⁰ In Palestine, Wingate's creation of the special night squads, made up of Jewish paramilitary forces lead by British officers and noncommissioned officers, was another testament to his unorthodox way of fighting.³¹

By the time World War II had begun, freshly minted Captain Wingate had already created a conceptual framework for his brand of operations, the long-range penetration. In the early 1940s, Wingate crossed the Sudan-Ethiopian border with a force of around 3,000 men he called the Gideon Force, after the biblical warrior of Old Testament lore,³² and, with deception, harassing tactics, and guerrilla warfare, was able to defeat the Italian force of some 36,000 strong.³³

His Gideon Force was disbanded in the summer of 1941; however, it was not long before Wingate started organizing another long-range penetration unit. Pulled into the Burma theater by Archibald Wavell, the former commander of British troops in Palestine and admirer of Wingate's unorthodox tactics, Wingate set to work transforming his new command, the 77th Indian Brigade into a long-range penetration force.³⁴

After a period of rigorous training, Wingate's force, now known by the nickname "The Chindits" (named after the Burmese half-lion and half-dragon temple guard statues)³⁵ was put to action in what was to be called Operation Longcloth. Originally designed to work in unison with the three Chinese units tasked with liberating Burma, the Chindits struck out

into the jungles of Burma on their own. The Chinese forces were in no shape to provide any support on the front end while Wingate's men worked the vulnerable rear echelons. Against advice from higher to wait, Wingate marched his men deep into Burma.³⁶

Wingate's soiree into Japanese-held territory was viewed in conflicting lights when the Brigadier's columns, ordered to disperse into small groups and rally across the border in India, returned after committing themselves too far behind enemy lines. Of the raid and the sentiment of General William Slim, Wingate's superior officer, Webster noted:

of the three thousand Chindits who went into Burma, only 2,182 came out—and only six hundred of those men were ever fit for military service again. He also noted that, while damage was done to the Japanese rail and communications systems by the Chindits mission, only an estimated 205 Japanese were killed. Because of these inequitable casualty rates, not to mention the costs in airpower and equipment lost for what was ultimately only a short-term disruption to the flow of Japanese troops, information, and goods, Slim was forced to assess the Chindit raid as a failure.³⁷

General Slim's assessment, however, did not stop positive propaganda about the Chindits exploits from circling the globe, giving hope to the Allied leaders. As noted above, Winston Churchill took a leading interest in Wingate's operational concept, and through that interest and championship, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) was brought to life.

Recruiting, Organization, and Training

Born on paper, Galahad needed living, breathing troopers to fill its ranks. Recruitment for the classified unit was conducted under a cloak of secrecy. Even the name Galahad was classified at the Secret level and known to only a few, not reaching the founding members of the unit until well into their training cycle.³⁸ Notice was posted for the new unit under the guise of the 1688th Casual Detachment recruitment with a request for 2,830 officers and enlisted men to volunteer for "a dangerous and hazardous mission."³⁹

The request was promptly disseminated across the U.S. Army. Ogburn writes,

At important commands all across the country and at posts in the Caribbean the directive from Washington had been read aloud at formations, including the specific statement that what volunteers were wanted for was a 'dangerous and hazardous mission.' It also had been read to the troops in the south and southwest pacific.⁴⁰

Before long, the men that would make up Merrill's Marauders were on their way to their ports of embarkation.

In a progress report dated 18 September 1943, penned by General Thomas Troy Hardy, an update on the 1688th Casual Detachment (Galahad) read as follows:

1. The following personnel for American Long-Range Penetration Units for employment in Burma are being satisfactorily assembled at the San Francisco Port of Embarkation:

960 jungle-trained officers and men from the Caribbean Defense Command.

970 jungle-trained officers and men from the Army Grand Force.

2. A total of 674 battle tested jungle troops from the South Pacific are being assembled at Noumea (the capital city of New Caledonia) and will be ready for embarkation on the Lurline 1st October.
3. General MacArthur was directed to furnish 274 battle-tested troops. He was able to secure only 55 volunteers from trained combat troops that have not been battle-tested. These troops will be picked up by the Lurline at Brisbane.⁴¹

The men furnished by the Army made up three battalions and it was not long before the entire force was consolidated in Bombay; the unit, now officially designated the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) was routed to Deolali only to be moved to a training camp in Deogarh where organization and training began in earnest.⁴²

The three battalions, on the advice of Brigadier Wingate, were broken down into two standalone groups per battalion. The British term was a column; however, American leadership, intent on placing their own flare on the unit, designated them combat teams. Mortimer explains,

Each of the six combat teams was color-coded and each trained to operate as a self-contained unit, comprising a heavy weapons platoon, a rifle company, an intelligence and reconnaissance (I&R) platoon, a communications platoon, and a pioneer and demolitions detachment.⁴³

The organization of each battalion is shown in figure 2.

First Battalion and its Red and White combat teams were placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William Osborne with each combat team falling under Major Edward Ghiz and Major Caifson Johnson, respectively. The Second Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel George Alexander McGee, consisted of the Blue combat team commanded by Major Richard Healy and the Green combat team commanded by Captain Thomas Bogardus. Finally, Orange, under Major Lawrence Lew, and Khaki, under Major Edwin Briggs, combat teams made up the Third Battalion with Lieutenant Colonel Charles Beach as commanding officer.⁴⁴

The Command chart is shown in figure 3.

	Battalion Headquarters	Combat teams		Total
		No. 1	No. 2	
Officers	3	16	16	35
Enlisted men	13	456	459	928
Aggregate	16	472	475	963
Animals (horses and mules)	3	68	68	139
Carbines	6	86	89	181
Machine guns, Heavy		3	4	7
Machine guns, Light		2	4	6
Machine guns, Sub	2	52	48	102
Mortars, 60-mm		4	6	10
Mortars, 81-mm		4	3	7
Pistols		2	2	4
Rifles, Browning Automatic		27	27	54
Rifles, M-1	8	306	310	624
Rockets		3	3	6

Note: This table does not include the supply base detachment at Dinjan.

Figure 2. Organization of Battalions, Merrill's Marauders, February-May 1944. Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., United States Army, 1990

Battalion commanders were given the reigns in training their respective personnel and encouraged to make the program of training provided by higher their own. Just over two months was dedicated to the training of Galahad. Physical fitness was an integral part of training, as the dense jungle and unforgiving terrain of northern Burma would undoubtedly take its toll on the men of the 5307th. Individual skills; platoon tactics; and company, combat team, and unit exercises were developed and conducted.⁴⁵ The bulk of the two months, however, was focused on creating cohesive and efficient units at the squad and platoon level.⁴⁶




Figure 3. Organization of the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History

Aside from battalion training directed organically by the U.S. Army, the men of the 5307th participated in several training operations under the tutelage of Brigadier Wingate and his Chindits, who were also preparing for another penetration mission into Burma.⁴⁷ On one occasion, the training operation, a force-on-force event tasking the Chindits with infiltrating and securing an airfield held by men of the 5307th, was concluded early when physical fights between members of each force threatened to determine the outcome of the maneuver.⁴⁸

The joint training, despite spirited rivalries, was no less valuable for the preparation of Merrill's Marauders. The U.S. Army's records explain, "Ten days spent on maneuvers with General Wingate's troops brought to light minor deficiencies. There was a shortage of pack animals, and the changes that had been made in organization and equipment required final adjustment."⁴⁹ Adjustments would be made quickly, as Galahad would soon be marching into Burma.

Proof of Concept

At 2200 hours on 7 February 1944, task force Galahad began its 140-mile march on the 40-foot-wide Ledo road into Northern Burma.⁵⁰ Firmly under the command of General Stilwell,

the 5307th was headed into enemy territory tasked with providing long-range penetration support to the Chinese 22nd and 38th Divisions, who at the time were advancing southward, through the Hukawng Valley, towards the Japanese 18th Division. The 18th was a force of about 7,000 men and occupied fortified defensive positions along the Kamaing road, effectively controlling the only motor supply route in the area.⁵¹

General Stilwell envisioned the men of the 5307th conducting wide foot-born flanking maneuvers through the jungle in order to dislodge the Japanese forces in coordination with a Chinese frontal assault. All three battalions were set to the task and stepped off to the east by dawn on 3 March. To meet their objective of emerging at the rear of the Japanese forces and cutting the Kamaing road, the Marauders took a wide sweeping route to the enemy's right flank.⁵² Each of the three Battalions took a different paralleling trail that guided them south towards Walawbum.⁵³

The men of the 5307th were able to infiltrate the Japanese rear echelon relatively undetected. The forces presence was not known to the Japanese until they were some 20 miles behind the Japanese lines; prior to discovery, the Marauders had only dealt with small enemy patrols and parties.⁵⁴ Once discovered, the men of Galahad engaged in numerous hard-fought battles until 5 March, when, after one final failed effort to dislodge the American forces, the Japanese withdrew to the south across the Nambyu River.⁵⁵

By 9 March, the Marauders and the combined Chinese forces had converged on Walawbum and cleared the town of Japanese combatants. The Marauders' first operation was a resounding success and a confirmation in the long-range penetration units' proof of concept. U.S. Army historians recount:

In 5 days, from jump-off on 3 March to the fall of Walawbum on 7 March, the Americans had killed 800 of the enemy, had cooperated with the Chinese to force a major Japanese withdrawal, and had paved the way for further Allied progress. This was accomplished at the cost to the Marauders of 8 men killed and 37 wounded ... [sickness further effected the 5307th numbers]. Of the 2,750 men who started toward Walawbum, about 2,500 remained to carry on.⁵⁶

Battle tested and successful in their first act against the enemy, Merrill's Marauders were viewed as a viable tactical and operational force that could be used in conjunction with traditional troops to expel the Japanese from Burma. The proof lay in the results, and the men of the 5307th would face exponentially more hardship as their campaign across north Burma continued southward.

