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Africa's Role in Global Terrorism: Why It Matters Now

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Africa is often overlooked in the global terrorism narrative; however, sociocultural vulnerabilities, the activities of competing violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and conflict prone environments suggest the region will become a key horizon for global terrorism. Given the increasing interconnectedness of Africa based VEOs to regional and global counterparts, the looming threat in Africa is simply not just an African problem. Terrorism, coupled with foreign fighter flows and the illegal trafficking of people, weapons, and narcotics, is contributing to destabilization in Africa, but also poses a threat to other parts of the world. In addition, North Africa is one of the largest contributors of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria, and the potential return of such fighters is likely to significantly increase instability in the near term. The question about Africa is not *if* terrorism will take root, but rather *how much* terrorism will entrench on the continent, and how much the world is willing to risk by allowing it to occur.

Keywords: Africa, terrorism, violent extremist organizations, violent conflict

As military leaders and policy makers begin to ask “what’s next” after Mosul, history would point to the African continent as a new, yet all too familiar nexus. Africa is often overlooked in the global terrorism narrative; however, sociocultural vulnerabilities, the activities of competing violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and conflict prone environments suggest the region will become a key horizon for global terrorism, if it is not already. This sentiment is already being vocalized in diplomatic channels. For instance, during an early March 2017 visit to the United Kingdom, the Deputy Foreign Minister for Iraq stated: “Even if international coalition could manage to push them [the Islamic State] out of Iraq then the next stage will be Africa and Syria” (MacDonald, 2017).

Given the increasing interconnectedness of Africa based VEOs to regional and global counterparts, the looming threat in Africa is simply not just an African problem. Terrorism, coupled with foreign fighter flows and the illegal trafficking of people, weapons, and narcotics, is contributing to destabilization in Africa, but also poses a threat to Europe, the Middle East, and North and South America (MacDonald, 2017; Atlantic Council, 2017). For example, the leading VEOs in Africa have largely aligned with the global movements of either Al-Qai'da or the Islamic State, and cooperation and communication between their various regional affiliates

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exist. In addition, North Africa is one of the largest contributors of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria and the potential return of such fighters is likely to significantly increase instability in the near term. Furthermore, Africa based militants have cooperated with European based networks to help drive attack planning, and members of the North African diaspora were involved in the 2004 Madrid train bombing, the November 2015 and March 2016 attacks in Paris, and the March 2016 attacks in Belgium (Jacinto, 2016).

A VULNERABLE CONTINENT

Africa will soon be home to one quarter of the world's population. Since 2015, the population of the African continent rose by 30 million people, roughly an increase of 82,000 people per day (United Nations, 2015). The United Nations estimates that by 2050 the African population will double to 2.4 billion (Kirk, 2016). Unfortunately, the pace of economic development will likely not sustain such growth and will exacerbate already high rates of unemployment and poverty, which are key drivers of instability.

VEOs have long been able to use such vulnerabilities to their advantage by offering disaffected people an identity through participation in jihad, the provision of goods and services, or even by establishing harsh rule of law where there is little competing governance. One quarter of the U.S. State Department Specially Designated Terrorist Organizations currently operate on the African continent. More alarmingly, since 2013, the State Department has listed 14 new terrorist organizations. Ten of these (roughly 70%) operate in Africa, underscoring the burgeoning threat.

Al-Qai'da has seemingly mastered the exploitation of disaffected people as part of their strategy for creating a safe haven in West Africa. In a 2012 document attributed to the Al-Qai'da in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Emir Abdulmalek Droukdel, Al-Qai'da's intent for engagement with local militant groups in Mali was outlined. It stated there was a "historic opportunity that must be exploited to interact with the Azawad (an Arabic term for a region of Northern Mali) people...with the aim of uniting it and rallying it behind [Al-Qai'da's] Islamic project" (Associated Press, 2016). By 2017, this vision became a reality with three regional militant groups from various ethnic backgrounds in Mali uniting under Al-Qai'da (France 24, 2017).

COMPETITION FOR PRIMACY OVER THE JIHADIST LANDSCAPE IN AFRICA

Al-Qai'da and the Islamic State have openly declared their aspirations to gain control over large portions of the African continent and incorporate the region into their respective caliphates. Historically, numerous VEOs, including Al-Qai'da under the leadership of Usama bin Ladin, looked to the under-governed areas of Africa to serve as a safe haven and eventual cornerstone of their broader jihadist ambitions (Astill, 2001).

Al-Qai'da leaders likely view that, due to pressure from global counter terrorism operations, the need to establish safe haven in Africa is important. A document attributed to Al-Qai'da recovered in Mali in 2012 stated: "Gaining a region under our control and people fighting for us and a refuge for our members that allows us to move forward with our program at this stage is

no small thing and nothing to be underestimated. The enemy's constant, persistent effort now is to not leave any safe havens."

Al-Qai'da leaders also advised their ranks in Mali that it was: "Better for you to be silent and pretend to be a 'domestic' movement that has its own causes and concerns. There is no call for you to show that we have an expansionary, jihadi, Qai'da, or any other sort of project."

ISIS has also declared its intent to control most of north and east Africa in order to establish safe havens for its forces. It called for fighters to relocate to areas of established safe haven in West Africa. In an edition of *Dabiq* magazine titled "Shari'a Alone Will Rule Africa" ISIS called for fighters who could not go to the Middle East or Afghanistan to go to a safe haven in Africa: "So rejoice...this is a new door that Allah...has opened so that you may migrate to the land of Islam and that you may wage jihad. So, whoever is prevented from immigrating to Iraq, Sham, Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, or the Khurasan, will not be prevented—by Allah's permission—from immigrating to Africa."

Both Al-Qai'da and the Islamic State are competing for access to safe havens, resources, and personnel in Africa. Al-Qai'da appears to be on a trajectory to be the more successful of the two, owing to its historical ties to the region (and its robust affiliates AQIM and al-Shabaab), its ability to leverage relationships with local groups, and its less violent campaign. Meanwhile, the Islamic State employs more harsh tactics (a mid-March 2017 Boko Haram video showed the beheading and execution of Nigerian spies), and has faced some setbacks from the Libya campaign and the stagnant development of its affiliate in Somalia. However, the Islamic State is likely poised to benefit most from the return of foreign fighters in North Africa, suggesting its trajectory may improve in the future.

In addition, Al-Qai'da and the Islamic State each promote interconnectedness between their Africa based groups and other regional and global nodes. For instance, in February and March 2017, AQIM and Syria based Al-Qai'da in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) disseminated two joint statements calling for attacks on the U.S. Stories about Africa based affiliates are also often promoted in Islamic State or Al-Qai'da strategic communications, likely in attempt to encourage a sense of unity of effort and global reach amongst their respective groups.

CONFLICT PRONE ENVIRONMENTS AND THE RETURN OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS

VEOs maintain a robust presence across Africa; however, North Africa is likely to become even more unstable, owing to regional and political instability, as well as the potential return of foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria. For example, late March 2017 testimony before the House of Representatives indicated that Al-Qai'da and Islamic state affiliates in North Africa are poised to wreak considerable havoc across the continent as they seek to regroup in the ungoverned spaces and threaten the countries immediately impacted, but also...the interests and security of the U.S. and its allies (Pham, 2017).

