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Conceptualizing Terrorism with the Complications of Unconventional Warfare in Mind

Dan Cox
U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA

Conceptualizing terrorism, even defining the term, has been highly contentious. The lack of an agreed-upon definition or even an agreed-upon set of concepts that every definition should encompass creates rifts between scholars and potential confusion among practitioners. This article attempts to examine the difficulty of conceptualizing terrorism juxtaposed against the practice of unconventional warfare. Because Special Operations Forces help foment insurgencies when conducting unconventional warfare and because insurgencies often resort to terrorism, it is important for practitioners of unconventional warfare to understand what terrorism is, how to detect it, and, perhaps, how to steer insurgents away from this tactic. This article explores these concepts as well as the potentiality that the intersection of terrorism and unconventional warfare produces a new type of collateral damage not fully covered in the existing international law of warfare.

Keywords: terrorism, unconventional warfare, special operations, counterinsugency

The concept of terrorism is ill-defined and deeply contested. There are political and philosophical reasons behind the difficulty in defining the term. Karunya Jayasena summed up the problem best stating that "for centuries, the term terrorism has been abused and misused, largely due to a lack of agreement over the precise meaning of the concept" (2011, p. 21). Having said this, most scholars and counterterrorism and counterinsurgency practitioners agree that a universally agreed-upon definition would be beneficial to the study and to the practice of countering terror threats. This article is not intended to provide the definitive answer to this definitional problem. Instead, this research is aimed at considering the implications of defining terrorism, state sponsorship, and collateral damage when it is juxtaposed against the concept of unconventional warfare. When one considers terrorism in this context, special operators can become conscious or inadvertent facilitators of terrorist activities. If the special operators are purposefully engendering terrorism, then they become the arm of state sponsorship for such terrorist acts. If the special operators have no intention or even no desire for their insurgent warfighting trainees to commit acts of terrorism and they occur anyway, then an interesting new brand of collateral damage is created that needs to be properly identified and understood.

Correspondence should be addressed to Dan Cox, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 250 Gibbon Ave, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 66027, USA. E-mail: docofages@msn.com

This article explores these ideas building an argument first by exploring the contentious definition of terrorism as a foundation. This is followed by a brief but specific examination of state sponsorship of terrorist activities. Next, unconventional warfare is defined and linked to the concept of terrorism. Before this occurred, unconventional warfare had to be parsed from the broader notion of irregular warfare. Last, the interaction between these terms and activities is explored and conclusions and implications not only for the definition of terrorism but the practice of unconventional warfare are offered.

Despite the 9/11 attacks on America, the continued relevance and spread of the Al-Qaeda threat, and the general rise of terrorism as a nearly ubiquitous insurgency tactic over the past four decades, there is still no universally or even nearly universally agreed-upon definition of terrorism. The situation can be as dire within a state as between states. In the U.S., for example, no two major federal agencies share a definition of terrorism. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has even split the concept into 20 very specific definitions to deal with specific law enforcement issues but even they failed to provide a more overarching definition that could have been shared between agencies. There is a similar if even more convoluted problem at the international level. Zeidan (2004) argued early on that there is no general international definition because the "political value of the term currently prevails over its legal one" (p. 491). It is important to have an agreed-upon international definition, for no useful international cooperation to combat terrorism can occur without a universal definition.

Recognition of this definitional problem is not new. Ariel Merari argued over twenty years ago that there was a pressing need to define terrorism precisely in order that scholarly research may progress. Still, he found that the discrepancy in the definition of the term terrorism had led to terrorism being defined broadly by some as "violent acts of groups against states, for others—state oppression of its own citizens, and for still others—warlike acts of states against other states" (Merari, 1993, p. 213). The difficulty in finding scholarly agreement is exemplified to no greater degree than through the work of Alex Schmid and A. J. Longman who exhaustively examined definitions of terrorism in an effort to find common themes that could be used in a core definition. Alas, they too found the field of definitions offered to be almost too vast to navigate and commonalities between definitions hard to discern (Schmid & Longman, 2005).

The difficulty in finding agreement on what is an essentially contested concept revolves around several competing factors. First, there is a conflict in world views that is unlikely to be overcome. The Organization for Islamic Conference draws a distinction between types of terrorism that is strictly politically and ideologically motivated. In 2001, the Organization for Islamic Conference (OIC) declared the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. to be illegal terrorist acts. However, in the same communiqué they were adamant in arguing that the right to self-determination of the Lebanese and Palestinian people under unjust rule and the subsequent violence that was manifested by proponents of self-determination could not be construed as terrorist in nature (Organization of Islamic Cooperation, 2011). The OIC thus made a false distinction between obvious acts of terrorist violence based on ideological biases. It is unlikely that staunch supporters of the Palestinian separatist movement or Hezbollah will ever agree to a neutral definition of terrorism but this ideological bias should not hamper the quest for such a definition.

Second, there is a conflict in scholarship in which various scholars have engaged in intellectual parochialism to serve either their own research agenda or ideological bent. Mark Juergensmeyer has added greatly to the field of study with his exposition on religious violence and terrorism, but he did a great disservice to the definition of *terrorism* when he added the confounding notion of religious terrorism, arguing that most of the terrorist acts that have been carried out in the past few decades are religiously motivated (Jurgensmeyer, 2000, pp. 4–6). This is unhelpful to any attempt to define terrorism because it unnecessarily constrains the definition. I understand that Juergensmeyer was simply attempting to explain to the reader the justifiably narrow focus of his research, but it would have been far more helpful if he had noted he was studying a subset of terrorism rather than almost dismissing the notion of terrorism altogether while simultaneously attempting to pigeonhole it into a specific category (Jurgensmeyer, 2000, p. 8).

Robert Pape adds a particular brand of confusion to the definitional quagmire by offering three distinct types of terrorism without offering a usable broad definition that could serve as an overarching guide to scholars, practitioners, and policymakers. He breaks terrorism into three distinct categories: demonstrative terrorism, destructive terrorism, and suicide terrorism. He argues that demonstrative terrorism is aimed at drawing attention to grievances and drawing supporters. Destructive terrorism is aimed at coercing opponents and drawing support to the cause. Last, *suicide terrorism* is defined as "the most aggressive form of terrorism, pursuing coercion even at the expense of angering not only the target community but neutral audiences as well" (Pape 2005, pp. 9–10). When one lists the definitions in such close proximity, the overlap is obvious and the distinction seems almost frivolous. The confusion such an arbitrary splitting of the definition of terrorism causes is seen in the literature and lack of general agreement on a common term.

Karunya Jayasena also attempts to define suicide terrorism but does not make the same mistakes that Pape makes. Jayasena begins with an overarching definition of the characteristics of modern terrorism as "a form of political violence, mostly driven by secular and political objectives, has a target audience, is balanced in range of lethality, coupled with state sponsorship and support, and has a hierarchical organization with a definitive structure" (2011, p. 26). Jayasena then places suicide terrorism under this broad definition as a terrorism subset, which is appropriate and helps one to avoid confusing over competing primary definitions of the phenomenon. Unfortunately, the terrorism characteristics themselves are problematic. Although state sponsorship is important, not all terror groups are state sponsored. The claim of hierarchical organization is bizarre and contrary to the known organizational structures or several notable terror groups. Last, the terrorists and targets are not well defined.

James Kiras adds a narrower definition of terrorism. He defines terrorism as "the sustained use, or threat of use of violence by a small group for political purposes, such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable response" (Kiras, 2002, p. 211 [italics removed]). There is much that is good in this definition and the fact that Kiras draws attention to the fact that terrorism can exist merely as a threat is an important point. This point resonates with Carl Von Clausewitz's assertion that the threat of a military engagement can sometimes have the same effect as an actual engagement (1989, p. 181). However, "small group" is not a specific enough designator of terrorists and there is no specificity regarding targets. Therefore, under this broad definition, an attack on military personnel could easily be construed a terrorist act. Bruce Hoffman adds a singular definition of terrorism as "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of change" (1998, p. 43). Peter Chalk also adds offers broad definition of terrorism. He defines *terrorism* as "the systematic use of *illegitimate* violence that is employed by substate actors as a means of achieving specific political objectives" (Chalk, 1999, p. 151, italics added). While both are parsimonious, both definitions are too broad. Almost any military action or use of force would fit under these definitions. Thus, they designate nothing of use for either the researcher or the practitioner.

Omar Lizardo does something clever in his attempt to define terrorism. He accurately and appropriately portrays the fact that several prominent definitions of terrorism are far too negatively pejorative. This leads Lizardo to observe that "the intended target of terrorist attacks is almost inevitably a recognized actor in the larger interstate system or a *proxy* for such an actor" (2008, p. 97, italics in the original). However, Lizardo overemphasizes the actor in his definition, arguing that the killing of noncombatants is unimportant to a terrorism definition. This forces him to declare the USS Cole attack by Al-Qaeda to be a terrorist act (2008, p. 101). It was not. It was an act of insurgency and thus his valiant attempt to define terrorism ends up confounding terrorism with insurgency.

Adding to the confusion, political expediency has caused various powerful actors over time to misuse the term for their own political gain. Although multiple examples exist, only one egregious example will be given here to exemplify this phenomenon. George W. Bush indulged recklessly in naming attacks in Iraq as terrorism when they were clearly committed by insurgents and the targets were U.S. military convoys (Smith, 2008). Although this may have served domestic political purposes and, perhaps, enhanced domestic will for the war in Iraq, it also served to confound the notion of terrorism and inadvertently open the possibility for those who wish terrorism to remain undefined to point to this misuse as an example of how it cannot successfully be defined.

Several authors add more useful substance to the exploration of what a good definition of terrorism would look like by offering generalizable suggestion regarding what a good, usable definition of terrorism would contain. One of the leading authors on this subject, Yonah Alexander, argued any definition of terrorism must contain five integral aspects: (a) illegality, (b) specificity in what constitutes a perpetrator, (c) a precise definition of targets, (d) an explanation of terrorist objectives and intended outcomes, and (e) a description of methods (2002, p. 3). Louise Richardson adds to this that a useful definition of terrorism must be framed in such a way that it distinguishable from other forms of violence (1998, pp. 52–56). Audrey Kurth Cronin arguably adds the most to this debate with her assertions regarding the four basic areas a good definition of terrorism must address. She argues that all terrorism is political in nature, perpetrated by nonstate actors, has a psychological effect greater than the event, and is aimed at civilian noncombatants (2011, p. 7).

Two definitions come very close to fulfilling these general objectives laid out by the aforementioned authors. A definition from scholars Walter Enders and Todd Sandler and the official definition of the U.S. Department of State are certainly serviceable definitions. Enders and Sandler conceptualize *terrorism* as follows:

> The premeditated use or threat of use of extranormal violence or brutality by subnational groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with the policy making that the terrorists seek to influence. (Enders and Sandler, 2002, p. 148)

The U.S. Department of State defines *terrorism* as "politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Both definitions do a better job of defining actors and targets than any previous definitions offered allowing for more precise study and actual combating of terrorists and their organizations. Still, Enders' and Sandler's emphasis on "extranormal" violence is superfluous and potentially confusing and the State Department definition needs at least a little tweaking.

Considering the debate over the definition and the need for precision without exclusion, this article builds on the Enders and Sandler and U.S. Department of State definitions to develop a workable albeit not perfect definition for use in this study. Considering everything previously said, we define terrorism as follows:

> Any premeditated violent act or threat of violence against noncombatants by subnational or international groups, clandestine agents, or individuals sympathetic to larger terrorist groups and movements, with the intent to influence a target audience larger than the intended victims toward or against a particular policy or with the intention to overthrow the current governmental system. (Cox, Stackhouse, & Falconer, 2009, p. 42)

This definition captures the psychological aspects of terrorism; it is intended to influence an audience much larger than its intended victims implying the attack should cause fear and perhaps a lack of confidence in the ruling regime. This definition also clearly delineates perpetrators and victims. States cannot commit terrorism but subnational and international groups can as well as lone-wolf perpetrators who are sympathetic to a larger group or cause even if they are not formally affiliated with that group. The final key point in this definition is that terrorism is always aimed at a political change whether large or small. This could range from a particular policy change, such as greater environmental protection (which the Environmental Liberation Front in the northwest U.S. aims for) or the overthrow of the western-dominated, world capitalist system (which is an aim of Al-Qaeda). This definition allows precision for the crafter of international legal conventions and the practitioner who has to combat terror organizations without being overly constrictive.

One caveat must be noted. This definition is not without controversy. First, some would argue that this definition does not allow for the multiplicity of interpretation of terrorist acts and thus "one man's terrorist cannot so easily be another man's insurgent." We argue instead that terrorism and insurgency are linked but that terrorism must be precisely defined as a specific tactical action of the insurgents so that proper study and combating of the phenomenon is possible. Second, violent acts such as the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon and the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 do not fit under the definition of terrorism and must correctly be labeled acts of insurgency. This does not validate these acts nor mitigate their horror in the least but it does allow for precision in defining the term.

Concomitant with the debate over terrorism, the notion of state sponsorship of terrorism has garnered increasing focus in the literature especially after the 9/11 attacks. However, Audrey Cronin argues that state sponsorship of terrorism was already on the rise and that there has been an increasing link between terrorist groups and state sponsors which began during the Cold War. She notes that "terrorism was often employed as a mean of exercising power and indirectly accomplishing policy aims" (2011, p. 4). in an era where direct military confrontation between Cold War rivals brought with it the specter of mutually assured destruction. State sponsorship is used in this article to denote third-party state sponsorship through moral, material, training, equipping, or direct military support of a subnational, international, or individual to commit one or more acts of terrorism. States sponsoring terrorism almost always are using the third party to control or sway either another government or a distinct population, which is larger than the intended victims of the terrorist acts.

Still, state sponsorship is often conflated with the erroneous notion of state terrorism. Referring back the literature and our definition, states cannot commit acts of terrorism. Although few scholars make the assertion that states can commit acts of terrorism, a brief review of some of the stronger claims will be addressed here. Mark Seldon and Alvin So devote an entire book's worth of research to support their contention that states can commit acts of terrorism. But they immediately confuse the terror that almost any military act can cause a populace with terrorism (Seldon & So, 2004, p. 5). Because they begin with the fallacious assertion that terror from warfare equates to terrorism, they conclude that one of the most terrifying military actions, the nuclear bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima in Japan had to be labeled terrorism (Seldon & So, 2004, p. 10). Peter Sproat, another proponent of state terrorism, actually illuminates the contradiction in his and Seldon and So's logic when he attempts to simultaneously define acts of war crimes and human rights violations as terrorism while specifically arguing these acts can never be deemed terrorist (Sproat, 1997).

The point is that if this expansion from state-sponsored terrorism to state terrorism is allowed, terrorism loses any specificity and, therefore, any useful meaning. Still, the notion of state sponsorship needs to be reconsidered and this is best done in light of irregular warfare. State sponsorship is usually studied when there is a direct relationship or sponsorship of the terrorist group or act. Iran's sponsorship of Hezbollah and its separatist terror campaign in Lebanon is one of the most obvious examples of direct state sponsorship (Byman, 2005). Direct links such as these have been studied extensively but indirect sponsorship, whether intended or inadvertent, has not. Indirect support would come through special warfighters engaging in irregular warfare supporting a foreign insurgency which, since insurgency and terrorism are linked, likely to engage in terrorist acts. Intention is the key here as the special warfighter has to consciously encourage or condone such acts but even inadvertent fostering of terrorism opens up a new and interesting form of collateral damage which will be explored later.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Report was the first modern U.S. governmental publication to address irregular warfare. In the report, an emphasis is placed on irregular warfare as a vital ongoing mission in the long war against Al-Qaeda and other terrorist and insurgent threats. This was followed closely in time by *DoD Directive 3000.07 on Irregular Warfare* (2014), which stated that irregular warfare (IW) is as strategically important as conventional warfare. This should not be misinterpreted to mean that IW is a new phenomenon only that it is a resurgent focus area in the post–Cold War era. The evidence presented in this section is aimed at defining *irregular warfare* and showing that IW has experienced a resurgence in importance as the U.S. continues to grapple strategically with important national, regional, and global (see Cox, 2010; Kilcullen, 2005) insurgencies and especially states that support these threats to U.S. strategic interests.

The increasing primacy of the use and definition of unconventional warfare is important, but what is more important in determining the implications of how to define and approach the term *terrorism* is how unconventional warfare is operationalized and how it relates to irregular warfare. The 2007 *IW Joint Operating Concept* defines irregular warfare as "a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations" (Department of Defense, 2007, p. 1) This is surprisingly similar to a definition of insurgency and only becomes significantly different when one understands that U.S. armed forces, most likely

Special Operating Forces (SOF) will be engaging with insurgents in a hostile or semi-permissive environment. This should not be confused with a definition of unconventional warfare but this definition is broad enough to encompass the endeavor. This definition was also found to be sound enough for inclusion into Joint Publication 1-02 *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Department of Defense, 2010b). The *IW Joint Operating Concept* notes that some irregular warfare and unconventional warfare encompasses acts of terrorism or transnational crime but U.S. national and international law prevents U.S. forces from supporting these illegal activities. Despite providing an exhaustive list of possible IW activities, the *IW Joint Operating Concept* correctly notes that insurgency and counterinsurgency comprise the core of IW (Department of Defense, 2007).

What is most important about the relationship between IW and unconventional warfare (UW) comes from the *Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats version 2.0* (Department of Defense, 2010a). In this document, it becomes clear that IW is mainly a defensive effort. The JOC lists five activities encompassing IW: counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, stability operations, and unconventional warfare. Of these, only unconventional warfare is a purely offensive tool the U.S. military can use. While SOF may engage in some targeted killings and network disruption of terror cells outside the U.S., counterterrorism remains largely a law enforcement and intelligence activity. Even the external disruptive SOF activities covered under counterterrorism serve to help defend the nation from terror attacks.

Counterinsurgency, too, is defensive in nature as SOF and conventional U.S. forces help a host nation government combat and quell an insurgent threat. Only unconventional warfare offers the opportunity for SOF to foment and support an insurgency against a hostile host nation government and offers the offensive capability of overthrowing that enemy state.

What is most important for this article are activities conducted almost exclusively by U.S. Special Forces in support of a local insurgency intended to overthrow or subvert in some way an unfriendly or rogue foreign central government. Therefore an examination of U.S. Special Forces doctrine as it relates to UW is a necessary next step in the progression of this examination of the link between terrorism and UW.

U.S. Army publication *ADP 3-05 Special Operations* notes “Army special operations forces units develop a deep understanding of local conditions and cultures which allows for a nuanced and often low-visibility or clandestine shaping of the operational environment” (2012, pp. 2–3). There is an interesting implication from this passage in *ADP 3-05*; SOF needs to engage clandestinely or at least with a light footprint to engage local forces in politically sensitive and partially denied or hostile areas. Building on this, *ADP 3-05* provides a far more precise and useful definition of unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare is defined in *ADP 3-05* as “activities conducted to enable the resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with and underground, auxiliary, and guerilla force in a denied area” (United States Army, 2012, p. 9). *ADP 3-05* notes that “these operations require distinct authorities” and one should be aware these authorities are distinct to SOF and fall outside normal Title 10 authorities that govern U.S. conventional forces (United States Army, 2012, p. 9). Unconventional warfare is driven by Title 30 authorities as well, becomes inherently an interagency endeavor, and the military must work in concert with the local embassy despite this activity being sensitive and clandestine in nature.

The problem for practitioners of unconventional warfare is that terrorism and insurgency are linked. Although insurgencies can operate without resorting to terrorism, the initial asymmetric advantage of the central government's forces and the inherent weakness in support and organization of a protoinsurgency force most insurgencies to use terrorism as at least an early tactic to undermine confidence in the local and national government. If one allows for a broader definition of insurgency to include any violence perpetrated by a subnational group or international organization to overthrow a government or affect a particular policy (O'Neill, 2005), then the number of particular groups that U.S. SOF can interact with expands. Furthermore, because terrorism almost never occurs outside of insurgency[1] states that regularly engage unconventional warfare run a greater risk of consciously or inadvertently fostering terrorist acts. Because the U.S. force is downsizing and because there seems to be at least a short-term political preference for smaller, less visible military options, unconventional warfare becomes a more likely option in the near future.

Because *ADP 3-05* (United States Army, 2012) defines unconventional warfare as working by, with, and through a local insurgency to affect or overthrow a government, the likelihood that SOF will have to deal with insurgencies at least considering terrorism as a tactical option becomes a highly likely risk. Even if the special warfighters have no intention of sponsoring terrorism, they have to become aware of the risks of inadvertently fostering terrorism. The strategic messaging damage that could be wrought when U.S. and/or Western forces inadvertently foster terrorism by supporting a local insurgency cannot be overlooked.

One way to deal with this risk is to recognize it and explain it. As with terrorism, intent is a key component. If a person were to turn a gun on civilians with the sole purpose of creating mayhem, then that person would be justly categorized as a mass murder. This is exactly the category the Columbine killers fell into, and this categorization was justified because they had no larger political purpose to their random violence. However, if someone or a group of people were to turn very similar automatic weapons against a civilian population with the intent to spread fear and move a population larger than the intended victims toward or away from a particular policy action, these people would correctly be deemed terrorists. Such was the case with Al-Shabaab operatives raided the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, with the express purpose of forcing the Kenyan government from ceasing its military operations against Al-Shabaab.

Similarly, intent is important in unconventional warfare since there is a very high probability that local insurgents will be tempted to engage in terrorism. So what does the U.S. military need to do to combat this risk? First, U.S. Army Special Forces need to lead the way in acknowledging this risk and not simply reverting to explaining its illegality as JP 5-0 does. It is logical for insurgent forces to gravitate toward terrorism, especially early in the campaign. So this needs to be acknowledged and then dealt with. Second, the Army, along with sister special operating forces, needs to reiterate the illegality of terrorism and the fact that the U.S. would never knowingly sponsor terrorist acts. Third, SOF doctrine needs to account for mitigating techniques and assessment techniques so that these forces have the ability to shape the insurgent away from terrorism and also recognize quickly when an insurgent force has embraced terrorism. Last, more research needs to be conducted on the inadvertent fostering of terrorism falling under a new type of collateral damage.

The modern laws of warfare (*jus in bello*) is well developed in terms of collateral damage resulting from conventional warfare, especially tactics such as aerial bombing. The simple equation that has resulted from consensus regarding the laws of warfare is that the violent response has to be proportional to the threat. Therefore, in a justified existential fight against belligerent states, such as the Axis during World War II, that not only have violated state sovereignty but also grossly violated human rights, operations such as the fire-bombing of Dresden and major cities in Japan are justified. Similarly, if the threat to the state is great enough and/or the central government is belligerent enough (perhaps grossly violating human rights), then inadvertent fostering of terrorism when all reasonable mitigation has been attempted can result in a new form of collateral damage resulting from externally sponsored insurgent terrorism.

In the final analysis, there is a pressing need for a common definition of terrorism or at least a common core set of aspects that most definitions in the field share. Because of political expediency and ideological considerations, there is unlikely to ever be agreement over a common international definition. Less energy should be wasted here because of this and more effort should be focused on the scholarly debate. Perhaps in time, if the epistemic communities around the world come to some sort of agreement over a definition, this could produce consensus at the political level but that seems unlikely. Still, a common definition is a key for the scholarship to move forward and for practitioners to more precisely combat the phenomenon.