Operational Success

The Marauders' victory at Walawbum provided General Stilwell control of the Hukawng Valley, an operational success that opened supply lines for the Allied forces while driving

the Japanese forces further south into the Mongaung Valley, just below the town of Shaduzup. The coordinated effort between the 5307th and the Chinese main effort had worked. General Stilwell's strategy was showing promise.

General Stilwell, pleased with the results of the Marauders' jungle-penetrating capabilities, wanted to keep the Japanese forces on the back foot. He instructed the men of the 5307th to conduct another wide flanking maneuver in concert with a direct push south by the Chinese. Gavin Mortimer explains:

Stilwell's plan was for the Chinese 22nd Division to spearhead the advance south along the Kamaing Road toward Jambu Bum, while to the west the Chinese 65th Regiment covered the right flank. The Marauders' task was another encircling operation, swinging east of the Kamaing Road and penetrating through the jungle to the Japanese rear, where they would cut supply lines, disable communications, and sow confusion in the enemy's ranks.⁵⁷

The 1st Battalion of the 5307th was to march due south over the Jambu Bum mountain, with the Chinese 113th Infantry Regiment in tow to aid in deconstriction and cut west to encircle the enemy at Shaduzup. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were instructed to parallel 1st and penetrate further south to set up blocking positions on the road between Shaduzup and Kamaing.⁵⁸ Actual Scheme of Maneuver is shown in figure 4.

Movement south was initiated on the morning of 12 March. It took 1st Battalion until 21 March to make it within five miles of Shaduzup. The march was slowed by the dense jungle and periodic entanglements with Japanese forces. The assault force was forced to call in air resupply twice on their way to their attack point. These resupply runs, a relatively new concept that facilitated the Marauders' deep penetration mission, went without issue.⁵⁹

2nd and 3rd Battalion were tasked with setting up a roadblock, about 15 miles south of Shaduzup, near the town of Inkangahtawg.⁶⁰ The terrain, enemy forces on the path, and unexpected Japanese reinforcements from the south corrupted the timing of the 5307th and resulted in the 2nd and 3rd Battalions' phased withdrawal from the area surrounding Inkangahtawg. The force fell back to high ground at Nhpum Ga with 2nd Battalion sitting in a defensive position at Nhpum Ga while 3rd took up a position a few miles north, securing the airstrip at Hsanshingyang.⁶¹

From 28 March, until the 1st and 3rd Battalion were able to break through the enveloping Japanese forces on April 8, 2nd battalion fought for their lives at Nhpum Ga.⁶² The Japanese reinforcements encircled the men of 2nd Battalion and made continuous efforts to overrun the Marauder's perimeter. By the end of the combat seen at Nhpum Ga, the Army reports

“the total number of Marauder casualties ... was 57 killed and 302 wounded. The number evacuated to hospitals by air because of wounds or illness caused by amoebic dysentery and malaria reached a total of 379. The figure of known enemy dead exceeded 400.”⁶³

Merrill's Marauders, despite not achieving the objective they set out on in early March, were able to significantly weaken the Japanese resolve in Burma. Although the unit experienced a large number of casualties, they were still successful in pushing the Japanese forces further south; in turn opening the way to their final and most important target—the airfield at Myitkyina.

Despite the condition of the Marauders and the men's sentiment that rest and reorganization was required, it was not to be. Myitkyina had to be taken, and taken before the monsoon season rolled in. Gary Bjorge explains the urgency writing:

Higher authorities wanted Myitkyina taken ... developments within the coalition at the strategic/political and operational levels were putting pressure on Stilwell to act. Since the tactical situation and the nature of the forces under his command meant that Myitkyina could only be reached and attacked by a task force led by the 5307th, the die was cast...The pressure that Stilwell was feeling from the coalition partners to take Myitkyina was a result of new British and Chinese support for his north Burma campaign. Because the support was, in large measure, a response to American pressure, he knew he could not slacken his efforts.⁶⁴

As such, the men of the 5307th were mobilized towards that end.

On 28 April, with a few weeks to recover from the ordeal at Nhpum Ga, the men of the 5307th struck out toward Myitkyina. Once again, rough terrain and rampant sickness whittled away at the Marauders' resolve. They did, however, continue on, driven by the hopes that this would be their last mission. On 17 May, the Task Force attacked and captured Myitkyina airfield. The airfield and town quickly fell under siege by Japanese forces, dispelling any hope for a well-deserved furlough for the men of Merrill's Marauders.

Bjorge explains their condition writing,

by the end of May, the 2nd Battalion, which started for Myitkyina with 27 officers and 57 men, had only 12 men left in action. The situation in the 3rd Battalion was about the same. Only the 1st Battalion still had some strength—a handful of officers and 200 men. In his diary entry for 30 May, Stilwell was forced to write, ‘GALAHAD is just shot.’⁶⁵

The men held out, and with 2,500 reinforcement troops, known as the new Galahad, the 5307th was able to hold their ground and ultimately take Myitkyina for good. Gary Bjorge sums up the end of the 5307th writing, “In the campaign to reach and take Myitkyina

they had reached the limit of what they could do, and they could do no more. There, at the strategic objective, the unit and the soldiers in both came to the end of the line.”⁶⁶ The 5307th had achieved a string of operational successes culminating in the completion of its original strategic aim, but it had cost them dearly.

Strategic Success in Burma

The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) was deactivated on 10 August, one week after the capture of Myitkyina. The men of Galahad dispersed just as they had been assembled, no fanfare, not even a final formation.⁶⁷ The unit did, however, receive a Distinguished Unit Citation from the War Department. It reads as follows:

After a series of successful engagements in the Hukawng and Mogaung Valleys of North Burma in March and April 1944, the unit was called on to lead a march over jungle trails through extremely difficult mountain terrain against stubborn resistance in a surprise attack on Myitkyina. The unit proved equal to its task and after a brilliant operation of 17 May 1944 seized the airfield at Myitkyina, an objective of great tactical importance in the campaign, and assisted in the capture of the town of Myitkyina on 3 August 1944.⁶⁸

The citation highlights the strategic success of the unit, for it was the retaking of north Burma, to open both land and air supply routes into China, requiring the capture of Myitkyina, that the 5307th was initially created.




Figure 4. Map from the Hukawng Valley to Myitkyina from 24 February to 27 May 1944.

Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History,

<https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/marauders/marauders-covermap.JPG>

Gary Bjorge concludes:

based on QUADRANT decisions the CCS [Chiefs of Staff] gave SEAC [Southeast Asian Command] two objectives. One was to carry out operations, 'for the capture of Upper Burma to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China.' The other was, 'to continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies of China, and the development of air facilities with a view to a) keeping China in the war, b) intensifying operations against the Japanese, c) maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese air forces in China, and d) equipping Chinese ground forces.' To achieve these two objectives, capture of Myitkyina was deemed essential.⁶⁹

The men of Merrill's Marauders, with the help of Chinese forces, did just that. The airfield and town of Myitkyina was captured. The Japanese were forced out of "Upper Burma" and air and land routes were secured and improved upon. For all intents and purposes, the men of the 5307th had accomplished the strategic goals for which it had been created.

Tragically, the strategic aims put in place by the Allied leadership changed by the time the Marauders had secured their objectives. Webster recounts, by the fall of Myitkyina:

the Allied chiefs had opted to attack Japan from the Pacific islands and not from China. This line of thinking made the fight to 'keep China in the war' almost pointless. The war on Japan would now be fought from the sky, by planes off Pacific Ocean islands ... Despite the sweat and toil of creating the Ledo-Burma road, despite the blood spilled on the soil of Burma, India, and China to support the road, the Burma road had become obsolete even as it was being opened. The war had evolved past an overland supply route from India to China.⁷⁰

Merrill's Marauders had faced stiff enemy resistance, dense and unforgiving mountainous jungle terrain, and a plethora of diseases in their efforts to secure strategic success in the CBI. Their sacrifice and stalwart actions cannot be disputed. Strategically, the utilization of the special operations force was a victory for the Allied forces. The strategy, however, was abandoned for a new one, leaving the triumph of the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) as hollow as the remaining men of Galahad who staggered across the finish line General Stilwell had laid for them.

Conclusion

The conception, creation, staffing, training, and utilization of the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) was spurred by a strategic requirement in the (CBI) theater. The Allied leadership, although at odds regarding the importance of China in the fight against the

Japanese, required a special operations force that could penetrate deep behind enemy lines in Burma and uproot the Axis power there.

Faced with the projection of an 80 percent casualty rate, rugged terrain, torturous conditions, and a determined enemy, the men recruited for the 5307th fought on toward their objective. Merrill's Marauders fought in three major battles and a plethora of minor ones on their way to capture the airfield at Myitkyina and force the Japanese out of northern Burma. Their efforts, at the time, were seen as vital to the strategic aims of the Allies. China's vast amount of untapped potential and its geological advantage as a staging point in future attacks against mainland Japan made it, in the eyes of Allied leadership, impossible to lose.

If the strategic situation had not changed by the time Task Force Galahad reached its objectives, the efforts of Merrill's Marauders would have secured a place in history as one of the most instrumental efforts of the Pacific theater. Unfortunately, for the men of the 5307th, the strategic landscape did change. China's potential primacy as a foothold against Japanese Imperialists fell second to the Pacific Islands and with it the strategic successes of the Marauders.

The sacrifice and hard-won battles of Merrill's Marauders, however, live on in the lineage of the 75th Ranger Regiment. The Regimental Flash, worn prominently on every Ranger's tan beret, displays the colors of each of the 5307th combat teams. The Regiment's Distinctive Unit Insignia is the very same, although modified slightly, design as that of the unit patch worn by Merrill's Marauders.

For the 75th Ranger Regiment, the legacy of the 5307th is deeper than just metal on a duty uniform. The history of the Regiment is a long and colorful one, and the exploits of Merrill's Marauders is one of the most prominent. The men of the 5307th laid the foundation for Special Operations Forces like the 75th Ranger Regiment, and will always be remembered for their daring, dedication, resolve, and courage under fire. Their strategic success cannot be doubted. If only the strategy they fought so hard to secure had remained in place, there would be no question as to their efficacy.