North Africa has collectively been one of the largest contributors of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria since 2011 (Soufan Group, 2014). Tunisia, which represents only 1% of the Muslim population, is a leading source. Thousands of Tunisians are estimated to have traveled to the Middle East to fight. Tunisians have provided a reliable cadre of fighters for the Islamic State. This includes Abu Bilal al-Tunisi, who reportedly masterminded the burning to death of a

Jordanian pilot, as well as Abu Bakr al-Hakim, who was reportedly tied to the June 2015 attack in Sousse, Tunisia that killed 38, and served as an ISIS commander in Raqqa, Syria (Malka & Balboni, 2016).

These experienced fighters are likely to return with both the skills and ambition to threaten already vulnerable countries across the region. This is a similar dynamic to the return of fighters who traveled to support the mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the war against the Soviets. Following the drawdown of forces there, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Egypt faced increased pressure from Islamist groups that benefitted from a cadre of battle hardened fighters.

OUTLOOK

The question about Africa is not if terrorism will take root, but rather how much terrorism will entrench on the continent, and how much the world is willing to risk by allowing it to occur.

Partnership and cooperation can prevent the acceleration of instability in Africa. Military forces will play a significant role, but they are not the solution. Initiatives should not only focus on countering VEOs, but building security capabilities of African partner nations, and fostering long-term resolutions through diplomacy and participation of interagency partners. It is only through a comprehensive, international effort focused on building functional governance from the national to local levels, that stability will be achieved.

Socioeconomic development will be critical to inhibiting the activity and influences of VEOs on the populace. Studies indicate ideology is not a driving factor for support of terrorism in Africa. Polling data from Nigeria (a region plagued by both Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa branch) suggests that Islam is not driving recruitment—rather, unemployment rates are a more predictable driver of support for VEOs (Linetsky, 2017). Analysts also suggest a correlation between the presence of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programs and lower levels of support for VEOs (Linetsky, 2017).

Similarly, civil administration is vital for enabling enduring security. Local police are an essential link in maintaining local security to protect the populace. The establishment of local security will legitimize the government, allow for the establishment of government services and assistance from international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to address education, health, and humanitarian assistance as a result of conflict.

Furthermore, the international community and the U.S. government will need to relook current organizational constructs in order to be able to support the development of national to local governance in conflict-affected regions in Africa. Current approaches are not working and the lack of a comprehensive approach will only support VEO objectives and goals.

We are on a time line of about 10 to 15 years to get this right. Failure to do so will have significant impact on stability in Africa and will negatively impact Europe, the greater Middle East, South America, North America, and coastal security in the Mediterranean Sea, Gulf of Guinea, and East Africa.

Over the years we have witnessed the devastation at the hands of an extremist ideology. This violence will pale in comparison to the devastation brought on by day to day survival and competition for resources in an unstable environment. This is why Africa matters now. An unstable Africa is not in the best interest of global stability.

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Locating the Human in Doctrine

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In 2013, top U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command military leaders chartered the Strategic Landpower Task Force to examine the concept of a human domain and inform whether to adopt it into doctrine. The Department of Defense (DoD) should not adopt human domain into doctrine. However, examining human in war illuminates opportunities to improve joint doctrine by developing precise terminology for the many facets of humanness in war. This article explores human domain, human dimension, human factors, and human capital. It also proposes re-evaluating defeat mechanisms to consider human factors and how military operations influence adversary decisions. Human domain concepts have gained attention in the land services and special operations, especially in population-centric conflicts, but the importance of human factors goes beyond these limited viewpoints. Since war is an inherently human endeavor, DoD should evaluate human factors across all domains and joint operations so the concepts are not unnecessarily constrained.

Keywords: human domain, human dimension, human factors, human terrain, human capital, special operations forces (SOF), doctrine, information operations

Is there an appropriate term to describe the humanness of war? If so, what is it: domain, dimension, element, factor, component, psyche, terrain, or something else? In 2013, the top military leaders of the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command released a white paper amplifying the importance of humans in “winning the clash of wills.” With their signatures, they chartered the Strategic Landpower Task Force to, among other tasks, examine the concept of a *human domain* and inform whether to adopt it into doctrine (Odierno, Amos, & McRaven, 2013). The question of “should there be a doctrinal *human domain*?” can be answered in one word—no. In fact, the question itself seems to have faded in most circles as each of the leaders who commissioned the Strategic Landpower Task Force has since retired. But, examining the subject produced thoughtful debate and illuminates opportunities to improve joint doctrine. To this end, the DoD needs to develop precise, descriptive terminology for the many facets of humanness in war. More importantly, the DoD should strive to master these facets,

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because they are fundamental to the prevention, conduct, and outcome of wars. Settling on joint terminology would be a good first step.

The DoD should not adopt the term *human domain* into doctrine. The existing DoD-recognized domains—air, cyberspace, land, maritime, and space—all define distinct environments in or through which activities and military operations occur.¹ A human is not a separate physical environment independent of the other domains, because people are constantly on land, at sea, or in the air or space. Still, some studies consider the human domain as the foundation of the other domains or as transcending them (Hoffman & Davies, 2013; Metz, 2013). This logic mirrors cyberspace, which has components residing within all the other domains. Yet, cyberspace warrants its own term, because warfighting activities occur within it while also being uniquely unbounded as they flow across the other domains. Humans also move across the other domains, but when discussing warfighting, adding *human* is superfluous. For example, *human war* is an unnecessary term, since it is hard to imagine a war that is not human at its core, except in the realm of science fiction. Activities and military operations associated with war and strategy are inherently human and do not need definition as such, especially as a domain. However, there are certain human-related terms that are necessary.

Human terrain expresses a worthy concept but is not the best term. Army leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq, recognizing “human terrain [as] the decisive terrain” in counterinsurgency (COIN), created human terrain teams (Petraeus, 2010, pp. 334–404). This initiative leveraged experts from the social sciences to provide combat forces “sociocultural knowledge” of relevant populations and key leaders (Lamb et al., 2013, pp. 21–22; Sims, 2015). Such knowledge is so important in COIN operations that the Army and Marine Corps COIN Manual devotes much of its chapter on intelligence to society, social structure, institutions, norms, values, etc. (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006). Applying the analogy of terrain to these human aspects of warfare is somewhat helpful due to its conceptual parallels with key terrain, decisive points, and maneuver. However, the analogy is weak when applied to other terrestrial actions, like seize, deny, and hold. Rather than rely on an inexact analogy to represent such an important concept, the DoD should make better use of an existing, more descriptive term.

Human factors, already codified in doctrine, describes “the physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an individual or group that influence perceptions, understandings, and interventions” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016, p. 105). Joint doctrine identifies human factors as part of the intelligence function’s joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. Specifically, sociocultural analysis—“the study, evaluation, and interpretation of information about adversaries and relevant actors through the lens of group-level decision making to discern catalysts of behavior and the context that shapes that behavior”—“includes the systematic mapping of human factors affecting a leader’s or key actor’s decision-making influences” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 2-0, 2013, pp. I-17–I-18). With this meaning and use, *human factors* is an adequately descriptive term, is already codified in joint doctrine, and covers the ground intended by *human terrain*. But, there is more to humanness in war.