This examination of the conceptualization of terrorism in light of irregular warfare produced some interesting implications for special warfighters. When terrorism is accurately addressed in doctrine and in unconventional warfare practice, terrorism emerges as a likely byproduct of SOF engagement with local insurgents. This new form of potential collateral damage must be dealt with in terms of messaging, law, and practice, and it would be so simple to do. All SOF needs to do is recognize this conundrum and address it.

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NOTES

1. The only possible counterexample that comes easily to mind is Aum Shinrikyo in Japan. This group participated in several high-profile terrorism plots and attacks with the express purpose of initiating the end of the world.

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SOFWERX's Return on Collision: Measuring Open Collaborative Innovation

Nina Kollars
Department of Government, Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, USA

Special Operations Command has engaged a number of different strategies intended to improve the agility and performance of its technology acquisitions process. Among these efforts is its newly opened idea space known as SOFWERX. This article examines SOFWERX's structure and function and argues that while SOFWERX exists as a traditional bureaucratic bypass for technology sourcing and development, its greater contribution to innovation will be in harnessing its knowledge returns on collision; the knowledge created and managed by that entity will be its most important asset. As such, proponents of the space would do well to establish metrics that measure collision as well as systems that can manage that knowledge.

Keywords: innovation, Special Operations Command, technology, acquisitions, collaboration

Assessment metrics are too often the enemy of innovation. Although there exists no shortage of bluster about new innovation programs across all of the Department of Defense (DOD), there is very little concomitant discussion of metrics—the means by which these innovative attempts will be measured. This is problematic since new processes are, by definition, threatening to existing systems. As such, they are easy targets for elimination should they appear to falter. Certainly, a host of factors can stifle military innovation (Farrell & Terriff, 2002; Grissom, 2006; Rosen, 1988), but the survival of these new innovation programs, at a minimum, means providing proof of success. And proof is about metrics.

To date, new innovation initiatives have popped up across all the services; many in response to Chuck Hagel's announcement of a Defense Innovation Initiative as part of the Third Offset Strategy (Hagel, 2014). The examples are myriad: the DOD's Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (Carter, 2016), U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa's (USAFE-AFAFRICA)'s Innovation Madness Challenge (Barger, 2015), Office of Naval Research's Massive Multiplayer Online Wargame Leveraging the Internet (Wichman 2016), Army's Apps for Army (Drummond, 2010), and for the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), SOFWERX—its newly minted innovation idea space. Each program functions slightly differently, aims at different effects, and is managed through different sources of funding. Nevertheless, they all share a unified problem—survival as

Correspondence should be addressed to Nina Kollars, Franklin and Marshall College, Department of Government, P.O. Box 3003, Lancaster, PA 17604, USA. E-mail: nkollars@fandm.edu

nontraditional novel programs. Therefore, strategically speaking, each must develop a set of metrics that can demonstrate their innovative effects.

This metrics problem for innovation comes at a time when analysts, seeking clarity over its mechanisms, are deeply skeptical about what exactly they do. Heritage Foundation's Dr. James Jay Carafano referred to Hagel's Defense Innovation Initiative announcement as "fairy dust" (Carafano, 2014, n.p.) Similarly, the Center for a New American Security's Ben Fitzgerald and Loren DeJonge Shulman repeated a general concern by Defense Innovation Unit Experimental participants that the program was akin to "pixie dust" (Fitzgerald & DeJonge Shulman, 2016, n.p.).

Mythological derogatives aside, these programs are more than simply novel. They are all a type of program that encourages open collaboration with nontraditional private industry/ practitioner partners using commercially available technologies and nonclassified methods for creation—a process generally referred to as *open collaborative innovation* (Baldwin, and von Hippel 2012) Open collaborative innovation is a distinct offshoot from its related main body of literature understood as *open innovation*—pioneered by scholars such as Gassmann, Enkel, and Chesbrough—which generally refers to openness of a firm in accepting new ideas (Gassmann, Enkel, & Chesbrough, 2010). Open collaborative innovation is the result of Eric von Hippel's early work in user innovation theory (von Hippel, 1988). This work features the development of solutions through open methods such as open source software (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2012). As such, these DOD ventures are unique in eschewing traditional defense industry dominated acquisition systems that emphasize long lead times, slow and methodical production, and most of all, secrecy.

Open collaborative innovation ventures have been an emergent factor in the private sector as a means to harness divergent perspectives, increase efficiency, and increase agility given a quickly changing environment. Overall, open innovation mechanisms differ immensely on the basis of the intended effect, the firm's culture, and the environment of operation. Some open innovation models are intended to produce a single solution to a single problem; others are intended to provide an alternate view to an ossified perspective; still others are intended to create new subnetworks of smaller firms (Docherty, 2015). Unless a project is clear about why and how it intends to induce open collaborative innovation, the program may become unfocused and its outcomes unrealized (Gassmann et al., 2010). So, the question remains, how will these programs induce open collaboration and how will they measure success?

In regards to Defense Innovation Unit Experimental's case, Chris Meissner and August Cole of Avascent warn that success of ventures such as this cannot be measured in contract dollars alone. In partial remedy, they offer three additional metrics—formulation of best practices; facilitation of contracts with firms; and championing commercial-off-the-shelf solutions (Meissner & Cole, 2016). Although Meissner and Cole's recommendations isolate some additional metrics for the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental program, they aim predominantly at producing additional pathways to speed the acquisition of technology. As such, their suggestions capture only part of the effect open collaborative innovation—as a bureaucratic bypass. What remains unexamined, however, is the primary product of open collaboration—knowledge creation.

To this end, this article examines SOFWERX as a single case through which two different (but not mutually exclusive) models of measurement are offered. Insights regarding the initiative were gathered as the result of a month-long residence at the SOFWERX space. I argue here that, in principle, while SOFWERX functions as a bureaucratic acquisitions bypass (and could be measured as such) in practice, SOFWERX's lasting value to SOCOM and defense acquisition will likely inhere in its status as a knowledge creation space. Insofar as this is the case its advocates would do well to establish metrics early on that can meaningfully capture those effects.

This monograph proceeds first by introducing SOFWERX, its space, and its function as a bureaucratic bypass. The development of an acquisitions bureaucratic bypass is a fairly common component of acquisitions systems historically (Kollars, 2015b). In wartime in particular, new organizations or agencies are created to work around bureaucratic blocks that prevent the development of urgently needed technologies. As such, these bypasses commonly measure success in terms of the technologies produced. In contrast with this, a second perspective is offered—that of knowledge creation and management. Knowledge creation is the outcome of human-to-human interaction wherein new ideas are created (Nonaka, 1994). Thereafter, the article concludes by offering methods through which SOFWERX's status as a knowledge creation space could be measured.

SOFWERX as Bureaucratic Bypass: Structure and Daily Function

Bureaucratic structures are excellent at creating certainty, regularity, and foundational transparency for their relevant communities (Dolan, 2010; Waterman, 1992; Weber, 1947). This is why they are the foundation of any good governance structure; it is their externalities that we malign—stasis, ossification, inflexibility. However, for military acquisitions programs in chaotic threat environments accompanied by rapid technological change, bureaucracy is deeply problematic. The solution historically has been to create bypasses that enable rapid development and purchase to solve this bottleneck. SOFWERX is one such agency.

The neatly appointed but unassuming SOFWERX is situated inside the Doolittle Institute on a corner across the street from Ybor City's Hillsborough Community College. The interior riffs aggressively on the makerspace craze rapidly populating university campuses, Silicon Valley, and entrepreneurial emulators (Colegrove, 2013). Most walls are writable, the tables have wheels, and light flows in through frosted glass in every direction. On its surface, the physical space of SOFWERX looks no different from the contemporary cargo cult of innovation spaces dotting the nation complete with a reliable coffee bar, three-dimensional printers, standing work stations, and a beautiful logo.

SOFWERX is operated by the tiny on-site staff of the Doolittle Institute in Ybor, all of whom take individual responsibility for welcoming guests, providing tours, facilitating introductions, and encouraging interaction amongst the several on-site projects. Also part of the program, down the street several blocks is DIRTYWERX, the fabrication shop attached to SOFWERX that can help produce prototypes. This shop, too, is staffed with a few knowledgeable employees who are skilled in welding, carpentry, laser-cutting, and electronics. When queried regarding what they believe SOFWERX's produces, the staff generally indicated that the program intends to draw in nontraditional acquisitions partners, or small start-ups that have new or differing solutions to existing SOCOM problems (Interview Cameron Hunt).

SOFWERX is notably human-centered in its approach to collaborative innovation. Interviews conducted with staff revealed that the primary stated purpose of SOFWERX aims at capturing new types of partners—the kind unfamiliar with, intimidated by, or just generally unable to navigate SOCOM's normal acquisitions process (Tambrein Bates, May 15, 2016, personal communication). This begins with geographical openness. The rules for visiting SOFWERX are distinctly different than visiting SOCOM itself. Upon entry into its doors all visitors must register their name, affiliation, and their purpose of visit. This sits in stark contrast with SOCOM headquarters on MacDill Air Force Base where non–DOD visitors must agree to a vehicle inspection, lock away all mobile phones and electronics, and must have an escort during their entire visit.

On a nearly minute-to-minute basis new people come and go throughout the SOFWERX space. Some are gathering at the behest of SOCOM for training, others hold business meetings with potential partners discussing nonclassified data. More formally, groups meet weekly or monthly to collaborate; a primary example being the open source software group Mil-OSS (mil-oss.org). Mil-OSS seeks to create a dialogue among different open-source software and hardware developers in the Tampa area. Mil-OSS' meetings are coordinated through the free website meetup.com and anyone may attend or present their experiments or prototypes for critique and discussion. From the military side is SOCOM's strategic futures group called the Donovan Group. The Donovan Group consists of a hand-selected group of military thinkers dedicated to thinking about divergent potential futures and what can be done to prepare for it. Group members are in residence at SOFWERX 3 days per week, and spend 2 days per week within the heavily guarded confines of MacDill. With this group also, there are mechanisms of bringing in new nonmilitary voices to stir up conversation and provide new insights and potential perspectives on the world.

Last, there is the technology itself. Throughout the space, across its varying work benches, are the prototypes of a number of tinkered technologies that include the TALOS program, the SOCOM funded project to produce the Iron Man suit (Magnuson, 2016); Box Botix, private inventor/entrepreneur Coby Leuschke's printable modular robots (boxbotix.com); and goTenna, Daniela and Jorge Perdomo's attachment that turns your phone into a walkie talkie (gotenna.com).

SOFWERX also hosts hackathons—weekend-long physical and virtual problem solving marathons where teams compete to produce the single best solution to a set of DOD issues. Its most recent hackathon held on May 21 and 22, 2016, hosted several teams who competed in four different challenges including cyber capture the flag, modular design for sensors on robots, and document translation software design. The event was cosponsored by a number of the leading organizations and industries in cyber security including Red Hat and MITRE Corporation and judged by the military agencies that proposed the challenges.

Although in most cases the official hours of operation for SOFWERX are Monday to Friday from 8 am to 4:30 pm, the space is almost always alive with engineers, designers, mathematicians, and academics engaging in conversation. The topics range wildly from setting up improvised mesh networks to determining the effects of global connectivity in megacities. Conversations between groups and projects are the norm and are a persistent component of being in the space—often regardless of the time of day. On most nights, directors and staff linger in conversation. Common among its evening visitors is acquisitions executive Hondo Geurts, Doolittle Institute Director Dr. Steve Butler, and SOFWERX Director Tambrein Bates. Project leaders, and local inventors casually engage one another in discussion.

Certainly, SOFWERX functions as a very appealing bureaucratic bypass. It sits outside the wire on the streets of Ybor City—rather than on SOCOM's home base at MacDill Air Force Base. Its primary asset is its autonomy—geographically and financially. SOFWERX has the freedom to query new potential partners, purchase or support low-cost early prototypes, and explore potential new uses for emerging advanced technologies. This freedom to interact and explore is fully restricted in the normal acquisitions chains, which favors well-established and already embedded defense industry types. SOFWERX's agility is directly attributable to a Partnership Intermediary Agreement. Normally, when government purchases from industry it becomes a time-burning highly regulated process that has the effect of deterring nontraditional partners who cannot afford the months- or years-long process of review, or who simply cannot endure the uncertainty given other profitable opportunities and the simplicity of the private contracts process (Sabin & Zakner, 2016). It is these entities that SOFWERX is after. Thus, as a result of the Partnership Intermediary Agreement, SOFWERX functions as a bypass, as a way for small producers to show their work directly to SOCOM without having to file paperwork and find their way through an infuriatingly slow months-long process.

As a bureaucratic acquisitions bypass, SOFWERX is enticing to small firms and individual entrepreneurs. Accordingly appropriate metrics for calculating whether the program is successful could be as simple as those offered by Meissner and Cole (2016)—some mixture of contracts, technologies purchased, and new partnerships finalized. These things are certainly being recorded and weighed closely by the staff of SOFWERX. The registration system, appointment tracking, and room booking systems managed by the staff ensure that all of these data can be used to capture its effectiveness as a bypass.

Why Knowledge Creation Is Important—And Measurable

Bureaucratic bypasses are important. But, this would be to vastly under-sell the value of what is being created. Largely absent from conversations about innovation is a clear discussion about what (other than bureaucratic efficiency), is being created—namely, knowledge. The gap exists not only in military discussion but also in academic discourse. Until only recently, theoretical exploration of the relation between military innovation and knowledge creation has been largely untouched (Catignani, 2014; O'Toole & Talbot, 2011). The term *knowledge creation*—for those unfamiliar with the literature—feels, again, perilously close to weighing pixie dust, and is not likely to warm the more doctrinaire hearts of those who believe material military power is the only real power. Nevertheless, measuring knowledge creation is a cornerstone of major research in organization science and the research is promising.

In the past two decades, management and business have significantly developed theory and research on the question of how knowledge is created and can be measured (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1996; McFadyen, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2009; Phelps, Heidl, & Wadhwa, 2012) The majority of the literature agrees that knowledge creation matters and that it is directly correlated to innovation. The primary question in play for the literature is "What variables really matter?" The answers appear to localize around tie strengths (frequency of interactions between subject matter experts), heterogeneity of a network, and facilitation.

Take, for example, the work of Smith, Collins, and Clark (2005). The researchers tested a number of hypothesized variables thought to influence knowledge creation and thus innovation in firms. They confirm statistical significance for three in particular: knowledge "stock" (which includes years of experience, education, and "functional heterogeneity" of "knowledge workers"[1]), "ego networks" (number and strength of "knowledge workers" contacts), and the overall organizational climate for risk taking and teamwork. The researchers found full or partial support for all their hypotheses. Years of experience, functional heterogeneity, strength and number of workers' contacts, and organizational climate for risk taking and teamwork demonstrate direct correlations with the knowledge creation capabilities of firms. Thereafter, the authors also establish the correlation between knowledge creation capability (its own variable) with the number of new products and services created. Therefore, a firm's knowledge creation capability can act as an effective indicator of potential success, and it can be measured through a variety of simple ways.

Returns on Collision: Measuring the Pixie Dust

Although the work of Smith, Collins, and Clark should not be taken as the single best model for establishing a baseline for measurement, it serves as a reasonable starting point as a thought experiment regarding how it might apply to SOFWERX. We begin with *collision*.

Regarding innovation and SOFWERX, SOCOM's acquisitions executive Hondo Geurts is fond of referencing Zappos Chief Executive Officer Tony Hsieh's catchphrase "getting a return on collision" (Burke, 2013). Hsieh actively plots to make his workspaces narrower and more communal to ensure that employees are continually colliding with one another. This means that ideas and information is constantly emerging and diffusing, meanwhile the company realizes greater efficiencies, new practices, and a more dynamic means of information exchange (Burke 2013). Apart from a catchy turn of phrase, collision may offer insight into a different metric.

Although return on investment is heavily associated with monetary inputs and technological outcomes, collision is somewhat different. *Collision* is just as much about what happens between the humans who collide as it is about technological outputs. Collision is a unique term particularly in terms of innovation since it implies most of the elements hypothesized in innovation theory about what works: the clash of the heterogeneity of views, thoughts, and approaches. In short, collision, creates new knowledge. So, beyond a catchy turn of phrase, what variables might matter in measuring knowledge at SOFWERX? If collision could be measured in terms of Smith, Collins, and Clark's three variables (knowledge stock, ego networks, and climate) what would that entail?

CAPTURING KNOWLEDGE STOCK

Functional Heterogeneity: Make Certain People Mix

If collision is what an organization is after, then good metrics provide evidence that the people passing through the space are from diverse backgrounds and that those diverse actors are interacting with one another. SOFWERX already tracks the names and affiliations of each of its visitors, this is done by simple registration inside the door to create a name badge. The computerized system also automatically records the date and time of registration thereby providing enough data to determine business times of day, most frequent visitors. This should be enough to construct a measure of diversity, frequency of visit, and most likely associates. Additional data collection, say regarding purpose of visit could further this effort for even more accurate measures of potential heterogeneous interaction. Specifically, because many meetings occur inside SOFWERX and Doolittle it might be helpful in understanding whether persons entering were simply interacting with similar types.

Divergent Thinkers: Selecting From Nontraditional Spaces

An additional way to measure functional heterogeneity is to examine the visitor list and look for visitors from unexpected or nontraditional places. The contemporary open innovation climate stresses that divergent thinkers are frequently weeded out of traditional education systems and hiring programs (McCarron & Inkelas, 2006; Jez, 2014). As a commonplace expectation, military agencies often hire what it considers to be the best and brightest. However, the process for selection tends to reflect choices from top tier universities. This is highly problematic for true heterogeneity because thinkers who survive traditional systems likely share similar backgrounds and practices. This unnecessarily narrows the potential pool of thinkers and potentially selects among a particular group with similar perspectives. Regular assessments of not simply the educational attainment but also the places from which visitors come ideally should be as diverse as possible across as many variables as can be imagined (race, class, gender, nationality, religion, neurodiverse capacities).

CAPTURING EGO NETWORKS

Make Use of Already Existing Network Systems

With the exception of some members of the hacker community and active duty Special Operators, the nature of contemporary professional connectivity through sites such as LinkedIn and ResearchGate means that visitors to SOFWERX can be found and mapped through already existing network systems that are freely available. The advantage of using these sites is that they provide a simple interface and data management tool for understanding how these visitors are connected, how dense those networks are, and where these visitors go over time. This could be supplemented with a short survey sent to visitors 6 or 12 months later to determine whether any of the ideas, connections, or experiences they had at SOFWERX were being used in some way later on.

CAPTURING CLIMATE

Staffing Connectors–Facilitation Matters

To capture knowledge creation capacity, and to ensure that interactions between visitors result in productive rather than destructive collisions SOFWERX would do well to gain feedback on the facilitation of the interactions. The emerging understanding of why some open collaborations work and others do not tends to reduce to one thing—the humans who work there. David Beach of Stanford Design School's Product Realization Lab argues vehemently that that the value of open collaborative spaces is not the result of laser cutters, foundries, or three-dimensional printers, it is the people who inhabit that space.[2] Those capabilities certainly attract the people who ultimately collide, but ensuring positive collision is the key strength of a good facilitator. Measuring that can be done in follow-up surveys or, more casually, in a conversation between the director and its visitors.

TOWARD AN INNOVATION STRATEGY: MEASURING KNOWLEDGE

Measuring success will not be SOFWERX's only political challenge. The trick of survival for SOFWERX will obviously depend on its cost (big budgets draw more attention, small ones are budgetary dust), and political adherents (will the new acquisitions executives take umbrage with unique projects run by their predecessor?). Nevertheless, showing outcomes makes it harder to kill a project. Nevertheless, if open collaborative innovation is what SOFWERX is aiming for, then measuring those things directly will likely move it closer to its intended purpose.

If the third-offset stands a chance of coming into being, focusing primarily on the machines that come out of these spaces misses the point. Effective creation and management of knowledge that fosters collision creates an army of divergent thinkers and a catalogue of intellectual capabilities with unlimited potential application. In this way, knowledge creation is more than pleasant academic inquiry. It is the foundation of a nation's capacity to new solutions. For matters of national security, paying closer attention to knowledge creation rather than (or at a minimum in addition to) machines created is arguably a more balanced approach to the myriad technological solutions available in the marketplace. In chaotic complex environments where uncertainty is rampant, and attempts at prediction become questionable, managing the knowledge correctly means that more exposure to varying voices and ideas is at least a head start on problem solving.

Certainly, emphasis on knowledge over technological show-and-tell is likely unsatisfying to those who see potential versus actual capabilities as synonymous with imaginary and real power. Recall, however, that in the contemporary era—particularly for Special Operations Forces that have a small community with exceedingly broad mission sets—the key may not be to produce one version of every potential piece of technology for every operator, but instead, to have the capacity to fabricate them when and where necessary (Kollars, 2015a). From this perspective, adaptability and agility in the age of abundant ideas and commercially available technologies shifts the emphasis to knowing what is available and how it might be used rather than purchasing everything now and hoping it has a purpose later.

SOFWERX, similar to all other entities seeking opportunities to engage open collaborative innovation's benefits, remains uncertain about what it can yield, or even what exactly its final organizational structure will resemble. In any potential future the problem of metrics will rear its ugly head. With spaces that are experimental, this is a tortured affair … mostly because the effects of the group's activity will be diffuse and nonobject producing. SOFWERX in particular is a unique entity because it is the brainchild of an acquisitions body itself. It is unclear what the competitive budgetary field will mean for its survival, but a clear-eyed view of its knowledge productive capacities may well help in establishing a solid argument for its continuance.

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NOTES

1. Knowledge workers are employees who are critical to creating new knowledge or developing innovations within their organizations (Smith, Collins, & Clark, 2005).
2. Interview with David Beach, Stanford, California, April 1, 2016.

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Saving Face, Sacrificing Democracy: American Ontological Security and the 1954 Intervention in Guatemala

Terilyn Johnston Huntington
Mount Vernon Nazarene University, Mount Vernon, Ohio, USA

The U.S.'s covert operations in Guatemala, resulting in the ouster and exile of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz, is ultimately the story of the U.S.'s identity and its attempts to preserve its ontological security within the insecurity of the Cold War context. This is observed through the U.S.'s relationships with the nations of the Western Hemisphere, as filtered through the lens of the Monroe Doctrine and its policy descendants. This article provides a new explanation for the execution of PBSUCCESS in 1954, arguing that at the root of the Eisenhower Administration's policy decisions regarding Guatemala is an obligation to protect the ideological interests of the U.S. and to preserve a self-identity as the Cold War's sole liberal superpower.