Endnotes

- ¹ Donovan Webster, *The Burma Road: the Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater in World War II* (New York: Perennial, 2004), 25.
- ² Webster, *The Burma Road*, 25.
- ³ Gerald Astor, *The Jungle War: Mavericks, Marauders, and Madmen in the China-Burma-India Theater of World War II* (Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley & Sons, 2004), 5.
- ⁴ Webster, *The Burma Road*, 25.
- ⁵ Gavin Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders: The Untold Story of Unit Galahad and the Toughest Special Forces Mission of World War II* (Osceola: Quarto Publishing Group USA, 2013), 3.
- ⁶ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 4.
- ⁷ Webster, *The Burma Road*, 29.
- ⁸ Gary J. Bjorge, *Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations in Northern Burma in 1944* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 4.
- ⁹ Bjorge, *Merrill's Marauders*, 5.
- ¹⁰ Jon Diamond, *Stilwell and the Chindits: The Allies Campaign in Northern Burma, 1943–1944* (Havertown: Pen & Sword Books, 2014), 59.
- ¹¹ Bjorge, *Merrill's Marauders*, 4.
- ¹² Astor, *The Jungle War*, 8.
- ¹³ Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1953), 353.
- ¹⁴ Bjorge, *Merrill's Marauders*, 4.
- ¹⁵ William T. Y'Blood, *Air Commandos Against Japan: Allied Special Operations in World War II Burma* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014), VII.
- ¹⁶ Astor, *The Jungle War*, 145-146.
- ¹⁷ Astor, *The Jungle War*, 146.
- ¹⁸ Bjorge, *Merrill's Marauders*, 5.
- ¹⁹ Bjorge, *Merrill's Marauders*, 5.
- ²⁰ Bjorge, *Merrill's Marauders*, 1.
- ²¹ *Merrill's Marauders, February-May 1944* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1990), 8.
- ²² Astor, *The Jungle War*, 156.
- ²³ Joint History Office (U.S.), *The Quadrant Conference: August 1943*, (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2017), 427-428.
- ²⁴ Astor, *The Jungle War*, 157.

- ²⁵ Charlton Ogburn, *The Marauders* (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2002), 15.
- ²⁶ Patrick K. O'Donnell, *Into the Rising Sun: in Their Own Words, World War II's Pacific Veterans Reveal the Heart of Combat* (New York: Free Press, 2003), 12.
- ²⁷ Astor, *The Jungle War*, 126.
- ²⁸ Diamond, *Stilwell and the Chindits*, 20.
- ²⁹ Diamond, *Stilwell and the Chindits*, 21.
- ³⁰ Diamond, *Stilwell and the Chindits*, 21.
- ³¹ Astor, *The Jungle War*, 127.
- ³² Diamond, *Stilwell and the Chindits*, 22.
- ³³ Diamond, *Stilwell and the Chindits*, 22.
- ³⁴ Astor, *The Jungle War*, 127-130.
- ³⁵ Astor, *The Jungle War*, 130.
- ³⁶ Webster, *The Burma Road*, 94.
- ³⁷ Webster, *The Burma Road*, 106.
- ³⁸ Ogburn, *The Marauders*, 44.
- ³⁹ Webster, *The Burma Road*, 164.
- ⁴⁰ Ogburn, *The Marauders*, 29.
- ⁴¹ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 8-9.
- ⁴² Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 11.
- ⁴³ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 30.
- ⁴⁴ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 30.
- ⁴⁵ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 14-15.
- ⁴⁶ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 15.
- ⁴⁷ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 32.
- ⁴⁸ Ogburn, *The Marauders*, 54.
- ⁴⁹ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 16.
- ⁵⁰ Astor, *The Jungle War*, 193.
- ⁵¹ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 31.
- ⁵² Ogburn, *The Marauders*, 91.
- ⁵³ Webster, *The Burma Road*, 169.
- ⁵⁴ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 35.
- ⁵⁵ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 41.
- ⁵⁶ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 45.
- ⁵⁷ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 89.
- ⁵⁸ Astor, *The Jungle War*, 235.

⁵⁹ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 52-53.

⁶⁰ Gary J. Bjorge, *Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations in Northern Burma in 1944*, *Army History*, no. 34 (1995): 21.

⁶¹ Astor, *The Jungle War*, 242-244.

⁶² Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 87-90.

⁶³ Mortimer, *Merrill's Marauders*, 91.

⁶⁴ Bjorge, *Merrill's Marauders*, 23.

⁶⁵ Bjorge, *Merrill's Marauders*, 27.

⁶⁶ Bjorge, *Merrill's Marauders*, 27.

⁶⁷ Ogburn, *The Marauders*, 282-283.

⁶⁸ Ogburn, *The Marauders*, 283.

⁶⁹ Bjorge, *Merrill's Marauders*, 15.

⁷⁰ Webster, *The Burma Road*, 326.

Intentionally Blank

The Liberator's Dilemma: The Paradox of American Leadership

Joseph Long, Independent Scholar

ABSTRACT

As the special operations profession enters an era of involvement in geopolitical competition as part of a U.S. strategy of integrated deterrence, the leadership skills developed by the broader profession of arms remain insufficient. The complexity of integrated deterrence reveals increasing uncertainty on how SOF must exercise leadership in support of American interests that center on the partner forces as well as the interests of micro-level populations and associated non-state, sub-state, and paramilitary actors. This article presents a rational choice and ethical consideration model for understanding the “liberator’s dilemma” that underscores the degree to which military operations increasingly rely on support from indigenous populations and associated micro-level partner forces. This fact reminds leaders across the profession that the effective use of irregular warfare can shape American strategic interests and SOF’s role in integrated deterrence despite a critical and paradoxical false assumption about population-centric warfare and the leadership skills required of the Joint SOF profession and military leaders.

KEYWORDS

Irregular warfare leadership, population-centric conflict, rational choice, gray zone

As the special operations profession enters a new era of Special Operations Forces (SOF) involvement in geopolitical competition in the “gray zone” as part of a comprehensive U.S. strategy of integrated deterrence, the leadership skills developed by the broader profession of arms remain necessary but insufficient. For special operations, the complexity of the emerging security environment suggests there is increasing uncertainty on how the Joint SOF profession must exercise leadership in support of American interests that center on partner forces of both developed and developing nations, as well as the interests of micro-level populations and associated non-state, sub-state, and paramilitary actors. As SOF adapts to these requirements through joint and combined integration, or “the imperative of approaching complex, complicated, wicked, and compounded challenges through ‘whole of governments, whole of societies,’” SOF must recognize the reality that this environment necessitates a new framework for understanding military leadership.¹

CONTACT Joseph Long | josephelong1@gmail.com

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the United States Government, Department of Defense, or United States Special Operations Command. © 2023 Arizona State University

Leader development and leadership education in the Joint SOF profession, and to an extent, the profession of arms, is at a historic inflection point. For the Joint SOF profession to produce the necessary leaders needed for the future, SOF must relook and reconsider the leadership education required for leading within the human domain in a world that requires military leaders to become much more than maneuver experts or masters of the interagency (JIIM-C) environment within complex ecosystems and networks. Instead, this inflection point requires operational leaders and senior commanders to lead through networks and lasting relationships within the most complex micro-level environments afforded by the human domain. Professional military education (PME) institutions that traditionally produce America's great Generals and Admirals must openly challenge all previous assumptions.

Furthermore, the SOF profession must recognize the leadership challenges that have emerged in recent watershed events like 9/11 where SOF (at all levels) stake their survivability and operational success on their ability to offer inspiring leadership within a complex ecosystem rather than the traditional command of the elusive decisive conventional battle. Specifically, Joint SOF professionals must recognize the degree to which micro-level populations in developing countries and tribal societies contribute to America's strategy of integrated deterrence. Even if America manages to achieve optimal leveraging of all elements of national power to successfully out-compete our great power adversaries through conventional deterrence, the risks to American interests in the "gray zone" remain pervasive. Outside of conventional military dominance, American military forces can defeat our great power adversaries directly and still suffer costly strategic setbacks in the extant strategic spaces between peace and large-scale combat operations (LSCO).

Thus, all military leaders involved in security competition as part of SOF's support to 21st century irregular warfare must recognize that modern leadership is about leading much more than joint military formations.² Instead, modern SOF leaders must offer quality leadership at the micro-level decisive point where integrated competition remains largely unseen on the global stage. Joint SOF leaders at every echelon must leverage relational rather than transactional leadership styles as populations and their associated partner forces determine who wins or loses in strategic competition. In this space, the population chooses a winner based on utilitarian preferences, independent of the more powerful military's ability to leverage physical force.

To understand the degree to which population-centric conflict requires a new understanding of more than just leadership within the SOF profession, the "gray zone" challenges inherent to SOF environments are also shaping the traditional sense of military "officership" as well as "generalship" at the strategic level. As more than a strategic consideration for SOF, the "liberator's dilemma" thought experiment underscores the degree to which military operations in the human domain increasingly rely on support from indigenous populations and associated micro-level partner forces. In short, the liberator's dilemma provides a necessary pragmatic and ethical explanation for the realities that strong

state actors face when engaging in third-party military operations designed to “liberate” an oppressed population from a hostile political regime. Specifically, the liberator’s dilemma serves both a rational choice for maximizing the effect of population-centric insurgency models³ under the “insurgent swims through the population like a fish swims through the sea” idea,⁴ as well as with responsible and pragmatic ethical consideration for the “liberated” population.

Using rational choice and ethical consideration models as a guide, the liberator’s dilemma argument does more than expose critical flaws and ethical dilemmas that emerge during liberation operations. Instead, the liberator’s dilemma argument shines a meaningful light on the nature of U.S. military leadership in the era of integrated deterrence, arguing that relational, cross-cultural, and networked leadership theories have taken primacy over “classic” leadership education traditionally rooted in transactional, “great man,” charismatic, and heroic styles of understanding how state actors and military leaders function in great power competition.⁵

Gray Zones, Selectorates, and Insurgencies

Effective leadership in complex and “gray zone” environments is impossible without understanding the dynamic and elaborate political and social ecosystems that exist in “classic” population-centric insurgencies. Population-centric insurgency models emphasize that the will or agency of a local population is the primary actor capable of determining success in insurgency-based military operations marked by a strong state actor engaged in competition with a weak counter-state actor. For the strong state, the population is the critical link to overcoming the information disadvantage whereby the state cannot easily or accurately identify members of the insurgency. As such, the population becomes an essential ally capable of identifying rebels for surgical strike kinetic targeting.