The Army has developed the term *human dimension*. Joint doctrine does not define the term but does use it to describe one of many dimensions of the operating environment (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, p. III-30; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-06, 2013, pp. II-5, III-6; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-24, 2013, p. III-2). Army doctrine uses the term differently and identifies the human dimension as “the cognitive, physical, and social components of Soldier, Army Civilians, leader, and organizational development and performance essential to raise, prepare, and employ the Army

in unified land operations” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2014b, p. 33). This definition has two major limitations. First, it only applies inwardly to U.S. Army personnel. Such a focused view is important to maximize Army capabilities but does not address myriad other human groups involved in conflict. If war is a clash of wills, certainly an adversary’s human dimension warrants attention (Clausewitz, 1976; Odierno et al., 2013). Other unaddressed groups include the joint and coalition forces alongside which Army personnel fight. The Army’s *human dimension* leaves out a host of human entities in warfare and strategy, including “friendly and allied (blue), host (green), and adversarial (red) forces (including political and military decision makers), as well as the local populations (white)” (Hoffman & Davies, 2013).

The second limitation of *human dimension* is that the term *human factors* adequately covers most of its definition. The attributes or components named are almost an exact match. Where *human dimension* extends its definitional reach is by applying those attributes to a purpose—to raise, prepare, and employ the Army in unified land operations. The limitations of *human dimension* make it insufficient and unnecessary, but its extension beyond human factors warrants exploration.

Building on the foundation of *human factors*, *human capital* provides a better description of the concept attempted by the Army’s term *human dimension*. In business, *capital* means “any form of wealth employed or capable of being employed in the production of more wealth” (Dictionary.com, 2017). Rather than wealth, DoD’s currencies are military force at the operational level and power at the strategic level. If human factors describe the raw elements, then human capital applies those elements toward an objective. The difference is similar to intellectual aptitude versus intellectual capital, which considers how to apply the potential of raw brainpower to creating economic value. Developing an organization’s human capital would cover recruiting, training, educating, exercising, building personal and organizational resilience, speeding decision processes, and similar human-centric activities. The term is equally applicable to any population group or organization. Since it overcomes the limitations of *human dimension*, the DoD should clearly define *human capital* and write it into joint doctrine.

The term *human domain* should fade away, but its emphasis should not. Proponents argue codifying its use would provide two benefits. First, it would “make the U.S. military more effective by reinforcing the primacy of human effects during campaigns and operations” (Metz, 2013). Indeed, the human effect is of primary importance in war and strategy. Clausewitz not only called war a “clash of major interests,” but he also included humans as central actors in all three components of his “paradoxical trinity” (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 89, 149). Thomas Schelling further framed conflict within the realm of human decisions. He described deterrence as passive, leaving the decision to act first with the opponent (Schelling, 2008). Although more active, his description of war is still about human decisions: “War is always a bargaining process ... [by] actions rather than words” (Schelling, 2008, p. 142). With this view, military commanders employ the six joint functions solely to produce strategic decisions made by humans. To emphasize the essential humanness of war and strategy does not require a new term; it takes leadership and a commitment to keep the subject at the forefront of conversation and study in education and the operational joint force.

The second benefit human domain proponents claim is that institutionalizing it as a domain would “provide a framework for investment, leader development, doctrine development, training, education, wargaming, and experimentation” (Metz, 2013). Again, leadership rather than a label is key. An identifiable program with a catchy label might gain attention, budget, and

resources initially, but when top leaders sustain their weight behind any issue, it tends to get traction. The leadership interest in and development of the “profession of arms” concept over the last several years provides a good example. Institutionalizing a human domain and developing programs centered on it would provide specific attention to the issue, but it would also set it apart as something different. Rather than make it unique, DoD should drive the joint staff and services to fully explore human factors in all of their concepts. Triggering a review of joint and service doctrine would further discussion and emphasis, and it would likely spur improvements.

Joint Publication (JP) 5–0, *Joint Operation Planning*, is ripe for change to incorporate the humanness of war. Specifically, it describes two ways of achieving objectives: defeat mechanisms and stability mechanisms. The latter, designed to affect civilians toward attaining peaceful conditions, include compel, control, influence, and support. Each of these actions focuses on the psychological reaction of the population. In contrast, the defeat mechanisms of destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate never address the adversary’s psychological reaction. Defeat mechanisms are meant for combat, so the lack of attention to adversary feelings is understandable when trying to “kill, destroy, or capture by all means available” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, pp. III-29–III-31). However, these mechanisms, as written, leave no room for considering how to create conditions where the enemy chooses to stop fighting. It may not be necessary to carry this to the extreme of Sun Tzu’s “acme of skill”—to win without fighting (Tzu, 1963, p. 77). But, considering a desertion rate of up to 30% by Iraqi ground troops subject to allied air attacks during Desert Storm, this is a concept worth pursuing (Lambeth, 2000). Reviewing and revising defeat mechanisms with this in mind would be consistent with joint doctrine’s conditional preference for disruption, rather than attrition, “which generally is more costly and time-consuming.”²

Keeping human factors at the forefront of conversation across all services and domains would also help avoid unnecessarily constraining the concept with a limited point of view. Special operations forces (SOF) have embraced the concept of a human domain (U.S. Special Operations Command, 2013). Because a large portion of the SOF mission set involves working with foreign partners and populations, a human focus is natural and beneficial. However, SOF’s written references to the human domain are almost exclusively in the context of population-centric conflicts (U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2014; U.S. Special Operations Command, 2013). SOF’s emphasis on human factors is good, but any downplaying of the importance of human factors in conventional operations is not helpful, because human factors are just as applicable to conventional conflicts (Hoffman & Davies, 2013). Likewise, human factors are not the exclusive territory of land forces. The desired effect of an adversary’s decision to cease fighting can result from action in any domain. Thus, each component should constantly evaluate how to better create this effect from or through its domain, as well as in conjunction with joint operations from and through other domains. Counter to the arguments of several land power advocates, just because land power puts friendly forces in close, personal contact with people does not make human factors more important to it at the strategic level.³ What is important for land forces, is to identify the unique ways close, personal contact by friendly forces affect human factors and follow-on decisions of adversaries and relevant groups.

JP 3–13, *Information Operations*, provides a foothold for exploring this concept, as it addresses the cognitive dimension, target audiences, key decision makers, and relationships among information, knowledge, and influence (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014). It describes a

framework where the “physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment provide access points for influencing target audiences” and employs “information-related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of target audiences to create a desired effect to support achievement of an objective” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. I-5, II-1). This framework deserves expansion beyond the information environment to all domains and capabilities, not just to influence decision-making abilities, but to drive adversaries toward decisions favorable to U.S. objectives.

Defining a doctrinal human domain remains unnecessary, but the DoD does need to embrace human factors as the key to success in war and strategy. Developing a force that can destroy something is important; however, knowing what to destroy or if destruction is even helpful is harder. Each proponent of a domain needs to not only master its tactical tasks but also anticipate the unique effects operations in its domain are most likely to create. Without this mastery and knowledge of human factors, U.S. joint forces will default to the less preferred method of attrition—at great human cost.

NOTES

1. Definitions of each domain can be found in U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 1-02 (2016), but the description of a domain is the author's. This definition varies slightly from the U.S. Army's in its Army Operating Concept: “An area of activity within the operating environment in which operations are organized and conducted by components.” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2014a, p. 46). It could be argued that cyberspace is not a physical environment, but it is made up of physical components, information that resides on physical components, and even transmissions across the electromagnetic spectrum, which does have distinct physical properties.
2. “There are two basic defeat mechanisms to accomplish this: attrition and disruption. The aim of disruption is to defeat an enemy's ability to fight as a cohesive and coordinated organization. The alternative is to destroy his material capabilities through attrition, which generally is more costly and time-consuming. Although acknowledging that all successful combat involves both mechanisms, joint doctrine conditionally favors disruption because it tends to be a more effective and efficient way of causing an enemy's defeat” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, p. III-30).
3. “Since people live on land, landpower is the most effective means of influencing will and behavior” (Goure, 2014, p. 44); “Landpower is particularly important in the human domain largely because it puts U.S. forces in direct contact with those they seek to influence” (Metz, 2013).