Keywords: Dwight Eisenhower, Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz, PBSUCCESS, Monroe Doctrine, ontological security, Cold War, U.S. foreign policy

> Traditions of liberty have been established in this hemisphere under the leadership of many great patriots. They fought for individual human rights and dignity. They lighted the guiding beacons along freedom's road, which have burned brightly in the healthy air of patriotic fervor. These beacons must not be stifled by the poisonous air of despotism now being fanned toward our shores from Moscow, Prague, and Budapest.
>
> —John Foster Dulles (1954c)

Standing before the Western Hemisphere's diplomatic leadership in Caracas, Venezuela, on March 8, 1954, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared the necessity for a declaration regarding the infiltration of communism in the nations of the Americas. These comments reiterated a U.S. policy that maintained the perceptual dominance of the U.S. in the region, espoused an anticommunist agenda, and reinforced the "benevolent protector" identity of the U.S. For Dulles and the rest of the Eisenhower Administration, a definite communist threat had descended upon Latin America in the form of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, President of Guatemala. Something needed to be done.

The story of the U.S.'s covert operations in Guatemala, resulting in the eventual ouster and exile of Arbenz, is ultimately the story of the U.S.'s identity and attempts to preserve its ontological security in the Cold War context and in relation to the nations of the Western Hemisphere, filtered through the lens of the Monroe Doctrine and its policy descendants. This

Correspondence should be addressed to Terilyn Johnston Huntington, Mount Vernon Nazarene University, 800 Martinsburg Road, Mount Vernon, OH, 43050 USA. E-mail: terilyn.huntington@mvnu.edu

article evaluates the U.S.'s 1954 intervention in Guatemala in four parts. First, the article discusses the covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation PBSUCCESS. Second, the article discusses the literature's narrative explanations for the event. Third, the article investigates an alternative explanation—ontological security. Last, the article uses ontological security to explain the public and private actions of the Eisenhower Administration.

THWARTING COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA

In March of 1951 nationalist reformer Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán took office as the democratically elected president of Guatemala.[1] A "brilliant and cultured" Arbenz had based his presidential campaign upon a plan to transform land policy in Guatemala (Cullather, 2006, p. 20). A bill generating agrarian reform went into effect on June 27, 1952. The policy "empowered" the government "to expropriate only uncultivated portions of large plantations" (Cullather, 2006, p. 20).

The main target of this land reform was the U.S.-owned United Fruit Company (UFCO). In 1953, UFCO owned approximately 550,000 acres of land (about 85% of it uncultivated). Arbenz's land reform expropriated 178,000 acres for government redistribution and offered to compensate UFCO $525,000 over 25 years, about $15.5 million less than what the company had asked for. Looking for assistance from the U.S. government, UFCO launched an extensive campaign to alert the world of Guatemala's "communist" leanings (McCann, 1976; Schlesinger & Kinzer, 1990).

Informed by the Soviet containment foreign policy of the preceding Truman Administration, the Eisenhower Administration was equally devoted to the restriction of communism throughout the world but especially in the Western Hemisphere.[2] Thus, the reception of a disconcerting letter from American Ambassador to Guatemala John E. Peurifoy to Assistant Secretary of State John M. Cabot in December of 1953 stirred Washington to action. Characterized by an alarmist tone,[3] Peurifoy reported to Washington:

> As a result my interview with President Arbenz, I am convinced communists will continue to gain strength here as long as he remains in office…Therefore, in view of inadequacy of normal diplomatic procedures in dealing with [the] situation, there appears no alternative to our taking steps which would tend to make more difficult continuation of his regime in Guatemala. (1953b, para. 1)

The Eisenhower Administration was ready, willing, and able to work with the CIA to covertly oust Arbenz. Having successfully deposed the Iranian President Mohammad Mossadegh in August of 1953,[4] the CIA was "flushed with its triumph" and "was about to overthrow another government" (Ambrose, 1999, p. 224).

As in Iran, the U.S. had contacts that would serve as helpful executors before, during, and after the operation: exiled nationalist revolutionary and prison escapee, Colonel Castillo Armas[5] and exiled General Ydigoras Fuentes, Arbenz's opponent in the 1950 presidential election. Armas and Fuentes were reportedly in league with one another, having met in Honduras in August of 1953 "to sign a 'gentleman's pact' promising to cooperate to overthrow Arbenz. Castillo Armas informed Ydigoras Fuentes that he had received assurances of American support…" (Immerman, 1980–1981, pp. 639–640). In the event of an overthrow attempt, Armas would serve as the leader of the dissident, invading forces ("the subversive fifth column") and Fuentes would prime the in-resident Guatemalan army for a coup d'état that would remove Arbenz (Gordon, 1971).

Before the eventual military invasion, CIA Operation PBSUCCESS had two primary goals: to introduce economic disruption in Guatemala and to foster civil and military insecurity in Guatemala that would cast doubt on Arbenz's ability to govern. First, on the economic front, operation planners orchestrated ways to "put covert economic pressure on Guatemala by creating shortages of vital imports and cutting export earnings" (Cullather, 2006, p. 41).

Among these "vital imports" were military supplies and weapons. The U.S. had instituted a "quiet embargo" (Gordon, 1971, p. 145) on the sale of military equipment to Guatemala in 1949 and "by December [of 1953] the Arbenz government could not purchase guns or ammunition of any kind" (Cullather, 2006, pp. 52–53). This, combined with the revelation that there were counterrevolutionary forces gathering in Nicaragua and Honduras created a sense of anxiety and unpreparedness on the part of the Guatemalan military.[6]

As the Arbenz government became increasingly desperate to purchase weapons to combat the pending threat, it was forced to look behind the Iron Curtain for an arms supplier. Thus, in January of 1954, President Arbenz sent Agriculture Minister Alfonso Martinez to Prague with the goal of procuring weapons from the Czechoslovakians.[7] Martinez succeeded in negotiating the purchase of "two thousand tons of light weapons seized from the Germans in the Second World War…The Czechs would arrange the transportation" (Gleijieses, 1991, p. 283). While Arbenz believed that obtaining these weapons would assist him in staving off a pending counterrevolution, the purchase of armaments from the Soviet Czechs had solidified the link between the Guatemalan government and the Soviet Union. This was clear enough proof, for the U.S., to legitimate its already-in-progress plan to invade Guatemala.

The second preinvasion goal of PBSUCCESS was to use psychological methods to destabilize and delegitimize the Arbenz regime. The psychological operation began on May 1, 1954, with "anti-Arbenz, pro-Armas radio pronouncements into Guatemala from the surrounding countries" (Ambrose, 1999, p. 229). The date, Guatemala's Labor Day, was chosen to launch the "Voice of Liberation" radio station guaranteeing it a large listening audience.[8] Claiming that the broadcasts were originating from posts in the Guatemalan jungle, the broadcasts, playing popular American music and brimming with the suspense of spy novels, staged dramatized police "raids" on the air, only to crop up in a "new" broadcasting location the next day, clearly "outwitting Arbenz's police" (Gleijeses, 1991, p. 295).

The radio station took on the persona of the radical counterrevolution and managed to convince American journalists from *The New York Times* and *Life* magazine of its authenticity (Ambrose, 1999, p. 229). Radio messages were designed to target four major groups—"women, soldiers, workers, and young people"—presenting information "urging them to join the Castillo Armas Liberation movement" (Schlesinger & Kinzer, 1990, p. 168). These messages were accompanied by literature and supply drops to assure listeners that the "the rebels were nearby" (Schlesinger & Kinzer, 1990, p. 169). If hearing the anti-Arbenz message on the radio was not enough, Catholic priests concerned about the infiltration of "anti-Christian communism"

(Gleijeses, 1991, p. 287) wrote and delivered homilies reinforcing the Voice of Liberation propaganda in the Church.[9]

Meanwhile, on May 15, 1954, the Czechoslovakian arms shipment arrived in Guatemala aboard the Swedish ship, the *Alfhem*. To obfuscate the ship's cargo, the ship took a circuitous route: departing from Poland and declaring a destination of Dakar, Africa, the captain of the *Aflhem* steered the ship toward Central America.[10] This subterfuge succeeded in diverting the attention of the U.S., who "mistakenly believed" the weapons were "carried in another ship, the *Wulfsbrook*" (Cullather, 2006, p. 78). The U.S.'s attempts to quarantine the cargo of ships entering the region had failed in preventing the Guatemalan acquisition of weapons.[11]

The arrival of the weapons in Guatemala accelerated the endgame of PBSUCCESS: the Armas invasion and deposal of Arbenz.[12] Increased propaganda literature drops and radio broadcasts caused Arbenz to believe that invasion was imminent. To quell the perceived plot, the Arbenz regime "attempt[ed] to destroy the fifth column before the invasion began" (Gleigeses, 1991, p. 317). By June 8, 1954, Guatemalan constitutional rights had been suspended. Hundreds of suspected government opponents were arrested and tortured, and at least 75 were killed (Cullather, 2006, pp. 83–84; Martz, 1956, pp. 100–103).

In the face of political oppression from the Arbenz government, Castillo Armas' invasion from Honduras began on June 15, 1954.[13] The "Fifth Column" consisted of an invasion force of about 150 men. Thus, the success of the operation hinged on the psychological response of the Arbenz government to the perceived threat (Ambrose, 1999, pp. 230–231). The CIA jammed government-controlled radio signals, leaving the lone broadcast as the *Voice of Liberation*'s, which implored Arbenz's pilots to defect to the U.S. with their planes.[14] To prevent the defection of additional planes from his anemic air force, "Arbenz grounded the remainder of his air force" (Ambrose, 1999, p. 231). Wearing a leather jacket and driving a station wagon, Armas and his rag-tag army (numbering about 150 with him, 250 total) crossed the Honduran border into Guatemala on June 18, 1954, en route to Guatemala City (Cullather, 2006, p. 88).

Meanwhile, the CIA propaganda machine increased its presence by taking to the air. Its purpose was to incur civilian panic, to increase pressure on Arbenz to resign, and to procure the allegiance of the Guatemalan military. The visual display of an airplane was effective in its own right, but the "air propaganda" was intensified when a railroad bridge was blown up and "cargo planes dropped pallets of arms over the Guatemalan countryside to persuade the Army that a fifth column was ready to rise against the government" (Cullather, 2006, p. 89). In addition, "Rebel planes strafed the capital for a few minutes every day and occasionally dropped a bomb, causing little damage but unnerving the populace…the city was quiet but tense" (Gleijeses, 1991, p. 326).

As long as Arbenz retained the fealty of the Guatemalan Army, he retained hope that the Armas rebellion would be thwarted. Arbenz was convinced that the U.S. Marines would follow the unintimidating Armas force (Gleijeses, 1991). Thus, Arbenz decided that he had no choice but to provide arms to "the peasants and urban workers" (Immerman, 1980–1981, p. 648). This decision, however, enraged a military establishment also fearful that the Marines were on their way. In addition, officers perceived Arbenz's decision as indication that he lacked confidence in their ability to wage war and protect the nation. Not only did the military refuse to arm the peasants, but it lost confidence in the Guatemalan President, demanding his resignation (Cullather, 2006; Immerman, 1980–1981).[15]

On June 27, 1954 Jacobo Arbenz Guzman resigned the Guatemalan presidency and slipped into exile, permitting the revolutionary Castillo Armas to ascend to political power. [16] By 1957, Armas would be the victim of a military assassination, and the other half of the 1953 gentlemen's pact, Ydigoras Fuentes, would be elected to the Guatemalan presidency. The successive Guatemalan regimes would glorify militarism and right-wing nationalism, definitely not what the Eisenhower had in mind when planning PBSUCCESS (Cullather, 2006).[17]

WHY INTERVENE? EXPLAINING PBSUCCESS

Operation PBSUCCESS marked the second time within 12 months that the Eisenhower Administration successfully endeavored to overthrow a sovereign regime.[18] With many policy avenues available to Eisenhower and his colleagues, why use (especially contingent and unstable) covert plans to achieve regime change? Historian Stephen Kinzer (2006) suggests that there are three reasons for a strong nation (such as the U.S.) to intervene in a weaker nation (such as Guatemala): "to impose its ideology, increase its power, or gain control of valuable resources" (p. 1). These three narratives dominate scholars' attempts to account for the U.S.'s 1954 intervention in Guatemala: policy (Cold War containment), spy power (the CIA as an employable tool), and economic (protection of United Fruit Company).

The first category of PBSUCCESS literature uses the policy narrative to explain the U.S. intervention in Guatemala. This literature is dominated by the use of communist containment policy to explain the U.S.'s interest in Arbenz's foreign policy choices. This view is prominently featured in secondary sources published during the Cold War (Green, 1971; Martz, 1956; Payne, 1973; Schneider, 1958) and those that focus on the political reasons for intervention in Guatemala (Brockett, 2002; Gleijieses, 1991; Shaw 2003; Stanley, 1994) and is advanced by members of the Eisenhower Administration directly after the execution of PBSUCCESS and in their memoirs.

The importance of communist containment is clearly illustrated by John Foster Dulles. Three days after Jacobo Arbenz's resignation on June 30, 1954, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proclaimed the Guatemalan victory over communism to the American people (conveniently ignoring U.S. involvement in the coup d'état):

> For several years international communism has been probing here and there for nesting places in the Americas. It finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into an official base from which to breed subversion which would extend to other American Republics…The people of Guatemala have now been heard from. Despite the armaments piled up by the Arbenz government, it was unable to enlist the spiritual cooperation of the people. (Dulles, 1954b)

In addition to John Foster Dulles' 1954 speeches (1954a, 1954b, 1954c), Allen Dulles (1963) and President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1963) claim the importance of communism to their decisions to intervene in Guatemala. Allen Dulles (1963) notes, "The communists have not always succeeded, and this is due in no small measure to the employment of intelligence assets…their stooges took over power in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954, and they were driven out" (p. 221). President Eisenhower (1963) reflected on the successful operation in Guatemala, stating, "By the middle of 1954 Latin America was free, for the time being at least, of any fixed outposts of communism" (p. 427).

The second explanatory narrative for American intervention in Guatemala focuses on power. In the context of the Cold War, Kinzer (2006) considers both the use of military and clandestine power in regime-change operations. Works that analyze Operation PBSUCCESS in terms of power, prioritize the development and use of spy power by the Eisenhower Administration to accomplish its more delicate foreign policy objectives. Because of the progression of declassified documents related to PBSUCCESS, this narrative has emerged after the end of the Cold War. These analyses explore the use of early CIA and covert operations in detail but retrospectively portray CIA interventions as a double-edged sword. A relatively inexpensive yet efficacious way to exert power throughout the world, CIA operations such as PBSUCCESS tended to leave newly installed leaders to their own devices, which was not always in the interest of the citizens the operation was designed to help (Ambrose, 1999; Blum, 1995; Callanan, 2010; Cullather, 2006; Daugherty, 2004; Holden, 1999).

Daugherty (2004) appropriately summarizes the double-edged nature of intelligence operations in Guatemala, characteristic of the spy power narrative:

> The great irony is that whole PBSUCCESS was a covert action success—overturning a potentially pro-communist government in America's backyard mostly through the psyops program and with only a "modest" push from the paramilitary side—it was ultimately a foreign policy tragedy. The removal of Arbenz allowed an oppressive and exceptionally cruel military dictatorship to hold sway for forty years, with hundreds of thousands of Guatemalans killed by their own government in that time. (p. 139)

Challenging the assertion that the Operation PBSUCCESS was primarily a politically (policy or power) motivated endeavor, the third and largest literature narrative looks at the U.S. economic interests underpinning covert actions in Guatemala. Although nearly all of the PBSUCCESS literature mentions the role of Arbenz's Guatemalan land reform as propelling the U.S. to action, these sources attribute U.S. interests in Guatemala as intrinsically linked to the United Fruit Company (Dosal, 1993; Immerman, 1982; Kinzer, 2006; Schlesinger & Kinzer, 1990; Smith, 2008; Sullivan, 2004). Kinzer (2006) characterizes the tragic tenor of many of these texts, regretfully stating that the U.S. had in 1954 "deposed a regime that embraced fundamental American ideals but that had committed the sin of seeking to retake control of its own natural resources" (p. 147).

Some of the texts, rather conspiratorial in tone, explore the connections between the Eisenhower Administration (especially the Dulles brothers) and the United Fruit Company (Gordon, 1971; Immerman, 1980–1981; McCann, 1976; Rabe, 1988; Raymont, 2005). Immerman (1980–1981) describes the logical progression that he contends led to the economically motivated overthrow of President Arbenz:

> United Fruit's well-known connections within the White House, State Department, and Congress did help to create a sympathetic audience. Nevertheless, government officials brought with them an outlook on world politics that was fashioned by the cold war ethos. They assumed that communism threatened the fundamental American way of life, that foreign investment was essential for this way of life so any threat of this investment was concomitantly a threat to the national interest, and that any threat to the national interest was necessarily that result of communist activity and a threat to national security. (pp. 638–639)

ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY: IDENTITY AND AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN GUATEMALA

As the literature shows, economic and political motivations have been useful lenses through which to understand the U.S.'s Cold War–era interest in its small, southern neighbor, Guatemala. However, material sources of power alone cannot account for the vigor with which the U.S. responded to the perceived radicalization of the Arbenz government. For the Eisenhower Administration, there seems to be a more personal catalyst propelling intervention in Guatemala: the preservation of U.S. identity. At the root of all policy decisions made by a nation's politicians is an obligation to protect a national identity that has been socially and rhetorically constructed to protect the ideational interests of the nation (Steele, 2010). Preservation of this identity is what causes the nation, to feel that its very existence, is ontologically secure (Kinnvall, 2004).

This practice of national-identity preservation is especially apparent during the Cold War. Historian Melvyn P. Leffler (2008) discusses the importance of identity in a bipolar geopolitical order: "Transnational ideological conflict shaped the Cold War. Peoples everywhere yearned for a more secure and better life" (p. 281). This set up a dichotomy of ideological choices for the world's nations: nations could either root their national identities in the Soviet or the American economic and political paradigms. Considering Soviet political and economic approaches to be antithetical to capitalist sensibilities and guided by a policy of containing and limiting Soviet influence, the U.S. rooted its ontological self-understanding not only in a liberal, democratic, capitalistic ideology, but also regarded itself as "the hegemon, or overseer of the global economy" (p. 283) and "the best hope for the world to enjoy the fruits of the modern world" (Ekbladh, 2010, p. 77).

The U.S.'s Cold War identity as "Leader of the Free World" (Peceny, 1999, p. 217) was rooted in a much older American mythos: exceptionalism (Weldes, 1999). As early as the 17th century, the American colonies understood themselves to be evangelists of liberalism and democracy, using the biblical imagery of a City on a Hill (McDougall, 1997). This politically evangelical identity translated to the Cold War context as a missionary ideology, compelling American foreign policy to influence other nations to follow the American political example (Schlewitz, 2004).

For a nation to maintain its ontological security, it must act in such a way as to limit existential fear and anxiety and promote policy options that will preserve and protect its identity (Steele, 2005). The protection of U.S. identity against Soviet penetration during the Cold War was especially salient in the Western Hemisphere (Weldes, 1999). To preserve American ideological superiority in the region in the Cold War context, the U.S. appealed to a nearly abandoned regional foreign policy: the Monroe Doctrine (Sessions, 1973–1974).

The Development of the Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine emerged in the 19th century as a preemptive policy prescription against European intervention and imperialism in the Western Hemisphere. In his 1823 annual address to the U.S. Congress, President James Monroe declared:

> We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and [European] powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. (Monroe, 1823)

With this statement, the Monroe Doctrine established three primary policy goals. First, politically, the Monroe Doctrine aimed to keep the Europeans out; second, it securitized the region to maintain stability, and third, economically, it provided the U.S. with access to natural resources and markets (Gilderhus, 2006).

A pointed warning to Russian and Spanish interests in the region, the Monroe Doctrine, ironically, placed the enforcement of this policy into the hands of the globally imperialist, European, British navy (Smith, 2008; Gilderhus, 2006).[19] It is understandable that this policy trajectory was criticized by the European powers as arrogant imperialism. Otto von Bismarck referred to the Monroe Doctrine as an "'insolent dogma…a species of arrogance peculiarly American and inexcusable'" (as quoted in McDougall, 1997, p. 57). Despite European criticism of the policy and the lack of an American enforcement mechanism in the policy, the Monroe Doctrine remained efficacious for over a century (Boot, 2002; Wilson, 1966).

After World War II, the victorious U.S. was given a prominent position in guiding the rebuilding efforts in Western Europe. Scarred by the sacrifices of two world wars, the U.S. sought to institutionalize liberal ideals at the supranational level through the founding of the United Nations. Latin America, however, was concerned that the U.S. had forgotten its Monroe Doctrine promises to its southern neighbors. "Hence, the United States agreed to the calling of an inter-American conference to codify a hemispheric security system in return for Latin American support in the delicate construction of the United Nations" (Sessions, 1973–1974, p. 260).

The diplomatic representatives of the Americas would meet in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil during the summer of 1947 to discuss a security treaty for the region. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (or the Pact) consisted of two primary policy prescriptions. First, an attack from an external force (read: the Soviet Union) would be considered an attack on all adherents to the Rio Pact and would be responded to with military force, given the approval of two thirds of the members. The U.S. insisted, knowing full well that effective military endeavors in the region would require American assistance, that "'no state shall be required to furnish armed forces without its consent'" (Sessions, 1973–1974, p. 265). Second, it was determined that disputes between the North and South American nations would be arbitrated in region before going to the United Nations (G. Smith, 1994).

The Rio Pact, which was approved by the U.S. Senate by a vote of 72–1, effectively transformed the previously unilateral Monroe Doctrine into a multilateral regional security arrangement (G. Smith, 1994). The Latin American nations were assured that it would be impossible for the European nations to use the United Nations to intervene in the Western Hemisphere and the U.S. Monroe Doctrine was entrenched and militarized albeit by a different name (Sessions, 1973–1974). This served to reaffirm the U.S.'s identity as the Western Hemisphere's leader and protector.

PROTECTING THE U.S.'S ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY: PBSUCCESS AND THE CARACAS RESOLUTION

For the U.S. in 1953–1954, ontological security was bound up in the assurance that the bipolar world order remained constant and that the Western Hemisphere remained free of Sino-Soviet communist influences. "U.S. leadership thus demanded continual demonstration of its ability both to guide its allies and followers and to counter threats by actual and potential opponents"

(Weldes, 1999, p. 47). Thus, when news of Guatemalan President Arbenz's communist leanings were confirmed by Ambassador Peurifoy's December 1953 reports to Washington, the Eisenhower Administration, representative of the American Self, suffered ontological insecurity and felt compelled to act in such a way as to recreate its perception of security.[20] When challenged in such a shocking way (as the revelation of communism in Guatemala), the American self becomes "unsure of its 'true' self" (Steele, 2010, p. 27).

In the case of Guatemalan communism, the U.S. acted in two different ways in order to protect and reestablish its ontological security and thus, itself: first, in the clandestine planning and execution of Operation PBSUCCESS; and second, in the public condemning of regional communism through the Caracas Resolution. The order here is significant as the U.S. chose to act in a clandestine manner before and while engaging the public process. Thus, in this circumstance, the U.S. was simultaneously acting to reaffirm its leader-of-the-free-world identity publically through the Organization of American States, while privately undermining a democratically elected presidential administration through Operation PBSUCCESS.