For the weaker counter-state, the population is also critical for survival. Insurgents rely on a supportive population, allowing them to overcome their relative size and power disadvantages compared to the state by providing concealment from state-sponsored security forces. Likewise, when the rebels are protected or hidden by the population, they can attack agents of the state from hidden safe-haven positions and erode the limited resources and support of the state to gain a long-term temporal advantage. In support of this hypothesis, insurgency scholars find that increasing access to operational safe havens empirically increases the length of insurgent conflicts, which erodes state power over time.⁶

In understanding how regime leaders add to the micro-level political dynamic of insurgency, Bueno de Mesquita & Smith argue that a government’s first priority, well ahead of caring for the people, is to stay in power.⁷ Therefore, regime leaders disperse resources to powerful political stakeholders and in-groups (or “selectorates”) using rational calculations balanced by the relative size of powerful actors whose support is required to stay in power, in comparison to the size of the regime’s core.⁸ In short, governing regimes maximize their likelihood of staying in power by dispersing the spoils of their power to as few people as

necessary in order to retain the bulk of their power at the center. As such, closed regimes tend to have smaller selectorates, achieve results with smaller payoffs, and are incentivized to demonstrate more repressive behavior toward their citizens compared to more open and democratic regimes. In autocratic regimes, not only do dictators tend to behave badly toward their populations, autocrats rely on centralized state power and repressive security forces to protect themselves from being punished by the population. However, dictators sometimes become targets of more powerful open regimes (such as the U.S.) through liberating military operations publicly framed in the spirit of *de oppresso liber*, the motto of U.S. Army Special Forces.

Key to understanding regime preference for stability is the effect that regime type has on regime survivability and stability. Specifically, Bremmer explains how the relationship between regime openness and regime stability is often non-linear and counterintuitive.⁹ By comparing recognized measures for regime *openness*, a measurable variable between low and high openness (dictatorship through democracy), with corresponding regime *stability*, the correlation between *openness* and *stability* is found to be curvilinear rather than a straight line.¹⁰ Although the most open governments tend to be the most stable, the most closed (autocratic) governments also tend to be highly stable. The effect produces a J-shaped curve that illuminates the problematic nature of replacing certain dictatorships with democracies.¹¹ In this context, military operations aimed at democratizing weaker, closed regimes result in decreased stability for the population, while similar operations against more open regimes tend to enhance or increase stability.




Figure 1. Bremmer's J-Curve

Figure 1 represents the strategic implications of the J curve on an indigenous population. Democratizing a stable but closed regime at point **A** by moving it toward greater openness at point **B** is likely to be destabilizing. The corresponding shift in the Y-axis moves from a stability level at **a** to a lower stability level at **b** resulting in an overall, and undesired, reduction in stability. However, shifting a less autocratic regime at point **B** toward greater openness at point **C** results in the Y-axis shifting from a stability level of **a** to a higher

stability level of **c**. This model reaffirms that prescriptive measures for regime overthrow for **A**-type states is not the same as for **B**-type states, suggesting that prescriptive measures for American political and military leaders in dealing with these cases is also not the same.

Theoretically, a more powerful and open regime can overthrow a weaker and more closed regime in order to free its citizens from tyranny. In doing so, the population should remain highly cooperative in assisting the stronger actor in targeting bad actors within the closed regime, while the strong actor, in turn, potentially gains an ally and future trading partner. Unfortunately, the expectations of this model fail to account for the paradoxical and unintended consequences found when observing the liberator's dilemma thought experiment. Thus, the liberator's dilemma offers a more complete explanatory lens for understanding why popular support at the onset of liberation eventually leads to support for the incumbent and repressive regime.

When popular support switches sides, the liberating force risks becoming locked into costly and protracted counterinsurgency operations that resemble costly and long-term occupation. Furthermore, scholars agree that protracted conflicts for militarily superior actors can be a strategic disadvantage when weaker actors defend against strong-state powers using an *indirect* military approach.¹² In such cases, weak actors can deny stronger actors their military advantage in part by incentivizing stronger actors to risk harm to the indigenous population. This advantage is critical for success in population-centric insurgency models.¹³

The Liberator's Dilemma

The liberator's dilemma serves as an informative guide for navigating the leadership challenges inherent to highly complex "gray zone" military operations by showcasing the agency and strategic power within indigenous populations. With micro-level popular support being the key to military success in any version of population-centric warfare, the kind of warfare inherent to strategic competition within a strategy of integrated deterrence, the ability to provide meaningful and effective leadership in this part of the human domain becomes essential. However, the American track record for succeeding at this leadership challenge is replete with strategic failure.

By reframing population-centric military operations as primarily leadership challenges, modern military leaders and SOF professionals will recognize the need to develop new skills that can be leveraged against the paradox of the liberator's dilemma so that U.S. forces can compete and win through better partnerships built on relational rather than transactional leadership styles. Although the liberator's dilemma is presented as a stylized strategic choice model, the variables presented offer opportunities for military leaders to better understand and connect with micro-level partner forces in 21st century irregular warfare. The liberator's dilemma argument shines a meaningful light on the nature of American leadership in the era of integrated deterrence, arguing that relational, cross-cultural, and networked leadership theories have taken primacy over "classic" leadership

education rooted in transactional and “great man” theories in understanding how state actors and military leaders function in great power competition.

$T=0$




Figure 2. Population Support Decision tree at Time Period 0

The liberator’s dilemma assumes that a third-party intervention force of a strong state military has achieved a successful initial invasion of a less powerful autocratic regime that challenges the strong state’s interests. The strong state “liberator” offers the population freedom from the repression of the stable but closed adversarial regime. As the stronger actor in the conflict, the liberator also assumes a moral obligation to assume responsibility for any destabilization of the population. However, large-scale stability operations often fall outside of the capabilities or resources available to most liberating powers. When a liberating force fails to provide sufficient stability to the indigenous population, the people are likely to suffer a fate worse than under the prior autocratic regime. Thus, liberating people from authoritarian regimes is a risky gambit fraught with the risk of moral hazard to the population’s welfare, ergo the liberator’s “dilemma.” Although the population might initially welcome the liberating force, competing incumbent groups from within the overthrown regime challenge the authority of the liberating force. The liberator’s dilemma underscores the logic that a stylized strategic choice model uncovers within the micro-level bargaining and rational choice problems found in figure 2.

The leadership challenge inherent to the liberator’s dilemma begins when a stronger, more open regime liberator (**L**) physically removes a weaker and more closed incumbent regime (**I**). At this point, the population (**P**) becomes the center of gravity for producing the expected outcomes of the conflict as predicted by insurgency theory.¹⁴ As figure 2 demonstrates, each side of the conflict offers varying utility for **P**. At the conclusion of the successful invasion (Time period 0), **I** can only offer the status quo (**SQ**), or a reduced version of the status quo, resulting from the tyrannical nature of the recently deposed dictatorial regime. Meanwhile, **L** offers freedom from oppression (**Φ**), by virtue of successful regime overthrow, combined with the introduction of goods and services (**Γ**) that **L** can now provide for the **P**. Since the invasion of **L** was successful over **I**, the model assumes that $(\Phi + \Gamma)$ reflects an improvement to the **SQ**, such that the utility of **L** is greater than the utility of **I** or $(\Phi + \Gamma) > (\text{SQ})$, indicating that a rational **P** should initially prefer to support **L** over **I**.

However, classic insurgency models are static and fail to account for temporal considerations and the expectation that a militarily defeated adversary will still compete against the liberator. Likewise, it also follows that “classic” models also fail to consider the impact that leadership, the ability of the liberator to gain and sustain popular support, has on the outcomes of insurgency-based operations. By considering the dynamics of competition within an insurgency-based campaign, military leaders can better anticipate and manage the physical and relational needs of the liberated population.




Figure 3. Population at Time 1

In scholarly competition literature, political interaction is considered less a discrete event than a series of repeated interactions between liberating and incumbent actors. In the case of competition between the Catholic and Protestant churches in Latin America, Trejo (2009) noted that the arrival of Protestant missionaries into traditionally Catholic areas in the 1960s-1980s had a negative effect on popular support for the incumbent Catholic Church.¹⁵ The value of goods and services provided by the newly introduced Protestant missionaries drew from traditional Catholic congregations.¹⁶ Not surprisingly, the Catholic church responded to this competition with increased investment in their own levels of goods and services. At this point, the population recalculated the relative utility offered by the Catholic and Protestant services and shifted support back to the incumbent Catholic Church.¹⁷ The theoretical implications for a would-be liberator are similar and the ability for the liberator to understand and positively influence the human domain becomes the key to successful leadership in a population-centric campaign.

At time period 1, **I** responds to external competition by increasing the utility of their offer to **P**. After losing to **L** at time 0 with an offer of **SQ**, **I** now also competes with **L** by offering their own (typically smaller) version of goods and services (γ) as part of their offer. Furthermore, **I** also benefits from its shared affinity (α) in linguistic and cultural alignment to **P**, for a total utility equal to $\gamma + \alpha$. However, as the quality of **I**'s offer increases over time, the quality of **L**'s offer begins to decrease. The initial value of the freedom from the repressive regime (Φ) begins an inevitable decline represented by the discount variable (δ), such that

$[0 > \delta > 1]$ with the value of δ eventually reaching 0. Therefore, as long as the conflict continues, the value of Φ will also eventually reach 0.