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Parameters of Simplicity as a Principle of Special Operations

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The study examined whether various aspects of simplicity, as a principle of special operations, were associated with the rate of success. These were a number of objectives, unit size, dependency on the enemy being at a specific location at a specific time, and other case-specific prerequisites. Finnish WWII long range patrols, SAS WWII operations in North Africa, and the Rhodesian Selous Scouts' external operations were analyzed and compared by means of bootstrapped tetrachoric correlations, totaling 155 cases. Dependency on specific prerequisites, closely associated with von Clausewitz's notion of friction, was found to be crucial for success and achievement of surprise.

Keywords: special operations principles, simplicity, principles of war, friction, von Clausewitz

What is “simplicity”? The Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary's (2005, p. 1194) definition of something simple as “easy to understand or do, not difficult” or “having or made of only one or a few parts” mirrors how simplicity is construed as a principle of military operations. The U.S. Army Field Manual (Department of the Army, 2011; see also Department of the Army, 2012a, 2012b; Ångström & Widén, 2012) emphasizes clear and uncomplicated plans and orders that avoid misunderstanding. Another common definition emphasizes reducing the numbers of prerequisites or elements of an operation; that is, having as few “moving parts” as possible, to reduce the impact of chance, uncertainty, and “friction” (Echevarria, 2005, pp. 68–69; see also; Ångström & Widén, 2012, p. 273).

Simplicity demands extensive situational awareness, in particular as to how an operation can be made less vulnerable to unknown circumstances and unexpected events, which is something far less one-dimensional than one might initially expect. Admiral William McRaven (1995, p. 11) notes: “Simplicity is the most crucial, and yet sometimes the most difficult principle with which to comply,” and considers three aspects decisive, that is, a limited number of objectives, good intelligence, and being innovative. Accordingly, there are several parameters of simplicity that may affect the ease of planning, ordering, and executing an operation. Apart from the number of objectives, the size and complexity of the attacking force, as well as case-specific preconditions may affect whether an operation is successful.

As is further explicated below, simplicity is closely associated with the notion of “friction,” as originally described by Carl von Clausewitz (1997). Simplicity and other principles outline manners by which the inherent unpredictability of war can be mitigated through reducing (though never completely eliminating) the likelihood of unfavorable outcomes. Special operations may be particularly relevant in the general study of principles of war, since the logic of modern warfare, mirroring von Clausewitz’s thoughts, dictates that massing of forces (or effects) against a decisive “center of gravity” is vital for success. Special operations contradict this logic, as a small force overruns a larger, perhaps even fortified force. Because massing in the traditional sense is not possible, it can be argued that special operations may be vulnerable to certain aspects of friction, and consequently, adherence to other principles; simplicity for example, may be paramount.

The aim of this article is to identify the specific parameters of simplicity that may affect likelihood of operational success, based on estimates of tetrachoric correlations in three contexts. These contexts, that is, Finnish WWII long range patrols, early WWII operations by the British SAS in northern Africa, and the external operations by the Rhodesian Selous Scouts, are selected to represent as different conditions as possible, in order to assess the stability of the results. To some extent, this study builds on findings of a previous inquiry (Lillbacka, 2014), which suggested that the concept of “simplicity” required further refinement.

A methodological caveat must be emphasized: even statistically significant findings are always limited and can never capture the immense complexity of real situations. Obviously, such findings should never be considered prescriptive for the same reasons that are detailed below. However, statistical tests have an unparalleled capacity of challenging propositions about tendencies, for example, propositions concerning principles.

An initial draft also considered the risk of suffering casualties. However, completely different aspects than those associated with success turned out to be relevant, and the result was highly unstable across contexts. Since there was no significant correlation with operational success, it was omitted from the analysis, although it would for obvious reasons deserve a study in its own right.

UNPREDICTABILITY, CHANCE, AND FRICTION

Although von Clausewitz’s (1997) book *On War*, published in 1832, has had a profound impact on modern military theory, particularly concerning the role of unpredictability and chance, it is hotly debated. Apart from disagreement regarding what the unfinished and posthumously published text *really* meant, meanings are divided whether it still applies two centuries later (see e.g., Beyerchen, 1992; Echevarria, 2007; Sumida, 2008; Waldman, 2013). The disagreement can partly be attributed to von Clausewitz’s emphasis on skilled, experienced, and intuitive judgment, and his distrust of explicit, prescriptive rules. In contrast to his contemporaries, for example, de Jomini and von Bülow, he claimed it was impossible to guarantee victory through any positive doctrine. However, he still considered it possible to develop a descriptive theory with guiding (but not prescriptive) principles. Although chance

and unpredictability are inseparable elements of conflict, this does not imply that events are completely random and beyond any attempt to influence them (Echevarria, 2007; von Clausewitz, 1832/1997; Waldman, 2013).

Chance is one of the cornerstones of what von Clausewitz called the “trinity” of warfare, the two others being rationality and the irrational sentiments of hostility. He compared warfare to a game of cards, where not only the skill of the player, but also that of the opponent and chance events decide the outcome (Echevarria, 2007; Fleming, 2013). Apart from unpredictability deriving from the interaction between two counterparts attempting to outdo one another, von Clausewitz lists other types of “friction,” a term he used in a somewhat contradictory manner. Sometimes (and originally) he meant internal resistance to effective action within an organization, and discrepancies between means and ends. Friction in a more general meaning counts factors such as human physical and cognitive limits that are magnified by the extreme stress of combat, the “fog of war,” that is, the limited, sketchy, and sometimes unverifiable information that a commander must rely on, as well as unknowable and unforeseeable chance events that can occur everywhere in the battlespace. Consequently, von Clausewitz emphasized the commander’s ability to consider the “laws of probability” since warfare is essentially governed by probabilities, and to assess the likelihood of various developments (Department of the Army, 2011, pp. 1–17; Echevarria, 2007, pp. 55, 66, 103–108, 155–162, 167; Fleming, 2013, pp. 63–67; Sumida, 2008, p. 128, 153–175; von Clausewitz, 1832/1997, pp. 1, 16–20, 41–42, 64–69, 279–283, 323–325; Waldman, 2013, pp. 104–123; Watts, 2004).

Some claim that von Clausewitz construed war as a nonlinear phenomenon, that is, a highly erratic and unpredictable system where outputs are highly disproportionate to inputs, causing what is seemingly randomness (Beyerchen, 1992; see also Fleming, 2013; Sumida, 2008). However, critics have noted that whereas nonlinearity renders outcomes a matter of probability, it does not imply that outcomes are completely erratic, ruling out, for example, effective planning. Notably, von Clausewitz’s notion on massing forces to attack a center of gravity is meant to reduce the impact of erratic events (Holmes, 2007; see also Sumida, 2008; Watts, 2004). Contrary to what is often believed, von Clausewitz did not reject principles, only prescriptive ones (Echevarria, 2007). Whereas the “true” probability of an event cannot be known (in the meaning of an exact number), certain outcomes are more probable and can be assessed. Accordingly, as Echevarria (2007) notes, guiding principles may still apply in nonlinear environments. However, to grasp such a complex situation, a commander cannot rely on positive doctrine, but rather on what von Clausewitz called “genius,” that is, intuitive understanding, cultivated by experience, training, and self-education (Echevarria, 2007; Holmes, 2007; Sumida, 2008; von Clausewitz, 1832/1997; Waldman, 2013), which parallels modern military training (Compare to Bryant, 2004; Department of the Army, 2011; Marr, 2001; Phillips, McDermott, Thordsen, McCloskey, & Klein, 1998).