First, the U.S. aimed to protect its ontological security, tied to the prohibition of communism through the clandestine Operation PBSUCCESS. Explained earlier, the U.S.'s interactions with Guatemala reached a crisis mode on May 15, 1954, when the Czechoslovakian weapons reached the Arbenz regime. At this point, the U.S. still had two choices: follow through with the plan or ignore the weapons shipment.

In the face of critical situations such as the arrival of the Czechoslovakian arms shipment in Guatemala, the Eisenhower Administration faced certain anxiety and ontological insecurity. "Someone who suffers from anxiety for a period of time is insecure insofar as their sense of being is challenged" (Steele, 2005, p. 526). Thus, the U.S. felt compelled to officially launch the Armas invasion because inaction "challenged the very identity of the United States, not only as the leader of the 'free world' but also as the guarantor of freedom in the Western Hemisphere" (Weldes, 1999, p. 38).

The cognitive dissonance produced by the U.S.'s regime change–oriented clandestine action, however, required resolution within the Eisenhower Administration. While PBSUCCESS was already in full swing in Guatemala and Honduras, the debates within the Oval Office still involved legal discussion that would legitimize action in Guatemala. This is illustrated by the debate surrounding National Security Council Resolution 5419 at a meeting of the National Security Council on May 28, 1954. The Statement of Policy, "U.S. Policy in the Event of Guatemalan Aggression in Latin America," (1954b) discusses circumstances in which the U.S. would be compelled to act militarily in Guatemala.[21] It was generally agreed that action would be justified under the Rio Pact because of "the US's right of self-defense and the great desirability of collective action in dealing with the problem of Guatemala" (National Security Council, 1954a).

The juxtaposition of the façade of "self-defense" and "collective action" while PBSUCCESS was already in progress illustrates an attempt on the part of those in the PBSUCCESS inner circle to legitimize the operation. This is a demonstrative example of an effort for the American self to reconcile covert actions that would not necessarily be considered legitimate by its citizenry (and certainly not by the other Organization of American States members) with external pretense.[22]

Second, the U.S. sought to protect and reestablish its ontological security through a public display at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, Venezuela, in March of 1954. On March 8, 1954, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles addressed the conference in support of a declaration that would officially condemn the "Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics." Dulles' address was steeped in the discourse of ontological security. His first goal was to establish a bright line between the Soviet "other" and the liberally minded nations of the Western Hemisphere by articulating the threat the communism posed to the region. "It may next be asked whether this international communist apparatus actually seeks to bring this hemisphere, or parts of it, into the Soviet orbit. The answer must be in the affirmative" (1954c)

Dulles then aimed to unify the organization through liberal, democratic ideology; the source, of course, of American ontological security.

> Traditions of liberty have been established in this hemisphere under the leadership of many great patriots. They fought for individual human rights and dignity. They lighted the guiding beacons along freedom's road, which have burned brightly in the healthy air of patriotic fervor. These beacons must not be stifled by the poisonous air of despotism now being fanned toward our shores from Moscow, Prague, and Budapest…That is why, it seems to us, we would be false to our past unless we again proclaimed that the extension to this hemisphere of alien despotism would be a danger to us all, which we unitedly oppose. (Dulles, 1954c)

The dichotomy between the U.S. public statements and its suspected (by the Arbenz Administration) actions in Guatemala was not lost upon Guatemalan Foreign Minister Toriello who used his opportunity to speak to the Conference to verbally berate the U.S. and Secretary Dulles for their duplicity and capitalistic bullying in the Guatemala (Martz, 1956, p. 88). He went on to condemn the U.S., although not in name:

> Those same privileged ones have also resorted to encouraging and backing plots and subversive acts to destroy a government which has the full backing of its people and needs no foreign aid to sustain it. They have recommended boycott and economic sanctions against Guatemala…Still not satisfied, and in view of the failure of all their attempts, they invoke anew the sacred word democracy, and reiterating the absurd pretext that Guatemala is a 'beachhead of communism in America,'…they dare to make the final attempt at open intervention against the Guatemalan government, now not against Guatemala only, but against the very foundations of Pan-Americanism. (quoted in Martz, 1956, p. 89)

For the U.S., Toriello's words were more than fiery rhetoric. They indicated a challenge to the ontological security of the U.S., making it far more likely—if not imperative—for the U.S. to go through with operation PBSUCCESS to preserve its self-understanding and identity as the liberal City on a Hill and protector of democracy in the Western Hemisphere. Toriello's speech also clearly indicated to the U.S. that there "were, in fact, communists in the Arbenz government. The Resolution passed by a 17–1 margin with only Guatemala opposed.[23] The U.S. left the conference with its resolve and identity in the region secured. It had won the fight of the day. The U.S. also believed that the resolution assisted in justifying its pending covert operation in Guatemala (Ambrose,1999). Guatemala, however, left the conference defeated and knowing that "there was no way that Guatemala alone could defeat a U.S. invasion, and Guatemala was alone. Caracas had exposed her isolation" (Gleijeses, 1991, p. 284).

CONCLUSION

The U.S. 1954 intervention in Guatemala has previously been characterized as an attempt to quash a democratically elected, reformist government (with some communist leanings) for the purpose of policy (Sino-Soviet containment), spy power (using its intelligence apparatus) and/or economic protectionism (of the United Fruit Company). Although these factors did contribute to U.S. intervention in Guatemala, this article has argued that the U.S. enacted PBSUCCESS to preserve and protect its ontological security, using the identity-protecting Monroe Doctrine, both in the Western Hemisphere and the bipolar geopolitical order.

Despite a self-proclaimed successful venture in Guatemala, the U.S. continued to create and reinforce its self-understanding and identity through the lenses of the Cold War, the thwarted Guatemalan communist threat and the passage of the Caracas Resolution, notably distancing itself from the Guatemalan revolution. On November 29, 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proclaimed:

> The Latin American countries are in no great danger from open armed attack, but they are vulnerable to communist subversion…The principle of this Caracas Declaration had a special bearing on the situation in Guatemala. There international communism had in fact got control of the Government. The American States were about to meet with reference to this danger when the Guatemalan people themselves backed loyal elements who cut out the cancer of communism…The reality of the matter is that the United States, by every standard of measurement, is the world's greatest answer not only materially but spiritually…I am supremely confident [we] will peacefully prevail. (Dulles, 1954a)

The ultimate irony of these words lies in the fact that Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán was a democratically elected leader. To preserve its closely held self-identity as the sole liberal superpower both in the Cold War context and in the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. concocted and successfully executed an elaborate plan to overthrow him. Although the Eisenhower Administration was pleased with its achievements in Guatemala, PBSUCCESS resulted in a politically unstable and less democratic Guatemala (Ambrose, 1999). In the end, the U.S. saved face and rebutted a perceived challenge to its ontological security, but it did so at the expense of Guatemalan democracy and the will of the Guatemalan people.

NOTES

1. For a discussion of the 1944 Guatemalan revolution and Jacobo Arbenz's rise to power, see Schlesinger and Kinzer (1990), Cullather (2006), Immerman (1982). Sullivan (2004) notes that Arbenz was victorious in the November 1950 election by a 3:1 margin (p. 43).
2. Containment became a foreign policy fixture of American Cold War policy after diplomat George Kennan's infamous article (1947), in which he argued that "the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of an long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies" (p. 575).
3. In a previous telegram, Peurifoy describes the 6-hr discussion with President Arbenz leading to his alarmist bent in consequent correspondence with Washington. He noted, "President showed depth of his feeling against United Fruit Company and his admiration for Guatemala's communist leaders, leaving no doubt he intended to continue to collaborate with them" (John E. Peurifoy, "The Ambassador in Guatemala (Peurifoy) to the Department of State," December 17, 1953, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d427) Schlesinger and Kinzer also portray Peurifoy as a shoot-first-ask-questions-later kind of diplomat, noting that Peurifoy "spoke no Spanish and knew nothing about Guatemala, but he expressed himself with certitude on the issue of 'Reds' in the Arbenz government" (p. 133).
4. Detailed accounts of the U.S.'s 1953 intervention in Iran can be found in Bill (1988), Kinzer (2008), and Roosevelt (1979).
5. Castillo attempted to prevent Arbenz (whom he believed to have been instrumental in the assassination of presidential candidate Colonel Francisco Arana) from becoming president, leading an assault on Matamoros in November of 1949.

He was arrested but later escaped from prison, claiming to have dug out a tunnel. While a tunnel was dug, Gleijeses (1991) quips that the guards would needed to have been "blind as well as deaf" to have permitted the prison escape (p. 83).

6. See Cullather (2006, p. 53). Gleijeses (1991, p. 279), and Gordon (1971, pp. 145–146).
7. To throw off U.S. suspicion, Arbenz and Martinez had publically argued the evening before Martinez's departure leading people to believe that the two no longer agreed on agriculture policy. When Martinez left for Switzerland the next day, it was believed that he might be seeking asylum. The CIA was not fooled and followed his movements to Prague (Cullather, 2006, pp. 53–55). When Martinez returned to Guatemala in February (still holding his political post), "he explained that he had been in a Swiss sanatorium attending to a heart problem" (Gleijeses, 1991, p. 282).
8. Advertisements placed in Guatemalan newspapers on April 30, 1954, alerted the public to a new news and music radio station that would begin broadcasting the next day (Schlesinger & Kinzer, 1990, p. 168).
9. See Ambrose (1999, p. 229), Immerman (1980–1981, p. 644), and Gleijeses (Gleijeses, 1991, pp. 287–288).
10. The captain received instructions to pilot the ship first to Curacau, Dutch West Indies, then Puerto Cortes, Honduras and, finally, to Puerto Barrios, Guatemala (Cullather, 2006, pp. 77–82).
11. A memo prepared for President Eisenhower's May 22, 1954, meeting notes the perceived seriousness of the Czechoslovakian/Guatemalan arms deal for the Eisenhower Administration. The memo articulates U.S. policy for future shipments: "To prevent further communist arms build-up in Central America, [the] U.S. Navy will stop suspicious foreign-flag vessels on the high seas off Guatemala … to examine cargo. If such vessels will not voluntarily cooperate, they will be taken forcibly to Panama for examination" (Cutler, 1954). This policy went into effect on May 24, 1954, under the name of Operation HARDROCK (Cullather, 2006, p. 82). No further weapons were detected, "yet Operation Hardrock was not mere bravado; it packed psychological punch" (Gleijeses, 1991, p. 313).
12. Unfortunately for Arbenz, the WWII-era former Nazi weaponry would do the Guatemalans little good against the Armas forces and CIA agents. The shipment included many weapons: "rifles, machine guns, antitank guns, 100 howitzers, mortars, grenades and … enough ammunition to last the Guatemalan Army 10 to 15 years in peace time" (Cullather, 2006, p. 81). However, "the Czechoslovakian arms were either worn out or ineffective for jungle warfare and completely inappropriate—because they were too complex or too cumbersome—for a militia force" (Ambrose, 1999, p. 228).
13. The transcript of a telephone conversation between John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen Dulles illustrates the level of concern in the Eisenhower Administration in relation to the political situation in Guatemala on the day that the invasion was set into motion. John Foster Dulles' secretary recorded: "The situation in Guatemala is getting very critical as a result of repressive and communist dictatorial activities of the government…we hope and expect that the army and the loyal anticommunists in the country which constitute the vast majority of the people will clean their own house" (Dulles, 1954d).
14. The broadcasted anecdote was recorded and edited by a CIA agent when an intoxicated Guatemalan pilot (who did defect with his plane) gave a "theoretical" speech after being asked how he would convince his colleagues to defect to the West (Ambrose, 1999, p. 231; Immerman, 1980–1981, p. 648).
15. This decision by the military was colored by an assumption that the ouster of President Arbenz was a foregone conclusion. It appeared to the Guatemalan military that the U.S. had determined that Arbenz's tenure as president had run its course, and the military did not feel that they could stand up to the U.S. and win (Gordon, 1971, pp. 146–147; Gjeijeses, 1991, p. 6).
16. President Eisenhower states in his memoirs that Arbenz left Guatemala for Czechoslovakia through Mexico (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 426).
17. Immerman (1982), Gleijeses (1991), and Brockett (2002) provide an extensive look at the political and social consequences of Arbenz's removal for Guatemalans. Kinzer (2006) summarizes Guatemalan sentiment in the years after the coup in a single quotation from a Guatemalan man at the 1995 interment of Arbenz's ashes in Guatemala City: "'All I know is that there was no persecution during his government … Afterwards, people began dying'" (p. 129).
18. Operation AJAX installed the Shah in Iran in August of 1953. Operation PBSUCCESS concluded in June of 1954. See Ambrose (1999, ch. 14–16).
19. McDougall (1997) elaborates on the British role in the Monroe Doctrine, asserting, "The Monroe Doctrine was not an American initiative at all, but a bold riposte to yet another British idea," but, simultaneously, "Britain was the biggest *target* of the American policy" (p. 58).

20. Steele (2010) argues that the self can be reliant upon consistent characteristics, but that the self is a transitive entity "constantly transform[ing] so that judgment is always contingent in time and place" (p. 26).
21. Not all members of Eisenhower's National Security Council were aware of the ongoing nature of Operation PBSUCCESS, so the discussion and approval of National Security Council 5419 reaffirmed PBSUCCESS's clandestineness in Guatemala (1954b).
22. Steele (2010) uses similar analysis to discuss the Bush Administration's need to recreate the American self after the conduct of enhanced interrogation during the Global War on Terror. This is because the Bush Administration's use of enhanced interrogation may not be understood to be in alignment with traditionally held American values central to the American self (pp. 149–162).
23. Mexico and Argentina chose to abstain (G. Smith, 1994, p. 81).

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Building Competencies for Special Operations Forces' Readiness in the Gray Zone

Spencer B. Meredith and David C. Walton
College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University, Washington, DC, USA

Special Operations Forces can be used for policy goals from long-term political influence operations, to engagements taken either to stabilize or dethrone regimes on the basis of U.S. interests. Those actions are taking place more frequently in the Gray Zone, where actors, actions, and areas of engagement merge between traditional interstate relations and nonstate challenges. Many of these contribute to a changing character of war, something that requires adaptable Special Operations Forces to support U.S. national security success. This article looks specifically at ways to ensure Special Operations Forces' readiness in the Gray Zone across a spectrum of issues and environments. It focuses on educational techniques that rely on tried and tested categories of scholarly analysis to ensure Special Operations Forces' adaptability in different contexts and to ensure that lessons learned can be applied to commonalities across them.

Keywords: Special Operations Forces, Gray Zone, future operating environment, cultural competency, comparative politics, conflict resolution

Recent activities by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Syria and Iraq have once again drawn public attention to an elite tool of U.S. foreign policy. In the past, SOF actions have focused on a range of operations from long-term political influence operations, to engagements undermining and removing regimes hostile to U.S. interests. We take the policy imperatives to shape foreign environments as a given, rather than wade into the debates about the efficacy of intervention, bureaucratic paradigms constraining implementation, or the politicization of policy debates in a democratic election cycle. The boundaries for this article are narrow in that regard, largely because the authors work in the arena where sharpening "the tip of the spear" is as important as ensuring U.S. military personnel have the breadth of perspective necessary to do their jobs well, thus leaving policy makers to determine the strategic employment of SOF.

In particular, we take as our starting point the ongoing discussions of the Gray Zone where actors, actions, and areas of engagement merge between traditional interstate relations and nonstate challenges. Coupled with the rise of social media outlets, the presence of "people power" resonates across more than domestic political environments. The character of war thus appears to be changing, not in the reasons for conflict but rather through the means for

Correspondence should be addressed to Spencer B. Meredith, National Defense University, 3915 Ardennes Road, Fort Bragg, NC 28310, USA. E-mail: spencer.meredith@gc.ndu.edu

expressing and addressing it. Relying on concepts developed in *SOCOM 2020* (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2011), *ARSOF 2022* (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2012), and follow-on white papers dealing with the nature of political warfare and deterrence options available to the U.S., this article looks specifically at ways to ensure SOF readiness across a spectrum of issues and changing operating environments. It does so by emphasizing the teaching of categories of analysis, rather than mastery of the myriad data inherent to the Gray Zone. SOF must be able to adapt to different contexts while also being able to see and understand commonalities across them. Doing so enables them to bring to bear their other considerable resources and talents towards the effective implementation of U.S. policy in often murky foreign settings.

One key talent that crosses traditional academic work in political science, history, economics, and sociology centers on the identification of local population interests and key social network hubs as both local interest articulators and aggregators, and as mouthpieces for U.S. goals back to the population. This pipeline of information can flow both ways because SOF have the potential to build trust with communities, local governments, and national officials through a host of humanitarian, economic, and political assistance programs ranging from digging wells, to culturally attuned civics training in governance. SOF also have a leadership model that builds capacity with local forces to withstand hostile enemy actions, or conduct their own through military means when necessary. This final piece is beginning to morph into something akin to traditional conflict resolution as SOF evaluate the value of non-violence as a new means to an old end—supporting U.S. interests in other countries.

Since the end of the Cold War, some formerly autocratic regimes have undergone transitions through nonviolent methods, usually through the ballot box, but sometimes through protest and "occupying" ground "nonviolently."[1] For example, the 2015 elections in Venezuela and Myanmar bode well for the possibility of peaceful transitions to more open, contested, and hopefully free societies. In addition, these cases show that support for nonviolent resistance is not always needed if systems exist for popular and elite deliberation, and both groups pursue them peacefully. Yet, what about places where regime moderation, if not outright change, might be in the U.S., and hopefully the local population's interests? Should the U.S. consider support to groups in Russia and North Korea or perhaps in Iran? To do so is fraught with pitfalls of illegitimacy and other negative externalities, so where could decision makers apply this support to nonviolent resistance movements? Most likely places of marginal global significance, but with greater regional importance would top that list. Zimbabwe stands out as a potential candidate because of its disastrous economic downturn under Mugabe, despite the country's potential for growth through a more balanced political system to guarantee diverse land rights and business protections.

However, the point of this article is not to debate the best or worst places for engagement, but instead to show that discussions about the Gray Zone span the spectrum of violent and nonviolent actions available to the U.S., its allies and partners. U.S. adversaries also operate this way, some of whom excel at exploiting the challenges facing an American global hegemon stretched by resource constraints and the vagaries of domestic political will. In the face of those internal and external challenges, U.S. SOF need three key areas of research and practice that are not sufficiently addressed in current training modules: cultural competency, comparative politics, and conflict resolution. Each of these can be found in traditionally civilian educational environments, but have been introduced into professional military education at the National Defense University as well.

STANDARD MODEL AND A BETTER WAY FORWARD

In general, the once-dominant university learning model of faculty as providers of knowledge, the Sages on the Stages, is quickly being overcome by the realities of the digital age and the realization that students are changing. At the very least, we see the model challenged by the multitude of information nodes available to students. Gone are the days of exclusive lecturing whereby course instructors simply transferred content to the students as the primary method of education. With the ubiquity of smartphones and near constant access to the collective wisdom of the Internet, students can access information of far greater breadth than any single instructor can conjure while in front of a classroom, even if students' capacity to understand it remains underdeveloped. Thus, the apparent value of educators solely as information gatekeepers is low. When combined with the experience level of the average SOF students, teachers can quickly find themselves standing in front of a classroom full of students with years of experience on the ground and perspectives that directly challenge the status quo. Adding to the challenges to Sage models, the Gray Zone's complex, multifaceted, and sometimes unanswerable questions require different approaches. Some combination of interactive lecture and regular discussion, interspersed with multiple learning activities can be a far more effective method in that regard. This enables the mentor Guide on the Side approach as not simply a change in nomenclature, but rather a recognition that this role requires the employment of an additional set of teaching skills.

As such, mastery of the material takes on greater significance as teachers find themselves carefully shaping a seminar discussion around a classroom full of motivated and engaged students who want to talk about subjects that go beyond the scope of the session's learning objectives. In that kind of environment, some of the greatest teaching skills become a long view for course outcomes, a deep understanding of what the course is supposed to teach students, and how it fits into the scope and sequence of the greater curriculum. There are many paths that learners may take to the destination, and it is the instructor's role to ensure that students take the best paths and ultimately reach that destination, even if it circuitously extends the edges of learning maps. When faculty are empowered with this deeper understanding of their context with SOF students, and the requirements it places on the communication of critical information, they have a more powerful position to manage individual classroom learning activities with the greater confidence of guiding students to the desired outcome.

It is important to note that this shift in faculty roles is closely linked to other emerging trends in higher education, like competency based learning and personalized student learning environments. These developments highlight the role of the university as not only an institution of higher education, but as a business with customers that require satisfaction. Disenfranchised students can vote with their education dollars, and universities that fail to show relevancy face real risks of becoming relics. This changing nature of student populations can also be linked to the emerging recognition that adults learn differently than primary and secondary students. Application of the adult learning principles should play a key part in student engagements as a result. This is particularly true for the SOF student body as these professionals by their very nature make up a highly skilled adult learning population. This article subsequently investigates this concept.

Cultural Competency

The U.S. military exists to fight and win the country's wars (DOD, 2011b). This traditional role is well understood, as are the skill sets of the forces required to fight and win. However, with the ever-changing complexity of the future operating environment, those wars will look less and less like the large formation, force-on-force, conventional conflicts of the wars of old. Security studies scholar James Carafano notes that the 2011 National Military Strategy highlights that America will emphasize diplomacy and soft-power instruments in increasing ways, and to response effectively, the U.S. must adopt a more nuanced attitude in state-to-state relations (Holmes and Carafano, 2011). This holds especially true for the nation's SOF.

The next generation of warfare will be increasingly complex and will likely require special operators to be more scholar–statesmen than warrior–killers (DOD 2006, 2009). To establish the skill sets likely to be necessary for the next generation soldiers, leaders look to a range of strategic planning documents at the Department of Defense that focus from the national level to service specific requirements. In particular, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the Defense Department's most substantial strategy process and sets a long-term course for the Department of Defense (DOD) as it assesses the threats and challenges that the country faces, and rebalances DOD's strategies, capabilities, and forces to address today's conflicts and tomorrow's threats. The QDR repeatedly notes that the long-term goal includes employing regionally focused forces to provide tailored packages that achieve critical global and regional objectives (DOD, 2010).

Following the QDR, the Defense Strategic Guidance highlights the nexus of this tailored concept with the statement that "whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost and small-footprint approaches to achieve security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence and advisory capabilities" (DOD, 2011a, p. 3). This approach alludes to the requirement for forces that are trained, manned, equipped, and resourced to engage in this network centric warfare, particularly with advisory capabilities. Advisory capabilities may be the most critical element of the guidance as it remains incumbent upon advisors to conduct activities within a set of best practices that include strong cross-cultural competency of core norms, values, and practices of the operating environment. Equally important are abilities to communicate back to host and partner nations the specific U.S. interests at stake within those cultural settings.