Figure 4. Relative Utility over Time

Additionally, **L** offers the same Γ as in time 0 due to the incorrect assumption that **P**'s support has been secured, while **L** suffers an additional reduction in utility resulting from the cost of foreign occupation (C), for a total new value of $(\delta \Phi + \Gamma - C)$. At this point, **P** will switch sides and support **I** if the utility of **I** becomes greater than the utility of **L** or:

$$(\gamma + \alpha) > (\delta \Phi + \Gamma - C)$$

When this happens, the liberator's dilemma exposes friction for the previously dominant **L**. In contrast to **L**'s best intentions, **P** is now worse off at $T=1$ than it was at $T=0$, all due to the failure of the liberating force. The result of this dynamic is that the indigenous population remains skeptical of the liberating force, and the liberating force feels betrayed by the population, all while the stability of the population remains in decline. This sense of skepticism and betrayal thus becomes the entirety of the leadership frame required for the liberator to escape from the population trap.

Implications of the Model

The implications for the liberator's dilemma at this point are critical to understanding the complex leadership challenges inherent to classic population-centric insurgency theory, where the population is key to success.¹⁸ In freeing people from a tyrannical dictator, **L** becomes the change agent that causes instability for the population. At this point, the subsequent reductions in stability indicate that the value of **L**'s original offer is decreasing. The value of freedom at time period 1 is reducing along with the relative value of Γ , given

that **I** is now offering γ . Furthermore, the costs of occupation (**C**) are expected to increase over time, while the benefit of affinity (α) simultaneously increases. This means that **L** becomes responsible for making **P** paradoxically worse off than before the military intervention while simultaneously improving the quality of governance for **I** through competition. By exposing harm to the population, the liberator's dilemma underscores a pragmatic and ethical problem for intervening regimes that must be accounted for when promoting global stability through American leadership through military intervention within a strategy of integrated deterrence.

To minimize the negative impact of the liberator's dilemma on an indigenous population, an intervening power should capitalize on the opportunity to increase its utility to the population at time 1. At this point, the population has shifted support from the liberator (**L**) to the incumbent (**I**) so that the incumbent is in a position to improve its offer and regain popular support. It is also critical that the liberator not only gain popular support but pursue operations that promote long-term sustainability and prevent negative impacts on popular support. To do this, the liberator must understand how time impacts utility in order to ensure that $L > I$ remains true at time 2 and beyond. Figure 5 illustrates the variables affecting **P**'s choice. Setting the conditions for $L > I$ means setting the conditions so that $(\delta^*\Phi + \Gamma^* - C^*) > (\gamma + \alpha)$ remains true.




Figure 5. Popular Support at Time 2

Solving for the variables that the liberator is capable of controlling (δ^* , Γ^* , and C^*), the model suggests that the paradox of the liberator's dilemma is less related to military strength than to the ability of the liberator to exercise *relational leadership* through building and sustaining meaningful *connectedness* with a distinct and complex indigenous population. Through the lens of the liberator's dilemma, the liberator now recognizes the inevitable decline of freedom from oppression (Φ) after regime overthrow, especially given the tendency for the costs of occupation (**C**) to increase rather than decrease over time. To minimize this tendency, **L** must ensure that transactional interactions with the population are as low cost as possible while also not relying on the assumption that Φ is sufficient to promote cooperation. From a Maslovian perspective, once the population benefits from Φ , their needs mature as **L** assumes responsibility for the security of the population following

the successful invasion.¹⁹ Therefore, value of security is lower at time 2 than it was at time 1, confirming that the value of Φ tends toward decline.

Secondly, the value of Γ must likewise increase in relation to the expected value of Γ 's capability to provide γ . Just as businesses in free markets must always improve the value of their services to their customers, so too must liberating forces ensure that their military efforts remain focused on continuously *increasing* the welfare and stability of the population. If the liberating force is successful in the application of relational and cross-cultural leadership necessary for sustaining connectedness, the population will remain supportive. If not, the liberator will suffer the choice of a rational actor who picks the strategic choice with the greatest utility. Furthermore, the values of Γ vice γ suggest that the population's behavior is the only useful measurement of success. A liberating force must counter the tendency to create convenient but irrelevant metrics.

Lastly, the liberator must understand the negative effect that an occupying power, regardless of how seemingly benevolent, comes with increasing costs. The visual effect of seeing armed foreign fighters patrol through population centers and enforcing restrictive population control measures, such as roadblocks and checkpoints, comes with an eventual negative impact on a population. The combined effect of all three variables suggests that static models are bound to fail and that the incumbent will eventually gain support when the liberator fails to account for temporal changes.

Therefore, the liberator's dilemma model not only underscores the dynamic political interaction between actors involved in insurgency operations, the rational choice nature of the model also illuminates multiple flawed assumptions and subsequent and common suboptimal behaviors that are absent from "classic" insurgency theory. By capturing the temporal and pragmatic nature of liberation operations, considerable leadership adjustments can help reduce the negative effects of this paradoxical dilemma. The application of carefully applied relational leadership through influence rather than military action becomes a force multiplier that allows the liberator to find success by escaping from the trap that befalls an unconnected indigenous population.

Implications for Military Leadership and the Joint SOF Profession

Again, the liberator's dilemma reminds SOF leaders across the joint SOF profession that U.S. strategic interests and SOF's role in integrated deterrence can be shaped by the effective use of irregular warfare. However, this realization must account for the function of the liberator's dilemma that exposes a critical and paradoxical false assumption about population-centric warfare and about the leadership skills required of the Joint SOF profession and of senior military leaders. Furthermore, variables that represent military strength remain conspicuously absent as the liberator's dilemma reminds us that "gray zone" operations are foremost leadership problems that require innovative ways of understanding the human domain more than they are measures of military power. In the liberator's dilemma, force does not equate to power, and recent U.S. military conflicts provide examples where military

power without an effective leadership strategy oriented in the human domain leads to protracted conflict and eventual failure. The solution then is to look toward improving our leadership skills before exploring more innovative ways to inflict physical force.

More problematically, traditional professional military education reinforces leadership models that evolved from a long history of military conquest where conquering military forces enjoy ownership over their historical narratives.²⁰ However, the military operations most conducive to “gray zone” competition require that military leaders and SOF professionals understand newer and more relational theories on leadership. In irregular warfare, leaders from the tactical special operations team to strategic and political levels must understand how to build connectedness and sustain relationships across highly complex networks and ecosystems. Building and sustaining lasting connectedness in indigenous populations requires that SOF leaders learn to *lead differently*.

As the liberator’s dilemma exposes, classic counterinsurgency theory fails to account for certain variables that represent the agency of a partner-force population. Population-centric military operations of all types must recognize and minimize the liberator’s dilemma paradox and consider how to offer utilitarian value to the populations where the U.S. military and SOF professionals operate. Sadly, the impact on the population has been largely a case of failure in our recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In observing and comparing urban Afghanistan populations in 2004 and 2011, lasting improvements to stability and quality of life were non-existent. The temporal effects in Afghanistan suggest that the population’s eventual support of the Taliban was less a victory for the Taliban than it was a strategic *leadership* failure of the military in general and the SOF profession more specifically. We must quickly realize our moral obligation to offer quality leadership to all of the actors within our networks, but most especially to the members of the population whom we often negatively impact.

For liberating operations of the future, as part of a strategy of integrated deterrence and strategic competition, the liberator’s dilemma exposes several important strategic considerations. First, we must begin population-centric military operations with a population-centric end state in mind. This requires consideration for the strategic benefit of limiting force structure *ex-ante* to a very small footprint in an upfront effort to minimize the inevitable adverse effects that will result from costs of occupation. Likewise, military planners must *also dictate* long-term objectives that consider the inevitable decline of the initial offering of freedom while considering the strategic effect that goods and services will have on how U.S. forces are perceived by a population over time.

Similarly, leading populations and their associated micro-level partner forces require that both senior military leaders and SOF professionals rigidly enforce stylistic relational leadership continuity across rotational units. The negative impact on the population of “20 one-year wars” versus “one 20-year war” must not continue. Furthermore, promoting effective leadership of an occupied indigenous population and their associated partner forces

necessitate that the people perpetually remain the main effort. American forces at all levels must resist the temptation to become enemy-focused and recognize that enemy-centric behavior translated to increasing (not decreasing) the cost of foreign occupation. In doing so, we must also acknowledge that time does not favor the liberator. We must achieve our strategic goals in a manner that promotes sustainability while also reversing entropy as quickly as possible. When population support shifts, we must resist the urge to seek kinetic solutions or to launch personnel surges. These will yield tactical success attached to strategic setbacks. Instead, we must recognize shifts in popular support as reminders that we need to redouble our partner-force and population leadership efforts.

Lastly, we must never forget that liberating military operations come with a moral hazard when they result in greater harm to the population than the initial status quo. The United States cannot pursue a strategy of integrated deterrence rooted in strategic competition if our cure remains worse than the disease. We must never forget to look at the operation through the lens of the population. Effective and authentic partner-force leadership offers more pragmatic and utilitarian options for the liberated people we wish to help. If military and SOF leaders understand the key tenets of irregular warfare, the liberator's dilemma should reinforce that irregular warfare is about "people, not platforms" and as such, require that the U.S. military build and sustain a "global capability and capacity" through "patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people who can build the long-term relationships essential to executing IW."²¹ In the execution of irregular warfare, if we think we are doing the right thing and the population shifts sides, then we are no longer doing the right thing. Senior leaders and Joint SOF professionals must think like relational networked leaders and leave traditional military leadership solutions for appropriate conventional contexts. As arguably the strongest state actor in history, we must remember that our great power adversaries are always watching and learning. We cannot fail to lead and fall behind.