It is with regard to von Clausewitz’s notions on massing as “the most general principle of victory,” where his view on chance (and the implications for the role of simplicity) is most evident. Ironically, the solution is similar to that suggested by de Jomini (2007, pp. 52–53). The larger the force concentrated in space and time against a “center of gravity,” a physical or moral entity that constitutes the strength of the opponent, the better the attacker is suited to address “friction” (Department of the Army, 2011, pp. 7–6, 2012b, pp. 4–3 – 4–4; Echevarria, 2007, pp. 163–186; Strange & Iron, 2005; von Clausewitz, 1832/1997, pp. 163–168, 175–182). This

fondness of “keeping it simple” to reduce exposure to friction is conceivably also why von Clausewitz was cautious about using turning and flanking movements (Echevarria, 2007, pp. 166–167), as well as trusting in intelligence (see Russell, 2007), because both imply relying on the unknown and certain *preconditions* that must be met. A flanking maneuver may require that the enemy remains passive and action based on particular information makes success dependent on its accuracy. Apparently, von Clausewitz advocated selecting the strategy that would be the least sensitive to chance events and enemy responses.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN CONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS – SIMPLICITY AS A MEANS TO OVERCOME FRICTION

The nine “classical” principles of war are incorporated in U.S. Army doctrine: (1) “Objective,” having a clear, decisive, and attainable aim; (2) “Offensive,” to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative; (3) “Mass,” concentrating forces or effects at a decisive place and time; (4) “Economy of force,” using sufficient forces to tie down local enemies to allow massing elsewhere; (5) “Maneuver,” placing the enemy in a disadvantageous situation through positioning and applying combat power flexibly; (6) “Unity of command,” a unified command structure; (7) “Security,” denying the enemy intelligence about deployment and capabilities; (8) “Surprise,” overcoming the enemy through unexpected means, positioning, or timing; (9) “Simplicity,” using uncomplicated plans and clear, concise order to ensure understanding and to reduce the element of chance (Department of the Army, 2011, pp. A-1–A-3, 2012b, pp. 4-1–4-2, 2012c, pp. 5–6; Echevarria, 2005, pp. 64–69, 2007, pp. 154–155; Hammes, 2005, pp. 266–267; Tovy, 2009, p. 56).

Other doctrines have included similar principles, for example, the Soviet concept of “deep battle” (explicitly aimed at overcoming the inherent strength of defense addressed by von Clausewitz, because the defender is less exposed to friction), which is highly similar to current U.S. doctrine, that is, sustaining tempo and initiative in simultaneous attacks throughout a battlespace (Hammond, 2005; see also Alger, 1982; Ångström & Widén, 2012; Department of the Army, 2012b; Lanir, 1993; Glantz, 1991a; Glantz, 1991b; Harrison, 2001; Lillbacka, 2014).

There are parallels between the nine “classic” principles and von Clausewitz’s counterparts (Echevarria, 2007, pp. 155, 163–166; see also von Clausewitz, 1832/1997, pp. 158–168, 175–182, 186–187), but “simplicity” is above all an integrated element in all of his thinking. He was ambivalent toward surprise, considering it a “substantive principle in itself,” but difficult to achieve with large formations, whereas small units could allegedly not accomplish much on their own. Hence, surprise should as “stratagems” or “ruses” (“deception”) be considered a last resort or the choice of an inferior force. He furthermore considered “secrecy” (“security”) and “rapidity” (“offensive” or what is referred to as “speed” below) prerequisites of surprise although not independent principles. (von Clausewitz, 1832/1997, pp. 168–170, 173–175; see also Echevarria, 2007, p. 165). A common denominator of surprise and deception is conceivably that they imply that certain preconditions must be met, that is, a particular response by the enemy, which increases friction.

How would this apply to special operations, which by definition violate massing as the central principle to overcome friction? McRaven (1995) notes that smaller forces are less susceptible to friction, since it is easier to maintain security during preparations (including full-scale rehearsals), and to develop and rapidly execute a simple plan. However, since they

cannot rely on the “brute force” of massing, and depend extensively on the element of surprise they may be sensitive to other types of friction, for example, chance events.

There are two perspectives on special operations principles. The Army Doctrine Reference Publication *ADRP 3–05* (Department of the Army, 2012d) states that the general principles of war are valid, but must be applied differently. McRaven (1995) argues that traditional principles do not pertain due to the particular circumstances associated with special operations and consequently developed an alternative set of six principles. These are: (1) *Simplicity*, that is, reducing the “friction of war” or chance, by limiting the number of objectives, acquiring good intelligence, and applying (technological) innovations. A complicated plan will require a lengthy, and consequently, a more hazardous execution. (2) *Security*, that is, denying the enemy knowledge about capabilities, the time and method of attack. (3) *Repetition*, that is, rehearsing the execution, which may also identify weaknesses in the plan. (4) *Surprise* means applying timing, an unexpected method of attack, and/or deception to prevent a defender from responding effectively. (5) *Speed* concerns a fast approach to the objective and avoiding prolonged contact with the enemy. (6) *Purpose*, that is, a clear mission statement and a personal commitment to achieving the objective (McRaven, 1995, pp. 9–23, 62–65, 108–109, 154–155, 194, 280; see also Tovy, 2009, pp. 57–61).

Whereas the official U.S. joint doctrine includes several other activities in special operations (United States Special Operations Command, 2014), McRaven (1995) focuses exclusively on direct action, that is, operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and supported forces, against a specific target, primarily a prepared defensive position. These are “time-sensitive” short-duration, and small-scale offensive operations utilizing specialized capabilities and operational techniques, and may involve, for example, raids, ambushes, and other direct assault tactics. This exclusive focus on direct action is also applied in the empirical study detailed in this paper.

In order to seize and retain the initiative in face of a numerically superior enemy in prepared positions, the attacker must achieve relative superiority by exploiting some weakness in the defense. For instance, if successfully infiltrating and being able to surprise an enemy position before the defender can react, a smaller attacking force can maintain the initiative. Before relative superiority is achieved, the attacker must traverse an area of vulnerability, encountered when enemy counteractions can be mounted, for example, when an infiltrating attacker attempts to reach positions from where to surprise the defender (McRaven, 1995; Tovy, 2009). Hence, especially during the area of vulnerability, an attacker will be exposed to friction.

Whereas all principles somehow concern “friction,” “simplicity” addresses all forms of friction. It can be argued that friction derives from three broad categories: internal friction within the organization, responses by the enemy, and unforeseeable chance events that may intervene, for example, diseases, weather, severed communications, and similar occurrences that are not inherent organizational characteristics or directly induced by enemy action. Most principles aim at reducing the effective response space of the enemy (e.g., “offensive,” “maneuver” and “surprise”) or internal friction (e.g., “unity of command” and “repetition”), but “massing” and “simplicity” span the entire range. Whereas “massing” requires superior force at least locally, “simplicity” refers to something even more fundamental, that is, choosing a strategy that is as void of necessary prerequisites as possible, which in turn will reduce (but never completely eliminate) the probability of failure.