As far back as 1968, the military has been studying the skill sets needed for military advisors, highlighting the role of cultural competence in particular (Chemers, 1968). Strategic documents build on that capacity to provide a framework that describes a global context of operations, while maintaining a regional focus and high levels of interaction with foreign cultures. Aiding these efforts is the nature of SOF as inherently joint units interacting across service boundaries. In particular, the Army operationalizes this strategic guidance through the U.S. Army 2012 Strategic Planning Guidance, which describes a globally engaged and regionally responsive Army with units increasingly focused on preparing for missions within specific geographical combatant commands (DOD, 2012). More broadly, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was created to manage the joint factors of the enterprise. USSOCOM describes an operational environment deeply characterized by regional contingencies and indirect operations. This human domain of operations is about developing understanding of and nurturing influence among critical populaces, and is a core competency for SOF (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2011). U.S. Army Special Operations Command and *ARSOF 2022* further this guidance, and describe the necessity of maintaining forces that have "… specially trained and educated forces that have a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language…" (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2012, p. 10).

Thus, the mandate is clear: the future operating environment and force structure requires Special Operations soldiers who are specifically recruited, assessed, selected, trained, and employed with cross-cultural competence as a core skill set. Yet, what is the skill set specifically and how can it be taught? This is no easy question to answer as a review of relevant literature emphasizes the ongoing debate over the definition of culture with hundreds of contending definitions (Matsumoto & Juang, 2013). To give some practical structure to the debate then, this paper focuses on cross-cultural competency.

The skill set of a well-trained soldier–diplomat is unique and requires a level of persuasive talents well above traditional soldiering skills (Scott, 2010). One of these abilities is a high level of cross-cultural competency defined as "understanding the salient aspects of a new and unfamiliar cultural environment, combined with the ability to work quickly, comfortably, and effectively with people from different cultures" (Caligiuri, Noe, Nolan, Ryan, & Drasgow, 2011, p. 4). Cross-cultural competency is perhaps best highlighted through the network-centric operations prevalent today that require situational awareness of subordinates with an on-the-ground knowledge base, which can then be passed on to future operators (Laurence, 2011). Building educational systems to harness past learning and apply it remains a key task for successfully engaging challenges in the Gray Zone operating environment.

This is particularly true for special operators who often operate remotely and deeply imbedded in Indigenous populations. One of the marking characteristics of special operators is the decentralized nature of their execution and the reliance on sound judgment of those executing them, often absent of the layers of supervision and direction usually associated with military operations. Aptitude for cross-cultural competency then, is a critical component of mission success for special operators, one they currently get through regional studies, but which also requires greater emphasis on key elements.

Special operators have gained a reputation for being regionally oriented and culturally astute (Wendt, 2011). However, more than a decade at war in Iraq and Afghanistan has created a shortfall between the time needed to inculcate those skills before going downrange, and the pace of operations that make for more on-the-job training. The latter has provided a wealth of knowledge, but one that needs both opportunities to pass along, and methods to teach beforehand to the next generation of SOF (Howard, 2011). Key are methods for learning and reinforcing greater cultural wisdom, not just how to speak the language and spot local identity markers.

Previously, formal secondary language acquisition was coupled with multiple immersive deployments in the area of operations, thereby creating a special operator who could develop a sense of cultural wisdom in the classroom and over time (Turnley, 2011). With that operational model overwhelmed by the current fight against violent threats, combined with the recognition that this skill set is required by the larger conventional forces as well, the DOD is seeking methods to institutionalize the development of this cross-cultural competency for more effective operations now and in the future. Yet, the traditional training model prevalent in the DOD is simply ill-suited for this task.

To help meet that need, highly credentialed faculty with a mastery of teaching as a skill can create well-scoped and sequenced curriculum as part of the solution. University education is not the panacea, but it plays a critical role in the SOF lifelong learning model of training, education, and experience. SOF still require the traditional training pipeline that has produced highly competent operators for decades, and there is no indication that this aspect of their preparation should be significantly changed. By managing the hard-won lessons from the past decade and a half of combat operations through graduate education in strategic security studies, special operators can return to their traditional regional stomping grounds with more than just local knowledge of Afghanistan and Iraq. They can also nest their experiences into larger debates, and apply the skills of cultural competency to new, and often complex operating environments.

Comparative Politics

The same can be said for comparative politics with its emphasis on understanding the nature of political systems, how governments and societies interact, the ways different forms of identity overlap, and what the culture of power looks like in different places. It does so with a rigorous methodology of case studies and theory testing.[2] In particular, comparative politics curriculum adds context to an often ad hoc nature of SOF experience in dealing with governments and societies. It also effectively structures the human domain as an area of complex and evolving interaction between norms that may change unpredictably, just as they may remain fixed in the face of multiple ideational onslaughts from contending narratives. In addition, comparative politics addresses the layers of knowledge and cultural learning that occur throughout diverse aspects of society, which may or may not be reflected and reinforced by political systems. Knowing whether social values play a role in government, and if so, what it may be, benefits SOF engagements as much as knowing the theoretical explanations for why and how governments function in general. Comparative politics thus enables SOF to make sense of the web of factors and multicausality they face by providing effective, tried-and-tested categories of analysis. It also allows for application of "lessons learned" from one operational environment to another by showing the comparisons and disjunctures between countries.

Of particular importance to the Gray Zone is a model of structure and agency that establishes the parameters for the background constraints and opportunities facing individuals and groups in the country of interest; international and transnational factors can also fit into the same basic analytical framework. Structure and agency can thus be applied to both state and society, identifying systemic factors while also showing how both arenas affect and are affected by individuals (and groups) operating according to their own incentives. Key criteria for evaluating the relative power and influence within those areas, and between them, fall into categories of capacity to achieve goals, and autonomy of action relative to outside agents seeking to override those decisions. Legitimacy defines the final category, relying on a spectrum of support/opposition measures, from the tacit apolitical approach of staying home, to explicit acts of public demonstration. Taken together, these categories help to explain the ways people initially identify their interests, aggregate them in larger groups of the like-minded, articulate them to those with power and influence to address their interests, and last, if possible, represent them within the systemic structure. Staging these interest processes and analyzing each as it fits into the overall context, gives SOF a set of analytical tools to understand the uniqueness of the environments in which they operate, in particular the ways and options for mobilization of groups. Equally importantly, it also allows them to carry over to new areas of operation the practical knowledge gained in previous contexts.

Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution also provides related benefits. As a catch-all academic discipline in many ways, conflict resolution represents a potent area of study for SOF practitioners because of its heavy reliance on field work to justify methodologies and paradigms. Accordingly, analysis and implementation of conflict prevention, mitigation, resolution, and reconciliation form a range of options because the discipline recognizes the enduring, cyclical nature of conflict – conflict can arise from greed, grievance, privation, power, or some enabling ideology that promotes a zero-sum approach to situations. Teaching SOF the fundamentals of the discipline thus gives a necessary context for the problems they seek to resolve, as well as a broader set of tools to revolve them, including nonviolently when possible. Particular emphasis on the individual and communal cognitive processes of deciding to join violent extremist organizations, later decisions to support the use of violence for political goals, and final decisions to participate in that violence show more than just the breadth of thought processes. It also shows points of interdiction for countering extremist narratives, whether through psychological or civil affairs operations.

The same depth of analysis can come from evaluations of organization life cycles, beginning with the initial stages of incubation of violent ideology, through later phases of strategic violence to achieve goals against external enemies and internal rivals, to the use of violence for specific political goals that require the organization to start approximating state-like behaviors. Some groups move into the final phase of political transformation, at which point sitting at the table becomes a viable possibility. As with individual cognition, understanding these group dynamics can help to establish the necessary conditions for engaging with adversaries. It does so pragmatically by giving a necessary pause to otherwise wishful thinking by showing that solving crises requires more than the cessation of violence. This remains particularly challenging in the Gray Zone given its overlapping interests, actors, boundaries, and conflicting issues.

More to the point, long-term reconciliation needs resolution of deeper injustices in economic, social and political systems, if not the more difficult task of reconceptualizing concepts of peace and justice amid perceptions of victimhood and abuse. These are no easy tasks in general, let alone for trained peace activists. Thus, although SOF may seem like unlikely partners in those areas, much of what they already do has practical relevance to their civilian practitioner counterparts. In addition, although the use of peace warriors comes with many potential pitfalls—not least the recourse to violence not present with civilian peace practitioners —there are also tremendous opportunities to benefit those in places where traditional conflict resolution personnel often cannot go. Therefore, by building on SOF downrange experience and existing capabilities, further education in the areas of cultural competency, comparative politics, and conflict resolution studies can be utilized to expand the range of options available for achieving U.S. national security objectives. To do so requires effective educational models that understand this particular student population.

ADULT LEARNING

Adult learning principles provide a realistic and practical set of guidelines that effective administrators can use to shape their efforts in creating high-quality educational experiences. This holds especially true for the Special Operations community, particularly when in the graduate level classroom, as students generally bring a more developed professional work ethic than traditional university students. This results in part from their types of life experience, as well as often greater time gaps between previous educational experiences where "on the job training" teaches valuable lessons brought into the classroom.

This corresponds to research by Malcolm Knowles (1984) into the specific characteristics of adult learners. He argued that adults in the classroom can be categorized by (a) internal motivations; (b) self-directed approaches to learning; (c) broad life experiences and knowledge applied to learning goals; (d) a focus on the relevancy of educational goals to professional benefits; and (e) a desire for respect based on their professional accomplishments. In particular, SOF graduate students are unique, even for adult learners. They are motivated beyond measure and in the absence of outside direction, will move through course readings and classroom materials with an intensity and pace that can startle the uninitiated. Faculty often find themselves in the enviable position of setting limits of advance rather than cajoling them into participating in learning. This can be harder than it sounds as there is a delicate balance between establishing proper pace and actually demotivating the students since they also need the breaks applied sometimes to ensure students have sufficient time to digest, process, and apply new material.

The life experiences of SOF students are also highly specialized. Most SOF students have multiple operational deployments, both inside and outside designated areas of armed conflict, and many have played instrumental roles in the real-world application of U.S. foreign policy. To describe them as "strategic corporals," the operating concept that even lower ranking soldiers can and do make decisions and take actions that have strategic effect would be an understatement given the breadth and depth of their real world analytical work. Yet, in some ways because of this strategic role, they often struggle to reconcile their unique experiences with what is being taught in the classroom. Synthesizing theory, policy, and experience is a herculean task and can be further complicated by the trauma that is all too often associated with that time downrange. Discussions of cultural nuances can wander into a war story of improvised explosive devices and lost comrades, just as instructions on how to establish bona fides in key leader engagements can conjure up the recounting of a previous engagement that had contradictory results on almost every count. The facilitator and the curriculum must account for these possibilities and strive to capitalize on the learning opportunities these scenarios create.

Special operators are goal oriented by default, and similar to adult learners in general, they look for some level of agency over their learning outcomes. The educator's task then becomes synchronizing program objectives, course learning outcomes, and individual class objectives with student goals. If there is no nesting in these levels, then the likelihood of alienating the students becomes a real risk. As a result, faculty become more than just content managers; they straddle the line between advisors, counselors and sometimes peers. This relationship allows the faculty to show relevancy of the material and work towards establishing trust to take on difficult topics that have more than professional interest to the students. This further highlights that faculty must be masters of the material; not just of their own classes, but of the program at large. When students begin to question why certain material is being covered, or are overcome by the inevitable mid-semester fatigue, the faculty are charged with drawing the linkages between what they are leaning and what they will be doing in the real world once they leave the classroom.

From a practical standpoint, this can be a difficult concept to operationalize. Drawing on alumni experiences is a valuable tool in this effort, and faculty learning is a proven sine qua non to this process. SOF students are exceedingly pragmatic, and programs need to create avenues for them to relay back to the faculty their application of classroom material. A recent graduate student of the National Defense University's Joint Special Operations Master of Arts (JSOMA) program described his experiences as a senior SOF planner in Africa, and how his deep understanding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the complex relationships created by the authorities and responsibilities of that organization positioned him as the subject matter expert. Because of his course choices where he selected elective work in NATO and the European Union, he was in a position to guide commanders and staff to make real-world decisions that were both informed and sensible, which resulted in significant operational successes. Another student relayed his experiences at a remote firebase in Afghanistan, specifically how his broader understanding of the "ends, ways, and means" of strategy development helped his unit align their everyday tactical actions with strategic objectives. This helped to create an operational synergy where intelligence, resources, and decision-making became more organized and focused. The unit was no longer just conducting "presence patrols" simply to show the locals they were there, but rather was engaged in filling gaps in knowledge to provide a more discrete understanding of the operational environment.

These kinds of practical applications of higher learning by SOF translate to one of the key currencies in the community—respect. Reputations are earned and bona fides precede the operator. A poor reputation and a lack of respect, both given and received, is a sure recipe for isolation and estrangement since collaboration is critical for mission success. This recognition fits into Knowles' adult learning principles, but also presents unique challenges in the classroom. There is a delicate balance between establishing authority, essential for proper classroom management, and creating oppressive oversight that marginalizes the very characteristics that should embolden students in new areas of intellectual effort. The SOF student does not want to be told to follow the steps as the only reason to accomplish educational tasks, but rather requires information in partnership with faculty to reach the correct conclusion on his or her own terms, even as the path is determined by the instructor. The ability to provide such guidance relies on a combination of assessments that keep the class on pace and on target, but do not stifle creativity or disenfranchise the learner.

THE ROLE OF JSOMA

In that regard, the Joint Special Operations Master of Arts program at the National Defense University occupies a unique role in preparation of the SOF soldier–scholar. Created in 2010 as part of National Defense University's College of International Security Affairs—the university's flagship for irregular warfare studies—JSOMA's objectives are broad in terms of analytical approaches, while remaining tailored to the SOF stakeholder. As such, JSOMA graduates are expected to analyze past and present geopolitical and country-specific Gray Zone environments characterized by the rise of nonstate armed groups and diverse challenges to state sovereignty. To do so, they must evaluate the roles of power and ideology, the rise of newly empowered and politicized ideological movements in relation to traditional models of government, and the basis for authority and legitimacy those groups exercise. They must also understand the relationship between political objectives, strategy, and diverse instruments of national power creating and constraining both goals and methods to achieve them. Undergirding all are the skills to think critically and strategically, differentiating between the processes of policy formation and implementation. Combined, these skills enable SOF students to apply knowledge to practice in collaborative and complex circumstances with diverse partners, be they interagency or host nations.

As part of that education, student population plays a role as well. One important aspect of JSOMA is the inclusion of noncommissioned and warrant officers alongside traditional professional military education students coming from the commissioned officer ranks. Students are drawn from the entirety of the joint Special Operations community across all rank structures, so it is not uncommon to have a class with an Air Force Major pilot sitting next to an Army Green Beret Warrant Officer discussing geopolitics with a Marine Corps Raider Gunnery Sergeant.

Unlike other programs, JSOMA is also a full-time, 10-month residence program taught at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, by full-time doctoral faculty. The campus selection was deliberate in that it keeps the rigorous academic focus well-grounded in the operational realities of the student population; Fort Bragg is widely considered as an epicenter for special operations. Facilitated access through close proximity to senior SOF commanders and daily interactions with the operational force also help reinforce the real-world components so critical to the adult learner. Similar in scope and intensity to peer programs and top civilian universities, students complete a 35-credit-hour curriculum taught by accredited civilian faculty, and must complete a rigorous Master's thesis that results in public presentation and defense. Ensuring comparability across the academic enterprise, the College of International Security Affairs maintains accreditation through both the Mid-States Council on Higher Education and the Joint Staff Process of Accreditation for Joint Education.

Those accreditations rely in large part on the faculty, whose expertise in curriculum allow for effective application of both adult learning principles to the SOF student population, as well as National Defense University's joint learning objectives so critical to the ongoing strategic security environment. The practical application of these are reconciled on the basis of the concept of *mutuality*. Civilian faculty could realistically argue with a student as to the correct placement of crew-served weapons in a perimeter defense, the proper characteristics of patrol base, or the correct sequence of Jumpmaster commands preceding an airborne operation. A wise faculty would submit to the expertise of the soldier in these instances, yet more importantly for the student's education, would then take that data and show how to include it in larger strategic analyses. Conversely, the wise student submits to the academic process managed by the faculty as experts in practical, applied scholarship designed to benefit policy making and implementation. This "give and take" approach matters a great deal, so considerable effort goes into explaining this relationship at the outset; successful students heed this advice early on and grow to become effective scholars in their own rights as they progress through the program. This increases their abilities to marry professional expertise with academic rigor, enabling them to speak to broad audiences within the policy community.

In that regard, while student perspectives are generally valuable for a collaborative learning environment, they are not all applicable to every classroom discussion. Faculty value student experiences and want to include that experience in seminars and assignments. However, the task of internalizing those experiences, processing their meaning to the student, and coming to terms with the conclusions is not exclusively a faculty-led activity. Mentoring students by helping them to manage that process themselves is essential to individual and program success because simply put, graduate school is hard and academically rigorous endeavors are bound to provide challenges that not every participant will overcome. This rigorous standard matches the same way that SOF recruitment, assessment, selection, and lifestyle has a high barrier to entry. As adult learners, in particular SOF learners, this approach raises the bar rather than crushes initiative. Finding that balance gets worked out in a variety of faculty–student engagements, three of which are highlighted here.

TEACHING EXERCISES

To bring these discussions directly into the classroom, faculty use different types of teaching exercises to draw students out of their standard operating procedures of analysis. In general, each has sought first to put students up on the analytical fence, from there to survey the intellectual landscape, before showing them how to come down and make effective arguments of their own.

"This is Sparta!": Who Is the Hero, Really?

This exercise was designed to build empathy and identity perspective, two core components of competency for SOF readiness. This has been a particularly critical exercise early in the instructional timeline as soldiers by design are indoctrinated into a meta-culture that seeks to erase individualism by rewarding conformity and homogeneity. An essential requirement for SOF is effective cross-cultural communication, and empathy and identity perspective are key parts of that. Significant effort needs to be applied in order to reinforce these characteristics, and in many cases, it begins by simply introducing the concepts to the student's lexicon. To help students position themselves individually, while still honoring their organizational culture, an environment of exploration must be created.

In this exercise, students watch a short clip from a popular movie and are asked to provide comments on who the protagonist and antagonist are, as well as identify major themes, all to be followed by a facilitated discussion. The use of video clips is a popular teaching method with this population and usually signals a time to relax and enjoy. By using this modality, we introduce complex and potentially uncomfortable personal exploration within the context of the familiar.

The movie *300* is a popular film among soldiers, not least because of its richly stylized cinematography and action with clear examples of masculine power. Of particular note, the movie itself was released at the height of the force surge in Iraq and during a difficult operational transition in Afghanistan. Soldiers thus viewed it at the time with an element of superiority and domination, views that regularly perpetuate over time in the community. In particular, the scene of King Leonidas receiving the Persian emissary and then casting him into the pit when threats of invasion against the Spartans are levied, is popular as it speaks directly to power, honor, and respect. When initially viewed, U.S. soldiers almost universally cast the Spartans as good and the Persians as bad. The movie itself casts known British, American, and Australian actors as Spartans and unknown non-Anglo actors as the Persians. In this casting, the soldiers identify uniquely, seeing themselves as Spartans—good—and the enemy (Al-Qaeda at the time)—the Persians—as bad. This sets the stage as students are then asked to view the scene not based on characters, but based on actions.

At its core, this movie is about an invading army (Persians) threatening a weaker indigenous community (Spartans). When viewed from this perspective the students often struggle with reconciling the good and the bad roles. A new perspective casts the U.S. as the invading

Persians, and thus begins to build empathy for the local forces in Iraq and Afghanistan given the easy analogy to the major combat operations executed at that very moment. The Spartans, by virtue of being the "other characters" are no long as easily associated with the U.S. This revelation has often created real confusion since students enter the exercise "knowing" who they identify with, and "knowing" who the good and bad forces are. Then, faced with an entirely new perspective, the realization that their position is no longer so certain gets strengthened by more viewings of the scene, with many students reporting they watched the scene again and again later that evening simply to reconcile that initial confusion.

This exercise is careful not to make any conclusions about a right or a wrong designation of who is good or bad, rather serving to demonstrate powerfully that identity perspective is potent. On the other hand, by ignoring multiple perspectives, soldiers risk potentially marginalizing operational capability; the oft cited "know yourself, know your enemy" mandate can become blocked as a result. In contrast, wise soldiers understand that this skill set is real and viable, since adding identity perspective in order to build empathy is a valuable operational tool.

Bangladeshi Bride

Another exercise that works towards those goals does so by combining all three aspects of cultural competency, comparative politics and conflict resolution through a simulation set in a rural community of Bangladesh. In it, students assume the role of various U.S. special operations elements meeting together to discuss ways to handle a growing crises. Set against the backdrop of annual flooding and politicized public assistance to communities based on their support or opposition of the national government, a woman gets brutally and publically murdered by her husband in a small village. Even though the village accepted the man's right to beat his wife when her family did not keep the dowry payments coming, no one anticipated the other village women's response to their friend's death. They fled to the wife's village, whose male members became enraged and exacted revenge on the murderer and his brother, burning the house to the ground and igniting intercommunity battles that threaten to spread as more and more people hear the story and see interviews and footage of the violence on their phones. Within days, demonstrations in nearby cities and rallies across the border in India bring the crisis out of the village and into the attention of the capital and beyond as it takes on more than just gender issues, exposing and engulfing ethnic and political relations along the way. The U.S. Ambassador requests assistance from the Theater Special Operations Commander to use SOF units already in the country for regular security force assistance training, in order to try to stop the violence and start the processes of resolving the conflict for the long term. Their efforts have as much to do with the comparative political structures and cultural nuances of Bangladesh as they do conflict resolution techniques. As a result, students have more than the immediate bloodshed to overcome as long-standing norms about the treatment of wives and deep economic problems compound to turn one murder into a cry for justice throughout the society.

Role Playing in the Past and Future

The final example uses a simulation based on the Serbian "Bulldozer" Revolution to evaluate the effect of international nonviolence trainers, specifically the Albert Einstein institute and retired U.S. Army Colonel Robert Helvey's work with Otpor. As part of the larger People's Movement opposed to Slobodan Milosevic and the system of patronage and clientelism he used to support his regime, Otpor members received training in the tactics of nonviolence, specifically how to react in the face of violence by state security personnel. They also were trained in the uses of media to communicate within the target Serbian populace audience, but also to elites who either sat on the fence or privately opposed the existing regime and its ruler. The pragmatic messaging to those audiences did not seek to establish post-Milosevic ideals for a new political system, rather sought to incite discontent and most importantly, offer viable means to mobilize it. Thus, the training in building efficacy served the opposition as much as the specific techniques for dealing with tear gas, water cannons, and police brutality. SOF students assume different roles within the regime, opposition, and as potential spoilers from both camps and among the as yet uncommitted masses. The exercise uses analytical categories from comparative politics to understand the social, economic and political particulars of Serbia at the time, and filters them through conflict resolution techniques. The final goal is to apply those lessons in evaluating potential support for other resistance movements using cultural competency of different contexts.

DISCUSSION MODELS

Uniting all three of these exercises have been four approaches to class discussion used at the College of International Security Affairs in general, and JSOMA in particular. The first method uses directed discussions around core themes that the instructor builds through a framework of content instruction and questioning about the reading assigned for that day. Semi-lecture in style and relying on aspects of adult learning related to attention and retention, instruction focuses on the teacher using regular changes in speech patterns, body position, and visual cues. This approach also highlights contentious elements from the reading so as to engender debate by setting up controversial positions and engaging student responses.