Endnotes

- ¹ Isaiah Wilson, III and C Anthony Pfaff, "Making the Case for a Joint Special Operations Profession," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 105 (Spring 2022): 45.
- ² Wilson and Pfaff, "Making the Case for a Joint Special Operations Profession," 52.
- ³ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, (London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: Guerilla Warfare Theory and Practice* (London: Granada Publishing Limited, 1965); Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerilla Warfare* (Champaign, IL: First Illinois Paperback, 2000a).
- ⁴ Mao Tse-Tung, "On Guerilla Warfare."
- ⁵ Thomas Carlyle, *Heroes and Hero Worship* (Union School Furnishing Company, 1908). <http://ebooks.rahnuma.org/religion/Seerat-Taiba/On-Heroes-Worship-And-the-Heroic-in-History.pdf>; Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History* (Univ of California Press, Vol 1); B. A. Spector, "Carlyle, Freud, and the Great Man Theory More Fully Considered," *Leadership* 12 (2): 250–60, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1742715015571392>; Gordon A. Wyner, "The 'Great Man' Theory," *Marketing Management* (January/February 2009): 6–8.
- ⁶ Navin A. Bapat, "The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24, no. 4 (2009): 265–80; Navin A. Bapat, "The Escalation of Terrorism: Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict," *International Interactions* 40, no. 4 (2014): 568–78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.902818>; Idean Salehyan, "Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups," *World Politics* 59, no. 2(2007): 217–42; Idean Salehyan, "No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict," *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 1 (2008b): 54–66; Idean Salehyan, "The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 (2008b): 787–801; Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War," *International Organization* 60, no. 2 (2006): 335–66.
- ⁷ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, "Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of Government Finance," *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 4 (2006): 936–50. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00463.x>; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics*. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2011).
- ⁸ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, "Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of Government Finance," *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 4 (2006): 936–50. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00463.x>; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics*. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2011).
- ⁹ Ian Bremmer, *The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006): 6.
- ¹⁰ Bremmer, *The J Curve*.
- ¹¹ Bremmer, *The J Curve*.
- ¹² Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (2001): 93–128.; Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (1973): 175–200.


- ¹³ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: Guerilla Warfare Theory and Practice* (London: Granada Publishing Limited, 1965); Mao Tse-Tung. *On Guerilla Warfare* (Champaign, IL: First Illinois Paperback, 2000a).
- ¹⁴ Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (2001): 93–128; David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, (London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964). Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* 27, no. 2(1973): 175–200; Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: Guerilla Warfare Theory and Practice* (London: Granada Publishing Limited, 1965); Mao Tse-Tung. *On Guerilla Warfare* (Champaign, IL: First Illinois Paperback, 2000a).
- ¹⁵ Guillermo Trejo, "Religious Competition and Ethnic Mobilization in Latin America: Why the Catholic Church Promotes Indigenous Movements in Mexico," *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 3 (2009): 323–42.
- ¹⁶ Trejo, "Religious Competition 323–42.
- ¹⁷ Trejo, "Religious Competition 323–42.
- ¹⁸ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: Guerilla Warfare Theory and Practice* (London: Granada Publishing Limited, 1965); Mao Tse-Tung. *On Guerilla Warfare* (Champaign, IL: First Illinois Paperback, 2000a).
- ¹⁹ Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50 (1943): 370–96.
- ²⁰ Keith Grint, "A History of Leadership," in *The SAGE Handbook of Leadership*, edited by Alan Bryman, David Collinson, Keith Grint, Brad Jackson, and Mary Uhl-Bien, 3–28 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011).
- ²¹ Joint Operating Concept, 2007.

BOOK REVIEW

***The (In)visible Hand: Strategic Sabotage, Case Studies* edited by Colonel (Ret.) Bernd Horn, James D. Kiras, and Emily Spencer**

ISBN: 978-0-660-38276-0, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, 2021, 316 pages, free PDF download, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2022/mdn-dnd/D2-440-2021-eng.pdf

Reviewed by: John Longshore, Independent Academic



Given current world events and the (re)emergence of global power competition shaping U.S. national security and defense policy, *The Invisible Hand: Strategic Sabotage, Case Studies* is without a doubt timely reading. An anthology supported by, produced by, and meant to inform our northern partner Canadian Special Operations Forces, the book exposes readers to little-known but significant sabotage events over the past 50 years through case studies. The commonality among all the events cited is that they involved the use of strategic sabotage.

The volume contains 13 distinct case studies of strategic sabotage. The works' authors are a mix of U.S. and Canadian military fellows, researchers, and current/past special operations practitioners. The

Invisible Hand's editors begin by offering a definition and overview of strategic sabotage. They highlight the distinction of sabotage during times of conflict and during times of “peace” as well as broadly introducing types of sabotage—kinetic and informational—and how each has been used separately, and in concert, with one another. The introduction and the first chapter end with a description of when the authors believe sabotage efforts obtain strategic effects i.e., what makes some sabotage strategic in nature. With these definitions and conceptualization in mind, subsequent chapters are specifically devoted to the various case studies.

Although not sectioned as such, the case studies in *The Invisible Hand* are separated by timeframe into three main areas: distinct sabotage efforts during World War II, efforts during the Cold War, and actions after 9/11 to the present day. The four World War II strategic sabotage case studies spanned efforts by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) to undermine and expose German influence throughout the U.S., Canada, and South

America to successfully blunt Germany's ability to support a controlled nuclear fission reaction by destroying heavy water production. SOE was also involved in a six-month campaign with the Royal Air Force's Bomber Command to deny Germany industrial capability in occupied France. Rather than indiscriminately bomb French industrial centers, small teams were dispatched to make contact with the manufacturing plants' French owners and give them a choice; allow or actively promote sabotage to critical equipment in their factories or risk their plants' destruction by the RAF.

The three Cold War case studies of strategic sabotage focus on the rise of the east/west tensions, expansive and targeted information operations, and broad sabotage and subversion perpetuated by both the United States, the Soviet Union and their proxies. The authors contend, that the CIA's support to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan after the 1979 Soviet invasion serves as one of the most prominent examples of strategic sabotage. The covert funneling of training, support, and arms, particularly stinger man-portable surface-to-air missiles, helped a vastly technologically inferior force exact significant casualties, drain resources, and ultimately force a Soviet withdraw.

Arguably, the most germane to the current reader are *The Invisible Hand's* more "current" case studies of strategic sabotage. The authors explore areas such as Iran's extensive use of proxies in the Middle East and beyond, the application of maskirovka (*deception*) as central to Russian military operations, and the rise of both indiscriminate and targeted cyberattacks. Especially timely is the case study on Russian military operations in Ukraine in 2014 and its use of deception to deter, disrupt, and effectively obscure its presence and influence against Ukrainian forces. There is little doubt that Russia is currently employing similar subversive measures in concert with cyber and information-related activities as it postures on the Ukrainian border.

In addition to the post-9/11 case studies, there are also chapters on regime change, "arguably the ultimate act of strategic sabotage" and right-wing hate through highlighting ties between the Russian government and far-right groups and the propaganda fueling anti-immigrant and anti-government sentiment. A summary chapter brings the separate case studies into focus and offers both national-level and operational-level requirements for strategic sabotage. The importance of operating in and identifying the national interest, the concept of attribution and deniability, and the ability to limit cost and risk are key national-level requirements for strategic sabotage. Operational requirements identified include robust, timely, and accurate intelligence, an understanding of cultural intelligence in particular, and the use of operational security throughout. In a final synopsis and based on the case studies, Col. (Ret.) Bernd Horn offers nine specific factors that contribute to successful strategic sabotage. His final contention is that through historical study we can "avoid the historical pitfalls common with many new, emerging, or rediscovered phenomena."

The Invisible Hand: Strategic Sabotage, Case Studies provides an interesting mix of identifiable historical strategic sabotage examples as well as infinitely more obscure

examples, highlighting singular events of limited duration and operations encompassing months or years. Regardless, each study provided a comprehensively deeper understanding of how actors conceptualized, planned, executed, and attempted to obscure acts of strategic sabotage. While not a page-turner in the strictest sense, this volume reinforces the notion that (1) sabotage can no doubt be a valuable strategic tool, (2) that sabotage planners are bound only by their imaginations and understanding of their adversaries and broader operational environment, and (3) the potential means, methods, and impact of saboteurs keeps expanding exponentially with advances in, and due to our increased reliance on, technology. Influence practitioners at all levels would benefit from the *Invisible Hand's* detailed treatment of strategic sabotage through the case studies it presents.


Intentionally Blank

BOOK REVIEW

***War of Shadows: Codebreakers, Spies, and the Secret Struggle to Drive the Nazis from the Middle East* by Gershom Gorenberg**

ISBN: 1610396278, PublicAffairs, 2021, 496 pages, \$34

Reviewed by: Stone Holden, U.S. Marine Corps



Ineffective spies, dramatic raids, high-stakes codebreaking, betrayal, and battle in the high desert of North Africa are all part of *War of Shadows: Codebreakers, Spies, and the Secret Struggle to Drive the Nazis from the Middle East*. The book provides a truly sweeping and thrilling journey into an overlooked period of WWII, covering the Allied efforts against the Axis powers in North Africa from 1939 to 1943 through a unique series of lenses. Gershom Gorenberg's deep experience as a journalist covering multiple aspects of the Middle East and Israeli issues provides a strong foundation for this book. Writing in a journalistic style, he dives into the issues with a unique eye and is faster paced than most historical authors. Gorenberg avoids a narrow recounting of battles in chronological order. The

author works tirelessly to lend perspective by including a wide cast of characters who range from the halls of Washington and the huts at the United Kingdom's Bletchley Park, Rome, Iraq, to actions across the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The author revisits several themes of unconventional actions for consideration throughout the book; key individuals who contributed through espionage or special actions; the cryptanalysts and communications security on both sides of the conflict; the perspective of British, Italian, and Nazi forces; and the local populations who endured the see-sawing effect of the struggle for the region.