Internal friction is reduced by simple and clear orders, and it can be argued that clear and uncomplicated orders also presuppose uncomplicated plans. The simpler a plan is, the greater the chance that it is properly understood and executed, and the less complex a system is, the fewer moving parts it has, the lesser the likelihood that it will malfunction. This matter is not always straightforward, as there is nothing that states that a simpler option is inherently better, for example, “using a javelin instead of an assault rifle” (Echevarria, 2007, pp. 68–69; see also Ångström & Widén, 2012, p. 273), but this illustrates the flexibility and response space that a more complex plan might have, which in turn addresses another parameter of simplicity. A “too simple” plan might actually violate the principle of simplicity, since it reduces the ability to address and overcome chance events or unexpected enemy action; in other words, a “too simple” plan might require that even more prerequisites are met.

Consequently, it is possible to identify certain parameters of simplicity. The number of objectives is likely to increase friction, especially if all of them must be achieved to guarantee success. As smaller units may be less exposed to internal friction, the size of the force is a conceivable parameter. Whereas it may be difficult to identify an opponent’s effective response space, even *post facto*, it can at least be assessed if success depends on whether the defender (or the target) has to be at a specific place, at a specific time, and/or undertake a specific action. The latter is for practical purposes included into a more general parameter that concerns sensitivity to chance events, referred to as “prerequisites” below. Whereas all conceivable chance events cannot be identified, it can at least be determined whether success is dependent on a particular prerequisite as specific equipment, capture, or destruction of an initial objective, or a particular action by the enemy. Hence, these five parameters are used below to more closely determine how simplicity affects success in special operations.

THREE CONTEXTS

The selection of cases, that is, Finnish WWII long range patrols, the British WWII Special Air Service (SAS) in North Africa, and the Rhodesian Selous Scouts, has been based on three criteria: the availability and suitability of data (that is, being detailed enough to mirror the aforementioned parameters), as well as representing as diverse contexts as possible. The long range patrols operated in sparsely populated temperate and subarctic woodlands and the SAS in a desert environment. Both encountered opposing forces using aggressive counter-tactics. The Finnish patrols in particular had inferior numbers and only light weaponry when attacking enemy positions, which conceivably made adherence to special operations principles exceptionally imperative in order to achieve relative superiority (Lillbacka, 2014). The SAS favored small stealthy groups but occasionally attacked in larger numbers, for example, with armed jeeps. The Selous Scouts operated in a subtropical environment and could often rely on the aging, but very able Rhodesian Air Force for transport and close air support.

Although the use of highly mobile small units against numerically superior Soviet forces gained international attention during the Winter War 1939–1940, Finnish patrol warfare came of age during the Continuation War 1941–1944. The vast woodlands north of Lake Ladoga required designated troops for deep reconnaissance and strikes in Soviet rear areas. This was the task of the 4th Independent Battalion, consisting of four company-sized detachments. The patrols, left to their own devices apart from occasional resupplies by air, faced an enemy that

after recovering from initial setbacks developed increasingly effective counter-tactics. During winter infiltration was made on skis, and during summer on foot or by sea plane, making use of numerous lakes. Patrols were usually squad- or platoon-sized, with the exception of a few larger company-sized raids (Lillbacka, 2014; Marttinen & Tikkanen, 2002; Saessalo, 2010; Tikkanen, 1996).

The main source of data concerning the 80 Finnish cases in the analysis is Lassi Saessalo's (2010) book "*Päämajan kaukopartiot jatkosodassa*" [The Headquarters' Long Range Patrols in the Continuation War]. Additional information has been obtained from Marttinen and Tikkanen (2002), Pentti and Tikkanen (1996) and (Tikkanen, 2004), as well as Irincheev and Repnikov (2013).

The SAS, established in late 1941, initially operated with small groups to infiltrate objectives behind enemy lines, primarily Axis airfields and harbors, because larger units had failed to achieve surprise. Following a costly first raid, the unit abandoned parachutes and relied on the trucks of the Long Range Desert Group and, later, jeeps for infiltration. The unit eventually grew to include two squadrons during the North African campaign. Although some raids were coordinated with air strikes, the SAS lacked close air support (Cowles, 1976). The data includes 44 raids against Axis airfields, harbors, and other installations. Data was insufficient to cover the pursuit stage following the battle of El Alamein. As a sole source, the Swedish translation (1976) of Virginia Cowles "*The Phantom Major*" from 1958 has been used.

Special forces were extensively used during the Rhodesian Bush War 1965–1979, and the focus on the Selous Scouts is solely motivated by availability of data. In contrast to the all-White Rhodesian Special Air Service, the Selous Scouts was a mixed unit. The motivation of the Africans counting two-thirds of the security forces was highly complex (Stapleton, 2011, pp. 1–10, 16–40), as is demonstrated by the use of "tame" or "turned terrorists," that is, captured enemies, to work against their former comrades (Reid-Daly, 1999, pp. 104–108; Stiff & Reid-Daly, 1982, pp. 104–105). The Selous Scouts also benefited from the cohesion and personal loyalties that developed in an elite unit (Reid-Daly, 1999; Stiff & Reid Daly, 1982). Demographic realities, such as only 3–5% of 5 million inhabitants in 1969 and about 6 million in 1980 being white, made the result of the long-term infiltration campaign by ZANLA and ZIPRA, the armed elements of ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union), a foregone conclusion. Rhodesian security forces developed a false sense of superiority due to successes in the late 1960s but were eventually unable to stem infiltration by opponents that avoided open confrontation to escape and fight another day (Cilliers, 1985; Godwin & Hancock, 1995; Melson, 2005; Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008).

The Selous Scouts, established in 1973, was initially conceived as a pseudo terrorist unit to be used in internal operations, posing as insurgents to locate the enemy and alert standby fire forces that would vertically envelop insurgent forces. However, as external raids into neighboring countries became prioritized, the Selous Scouts were deployed in a various numbers of operations, as small groups infiltrating by foot or by helicopter or parachute, or in some spectacular cases, as company-sized flying columns involving more than a dozen transport vehicles, as well as in several attempts to assassinate Joshua Nkomo, leader of the ZAPU (Cilliers, 1985; Melson, 2005; Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008; Reid-Daly, 1999; Stiff & Reid Daly, 1982).

Data regarding the 31 external operations examined here derive primarily from Stiff's and Reid-Daly's "*Selous Scouts. Top Secret War*" from 1982, later republished in 1999 under the

name “*Pamwe Chete. The Legend of the Selous*,” but also from Moorcraft & McLaughlin (2008), Godwin & Hancock (1995), and Cilliers (1985).

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DATA

Apart from “success,” and the five parameters of simplicity described above (number of objectives, size of the attacking force, dependency on the enemy being at a specific place, at a specific time, and particular prerequisites), achievement of surprise is considered in the analysis. Surprise is vital for special operations, and could be considered as an additional precondition. All variables are dichotomies, except “Success,” which is an ordinal variable with three values: success (100% of objectives achieved), partial success (50–90% achieved), and failed missions (less than 50% achieved). It can be argued that on a deeper and immeasurable level, all of the variables are continuous properties. For instance, a precondition may be more severe in one case than in another, but the degree of severity is not immediately measurable. The variables’ distributions and difficulties in comparing and interpreting higher values necessitate simplified measurements. For instance, when accounting for the number of objectives, sources usually report objectives actually targeted, which may differ from original plans. In some cases, a favorable situation was exploited, and further objectives were added. This is of course typical of missions that already included several objectives. Since the rate of success is also dependent on the number of objectives this may add an element of uncertainty. Accordingly, it seems more adequate to simplify the measurement by binning values.