The second approach guides the students by offering more opportunity and time for them to wander on rabbit trails, while ensuring that those tangents come back on point at key intervals. Perhaps the most taxing on the instructor, this approach can also be very rewarding for the students as they build on their earlier public speaking in the directed discussions to develop more facility for academic inquiry and the trying out of new ideas. Debates between students are particularly important in this approach, as is the instructor's ability to reign in discussions when they go too far afield, lead to ad hominem criticisms, or sidebar conversations distract from the central purpose of the class.

As students become more familiar with speaking out in an academic environment and the ground rules of academic discourse in general, the third approach, facilitated discussions becomes more prevalent. In them, the instructor sets up basic propositions and presents a few key data points that review and build upon class readings, then breaks the class into groups for smaller discussions along central themes. The food for thought serves to generate creative thinking and showcases the depth and breadth of understandings of the subject and how it connects to other topics.

The fourth and final discussion model is cumulative in that the instructor gives a general topic, in one case the number 64 (reflecting the percentage of men traveling to Europe in the ongoing European migrant crisis), and observes as groups of students generate different types of interpretations and analytical frameworks for breaking down the issue into manageable research questions. This enables students to begin developing viable definitions of the problem and ways to evaluate possible solutions. Debates about definitions, boundaries, and assumptions allow the students to move beyond rudimentary reactions and preconceptions, into critical thinking and reasoned argumentation.

Taken as a whole then, these four classroom approaches can be applied across different educational settings to showcase the value of learning core concepts and practices. They do so by providing opportunities for SOF adult learners to connect their professional experiences with larger scholarly analysis. Doing so helps to build SOF readiness by developing understanding of cultural competency, comparative politics, and conflict resolution—analytical frameworks critical for engaging in the current and future operating environments.

EDUCATIONAL STEPPING STONES

Results from the JSOMA program's brief history have already been impressive with many graduates working directly on their areas of research in follow-on assignments either in their current service commitments, or through interagency coordinating and advisory capacities. More generally, the application of core competencies with adult learning principles has led senior SOF leadership to identify the program for its effectiveness and value in advancing the strategic discussion of U.S. foreign policy goals and methods of achieving them. As part of the College of International Security Affairs, with its unique focus on irregular warfare within the National Defense University, and the larger professional military education establishment more broadly, JSOMA has succeeded in meeting its stakeholder's needs by applying the best of academic practices to highly motivated and skilled professionals. In that regard, by using effective classroom instruction as educational stepping stones for SOF students, the program will continue to shape strategic thinkers for the complex security environments of the foreseeable future.

NOTES

1. This last point relates to the debates about the nature of nonviolent protest. Does the Maidan resistance qualify as such given the disavowal to attack, or does the very nature of occupying public property with the necessary force to do so equate to violence? Even more difficult for the terminology is what to do with responses to violence by pro-government and state security forces. Hence, the quotation marks to illustrate the contested nature of even the most basic definition in the real world of political transitions.
2. This brief synopsis of comparative politics is certainly not exhaustive of the debates about comparable and contrary approaches in the field, or even what the field means in terms of applied research. Again, we take certain things as given as a result of the nature of professional military education, and the specific role of SOF in U.S. foreign policy.

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State of Special Operations Forces Education

Peter McCabe
Joint Special Operations University, MacDill AFB, Florida, USA

U.S. Special Operators are the most highly trained and educated military professionals in the world, but we must continually improve existing training and education programs.

—General Joseph Votel, U.S. Special Operations Command
Command Training and Education Guidance

Although Special Operations Forces (SOF) are well educated, existing education guidance and programs must continue to be improved, including better articulating the requirement for education specific to SOF, beyond existing service education programs. An examination of the existing guidance documents allows for an outline of the gaps and limitations for special operations education and a few recommendations are provided to address the more obvious limitations in special operations education. The state of SOF education is moving in a positive trajectory, but it will only remain so if guidance is clear and the special operations community educational needs are heard and met.

Keywords: education, special operations, guidance, curriculum, assessment

INTRODUCTION

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are elite, highly trained, and educated personnel who conduct operations that typically exceed the capabilities of the conventional force. “These operations are designed in a culturally attuned manner to create both immediate and enduring effects to help prevent and deter conflict or prevail in war” (JP 3-05, 2014, p. I-1). SOF have a long and storied history, but there is an increased focus on SOF since 2001. The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate how SOF are central to the implementation of U.S. national defense strategy. This has been achieved by countering transregional terrorist organizations through unconventional warfare means. In the early phases of the war with Iraq, SOF played a central role in a special operations–intensive campaign, providing the primary ground force element on two of three fronts, and performing a number of special reconnaissance, direct action, counterterrorism and foreign internal defense missions in support of the conventional campaign (U.S. Special Operations Command [USSOCOM], 2007, pp. 113-127). Beyond the more direct aspects of the SOF mission are other missions just as important to the success of military operations. These include, but are not limited to, building partner capacity, training and assisting native forces, special reconnaissance, and intelligence collection. SOF personnel successfully conduct these

Correspondence should be addressed to Peter McCabe, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd, MacDill AFB, FL 33621. E-mail: Peter.McCabe.ctr@socom.mil

operations because of the excellent training, equipment, experience, leadership, and education they receive throughout their careers.

This article addresses the state of SOF education. As General Votel's quote illuminates, SOF are well educated, but existing education guidance and programs must continue to be improved, including better articulating the requirement for education specific to SOF, beyond existing service education programs. USSOCOM education guidance is in its early stages of development, and what is currently available is generally very broad—in part because of its infancy—because the requirements are still being defined, and it does not levy specific responsibilities or provide curriculum requirements to be acted upon and measured. The role of USSOCOM in the education realm is also evolving and is in the early stages of defining SOF's education needs and requirements and who is responsible for delivering it. Do existing special operations education programs meet the needs of the SOF community? Does special operations education need a complete overhaul or are minor tweaks required? These questions, although valid, are not inclusive of all the questions possible in an inquiry into education for SOF. However, they should suffice for examination into the state of SOF education.

This article provides a quick review of the current literature on SOF education, inclusive of all members of the SOF community: operators, enablers, and support personnel. The lack of scholarship on this topic is not surprising, considering the small size of the SOF education community and the academic and media attention on SOF operations. This will be followed by a look at the history of SOF education. It is important to understand the current SOF education guidance, including defining the term *special operations–centric education* (*SO-centric education*). The guidance discussion will consist of a review of USSOCOM Directive 621-1 (2014a) and the Commander's Training and Education Guidance (USSOCOM, 2014b). This will allow for an outline of the gaps and limitations for special operations education (improving guidance and identifying SOF community needs), which is followed by a few recommendations to address the more obvious limitations in special operations education. The time is right to reassess the SOF education direction and its contribution to future SOF capability. Further refinement of USSOCOM's education guidance documents and holistic curriculum review (needs assessment) will improve the access and interaction with the special operations community.

Literature Review

The little that is written about SOF education focuses on timing opportunities early in a career with some work on the efficacy of these opportunities. Army Lieutenant Colonel Mark Beattie's (2003) thesis for the Army Command and General Staff College, titled *U.S. Army Special Forces Officer Advanced Education*, focuses on the educational requirements for mid-career SOF officers, and his conclusions are applicable to special operations personnel in general. Beattie recommends that USSOCOM must place an "emphasis on professional education of SOF officers attending professional military education (PME) institutions, at both intermediate and senior levels" (Beattie, 2003, p. 65). Navy Lieutenant Commander Robert Lyonnais's (2003) thesis for the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), titled *Joint Professional Military Education: Time for a New Goal*, agrees with Beattie and notes that the Joint Professional Military Education

> …must be rigorous, obtained as early as possible in an officer's career, studied by all officers not only the ones selected for joint assignments, officers are most effective when they are competent in their service and finally that the current system is not as effective as it could or should be. (p. 3)

Schreiber, Metzgar, and Mezhir (2004, p. 2) advocate for SOF officers to be educated and trained sooner than later at the operational and strategic levels of joint operations "early in their careers, either through formal joint SO classroom instruction or distance learning, to prepare them for service with regional combatant commands, theater special operations commands, joint task forces, [Joint Special Operations Task Force], or joint staffs." Schreiber and colleagues advocate for SOF officers to be educated and trained sooner rather than later at the operational and strategic levels of joint operations. Thomas Donovan's Naval Postgraduate School thesis, titled *Structuring Naval Special Warfare Junior Officer Professional Military Education*, concludes the "Naval Special Warfare junior officer community will benefit from education opportunities inserted into the officer career path" (Donovan, 2007, p. xv).

Whereas most studies focus on special operations officers being educated and trained early in their careers, other studies attempt to evaluate the educational opportunities being provided to SOF. Andre Nelson's SAMS thesis (2011), titled *A Broader Education for Special Forces Officers*, focuses on measures of effectiveness of different aspects of an SOF officer's education. He concludes that SOF officers require a broader educational base over their whole career (not just early in their career) to meet future challenges. Nelson (2011, p. 43) argues that "nesting educational content, context, methodology, and sequence over a broader and longer time period would allow Special Forces officers to operate at higher levels on the true battlefield of the future, the mind."

Colonel Imre Porkolab from the Hungarian Army argues that SOF education can provide a better understanding of the security environment and how to deal with surprise and uncertainty in his *Counter-Terrorism Exchange Journal* article titled "The Future of SOF Education: A Vision for Global Special Forces Education." Colonel Porkolab (2003) contends that "adaption to prepare for future challenges is a major driver of study and research in high-profile organizations, and education is an integral part of this adaption process" (p. 53).

Kristy Kamarck's (2016, p. 6) non–SOF-specific study questions whether the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) curriculum, method of delivery and instruction, course structure, and career timing are appropriate in the context of today's strategic environment and force structure needs in providing a thorough overview of JPME history before and after the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. This historical review of the evolution of JPME acknowledges the "competing demands over the course of an officer's career for training, education, and operational experience, make it difficult to manage joint education and assignment" (Kamarck, p. 9).

This short (and incomplete) overview of the literature focuses on the timing of SOF education and those studies provide a glimpse into the history of SOF education. The following section will address that in more detail.

History of SOF Education

Special operations education was primarily conducted by the service war colleges in a limited way using electives prior to the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 that established USSOCOM as a combatant command with service-like functions. Those functions were simply and specifically to train, equip, and organize SOF. In addition, the individual service's special operations community essentially "took care of their own." For example, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School dates back to 1950 when it was the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Division of the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas (see http://

www.soc.mil/swcs/about.html). In 1956, the school was renamed the U.S. Army Center for Special Warfare. After more missions were added (counterinsurgency operations, unconventional warfare), the school eventually consolidated in 1985 as the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. On June 20, 1990, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School was reassigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. A similar experience is evident in the evolution of the Naval Special Warfare Center, Center for Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) and Special Warfare Combatant-craft crewman (SWCC) and Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The history of advanced (graduate) education for naval officers began in 1909. In June of that year, "Secretary of the Navy George von L. Meyer signed General Order No. 27, establishing a school of marine engineering at Annapolis" (NPS, 2016). By 1951, the NPS moved to its current location in Monterey, California. The Naval Special Warfare Center and Center for SEAL and SWCC provide training and PME, respectively, for Naval Special Warfare forces.

The history of SOF education is a long history of service schools providing their officers and noncommissioned officers professional military education with familiarization with special operations. Joint education efforts tailored to SOF have recently become a reality with the establishment of Joint Special Operations University and the ability to teach integrated and synergistic application of SOF functions to satisfy operational and strategic objectives. All of this is possible because of civilian and military guidance to the SOF community. Today, all four special operations service components have their own schoolhouses; in addition to aforementioned Army and Navy schools, the Air Force Special Operations School resides at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and the Marine Special Operations School resides at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. It is important to note that the education opportunities USSOCOM advocates for SOF are additive to, or above and beyond, service education programs, including PME and JPME.

There is a wide array of educational opportunities focused on and available to SOF, including Joint Special Operations University programs and courses; NPS programs and courses; courses at the National Defense University's College of International Security Affairs at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; SOF participation at the various Department of Defense (DOD) regional centers; interagency programs; and programs and courses at various civilian institutions and academia.

Joint Special Operations University was established in September 2000 at Hurlburt Field, Florida, as an "institution of higher learning focused on joint special operations education" (Joint Special Operations University, 2017). Joint Special Operations University is an "instrument that could meet the specific education needs of special operators and non-SOF national security decision makers; it is a USSOCOM investment to help ensure that SOF remains a relevant force in the future" (Joint Special Operations University, 2017). Joint Special Operations University's first president, Army Brigadier General Ken Bergquist argued that Joint Special Operations University

> is not designed to replace existing training and education programs; indeed, the Air Force, Navy and Army special operations communities each train their forces most effectively. However, these … programs are inherently service-centric and provide little instruction in the joint application of SOF (Schreitmueller, 2000).

In 2010, Joint Special Operations University moved to Tampa, Florida, and continued its charter to provide educational support to SOF schools and service and joint professional military education institutions.

The NPS Department of Defense Analysis program was established by the U.S. Navy in 1992 and was officially sponsored by USSOCOM in 1994. Approximately 40 SOF students comprise the greater part of the Department of Defense Analysis program (the 18-month program causes students to cross fiscal years). Students earn a Master of Arts in irregular warfare and special operations. The College of International Security Affairs at Fort Bragg is a satellite campus of the National Defense University; it is not an SOF entity or school.

The College of International Security Affairs is the DOD flagship for education and the building of partnership capacity in combatting terrorism and irregular warfare at the strategic level. The National Defense University is responsible for the content and accreditation of the program. The College of International Security Affairs at Fort Bragg leverages service authorities and concurrence to provide officers and noncommissioned officers a unique opportunity to prepare for high-level policy and command and staff responsibilities through graduate, interagency, and joint professional military education programs.

USSOCOM is also making inroads into SO-centric education opportunities, which are joint requirements (they span at least two components), and related to or a mission of special operations and SOF. SO-centric education is defined in the new USSOCOM Directive 621-1, April 18, 2016, as “SO-centric education concerns the study, research, programs of instruction, and academic pursuits related to core SOF mission areas, SOF specialties, and/or items and topics of particular interest to Special Operations and Special Operations Forces” (2016e). Examples of some early SO-centric education opportunities are education and training programs and courses relating to developing SOF countering weapons of mass destruction planners for the theater special operations commands and SOF Enterprise. The requirements for developing these planners spans all the components, are over and above what the services provide as a focus or concentration, and are related to a key SOF mission.

Current Guidance

At the congressional level, Title 10, United States Code, section 167, directs the commander, USSOCOM, to train assigned forces to meet special operations assigned missions and to ensure interoperability with conventional forces and other SOF. USSOCOM’s education responsibilities are derived from the following Title 10 mandates: develop strategy, doctrine, and tactics; conduct specialized courses of instruction for commissioned and noncommissioned officers; and monitor the PME of officers and enlisted personnel (Beattie, 2003, p. 14). Furthermore, the commander of USSOCOM has the service-like responsibility of providing education venues that specialize in the art and science of joint special operations.

Some of the military guidance documents that focus on education include Department of Defense Instruction 1322.10, “Policy on Graduate Education for Military Officers,” April 29, 2008, which outlines the intent of the Department’s graduate education programs; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01E, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy,” May 29, 2105, which provides guidance for “officer professional military education … and joint professional military education” (2015, p. 1) and the Joint Staff White Paper, “Joint Education,” July 16, 2012, which posits that “joint education is essential to the development of our military capabilities” (Dempsey, 2012, p. 3). This guidance pertains to all of the DOD and highlights the importance placed on education by the military.

There are two primary USSOCOM guidance documents for SOF education. The first is the USSOCOM Directive 621-1 (2014a), and the other is the USSOCOM Commander's Training and Education Guidance (2014b). USSOCOM bases these documents on national guidance in accordance with Title 10, section 167, which grant several responsibilities to the USSOCOM commander that pertain specifically to education: "Conducting specialized courses of instruction for commissioned and noncommissioned officers; monitoring the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military education of SOF officers; validating requirements; and establishing priorities for requirements" (U.S. Code, Title 10, 2010). Furthermore, there is new draft DOD directive language that makes note of SO-centric education and USSOCOM's role in developing and advocating for it with the services, if and when published.

USSOCOM Directive 621-1, "Special Operations Professional Education," is the authoritative guidance regarding the development, implementation strategy, and structure of all SOF education, establishing policy and procedures for all SOF education capabilities and requirements and assigning roles and responsibilities at USSOCOM and its subordinate commands (2014a, p. 2). The directive outlines USSOCOM's education vision, intent, and goals, which are very broad and focus on building and maintaining a professionally educated force. Roles and responsibilities are also outlined to guide the special operations education structure. For example, USSOCOM Force Management Directorate-Education and Training Division provides "education and training guidance, policy recommendations, and assessment oversight" as well as "program and allocate funds for the SOF Education Program" and Joint Special Operations University provides "specialized joint professional military education, developing SOF specific undergraduate- and graduate-level curriculum and by fostering special operations research, analysis and outreach" (2014a, p. 3). With recent changes of structure as a result of the Joint Special Operations University Charter (February 9, 2016), signed by General Votel, designating Joint Special Operations University as a

> direct reporting educational activity of the command … [Joint Special Operations University] shall be considered a directorate-level organization, reporting to the Commander, but distinct from the management headquarters function of the command, the roles and responsibilities require further refinement to allow clear direction and focus. (USSOCOM, 2016c)

The USSOCOM's draft FY17–20 Commander's Training and Education Guidance (2014b) provides broad guidance on training, exercises, education, and language goals for the SOF community. The Commander's Training and Education Guidance provides areas of emphasis for SOF education, including officer and noncommissioned officer education, as well as leader education and SO-centric education (Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and Unconventional Warfare).

Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the need to understand and leverage aspects of human behavior drives educational needs. In the 2013 Posture Statement to Congress, former USSOCOM Commander Admiral William H. McRaven defined the human domain as "the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior" (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 2014). Integrating human aspects of military operations analysis into intelligence analysis can better equip U.S. forces to understand operating environments and produce more informed decisions on forward presence; engagement planning; partner building; and influencing hearts, minds, and behaviors. What are the future advanced technologies and cultural social practices for engaging underdeveloped populations in support of partner governments to achieve U.S. interests? What doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, facilities, and policy actions need to occur to institutionalize human aspects of military operations analysis within SOF? (Joint Special Operations University Research Topics, 2016b).

Gaps and Limitations

At present, SO-centric education is only a SOF enterprise term. It will be defined at the DOD level once an issuance describing military education is published, something that does not yet exist. SOF is tasked both formally and informally with missions different from those from the general purpose forces (JP 3-05, 2014) which points to different preparation. Being specific to a mission, this can appear to blur the line between education and training. Training would seem to apply as preparation to complete specific tasks, but since training is oriented toward standardization and similarity in action, it applies less than creating diversity of thinking through education which helps create new ways to solve complex and wicked problems. With the difficulties in defining the differences between training and education, sorting roles in managing education and other recent political complications, USSOCOM Headquarters has not sufficiently defined the SOF educational requirement to articulate it sufficiently for Congress and other policymakers to understand it well.

This leads to a disconnect between what the SOF community wants versus what USSOCOM Headquarters directs. The SOF Education Requirements Process validates and certifies SO-centric education. But how does the SOF educational institutions know the current courses being offered to the SOF community are meeting their needs? An educational requirements analysis was conducted of Joint Special Operations University by Booz Allen Hamilton in 2005, examining the sufficiency of education programs and activities offered or available to mid- or senior-level SOF officer, enlisted, and warrant officer personnel. The results of the study showed that while the "current joint SOF is exceptionally well trained … the same force is not well prepared for integrated planning or force application at the operational and strategic levels of warfare" (Joint Special Operations University, 2005, ES2). In response, Joint Special Operations University produced a *Strategic Plan for academic years 2006–2013* defining a leadership competency model to "provide a new and comprehensive instructional methodology to more efficiently and effectively meet the educational needs for us to develop and prepare SOF's leaders for those emerging operational challenges" (Joint Special Operations University, 2006, p. 29), but it did not directly address the educational requirements analysis identified gap (integrated planning and force application). A follow-on Joint Special Operations University internal study of SOF education requirements in 2007–2008 found that "Components and [theater special operations commands] repeatedly cited one education shortfall in particular: the ability of personnel to serve effectively on a joint special operations staff" (Joint Special Operations University, 2008, p. 9). It has been more than 10 years since the last educational requirements analysis was conducted at Joint Special Operations University. When was the last time such an analysis was conducted at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the NPS, the Naval Special Warfare Center, the Air Force Special Operations School, and the Marine Special Operations School? More important, when have these SOF educational organizations coordinated, synchronized, and leveraged their curriculum?

The Education Requirements Process provides a framework for USSOCOM, components, theater special operations commands and staffs to submit requirements for SOF Education

Council endorsement, however, a holistic review of SOF education programs is beyond the scope of that process. Current SOF education programs certainly are providing quality education to the SOF community. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the courses provided are meeting the needs of the SOF community or the USSOCOM commander. The requirement for a review of SOF education is due, and implementation of such a study is discussed in the recommendations.

The existing lack of education requirements articulation is further complicated by a future operating environment anticipated to be further defined by increasingly interconnected global commons paired with the increasing effects of nonstate actors. SOF preparing to operate in this environment are bound by fiscal constraint, decreasing resources, and manpower limitations amongst an era of expanding SOF requirements. While the characteristics of warfare in this environment will continue to evolve, what are the skills not yet currently present within special operations that are assessed as necessary for success? How can USSOCOM effectively prioritize training efforts while addressing the risks assumed with inaction? Given the likely requirement for foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare missions, how critical are language capabilities? What are the roles of culture and cultural intelligence? Should training be broadened throughout all SOF or focused on specific SOF specialties? (USSOCOM, 2016a, p. 10).

Recommendations

The SOF educational institutions should conduct an educational requirements (needs) analysis. This would be a daunting but necessary task. Just under 1,200 personnel responded to the previous Booz Allen Hamilton web-based survey. A SOF communitywide survey would reach out to many more. A similar study would need to cover various stakeholder groups: USSOCOM Headquarters, combatant commands, theater special operations commands, components, and SOF schools. In the Booz Allen Hamilton study, the respondents provided detailed, personal experiences with educational opportunities and related them to operational requirements. Something similar can be accomplished with a new study. The strategic environment has changed over the last 10 years and SOF imperatives change as well. The *SOCOM 2035: Commander's Strategic Guidance* (2016d) outlines what SOF must do, what SOF is expected to do, and what SOF should do. Using this as a guide, SOF educational institutions should be focusing courses on must-do missions such as hostage rescue and recovery, and countering weapons of mass destruction. The expected missions include countering transregional terrorist organizations, SOF core activities (JP 3-05, 2014), and unconventional warfare. The should missions include transregional synchronization, rebalance to effect situations before they become crises, and provide a ready and resilient force and family (USSOCOM, 2016d, pp. 10–15). Making a link between SOF education courses and these missions could be codified in an updated Commander's Training and Education Guidance. The SOF Education Conference and Council is the correct venue to plan and execute an educational requirements analysis study and periodically assess the results.