Gorenberg focuses on the British struggle against the Italians and Germans in North Africa, primarily chronicling the time before the U.S. invasion under Operation Torch in late 1942. The North African theater is often treated more like a footnote, sideshow, and prelude to the much larger battles against the Soviets and in later battles in Western Europe. Other books dedicate much more time to the landings at Normandy or the Nazi failures against the Soviets on the Eastern Front. In this work, the author does an excellent job of reinforcing how vital this theater was to overall success in the war against the Axis powers. Not only did this region hold critical reserves of petroleum, but it also served as the sinews which held the British Empire together while the U.S. decided to join the war and took the time to ramp up its critical industrial capacity. Without the Suez Canal staying in Allied hands,

reinforcements from the colonies would not be available to fill the ranks on the European

front. Furthermore, the critical supplies for waging war against the Imperial Japanese in Asia would be cut off in the west if North Africa fell to the Axis. Gorenberg makes a convincing argument that without the tenacious efforts of the Allies in the early days of the war, critical lines of communication would have been lost, and valuable practice against the German forces would have been missing before the Allied liberation of Europe.

The author is a master at creating the critical air of context before diving into his story. He deftly lays the scene for the struggle for North Africa by examining some of the key personalities who would determine much of the success or failure for each side. The investments in intrepid individuals who had the drive to explore the endless tracts of desert prior to the war ended up providing invaluable intelligence. It is easy to forget in the world of instant mapping that even as recently as the late 1930s the spaces between Italian-dominated Libya and British-backed Egypt were still largely unexplored at the start of the war, which would have a major impact. Much of that intelligence value depended on the open-mindedness of either side's leadership, and their willingness to eschew traditional notions of soldiery and embrace the high-risk, high-reward propositions of these explorers. The book serves as a reminder to commanders that attracting, identifying, and properly employing those with unique knowledge and talent is a critical skill that can provide a vital edge in combat.

Throughout the book, Gorenberg carefully zooms in and out of the conflict to connect and frame the main activity on the battlefield with the critical support actions impacting the battlespace from around the world. He looks at the works of the cryptanalysts in the UK's Bletchley Park, tracing their early work in breaking Nazi codes. What truly makes his description of that work interesting is the particular detail he pays to lesser-known actors who made significant contributions. This includes the Polish delegation, who broke much of the Enigma codes out of sheer mathematical talent and shared their work as war loomed (unfortunately, parochialism and xenophobia prevented the British from capitalizing on their potential to aid their own decryption efforts). Gorenberg also includes the American efforts at codebreaking, and the relationship with the British elements, providing insight to some of the successes as well as hesitation to share between even close allies by those who knew the costs of a leak. Going beyond many other books on cryptography during WWII, the author carefully ties specific cryptological breakthroughs with battlefield actions. He successfully connects much of the uncanny battlefield success of Field Marshall Rommel to the high-quality intelligence he was receiving straight from the messages of the Allies.

One of the most fascinating elements of the book is the examination of Italian espionage activities by special units in their contributions to the war. While the Nazis came to rely on the complex Enigma machines, many of the Allied countries relied on cipher books to keep their communications secret. Italian elements cleverly exploited the weakest link in the cipher chain—human error. They consistently placed personnel in foreign embassies and consulates throughout Rome and their territory. They used this covert placement to facilitate

good old-fashioned robbery aimed at codebooks and diplomatic messages. Simple failures by embassy staff—unlocked doors, safes that could be unscrewed from the back, unsecured keys, and more—allowed the Italians an unprecedented look at the communications that provided a wealth of battlefield insights.

Gorenberg's efforts to tie such a vast scope of players across a staggering geographical scale can leave the writing feeling somewhat disjointed at times. On occasion, he dives into elements and characters that perhaps deserved less time and attention upon retrospect. Some of the characters were interesting but only appeared once or twice in the book and were not particularly central to the overall narrative being told, distracting from the central themes of the work. The distraction provided by these characters takes time away from other elements which could have been explored more in-depth. The actions and effects of the Long Range Desert Group and Special Air Services were briefly mentioned but generally as ways to illustrate the importance of the cryptographic war waged behind the scenes. A more complete and rich narrative would have emerged if more time had been devoted to those elements. Nevertheless, the author succeeds in weaving a remarkable and entertaining tapestry with his story.

The value proposition for any student of warfare and history is the rich chronicle of experiences that Gorenberg has provided. This book is full of lessons for warfare against a capable state actor with global access, the ability to penetrate secure communications while protecting his own, and the importance of well-executed high-risk operations to larger success. The unique lens through which the author examines the war, and the often forgotten, yet critical, theater of the war makes this a gripping read and well worth the time for someone looking to expand their WWII history while learning valuable lessons that apply to today's return to great power conflict.

Intentionally Blank

BOOK REVIEW

***The Digital War: How China's Tech Power Shapes the Future of AI, Blockchain and Cyberspace* by Winston Ma**

ISBN: 978-1-119-74891-5, Wiley, 2021, 416 pages, \$27

Reviewed by: James Raub, Naval Postgraduate School



As American policymakers and military practitioners grapple with the mandate of *strategic competition* with China, the cyber domain remains an area of crucial relevance. Even more so as the People's Republic of China (PRC) challenges the current world order through its massive, state-sponsored digital transformation. In his book, *The Digital War: How China's Tech Power Shapes the Future of AI, Blockchain and Cyberspace*, Winston Ma attempts to bridge the knowledge gap between China and the West, providing timely insight into the emerging terms, trends, and technologies shaping China's digital future. The book succeeds in offering a relevant and detail-rich account of China's technology revolution, but struggles to remain balanced, attributable, and readable.

Winston Ma—currently an adjunct law professor at NYU's School of Law and managing director for the China Investment Corporation's North American Office—offers an insider's perspective on China's technological evolution after spending years working in both the United States and mainland China. Ma describes China's transition from a "mobile economy," with its 900 million users, to a "digital economy," where internet service providers have become the multi-modal nexus of expertise for technology innovation. As Ma explains, this "digital economy" is built on the world's "largest 'mobile first' and 'mobile only' market," where 99 percent of users' first and only access to the internet came through a mobile device. This phenomenon offers a unique and unrivaled user data pool from which to advance the central government's goal "to become the world's first AI superpower."

In the first eight chapters, Ma covers a broad band of topics, beginning with a short history of China's technology revolution and quickly followed by a vignette-filled discussion of "big data," the AI-powered "fans economy," Blockchain and Fintech, the "shared economy," and China's big data legal framework. With each topic, Ma stresses the themes of Chinese resilience, ingenuity, and determination. He also offers a litany of success stories to contextualize the political and technical elements that underpin this digital revolution. One

such example, highlighted early and often, is China's digital currency, which was piloted by the People's Bank of China in 2020 and has already gained significant traction across the

country and has piqued interest worldwide. Ma also follows the rise of Chinese tech giants like Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu, citing them as archetypes of innovation and success. After discussing the full range of internet of things, AI, blockchain, cloud computing, and data analytics (iABCD) technologies, Ma finally turns his attention to the topic of cyber conflict. In the final two chapters, Ma discusses the far-reaching implications of a fractured digital world, where both emerging and established countries must choose between either the U.S. or China. No one wins in a digital Cold War, and the only way to avoid such an eventuality, he argues, is “for the United States and China to reach a new equilibrium to collectively lead innovation in the age of AI.”

Straddling the worlds of U.S. academia and Chinese business, Ma offers a unique perspective that is often absent or discounted when American leaders discuss strategic competition. However, Ma’s work makes four critical omissions that undermine and detract from his message. First, while charting the recent history of China’s technology revolution, Ma neglects to mention any similar Western developments, which results in a noticeably lopsided depiction of the topic. Second, Ma fails to address or acknowledge topics of which the Chinese government is often criticized, and as a result, he misses an opportunity to establish his credibility. Third, Ma’s inconsistent and opaque citation methods make it challenging to discern between his original thought and external resources. Lastly, and at a more basic level, Ma’s book lacked thorough editing and seemed careless due to an abundance of minor typos and grammatical errors. While his attempt to educate Western audiences and stimulate Sino-American conversation is worthwhile and relevant, these efforts are significantly hampered by a long list of oversights, omissions, and errors.

Despite these critical deficiencies, however, *The Digital War* presents the unique perspective of someone well-versed in the investment and capital markets of both the U.S. and the PRC. It also provides information on China’s booming tech industry to familiarize readers with numerous Chinese terms and technologies. Additionally, and in a meta sense, this book serves as an indicator of the image China is attempting to project as it seeks to gain influence around the world.


Ultimately, *The Digital War* is probably not for casual consumption due to its pro-PRC slant, technical density, and myriad typographical issues. However, for those who value an insider’s perspective regardless of bias, Winston Ma’s insights are well-informed and thorough. Furthermore, the counternarrative he offers may prove useful as American leaders work to gain a holistic understanding of their greatest strategic competitor.

BOOK REVIEW

***The Insurgent's Dilemma: A Struggle to Prevail* by David Ucko**

ISBN: 978-0197651681, Oxford University Press, 2022, 328 pages, \$35

Reviewed by: David P. Oakley, Joint Special Operations University



David Ucko's *The Insurgent's Dilemma: A Struggle to Prevail*, is a captivating book that is a must-read for national security professionals, professional military education (PME) professors, and those interested in the future of insurgency. An engaging read, Ucko does a brilliant job combining theory and history to offer a perspective on the future of insurgencies while also questioning some widely accepted, yet incorrect, notions of insurgency and counterinsurgency. His main point in the book is that insurgencies are changing because of shifts in the strategic environment and that states must appreciate these changes to develop effective responses and avoid the over-militarized responses that often plague counterinsurgent approaches.

The title of the book, “Insurgent’s Dilemma,” succinctly captures the book’s underlying challenge to the accuracy of the widely accepted aphorism that “the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.” Although this quip makes for a good bumper sticker to capture the difficulty of counterinsurgency, it is also misleading and wrong. As Ucko points out, the insurgent faces “the difficulty of asserting oneself as a start-up, of challenging authority violently, and establishing oneself sustainably as the new source of power, without suffering devastating retaliation along the way.” This “dilemma,” how it influences insurgent approaches, and how states should respond is the focus of the book.