Hence, the variables are more easily measured as dichotomies, that is, single or multiple objectives, and squad-size attackers or larger, or as an ordinal variable in the case of success. In cases where variables are dichotomous or ordinal either by default or by design, tetrachoric, and polychoric correlations are appropriate measurements of association.

A tetrachoric correlation is calculated between two manifest dichotomous variables (Y_1 and Y_2), assumed to represent latent continuous variables (η_1 and η_2) with a normal distribution, corresponding to the more familiar Pearson correlation between the latent variables. Polychoric correlations are calculated for ordinal variables with more than two categories. Whereas tetrachoric correlations are considered adequate and robust measurements, and are frequently used when, for example, practical reasons dictate the use of dichotomies, they require more computational power than alternatives, and there are still questions with regard to standard errors and suitable sample sizes for statistical power (see Bonett & Price, 2005; Greer, Dunlap, & Beatty, 2003; Holgado-Tello et al., 2010; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996a, 1996b; Long, Berry, & Mielke, 2009).

The study considers relatively small subsamples, which also affects the standard errors. In situations where the standard error (which is instrumental for assessing statistical significance) is unreliable, or requirements for a test (e.g., normality or a sufficient sample size) are not met, bootstrap analyses can estimate a robust value. The principle is utterly simple: a sample fraction is selected a repeated number of times, after which a parameter estimate is re-measured in each new sample, and the mean and standard deviation of the estimate are then calculated. The mean represents a more robust parameter estimate and the standard deviation its standard error (Hesterberg, Monaghan, Moore, Clipson, & Epstein, 2003; Johnson, 2001; Nevitt & Hancock, 2001).

The bootstrap analysis is performed with the PRELIS and LISREL statistical software, version 9.2 (The procedure is described by Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996b, pp. 186–190). For each correlation analysis, 100 bootstrap samples with a sample fraction of 75% are created. As bootstrapped estimates should be more reliable, they are also used for comparisons between contexts. However, the bootstrapped standard errors cannot be used in cross-group comparisons, as the test of model fit is founded on the default assumptions of standard errors based on (sub)sample size in LISREL. Correlation analyses based on bootstrapped standard errors can tell if significant associations are found within each subsample, and comparisons can tell whether these results are stable across contexts. The comparisons account for two primary models, that is, that there is no significant correlation between a parameter and success, or that there is a significant correlation that is invariant across groups. If both fail to achieve sufficient model fit, a third model, based on invariant correlations, is identified.

The coding of cases with regard to “Place,” “Time,” and “Prerequisite” follows a number of rules. Actions such as mining a railway or destroying a bridge are not dependent on either, and hence, all three are coded as “no.” Derailing a train is not dependent on the enemy choosing the place, but choosing the time, and hence only “Time” is coded as “yes.” Assassinating a target is dependent on the enemy choosing the time and place, but not (necessarily) a particular precondition, and hence, the two first parameters are coded as “yes” and “Prerequisite” as “no.” Capturing a prisoner depends on the enemy choosing the time and place, as well as not resisting, and is hence coded as “yes” for all three parameters. SAS attacks on airfields were dependent on whether aircraft were actually stationed at the objective, and hence, the enemy choosing the place is coded as “yes.” If no aircrafts were found, but the patrol engaged other targets, success is coded as “partial success.” If the main body of enemies escaped before the attack, the result is considered a partial success for the Selous Scouts. Apart from attempts to capture prisoners, there are other cases when the variable “prerequisite” was coded as “yes”: the Selous Scouts’ attempts to assassinate Joshua Nkomo which required link-ups between the assault force and an agent in place (Reid-Daly, 1999, pp. 388–407; Stiff & Reid Daly, 1982, pp. 348–367), the destruction of a bridge to fend off enemy reinforcements (Reid-Daly, 1999, pp. 315–331; Stiff & Reid Daly, 1982, pp. 283–296), SAS raids depending on weather, special equipment, or being able to infiltrate enemy positions disguised as prisoners-of-war (Cowles, 1976, pp. 34–42, 82–108, 121–147, 198–213).

RESULTS

The results of the correlation analyses are reported in Table 1–4, and reveal some recurrent patterns, but also differences between subsamples. Quite expectedly, the paramount correlation in all subsamples is found between success and surprise. Most subsamples also reveal that the parameters of “place” and “time” may be redundant, since they correlate very strongly with “prerequisite.” However, initial tests did not suggest that these could simply be added together for increased explanatory power, but are rather associated with similar missions. The correlations in Table 1 are not of primary interest, since the subsamples differ in size. Since the subsample referring to long range patrols constitutes more than half of the total sample, it largely determines the results in Table 1.

TABLE 1
Bootstrapped Tetrachoric Correlations between Success, Surprise, and Parameters of Simplicity in the Entire Sample (N = 155)

	<i>Success</i>	<i>Surprise</i>	<i>Number of objectives</i>	<i>Size of unit</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Time</i>
Surprise	.895 ** (.043)					
Number of objectives	.330 * (.138)	.292 * (.126)				
Size of unit	-.112 (.142)	-.068 (.141)	.353 * (.141)			
Place	-.278 * (.133)	-.357 ** (.132)	.038 (.163)	.348 * (.144)		
Time	.049 (.121)	-.049 (.129)	.260 + (.154)	.257 + (.136)	.996 ** (.002)	
Prerequisite	-.434 * (.118)	-.404 ** (.127)	-.034 (.153)	.253 + (.143)	.959 ** (.027)	.671 ** (.093)

Notes: + $p \leq .10$, * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses, diagonal elements (=1) are not reported

TABLE 2
Bootstrapped Tetrachoric Correlations between Success, Surprise, and Parameters of Simplicity in the Subsample "Finnish Long Range Patrols" (N = 80)

	<i>Success</i>	<i>Surprise</i>	<i>Number of objectives</i>	<i>Size of unit</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Time</i>
Surprise	.923 ** (.050)					
Number of objectives	.443 * (.171)	.498 ** (.171)				
Size of unit	-.543 ** (.154)	-.288 (.205)	-.467 * (.194)			
Place	-.422 * (.167)	-.425 * (.165)	-.222 (.209)	.377 + (.200)		
Time	.051 (.188)	-.004 (.200)	-.079 (.235)	.079 (.243)	.988 ** (.005)	
Prerequisite	-.422 * (.167)	-.425 * (.165)	-.222 (.209)	.377 + (.200)	1 ^{a)}	.988 ** (.005)

Notes: + $p \leq .10$, * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses, diagonal elements (=1) are not reported

^{a)} The values of "Place" and "Prerequisite" are identical; no standard error is calculated

In Table 2, the size of the patrol is inversely proportionate to the rate of success. Apart from the obvious explanation that a small group is stealthier, other conditions may cause a spurious effect, that is, that patrols increased in size during the course of the war, and large patrols were used for some of the most difficult tasks, for example, taking prisoners. Missions dependent on "place" were also dependent on "prerequisite," and the values are accordingly identical. The positive correlation between success and the "number of objectives" is of course counter-intuitive, and is further addressed below.