The other benefit of a SOF communitywide educational requirements analysis study would be to provide coordination, collaboration, and synchronization for SOF education programs. Current USSOCOM Directive 621-1 guidance directs the USSOCOM Force Management Directorate-Education and Training Division to coordinate "in conjunction with [Joint Special Operations University] … advanced educational professional development for the SOF community through existing service programs or through USSOCOM-unique opportunities" as well as "develop, coordinate, and execute a USSOCOM education strategy that complements and supplements existing SOF component, service and joint professional military education programs to ensure fulfillment of USSOCOM education responsibilities" (2016e, p. 10). The Joint Special Operations University has a similar mandate to "synchronize the command's education strategy with the [joint staff, services, and JPME] institutions, and officials with the interagency community" (USSOCOM, 2016e, p. 11). The guidance is there; the missing element is the willingness to take on the daunting task of a review of the educational requirements for the SOF enterprise. The future direction of SOF education is the beneficiary. Schatz, Fautua, Stodd, and Reitz (2015) in their conference paper, "The Changing Face of Military Learning," contend that military members

> must possess the independent decision-making skills to operate with clear a priori task direction, because so many challenges they face are novel. They must have the capacity to operate on intent, balance their tactical actions against strategic goals, and integrate multiple domains of sophisticated skills (e.g., soldiering skills, sociocultural understanding, emotional intelligence, resilience, and self-reflection) all within a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational context. (Schatz et al., 2015)

What are the ways to ensure that the SOF operator, enabler, and support personnel can meet this high standard? By providing them with the very best SOF-specific education that meets the USSOCOM Commander's intent and the SOF community desires.

The gaps and limitations of USSOCOM educational guidance was previously discussed. USSOCOM Directive 621-1 (2014a) and Commander's Training and Education Guidance (2014b) provide the SOF community with a solid foundation to meet the end goal: to become more intellectually agile and better prepared to operate in the complexity of the globalized, multinational, interagency environment. Education guidance to the larger force at the DOD level would benefit the special operations community and help define the service's and SOF's roles in educating their respective forces. This guidance would make it easier to realize the SOF requirement beyond service-provided educational programs. Whether Congress would better define USSOCOM's educational role is beyond the scope of this article, but it is an issue that requires further research. Although military education as a whole is a service responsibility, there are aspects required by SOF that demand more description to better define SO-centric education. The state of SOF education is moving in a positive trajectory but it will only remain so if guidance is clear and the special operations community educational needs are heard and met.

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Organizing Special Operations Forces: Navigating the Paradoxical Pressures of Institutional-Bureaucratic and Operational Environments

Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen
Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen, Denmark

Increased focus on the potential of special operations has lead several countries to establish dedicated special operations organizations. Analysts have warned against bureaucratization, yet little research has explored the effect of organizational formalization or asked how best to organize. This article draws from research into high-reliability organizations and interviews in Denmark's Special Operations Command. It contrasts the demands of the command's institutional-bureaucratic and operational environments and argues that the ability to straddle them is key to success. The high-reliability organization's ability to match divergent problems with dissimilar internal organizational behaviors is held out as a model for inspiration.

Keywords: special operations, high-reliability organization, bureaucratization, adaptability, creativity

The mixed results from the 2000's military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq seem to have dimmed Western political appetite for large, drawn-out, ground interventions in foreign theaters. The search for alternative means of countering the threats that emanate from weak states, regional conflicts, and international terrorist networks, has led to a growing political and analytical interest in Special Operations Forces (SOF). These forces are seen as uniquely suited to match the complexity and dynamism of the current security environment because of superior tactical skills, adaptability, and ability to improvise (Finlan, 2008; McRaven, 1995; Spulak, 2009; Fitzsimmons, 2003; Noetzel & Schreer, 2007). Establishing dedicated SOF organizations and granting their leaders direct access to senior national decision makers are seen as ways to ensure appropriate development and use of this different military capability, and as a way to ensure a SOF voice in national security debates (Luttwak et al., 1982; Marquis, 1997; Rothstein 2006; Sarkesian, 1984; Turnley, 2008).[1] At present, several countries, including Denmark, France, Germany, Lithuania, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom are expanding and investing in special forces and/or setting up dedicated organizations to lead them (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters [NHSQ], 2012; Værnsfælles Forsvarskommando, 2015).

While researchers have generally welcomed this development, some have pointed out that organizational formalization might eventually pressure SOF to resemble conventional military

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Correspondence should be addressed to Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Royal Danish Defence College Ryvangs Allé 1, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark. E-mail: andn@fak.dk

forces more. Increased resource availability and an organizational presence at the strategic level entails higher accountability standards and greater need to adhere to formal rules and procedures. An urge to appear like reliable and competent partners to the rest of the military establishment might cause a gravitation toward classical, conventional military organizational forms, activities, and behaviors (Adams, 1998; Rothstein, 2006; Marquis, 1997; Turnley, 2008). Put shortly, pressures from the conventional and political institutional-bureaucratic environment of new dedicated special operations organizations might over time quell some of the special qualities these organizations were meant to preserve. Considering the strong political focus on strengthening SOF through organizational consolidation, little research has systematically explored this potential dilemma and possible ways to circumnavigate it.[2]

This article aims to add to our understanding of how to organize special operations at the strategic level in ways that preserve and strengthen the adaptability called for by the current security environment. It draws from a Danish case study and from insights generated by research into so-called *high-reliability organizations* (HROs), organizations that function with a high degree of reliability in complex, multifaceted, and dynamic risk environments by matching divergent environmental demands with different internal organizational behaviors. The article suggests that new strategic level special operations organizations face analogous challenges and may learn from how HROs cope. Specifically, the article seeks to answer the following questions: Do Danish special operators experience increased pressure to conform to rules, procedures, and regulations that originate in the institutional-bureaucratic environment? What might special operations organizations learn from HROs about how to navigate divergent environmental demands?

The article proceeds in three parts. The first part introduces the Danish case and offers an initial empirical assessment of whether organizational formalization entails increased bureaucratization of special operations. The second part introduces the literature on HROs, discusses differences and similarities between HROs and SOF, and suggests how SOF may learn from HROs. The third part concludes and suggests avenues for future research.

EMERGING ENVIRONMENTAL CROSSPRESSURES: THE DANISH CASE

The long-term effect of current efforts to consolidate and enhance the strategic organizational presence of special operations forces is not yet evident, particularly not in those smaller North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries that have only recently begun to focus more on special operations. This section leverages a Danish case to offer an initial empirical assessment of whether the personnel of special operations organizations experience increasing pressure to follow rules, procedures, and regulations that originate in their institutional environment, and whether these rules, procedures, and regulations are perceived to diminish SOF's ability to adapt to the operational environment. The questions were explored by means of semi-structured interviews with Danish special operations personnel, including sets of questions about the planning and rollout of recent international missions and set of questions about day-to-day interaction, coordination, and decision making in the recently established Danish Special Operations Command (DNK SOCOM).[3]

With the 2014 Danish Defence Agreement, it was decided to establish a dedicated Danish Special Operations Command and transfer Denmark's two SOF units —*Jægerkorpset* and *Frømandskorpset*—from the Army and the Navy, respectively, to this new organization.

Denmark provided an attractive case for exploring the challenges faced by new dedicated special operations organizations, as it offered the opportunity to supplement a largely U.S.-centric research field with a small country case study. But also because Danish special operators have been deployed in a range of different international operations over recent years, including antipiracy operations in the Indian Ocean, security assistance and training missions in Afghanistan, removal of chemical weapons from Syria and Libya, and special reconnaissance in Mali. Having had ample recent exposure to the operational environment, the respondents were expected to have experienced potential tensions between the requirements of the operational and institutional-bureaucratic environment, in case such tensions actually exist. They were also expected to have formed at least an initial impression of how missions would be planned and carried out under DNK SOCOM, while still having a fresh memory of what things were like before.

In general, the interviews seemed to confirm the existence of cross-pressures, even if the data did not permit for strong conclusions about whether they were abating or worsening with the establishment of a dedicated Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Two themes emerged from the interviews: Pressures and constraints relating to what some respondents described as "overplanning" of international deployments and "overprotection" of deployed contingents. Pressures to diverge from the respondents preferred nonhierarchical and informal interaction forms when dealing with what some respondents termed "outside-the-fence" issues—issues where external approval or collaboration was called for to decide and move ahead.

Planning, in the perception of the respondents, appeared to be a term that carried positive connotations. The systematic, linear, step-by-step approach used by most armed forces across from different services was appreciated and held out as an ideal by a clear majority. Yet, it was also characterized as an ideal that needed to be flexible and adaptable to different circumstances, including time pressure and a need to adjust on-the-go as new knowledge emerges. In terms of planning and carrying out international missions, respondents expressed a preference for broad mandates and delegated decision making and they contrasted this to what some termed "overplanning" and "overprotection" on part of domestic planning headquarters and decision makers.

For example, troop- and patrol commanders with Jægerkorpset related how they were not permitted to adjust the preconceived size of a Danish contingent deployed to Afghanistan. The mission could, in the respondents' assessment, have been carried out by a smaller contingent, which would have saved resources and resulted in longer endurance (Aalborg Air Base, April 2016). Respondents differed in their interpretation as to why this adjustment was not allowed. Some point to a general inclination to seek safety for deployed units in larger numbers, others to a lack of SOF specific insight among domestic planners (the mission was planned before the standing up of DNK SOCOM). In the words of an officer with "Jægerkorpset": "In the Army you have this tradition that you deploy those contingents/building blocks you know from home" (Aalborg Air Base, April 2016).

A strong theme across from several interviews was how a mixture of "overplanning" and "overprotection" reduced the ability of deployed units to adapt to the operational environment and accomplish their missions. For example, a respondent with Jægerkorpset recalled how efforts to reduce the number of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against the International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan were hampered by nonflexible, preconceived limits on the permitted geographical area of operation of a Danish SOF unit. The area included the attack zones, but excluded the zones where insurgents produced and stored the IEDs. Allegedly, the off-limits area was considered too dangerous (Aalborg Air Base, April 2016).

In a similar vein, respondents with Frømandskorpset related how force protection requirements prohibited them from accompanying their Afghan trainees in the vehicles of the Afghan security forces. An officer explains: "… we actually preferred using the unarmored Afghan vehicles. They are much closer to a SOF solution" (Korsør Naval Base, March 2016).

Preconceived and mandated tactical standards at times, in the accounts of the respondents, resulted in orders that might have made a conventional unit safer, but made little sense for a SOF unit: The obligatory procedure for dealing with IEDs in the Afghan theater required a larger number of troops than the number of operators in a SOF patrol (Aalborg Air Base, April 2016).

Some respondents relate how they managed to push the limits of restrictive mandates by repeatedly pressuring domestic planners and headquarters for more leeway. Or how they simply ignored tactical standards or cumbersome, formal lines of command that, in their judgment, made no sense to a SOF unit (Korsør Naval Base, March 2016; Aalborg Air Base, April 2016). While this might have made sense from an operational perspective, it is easy to imagine the fall out if things had gone wrong. Furthermore, one might hypothesize that the practice has not endeared SOF to the conventional establishment.

In sum, the interviews indicated that Danish special operations personnel experience pressures from the institutional-bureaucratic environment—overplanning and overprotection—and that these pressures reduced their ability to adapt to the requirements of the operational environment.

Are things improving with the establishment of DNK SOCOM? Several respondents pointed out that planning for the two most recent international missions—deployments to Mali and Iraq—had afforded greater flexibility with regard to specifying the nature of tasks, size, and organization of the force, local partners, and geographical area of operation. When asked directly, however, most respondents withheld judgment, arguing that it was still too early to tell (Korsør Naval Base, March 2016; Aalborg Air Base, April 2016).

A second theme that seemed to confirm the existence of pressures from the institutional-bureaucratic environment emerged when respondents were presented with sets of questions about day-to-day interaction in Denmark's new special operations organization: The need to operate in a more hierarchical and proceduralist organizational mode when dealing with what some respondents termed "outside-the-fence" issues.

A majority of respondents described their organization as hierarchical on paper, but in reality characterized by flat and relatively free-flowing interaction between ranks and organizational subunits. Respondents explained this in part by pointing to the limited size and newness of the organization, in part by pointing to a specific antihierarchical SOF culture. A majority also described their organization as goal-oriented, not particularly concerned with following set procedures, adaptable, and able to improvise when existing means and methods come up short. An officer exemplified this by describing how special operators together with the crew of a Danish frigate had to improvise solutions when they took the first presumed pirates prisoner during a mission in the Indian Ocean: "We received an e-mail saying 'Danish Criminal Justice Law to be followed to the letter.' […] They were in the middle of nowhere so that was impossible […] In the end we had to find some pragmatic solutions, using VTC to place them in front of a Danish judge with interpreters etc." (Aalborg Air Base, March 2016). Others related how they avoided a delay in deploying to Mali by coming up with a suitcase size communication solution that substituted for the container size Army standard (Aalborg Air Base, March 2016). Others again described how a piece of stranded equipment was rescued from a highly forbidding environment by working personal contacts in the armed forces of an allied nation (Aalborg Air base, April 2016).

Some respondents highlighted the habit of constantly tinkering with equipment to optimize performance. An officer with "Jægerkorpset" explained: "I was raised [in the Army] on the belief that you do not modify the issued equipment. But up here I learned that that is ok." (Aalborg Air Base, April 2016). Or, in the words of a respondent from SOCOM, talking about the constant urge to improve on means and methods: "But all SOF have this thing—'if I'm able to create something novel then that's what I'll do instead of just remaining where I am'" (Aalborg Air Base, March 2016).

While flat, crosscutting interaction, goal orientation, adaptability, and the ability to improvise were dominant in the respondents' descriptions of their organization, a more hierarchical, compartmentalized, and procedural way of thinking also emerged. This was the case when respondents talked about what some termed "outside-the-fence" issues—preparation of papers, documents, plans, and procurement requests that needed clearance or support from other commands or higher bureaucratic levels (Aalborg Air base, March 2016). Questions of resource ownership also seemed to trigger this mode. An officer with SOCOM recalled his instinctual reaction when he was called up by a specialist from the Army, who offered his expertise in support of a SOF task: "Did he clear this within his own system? [. . .] Do we risk stepping on somebody's toes? How much cover do we need to move ahead with this?" (Aalborg Air Base, March 2016).

An officer with Jægerkorpset warned against a creeping bureaucratization: "One should be careful not to drown this capacity [SOF] in rules, regulations, standard procedures etc, because then you are not going to get the best out of it." (Aalborg Air Base, April 2016). Another respondent, an officer with DNK SOCOM, noted the irony in how "..we want to think out-of-the-box, but our organization looks like a classical military bureaucracy." (Aalborg Air Base, November 2015). A high-ranking SOCOM officer pointed out that when it comes to administrative, budgetary, and HR issues, it was necessary to stick to the procedures to get through. Ideally, he explained, he would like to see the organization constantly push for new ways of doing things. However, ". . . that would set me so much apart that I would not be a constructive partner to the rest of Danish Defence and that would entail isolation." (Svanemøllen Garrison, March 2016).

To sum up, the interviews seemed to confirm the existence of crosspressures from the institutional-bureaucratic and the operational environment of SOF. This was evident in the respondents' accounts of the planning and roll out of (mainly pre-SOCOM) missions and when they talked about the day to day interaction in Denmark's new special operations organization. Special operators might wish away the institutional-bureaucratic environment, yet as pointed out above by the senior officer, SOF remains dependent on this environment for legitimacy, funding, collaboration, and for certain military capabilities. So, how might dedicated special operations organizations navigate in their different environments?

NAVIGATING INSTITUTIONAL-BUREAUCRATIC AND OPERATIONAL PRESSURES: HROs AS A MODEL?

While the SOF specific literature has not grabbled systematically with the organizational question, one subfield of organizational studies arguably offers applicable insights: Research into so-called HROs. Special operations organizations face challenges that are analogous to those faced by HROs and special operations organizations might learn from how HROs cope.

HRO Research

HRO research is preoccupied with identifying organizational designs, capabilities, habits, and interaction patterns that enable an organization to match complex and dynamic risks, comprising both known and unfamiliar threats and hazards.[4] The research emerged as a supplement to earlier studies into the organizational causes of major accidents and safety lapses (Reason, 2000; Sagan, 1993) by zooming in on the positive characteristics that enable an organization to perform with a very high level of reliability. HRO research has aimed to identify these organizational characteristics by studying amongst others wildfire fighting teams, air traffic controllers, nuclear plant, and electricity grid operators (Comfort, 2005; Hamel & Valikangas, 2003; Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; Lee et al., 2013; Weick, 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).

The research highlights a number of attitudes, behavioral patterns, norms and values that include the following:

- The capacity to improvise and use what is already at hand to create novel solutions to unexpected problems.
- A virtual role system. Organization members cultivate an understanding of the organization in its entirety and the roles performed by others, permitting each member to support or take over from colleagues.
- A high degree of individual open-mindedness, curiosity, and a recognition that even if past experience is helpful, each situation is potentially novel.
- Respectful interaction, which permits the organization to capitalize better on the entire stock of available knowledge.
- A strong focus on learning and on exchange of experience through dense internal communication.
- Ongoing horizon scanning to detect early signs of change.
- Continuous experimentation to improve on means and methods.
- Flat nonhierarchical interaction and respect for the expertise of specialist and front-line operators (Hamel & Valikangas, 2003; Longstaff, 2005; Weick, 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).

Structurally, HROs are typically characterized by a variety of resources and skills to increase chances that the organization can match whatever comes at it, loosely coupled subsystems to ensure against cascading failure, maintenance of a reserve capacity to buffer against unexpected trouble, and functional redundancy in critical systems to ensure that core functions can be upheld even under conditions of partial system breakdown (Godschalk, 2003; Lee et al., 2013; Longstaff, 2005, 2010; Parker, 2010; Wildavsky, 1993).

HRO research distinguishes between an organization's ability to handle known problems through preplanned means and methods versus improvising on-the-spot to handle new, surprising, and unfamiliar problems. The two capacities, it is pointed out, in principle go with different organizational designs, capacities, behaviors, and authority patterns. Known threats are handled effectively and efficiently through tried-and-tested technologies and by following rules and regulations that embody the organization's experience and historical knowledge. In effect, a classical Weberian bureaucratic mode. Surprising and unfamiliar threats, in contrast, require delegation, instantaneous collegial and collaborative troubleshooting by experts and operators, experimentation, fast feedback, and adaptability. Cultivating the ability to do both within the same organization is regarded as a major organizational challenge (Boin & van Eeten, 2013; Hollnagel et al., 2008; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Roe & Schulman, 2008). As noted by LaPorte and Consolini, what HROs achieve is, observably, working in practice, but not in theory, as they straddle disparate organizational models, including bureaucratic, professional, and emergency management organizations (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991).

How do you lead and organize to achieve this ability and how do you know when to change gears?

LaPorte and Consolini (1991) in a study of air traffic controllers observe how the switch between different organizational modes is triggered by an increase in operational tempo or the occurrence of incidents consensually perceived as emergency indicators. They do not investigate how this consensus emerges, but the recommendation flowing from their observation appears straightforward: To have an ongoing, organization wide conversation about what the different gears look like, what they require from operators and leaders, and which situations or incidents should trigger a change from one to another.

Along the same lines, Weick and Sutcliffe argued that it requires strong socialization into a common set of decision premises for organization members to master both a centralized (known problems) and a decentralized (unfamiliar problems) mode (Weick, 1987). In a HRO, they argue, people are socialized into a strong commitment to failure free performance and organization members are engaged in a continuing conversation about what must not go wrong (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).

Snowden and Boone focused on the role of organizational leadership. They identify four types of problems and contexts—simple, complicated (both akin to the HRO literature's known problems), complex, and chaotic (akin to unfamiliar problems) and recommend different leadership styles for each (Snowden & Boone, 2007). The first two contexts call for fact-based management that relies on analysis, rules, and regulations. The latter two instead call for leaders that probe, search for patterns, and iterate ahead. Snowden and Boone (2007) argued that the adaptability of an organization depends on whether the leadership has adequately understood the different challenges of different contexts and are able to overcome potential individual bias that leads them to prefer one type of leadership over the other.

Moynihan (2011) argues that all large organizations have multiple cultures and that the ability of leaders to leverage different cultural assumptions to meet environmental demands is at the core of an organization's ability to change gears. In a case study, he analyzed the U.S. Department of Defense's response to the Hurricane Katrina, tracing a shift from a sluggish, proceduralist, and reluctant first response into a forward-leaning stance. He showed how the Department of Defense leadership leveraged an "anything to get the job done" culture to overcome a different aspect of the culture of the armed forces, namely a strong inclination to maintain an arm's length to domestic tasks (Moynihan, 2011).

Figure 1 summarizes and compares the organizational principles and practices ideally suited to handle known versus unfamiliar problems.

	Known problems/bureaucratic mode	Unfamiliar problems/delegated and experimenting mode
Handle threats/problems via:	Implement pre-determined and tested response/plans. Apply known and trusted technologies. Problem handled by predesignated operators/subsystems.	Improvise, learn, and adjust in iterative processes and via fast feedback. Unexpected problems handled by leveraging relevant knowledge from across the organization.
Organizational structural characteristics:	Hierarchical, specialized subsystems.	Flat, vertically and horizontally networked.
Organizational behaviors and habits:	Proficiency in applying trusted and tested technologies and solutions. Focus on avoiding errors by following rules and procedures. Experimentation not desirably and/or necessary. Interaction regulated by formal structures, plans, processes.	Horizon scanning, looking for signs of change, dense vertical and horizontal communication flows, ongoing experimentation, focus on learning, non-hierarchical interaction, multiple perspectives considered, cultivating whole of organization knowledge.
Leadership priorities:	Zero mistakes. Control. Predictability.	Adaptability. Continuous experimentation. Trust. Delegation.

FIGURE 1 Handling known problems in bureaucratic mode and unfamiliar problems in delegated and experimenting mode.

HROs and SOF: Different and Alike

To what extent do SOF resemble HROs and are the insights generated by HRO research applicable to SOF?

There are obvious differences between the two types of organization. HROs strive to prevent, detect, contain, and eliminate disturbances to their operations. They cultivate the ability to improvise, iterate, and innovate to ensure against system break down in case of surprising or unfamiliar problems. Yet, because the costs of mistakes are frequently high, few HROs would experiment for the sake of experimenting. The unfamiliar-mode is necessary, but neither the most prevalent nor the preferred mode of HROs. One might say that HROs strive to enlarge the number of problems and situations that can be handled reliably and efficiently in the known-problem/bureaucratic mode via a strong focus on understanding the systems they operate and continuously learning about how they react to various environmental inputs.

The opposite is arguably true for SOF. SOF deal with thinking and adaptive opponents and their ultimate purpose is to introduce disturbances to the environment to achieve operational or strategic effects. Even when dealing with a known problem, SOF may want to address it in new ways to gain the advantage of surprise.

Moreover, SOF have more opportunity than, for example, air traffic control organizations or nuclear plant operators to go off-line to experiment and use trial-and-error learning through exercises and training without risking a catastrophic system break down. One might say that SOF, through leveraging tactical proficiency and creative thinking, should strive to enlarge the number of problems and situations approached with the unfamiliar-problem mode to explore, develop, and apply new, surprising means and methods.