A well-written book that flows logically, its eight chapters and conclusion are not only engaging, but organized in a manner that makes it an easy reference to revisit Ucko’s concepts in the classroom or as a member of a team trying to appreciate the complexities of a burgeoning or ongoing conflict. The introduction provides an overview of the book and introduces the three types of insurgencies (localized, infiltrative, and ideational) that Ucko argues insurgents are currently employing. The second chapter, “Unraveling the Dilemma,” looks at “insurgency as a phenomenon,” provides evidence to support his observation that insurgencies fail more often than they succeed and explains how approaches to insurgency are influenced by the strategic environment. Using contemporary and historical examples to

establish his argument, this chapter effectively sets the stage for the essence of the book: the ways insurgents will adapt to strategic conditions and how states should respond.

Ucko delves into the three types of insurgencies separately in chapters 3-5 and then uses chapters 6-8 as corresponding chapters that provide recommendations for how states should respond to each type of insurgency. This organizational approach of understanding the variants before discussing state responses allows the reader to appreciate the gradients between the types of insurgencies. This simple organizational approach of considering each type separately before discussing potential state responses also reminds the practitioner that they must “understand the environment” or “frame the problem” and not merely respond to insurgent violence. This is something that seems obvious but is often neglected in a practitioner culture that prides itself on taking swift action.

Ucko’s succinct conclusion summarizes the contents of the book and reinforces his point that the three insurgent approaches, although different, are all focused on attaining legitimacy. This reminds the counterinsurgent not to become so distracted by the insurgent’s “ways” and “means” that they lose sight of the insurgent’s “ends.” It is another reminder of the value of counterinsurgent understanding before action. Although the introduction and conclusion are valuable for revisiting the major themes and arguments, the reader is missing out if they skip over the substance in-between.


It is obvious that Ucko’s approach is influenced by his decade of educating national security professionals from the United States and partner nations at National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (CISA). Although the book is rich in the history and theory that scholars enjoy, it is also accessible to the practitioner who might become the counterinsurgent Ucko discusses throughout the book. The book is particularly useful for the PME professor charged with educating these practitioners to understand the environments they operate within, assess the utility or limitations of military force they employ, and appreciate the potential consequences of their actions. This makes the book a resource for overcoming the PME professor’s dilemma on how to use theory and history to enable the practitioner, without the practitioner becoming overwhelmed and losing sight of its relevance. As many professors and students can attest to, PME classrooms often lack the rigorous scholarship and academic experience necessary to intellectually nurture the type of practitioner needed to face contemporary challenges. Instead, these classrooms often become training grounds to teach doctrine, processes, and procedures that are necessary to develop the technician, but insufficient at nurturing the critical thinkers needed for strategic competition and integrated deterrence. Ucko’s book is a valuable resource to help PME overcome this issue and ensure that practitioners are not merely technicians who know HOW to employ capability, but critical thinkers who appreciate the potential consequences of their actions (both are required).

BOOK REVIEW

***Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence* by Amy B. Zegart**

ISBN: 978-1-119-74891-5, Princeton University Press, 2022, 424 pages, \$25

Reviewed by: Mark Grzegorzewski, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University



Amy Zegart's newest contribution, *Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence*, provides the non-intelligence specialist an overview of the many aspects tied to intelligence and how the public and technology shape intelligence. Zegart is well-positioned to write on this topic given her past government work that includes working on the National Security Council, on a presidential campaign as a foreign policy advisor, and her definitive work on the 9/11 intelligence failures in *Spying Blind*. She is the founding co-director of the Stanford Cyber Policy Program and currently serves as the chair of Stanford's Artificial Intelligence and International Security Steering Committee.

In her book, Zegart addresses many timely questions not just about intelligence, but also how the public interacts with intelligence. She asks what the ramifications are if the public gets its understanding of intelligence from pop culture, and how does technology open the aperture for intelligence, which was formerly the domain of nation-states. While there is a thread of the “algorithms” theme running throughout the book, the real meat of the intelligence-technology dynamic can be found in the last two chapters. The other chapters, which stand on their own, range from historical case studies (e.g. Operation AZORIAN, Church Committee, etc.) to critical thinking exercises (“The Seven Deadly Biases”) to law and Congressional oversight.

The author starts by discussing her motivation for the book, which was her undergraduates' misinformed view of the intelligence community, a view largely informed by Hollywood productions. While the lesson is the Hollywood depiction of intelligence is not real life, Zegart also points to the increasingly porous relationship between fiction and reality (“spytainment”), such as with the movie *Zero Dark Thirty* which consulted with the Central Intelligence Agency to get the representation correct. This approach, that intelligence has been opened up and is not just the domain of governments anymore, moves the topic in a new direction by focusing on the technology corporations that are siphoning data and

engaging in their intelligence analysis. Moreover, while these corporations can engage in analysis, so can everyday internet users, due to ubiquitous sensing and near universal connectivity, leading to open-source digital forensics groups like Bellingcat.

It is here that Zegart's book really opens a larger discussion about intelligence. What is it and who does it? This is a question that has followed the U.S. intelligence community since its inception. Is it only the government that does intelligence? Zegart points out historically this has not always been the case. Does intelligence only involve collection and analysis or is there also an operational aspect? These are important questions as the government's monopoly on intelligence has been broken and, in many ways, democratized. When anyone can be an intelligence collector, analyst, and/or operator (bringing back spytainment, think of Carrie Matheson from *Homeland*), what are the implications for the world? Intelligence analysis is no longer only conducted in classified government reading rooms. It is online, sometimes free, and sometimes available to the highest bidder. It is also operational with private contracting firms. As the state loses control over secrets, does this impact its control over the monopoly of violence? In an already oversaturated world of international actors, what does this mean for the future? Zegart often hints at answers to these questions throughout her book.

While I enjoyed many aspects of Zegart's newest book, I also was left wanting more. Although the book is published by a university press, it seems more targeted to the casual reader or perhaps a primer for an undergraduate college student. As a professional associated with the intelligence community, I was hoping for more, especially in regards to the "algorithms" aspect of her contribution. Perhaps due to her inclusion in the 2020 Center for Strategic and International Studies Technology and Intelligence Task Force or her 2019 *Foreign Affairs* article of the same book title, I expected a different book. Her 2022 publication is much more a survey book that touches upon different parts of the intelligence community elephant. While there is a narrative running throughout her book that the digital age is making intelligence more difficult, I hoped for deeper analysis on where things are headed rather than a descriptive analysis addressing many aspects of the narrative.


In closing, Zegart's newest book does contribute to the field. However, it all depends on your starting level of knowledge. As with all Zegart's works, it is masterfully written and easily digestible. Therefore, for those who are novices to the field of intelligence, this is a must read. For those who are a bit more seasoned, this book will help you refresh some things you may have forgotten and direct you towards new developments that you will need to consider in the future of intelligence.

BOOK REVIEW

***T-Minus AI: Humanity's Countdown to Artificial Intelligence and the New Pursuit of Global Power* by Michael Kanaan**

ISBN: 9781948836944, BenBella Books, Inc., 2020, 284 pages, \$27.95

Reviewed by: Jake Keplar, Independent Academic



T-Minus AI: Humanity's Countdown to Artificial Intelligence and the New Pursuit of Global Power by Michel Kanaan offers a useful and interesting contribution to the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Kanaan is a U.S. Air Force officer and previously was the Air Force's first chairperson for AI, as well as Director of Operations at the Department of the Air Force-MIT Artificial Intelligence Accelerator. Although an Air Force officer, his book is intended for more than just the military audience. In his book, Kanaan explains the history and evolution of AI, and the changes that will occur in the world and society from its employment. The author attempts to describe AI within the context of human history, humanity, and society, as well as explain the ethical implications of AI.

While the book contains some details about the technical aspects of AI, it is certainly much more focused on the broader history and implications of AI and less about the technical and mathematical underpinnings of it. Anyone interested in a book with a more technically-focused or mathematically-focused explanation of AI should look elsewhere. Throughout the book, Kanaan writes with a clearly stated focus: ensuring AI is implemented in a way that is consistent with human dignity and democratic ideals, liberties, and laws. This theme is present throughout, especially in part three of the book.

In part I, Kanaan devotes entire chapters to the origins of the human race, the history of counting, modern computing, and the relationship between humans and machines. While entire chapters dedicated to these topics may seem to some like a circuitous path to explain AI, the author provides context for each of the topics and how they relate to and contribute to the development of AI and links the chapters in a logical progression. Kanaan describes how the mathematical problems faced by humans evolved over centuries, becoming more complicated to the point that modern computing was born. This history may seem trivial and unnecessary, but it fits nicely into the author's comprehensive approach to explaining AI.

Part II begins with a continuation of the history from Part I but with a focus on more recent topics. The author recounts three human vs. computer matchups: individual human players competing against computer algorithms in traditional board games Chess and Go and a team of human players competing against a computer algorithm in the eSport Dota 2. The chapter on games coupled with the chapter discussing the dramatic increase in data in recent years, progressed smoothly into the chapter on AI in more detail. Kanaan then describes the various types of AI and which types are better suited for specific purposes.

Part III examines AI from a global perspective examining how selected countries use AI as a part of governance, and also how AI has become an area of competition for the world's leading countries in AI research. Throughout Part III, Kanaan highlights ethical issues surrounding AI and the varying ways different countries approach the ethics of AI. Kanaan also discusses how certain countries focus their AI research and implement their AI strategies. He also highlights quotes on AI from notable world leaders highlighting the growing competition in AI. China, Russia, and the U.S. are all vying to become the world leader in AI for prestige, influence, and power. The author is very critical of the unethical way he claims some governments employ AI in non-democratic ways. This examination, and criticism where the author feels appropriate, is consistent with his stated focus, ensuring AI is implemented in a way that is consistent with human dignity and democratic ideals, liberties, and laws. This is the essence of his book.

For readers who want to quickly dive into the types, key concepts, and innerworkings of AI, this book will begin slowly and take a winding path on its way to more technical information. Anyone who wants to understand the broader context and implications from the use of AI would benefit from reading this book. However, for those readers who seek a history, examination, and critique of AI in its totality, this book should be a great read. In that sense, Kanaan met his stated goals of this book. *T-Minus AI* is well-written, easy to read, and is a good contribution to research about the broader implications of AI's impact on the world.