Strategic level SOF organizations are responsible for negotiating SOF's relationship to the wider institutional-bureaucratic environment. They face a particular challenge: Safeguarding and enlarging the room for the unfamiliar-problem/delegated mode despite pressures from the institutional environment to cultivate organizational behavior akin to the HRO's bureaucratic mode. Simultaneously, they must ensure working relations to this environment.

One possible way ahead might be to cultivate a hybrid organizational culture that blends elements from the bureaucratic and the delegated mode. However, this would arguably make for suboptimal performance in relation to the institutional-bureaucratic and the operational environments: A partly bureaucratized SOF would lose its edge in a dynamic, complex operational environment. And a special operations organization that constantly tries to "cut corners" with regard to the formal standards and lines of command of the institutional environment would end up with few friends and little room for maneuver.

An alternative but challenging path is to draw inspiration from the ability of HROs to apply fundamentally different organizational principles and practices depending on the problem and situation at hand. If special operations organizations were able to (a) cultivate both a bureaucratic and a delegated/experimenting organizational mode, (b) arrive at a common organizational understanding of when which mode applies, and (c) develop the ability to switch back and forth, they would be well positioned to harvest the strategic benefits of organizational formalization without sacrificing SOF's differentness in the process.

In sum, HROs strive to operate mainly in known-problem mode, while SOF should strive to operate mainly in unfamiliar-problem mode. Yet, arguably they share a central, organizational challenge: Providing an organizational frame that cultivates and nurtures the ability to switch between these two modes to accommodate very different types of problems and environments.

Figure 2 seeks to capture the difference between HROs and SOF, while highlighting the shared challenge of mastering and switching back and forth between two different organizational modes.

Switching, as pointed out by the HRO literature, is a major organizational challenge. It requires (a) a shared, organization-wide understanding of what the different modes look like in terms of interaction, priorities, and decision-making standards; (b) a shared, organization-wide understanding of which mode is appropriate to which situation and when to shift; and (c) leaders who are aware of the organization-wide stock of common cultural assumptions and take time to consider which assumptions could be leveraged through which easily communicable actions or symbols to generate a shift in organizational mode. The respondents' own distinction between outside-the-fence and inside-the-fence issues offers a possible starting point for an organizational conversation about these questions: Which issues are currently inside and outside? Are they handled correctly? Which outside the fence issues would benefit from being handled with inside the fence methods? Is it possible to negotiate the room to do so with the institutional environment? If not, is it worth the fall out to apply inside the fence methods anyway?



FIGURE 2 HROs and SOF: Different primary organizational mode but common challenge of switching back and forth between distinct modes.

CONCLUSION

Several countries have, or are in the process of setting up, dedicated organizations to safeguard, develop, and strengthen their national SOF. While researchers have generally welcomed this development, some have pointed out that organizational formalization might ironically lead to pressure on SOF to bureaucratize and to resemble conventional military forces more to appear legitimate to the rest of the military establishment, attract funding, and live up to the standards of accountability applied to other national service headquarters. Considering the strong political focus on strengthening SOF through organizational consolidation, few studies have delved systematically into the question of how to organize SOF at the strategic level or explored the potential dilemmas and crosspressures faced by special operations organizations.

This article aimed to shed light on the organizational question. Specifically, it asked, "Do Danish special operators experience increased pressure to conform to rules, procedures, and regulations that originate in the institutional-bureaucratic environment? What might special operations organizations learn from HROs about how to navigate divergent environmental demands?"

Although the data offered inconclusive evidence as to whether bureaucratization pressures are increasing, it documented the existence of such pressures, evident in what the respondents termed "overplanning," "overprotection," and in the way "outside-the-fence" issues apparently required a more hierarchical and procedural interaction in Denmark's new special operations organization.

The article suggested, that special operations organizations could draw inspiration from HRO's ability to distinguish and switch between a known-problem/bureaucratic mode and an unfamiliar-problem/delegated mode. This would enable special operations organizations to navigate the paradoxical pressures of a dynamic operational environment, that calls for delegation and adaptability and an institutional-bureaucratic environment that calls for hierarchical control, rule following, standard procedures, risk minimization, and adherence to formal lines of command.

The article used a Danish case to begin to assess the need for and the viability of seeking to cultivate HRO practices within SOF. Creating an organization wide understanding of why and when to shift mode might be easier in a small country with a small and relatively new special operations organization. Do the findings apply beyond Denmark? The strong identity and the idea of a unique SOF culture might provide the organizational capital needed also for larger organizations to make organization members tune in on a common conversation about organizational practices and principles and the need to cultivate different modes. The goal-orientation and determination to get the job done that is frequently emphasized as a SOF characteristic might be funneled toward the task of cultivating and learning to shift between organizational modes if leaders are able to clearly articulate why and when it is necessary. Ultimately, however, the question of generalizability should be tested through comparative research that comprise more country cases.

Furthermore, even if a number of respondents have experience from working with or within the Danish Army or Navy, the contrast to conventional forces and to the institutional-bureaucratic environment depicted in the interviews are based on perceptions. To further validate the emerging picture of paradoxical pressures on special operations organizations, supplementary interviews with external stakeholders from the strategic-military and institutional-bureaucratic environment would be needed. This would help clarify the fault lines dedicated special operations organizations need to navigate as they strive to prove themselves as legitimate and constructive partners to the wider military establishment, without losing their differentness in the process.

NOTES

1. Researchers disagree on how to define *SOF* but tend to agree that they differ from conventional forces (Finlan, 2008, p. 130; Fitzsimmons, 2003, p. 205; Gray, 1998, p. 145, p. 151, and p. 191; Kiras, 2006, p. 62 and p. 115; Noetzel & Schreer, 2007, p. 15; Spulak, 2009, p. 26; Tugwell & Charters, 1984, p. 35). Asklund and Christensen, on the basis of a comprehensive literature review, suggest two defining characteristics: (a) tactical superiority achieved by selective recruitment, rigorous training, and adherence to operational principles such as simplicity, speed, operational security, surprise, and meticulous preparation; and (b) "anti-systemic" thinking, including creativity and an inclination to stretch, bend, and transgress existing military methods and norms (Asklund & Christensen, 2016, pp. 9–11).
2. Among the more elaborate existing studies are works that focus on the process and politics of the establishment of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), a recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) report, and a report from the early 1980s by a group of U.S. defense consultants. The reports offer valuable insights into a range of day-to-day organizational and management issues but do not systematically explore environmental pressures or how to navigate them (Locher, 2002; Luttwak et al., 1982, Marquis, 1997; NSHQ, 2012; Turnley, 2008).
3. Respondents comprised commanding officers, staff officers, noncommissioned officers, troop commanders, and patrol commanders and were selected with an eye to ensure that all leadership levels were represented. Data were gathered during field visits and interviews and focus groups with 25 respondents in DNK SOCOM, *Jægerkorpset* and *Frømandskorpset*. Interviews lasted between 90 and 120 min, were recorded and transcribed verbatim, and coded by two individual coders. Verbal informed consent was obtained before the interviews, and all respondents were promised full anonymity.
4. The following two paragraphs and Figure 1 elaborate on an earlier article by the author, which reviewed HRO and organizational resilience literature as part of a study of strategic leadership in national security bureaucracies [Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2017].

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BOOK REVIEWS

Crandall, Russell. *America's Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare From 1776 to the War on Terror*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014., 472 pp., $113.00 (hardback). ISBN: 978-1-107-00313-2.

Reviewed by **Jason Heeg**
PhD Candidate, Faculty of History, University of Cambridge
Cambridge, England

Russell Crandall's book *America's Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare From 1776 to the War on Terror* is a valuable resource for unconventional warfare practitioners. Crandall is a professor of international politics and American foreign policy at Davidson College in North Carolina. He has served in various high-level policy jobs in the U.S. government and has published multiple books on Latin America. This most recent book covers a vast swath of history and focuses on irregular warfare. His first key argument is that although dirty wars are challenging to study, the United States will face this type of warfare in the future, and military personnel and government officials must understand it. The second is that although there are some similarities and consistencies among counterinsurgencies, each is unique and must be fought according to the situation in the particular country or region. He uses the comparison of General Petraeus's success in Iraq and later challenges in Afghanistan to highlight this aspect. This review covers each of the four sections of the book individually.

PART 1: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO CHASING SANDINO, 1776–1930s

Following the introduction and a 15-page primer on irregular warfare, the first section looks at a 200-year period. Crandall includes seven case studies in this section in approximately 100 pages. The space allocated allows him to provide an acceptable level of detail to be of value to the reader. It is important to note that the book is well sourced and has an impressive bibliography for readers who are interested in further research into the conflicts that are covered. In this section, he also introduces the *intermezzo*, which are short chapters that provide a non-U.S. perspective to the narrative. The first intermezzo examines the Boer War (1899–1902), and the second examines T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt (1916–1918). Both of these classic events should be studied, and Crandall provides a concise overview of each.

PART 2: THE COLD WAR, 1940s–1989

This section looks at counterinsurgency during the Cold War. Although the introduction focuses on the Kennedy Administration's counterinsurgency and development policies, the chapters that follow offer a wide view of counterinsurgency events and theory during the period. The intermezzo on Mao Zedong provides an overview of Mao's early life up to 1949 and his contribution to revolutionary warfare. Of course, it is best for scholars of unconventional warfare to read the original works of theorists such as Mao; an advantage of reading *America's Dirty Wars* is that Crandall gives a concise excerpt with key points, which are a great place to start. The reader can then consult the footnotes and bibliography for more in-depth study. There are two chapters on U.S. counterinsurgency support to Greece and the Philippines during the early Cold War, and Crandall draws important lessons from these mostly successful events. In the intermezzi concerning Algeria and Malaya, Crandall examines two different counterinsurgency approaches used by the French and British. The theories of David Galula and Robert Thompson are also compared and contrasted.

The longest and final chapter of Part 2 focuses on the French and U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The chapter begins at the end of World War II and chronicles France's conflict with the Viet Minh up to the battle of Dien Bien Phu and the French withdrawal. Crandall then turns to the Second Indochina War, which pitted the United States and South Vietnam against the National Liberation Force ("Viet Cong") and the North Vietnamese Army. Crandall reviews the policies of successive presidential administrations and military strategies, as well as the dissenting views on how to prosecute the war. Unfortunately, Crandall avoids the "lessons learned" section that appears in most of the other chapters. Later in the chapter, he delves into the counterfactuals that imagine a positive outcome for South Vietnam and the United States if the political will would have existed. He then makes a compelling argument concerning the counterinsurgency operations following the Viet Cong's transition to phase III of the insurgency during Tet in 1968. In the end, Crandall concludes that "Despite its glaring deficiencies, the American counterinsurgency strategy had largely defeated the Viet Cong, one of the most formidable guerrilla forces in modern history." (p. 235).

PART 3: LATIN AMERICA AND THE COLD WAR, 1950s–1980s

In this section, Crandall looks at a wide range of covert action and unconventional warfare events as well as counterinsurgency support to various Latin American countries during the Cold War. His treatment of the Cuban Revolution is sparse, which is surprising given that it was the watershed moment in Latin America's Cold War. The intermezzo concerning Che Guevara is disappointing, and the author does not seem to grasp the critical importance of the foco theory. Crandall explains that other factors contributed to the success of the revolution but does not entertain the challenges to the guerrilla myth such as argued by Julia Sweig in *Inside the Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground*. It is interesting to note that Crandall attributes the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua "as the only example of a successful foco revolution" after Cuba, when it was clearly not a foco revolution (p. 281). Also in the section, Crandall looks at Guatemala and the Bay of Pigs and attempts to remove the victorious rebels from power in Nicaragua. In addition, there are chapters on counterinsurgency support to Guatemala and El Salvador. Crandall boldly steps into the debate between the two extremes of counterinsurgency: the good, the survival of democracy; and the bad, the shoring up of dictators and the associated human rights abuses. He offers a cogent analysis of the entire spectrum and applies them to the current situation in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, and the Philippines.

PART 4: POST–COLD WAR, 1990s–2000s

The final section is introduced by examining the expected peace dividend and the hoped for New World Order after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, after the successful implementation of the Powell Doctrine in the Persian Gulf War, Crandall argues that the U.S. government reverts to the dirty war model out of necessity because of the global conflict environment in the post–Cold War world. Of particular interest to the unconventional warfare practitioners, there are chapters on the covert action against the Soviets in Afghanistan; the 2001 U.S. Special Forces led invasion of Afghanistan and the invasion of Libya. There are intermezzi that look at the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and the small-footprint successes against the insurgencies in Colombia and the Philippines. After reviewing the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the continuing debate among counterinsurgency theorists, Crandall warns (p. 396):

> Another concern was that the COIN school's promotion of a "gentler" form of counterinsurgency made it appealing to politicians and others as it appeared to promise all of the benefits of antiguerrilla warfare and nation building without the violence and controversy normally associated with it.

This is Crandall's most salient point. Throughout the book, he argues that there are not simple solutions to the types of conflict that fall within the spectrum of irregular warfare. He provides convincing evidence that the United States and other Western democracies will engage in dirty wars in the short and long term. Accepting this point, political and military leaders—as well as special operations practitioners—must understand the history and theory of irregular warfare. This understanding, combined with a deep practitioner's experience, and knowledge of current events can provide a framework for success in the next dirty war.

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Barnes, David M. *The Ethics of Military Privatization: The U.S. Armed Contractor Phenomenon*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2016, 220 pp., $155.00 (hardback). ISBN: 9781472464439.

Reviewed by **Ryan Shaffer, Ph.D.**
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC

David M. Barnes examines the ethical implications of military privatization. He presents several arguments against the U.S. government hiring private security companies (PSCs) and writes if the government must rely on private contractors for security then it should only be in extraordinary cases and under certain conditions. Although he examines the issue from an ethical perspective, Barnes also explores legal aspects of armed contractors that raise complicated questions about the gray area they inhabit in domestic and international law. Drawing not only from academic literature but also from personal experience in Iraq, Barnes explores armed contractors through a historical survey and describes the consequences their activities have on professional soldiers. He makes his cases through clear definitions of the terms and cites academic studies, military theories, and news reports. Overall, he presents a convincing argument for eliminating the privatization of force in conflict but leaves room for others to more widely explore government contractors and approach the subject from an international law perspective.

The book begins with a survey of the "armed contractor phenomenon" and Max Weber's notion of the state's monopoly of force (p. 14). Barnes explains how contractors during the Iraq War did not report to the military command challenging the government's monopoly of force and how prisoners of war are guaranteed certain international rights during conflict, but contractors do not fit this category. Although the U.S. has used mercenaries, such as during the American Revolution, the government has historically avoided privatized force and Additional Protocol I to Article 47 of the Geneva Convention (1977) tried to criminalize mercenaries. Moving to definitions, Barnes distinguishes between mercenaries, soldiers, and armed contractors by noting the differences in permanence, corporate nature and allegiance. He concludes, "the modern day PSC is not the same as either the eighteenth century mercantile

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companies; nor, are its employees the same as mercenaries of the past in spite of their shared characteristics," but the PSC is also "distinct from the professional soldier" (p. 64).

The remainder of the book is focused on reasons why it is not morally permissible to hire PSCs. Barnes argues "that the armed contractor phenomenon is a form of commodification, and it is this commodification of force that is distinct from and detrimental to a state's monopoly of force" (p. 67). He finds that proponents of contractors cite efficiency but describes that the cost savings is not clear with current evidence and the risk is too great for the state. Barnes then explores how "armed contractors are not the legal equals of combatants nor are they the moral equivalent of professional soldiers" (p. 107). Moreover, he cites the U.S. government declaring that contractors are civilians, showing that there is not a clear category, such as combatant or civilian, where armed contractors belong. Barnes also explains how the military and contractors compete for talent, contractors modify soldier identity and private military contractors gain a voice in government that could alter the jus ad bellum debate and public discussions about international crises. The monograph closes by looking at the future of armed contractors and summarizes why it is not "morally acceptable" to hire private military companies (p. 188). Yet, he acknowledges that contractors are not going away soon, so Barnes recommends improved contractual control over companies, "robust" oversight, and ultimately ending the private use of force.

The Ethics of Military Privatization is a good contribution to the debate about the U.S. government's use of armed contractors. It raises many key issues, such as the need for a legal framework to clearly define contractors and how private companies alter the military and debates about war. Moreover, it also demonstrates the need for further studies about contractors in the intelligence community and risk of espionage, which are not analyzed in the book. Also as Barnes is looking at the U.S., how these arguments would relate to weaker or failed states provokes a range of interesting questions for rulers whose own security forces are ineffective. Indeed, would an unstable and internationally recognized government with a newly created military be ethical in hiring armed contractors to boast its security? This raises a range of issues about the contractors that are employed to protect government officials in locations with weak internal security and soldiers that are poorly trained with dubious allegiances. Nonetheless, the book is well-thought-out and scholars along with policymakers interested in military studies, ethics, and government contractors will find it a useful study in those fields.

ORCID

Ryan Shaffer http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6766-2194

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BOOK REVIEWS

Henriksen, Thomas H. *Eyes, Ears and Daggers: Special Operations Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency in America's Evolving Struggle Against Terrorism*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016, 194 pp., $19.95 (hardback). ISBN: 978-0-8179-1974-0

Reviewed by **John G. Breen**, **Ph.D.**
Commandant's Distinguished Chair for National Intelligence Studies
U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA

In 2016, I had the opportunity to hear a senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer speak eloquently about the tactical, operational, and strategic security challenges facing the U.S. Early in his presentation, this officer commented that the contemporary security situation was the most challenging he had seen in more than three decades of service. Later, he argued that the CIA and the greater intelligence community, along with the U.S. military, particularly the Special Operations Forces (SOF), were all working together much better, more closely, and with greater affect than ever before. This uplifting sentiment seemed to resonate with the audience and certainly was a comforting message. In the brief Q&A session that followed, I asked, "But why the disconnect? Why, if the intelligence and military communities, particularly CIA and SOF, were truly working together better than ever before, was the international security situation the worst you've seen in thirty years?"

Thomas Henriksen, in *Eyes, Ears and Daggers: Special Operations Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency in America's Evolving Struggle Against Terrorism*, provides a gripping historical account of the development of the SOF/CIA partnership; a solid primer for those interested in how (and how effectively) SOF and CIA have shared and shaped the battlespace throughout history. As a primer, although this book will not answer all of the reader's questions, but it does provide an expansive look at the issues, hopefully stimulating further research.

Eyes, Ears and Daggers opens in 1776 and ends with a discussion of contemporary challenges in "Somalia, Yemen, and Beyond." In between, there are excellent examples of how each community prosecuted its mission well, and occasionally not so well. In one of the

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best chapters of the book involving World War II's influence on the emergence of paramilitary capabilities, Henriksen details how the British experience with Irish insurgency in the 1920s and 1930s, with the Republic of Ireland eventually gaining independence from centuries of British rule, likely inspired Churchill's establishment of the United Kingdom's own paramilitary force, the Special Operations Executive (SOE). American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officers learned quickly from SOE counterparts the murky arts of unconventional and irregular warfare. Jedburgh teams of SOE and Office of Strategic Services officers then worked together effectively for the duration of the war.

The threat of Soviet and Chinese Communism along with the North Korean and Vietnam Wars all contributed to America's continued interest in paramilitary capabilities, with a new or at least newly appreciated interest in having CIA and SOF work more closely together, emphasizing the capacity of the military and the flexibility of the CIA. Henriksen's discussion of Vietnam is particularly good; he takes the reader through the history of successful CIA paramilitary operations up and until 1963 when Operation Switchback passed the mission on to SOF, with a change from village defense to commando operations. This "conventionalizing" (p. 45) of the effort, the author suggests, weakened the effectiveness of the CIA-SOF partnership.

Following the ignominious end of the Vietnam War, which the author seems to blame on the withdrawal of conventional forces and Congressional perfidy, the hollowed-out Army of the 1970s and the Church Committee withering of the CIA each contributed to an appalling diminishment in special operations effectiveness as the decade drew to a close. Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, a lethally incompetent attempt to rescue American hostages from the sacked U.S. Embassy in Tehran, illustrated this sorry state of affairs. Subsequent legislation established the U.S. Special Operations Command and led to the creation of Joint Special Operations Command. As Henriksen points out, Afghanistan, Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf War, Colombia, Somalia, and the Balkans then gave CIA and SOF opportunities throughout the 1980s and 1990s to reestablish lost capabilities, the most important of which may have been hunting down high value targets. These skills would be further honed after the attacks on 9/11.

Eyes, Ears and Daggers does a very good job, encompassing the second half of the book, describing how CIA and SOF worked well together to initially defeat the Taliban and to subsequently cooperate in the ever expansive Global War on Terror. The strength of this section is the author's appreciation for both the strengths and the weaknesses of each organization, whether those be cultural, capability, or as derived by authorities. His description of the raid that killed Osama Bin Laden focuses on their cooperation leading up to the operation and addresses the murky authorities used to conduct, and later explain, the mission. As he notes, Leon Panetta, then CIA Director, claimed the operation was conducted under Title 50 authorities vice a traditional military operation conducted under Title 10 authorities. Henriksen calls for an examination of the inherent ambiguities of these Titles, but it would have been useful to hear more from him on this important matter.

As *Eyes, Ears and Daggers* concludes, Henriksen appears to argue that the rise of ISIS and its spread to other locales was due to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, relying too much on SOF/CIA, and not allowing other elements of U.S. power the opportunity to "win the war on terror." With his description of new threats emerging in Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Syria and again in Iraq and Afghanistan, his *Recommendations* at the end of the book call for continued SOF/CIA integration; these are tactical suggestions, aimed at solidifying the historical ebbs and flows of this sort of internecine cooperation at a current high point; fair enough. What's missing in much of Henriksen's too-brief commentary here is a more fulsome discussion of strategy.

Pointing to seemingly popular SOF/CIA lethal efforts to remove terrorists from the battlefield and programs to build up foreign internal defense, Henriksen does write that the Obama Administration was

> neglecting to adequately combat jihadi movements far from the United States. The SOF-CIA weapon can hold terrorism at bay until the unlikely prospect that the Islamist fervor burns itself out before an unforeseen catastrophic event takes place. Or the United States and its allies can resolve to win the war on terrorism. (p. 165)

In his October 2016 opinion piece in the *Washington Times*, Henriksen (2016) was somewhat more explicit: "The next administration must move beyond the limited Obama strategy of merely keeping the lid on expanding Islamic State affiliates until it leaves office."

Remember the senior CIA officer's dichotomous contention that the CIA and the military are working better now than ever, but that the international security situation is the most dangerous in decades? Like the senior CIA officer, Henriksen never does fully answer this important question. It may be that endless conventional military engagement will one day win the war on terror, but I suspect not.

Eyes, Ears and Daggers is perhaps appropriately focused on the lethal paramilitary work of CIA and SOF. Though important to provide time and space for other operations, it seems more likely that real solutions will be found not in this lethal component but rather in the worlds of civil affairs, foreign aid, diplomacy, and strategic intelligence collection. There is not enough space to delve into this here, but perhaps Henriksen might explore those softer elements of Special Forces and intelligence in his next book.

REFERENCE

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