TABLE 3
Bootstrapped Tetrachoric Correlations between Success, Surprise, and Parameters of Simplicity in the Subsample "British SAS" (N = 44)

	<i>Success</i>	<i>Surprise</i>	<i>Number of objectives</i>	<i>Size of unit</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Time</i>
Surprise	.991 ** (.014)					
Number of objectives	.041 (.664)	.685 + (.388)				
Size of unit	-.009 (.496)	.356 (.564)	.277 (.647)			
Place	-.217 (.670)	-.353 (.655)	-.486 (.348)	-.651 ** (.293)		
Time	-.217 (.670)	-.353 (.655)	-.486 (.348)	-.651 ** (.293)	.890 ** (.314)	
Prerequisite	-.802 ** (.189)	-.526 + (.271)	.119 (.669)	.189 (.606)	-.781 ** (.279)	-.781 ** (.279)

Notes: + $p \leq .10$, * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses, diagonal elements (=1) are not reported

TABLE 4
Bootstrapped Tetrachoric Correlations between Success, Surprise, and Parameters of Simplicity in the Subsample "Rhodesian Selous Scouts" (N = 31)

	<i>Success</i>	<i>Surprise</i>	<i>Number of objectives</i>	<i>Size of unit</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Time</i>
Surprise	.895 ** (.156)					
Number of objectives	.645 + (.363)	.494 (.455)				
Size of unit	.243 (.345)	.209 (.347)	.980 ** (.013)			
Place	-.453 + (.284)	-.263 (.394)	-.961 ** (.022)	-.564 + (.286)		
Time	-.285 (.339)	.074 (.359)	-.983 ** (.015)	-.862 ** (.142)	.995 ** (.004)	
Prerequisite	-.377 (.302)	-.188 (.388)	-.552 (.379)	-.449 (.295)	1.000 ** (.001)	.877 ** (.141)

Notes: + $p \leq .10$, * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses, diagonal elements (=1) are not reported

Ironically, although SAS patrols were initially kept very small to maintain stealth, Table 3 shows that the aforementioned finding cannot be replicated. The odd result associated with the "number of objectives" is indirectly repeated, since it is correlated with surprise. Yet, there are reasons to view this with skepticism, as is further detailed below. The only parameter significantly correlated with success, apart from "surprise," is a "prerequisite."

In the Selous Scouts subsample, “place” is significantly correlated with success, but only on a .10 level of significance. The otherwise insignificant correlations (barring “surprise” and the counterintuitive association with “number of objectives”) could be attributed to the small sample size, but may also be an outcome of the specific conditions of the Rhodesian Bush War. ZANLA and ZIPRA did not employ the aggressive counter-tactics of German and Soviet forces when attacked, and preferred to disengage to save their strength. Furthermore, the Rhodesian Air Force was in many cases a force multiplier that overcame resistance. In other words, the Selous Scouts could at least under some circumstances overlook the principle of simplicity, since they had the means to remedy an unfavorable situation.

Whereas the correlations of individual subsamples may illustrate the particular circumstances in certain contexts, they are primarily of theoretical interest only if the results are stable across contexts, and hence, no further detailed analysis of the subsamples is warranted, unless they can shed light on the findings reported in Table 5.

The strongest correlation, that is, surprise as a precondition of success, is partly invariant, being somewhat stronger, that is, .991 (.002), $p = .000$ in the SAS subsample, whereas it can be fixed at .909 (.016), $p = .000$ in the two other subsamples. This minor difference does not affect the interpretation that success is extremely dependent on surprise (See also Lillbacka, 2014, pp. 103–106), although this may to some minor extent be an outcome of the coding, since an aborted mission is also coded as a failure to achieve surprise.

The correlation between the size of the unit and success, as well as with surprise, can be fixed at zero without loss of model fit. Similarly, “time” is uncorrelated with success as well

TABLE 5
Tests for Equality of Correlations Based on Bootstrapped Tetrachoric Correlations

Variables:	Estimate	p	Model fit when parameters are constrained			
			Invariant across groups (d.f. = 8)		Estimate fixed at 0 (d.f. = 9)	
			χ^2	p	χ^2	p
Success - Surprise	a)		38.421	.000	228.912	.000
Success - N. of objectives	.376 (.084)	.000	9.097	.334	22.994	.006
Success - Size of unit	-.103 (.103)	.319	11.475	.176	12.445	.189
Success - Place	-.364 (.085)	.000 b)	1.445	.994	14.379	.110
Success - Time	-.150 (.101)	.140	2.032	.980	4.112	.904
Success - Prerequisite	-.534 (.066)	.000	11.358	.182	41.860	.000
Surprise - N. of objectives	.559 (.063)	.000	2.251	.972	36.345	.000
Surprise - Size of unit	.092 (.103)	.373	7.313	.503	8.092	.525
Surprise - Place	-.347 (.087)	.000 b)	.579	1.000	12.254	.199
Surprise - Time	-.094 (.103)	.363	3.391	.908	4.204	.898
Surprise - Prerequisite	-.380 (.083)	.000	2.794	.947	16.959	.049

Notes: a) The correlation is partly invariant; .991 (.002), $p = .000$ for SAS, and invariant, .909 (.016), $p = .000$, for Long Range Patrols and Selous Scouts; $\chi^2 = .035$ (d.f. = 7); $p = 1.000$.

b) The correlation is significant, but can be fixed at 0 with good model fit, which can be attributed to large variations of the estimates in the subsamples.

as surprise. Models where the correlations between “place” and success as well as surprise are fixed at zero achieve good model fit, although the changes in model fit when the parameter is assumed to be significantly non-zero (but invariant across subsamples) suggest substantial improvement, that is, $\Delta\chi^2 = 12.934$ ($\Delta\text{d.f.} = 1$) and $\Delta\chi^2 = 11.675$ ($\Delta\text{d.f.} = 1$), respectively. Accordingly, there is an inverse correlation between success and surprise on the one hand, and “place” on the other. However, because previous results suggested some redundancy concerning “prerequisites,” the parameter of “place” warrants no further attention.

There are two results with potential theoretical implications. The first concerns the seemingly positive correlation between the “number of objectives” and success as well as surprise. This counterintuitive result would suggest that more complex operations are more successful. However, the correlation turns out to be an artifact of the coding. First, it is partly an outcome of *partial successes*. Whereas missions that have a single objective are either complete successes or failures, missions with several objectives can achieve at least some of these. Hence, if the variable is recoded into a dichotomy, where partial successes and failures are combined, the correlation becomes non-significant in the long range patrol subsample, that is, .275 (.189), $p = .149$, and the SAS subsample, that is, .112 (.665), $p = .867$, but is significant in the Selous Scouts subsample, that is, .686 (.308), $p = .028$. However, the latter can be explained by the manner in which the number of objectives is counted, since some mission profiles were either strictly constrained or allowed a certain degree of initiative to exploit a favorable situation. If a further variable is constructed that control for this (operations aimed at taking prisoners and assassination attempts were assumed not to give any leeway), the bootstrapped partial correlation is .248 (.612), $p = .686$ between success and number of objectives in the Selous Scouts subsample. Accordingly, the seeming correlation can be attributed to the traditional aggressiveness of special forces, as they could add objectives not part of the initial plan. Whereas this is a sound reminder that numbers should not be trusted blindly, the result also has a somewhat puzzling implication. There is no significant correlation with the number of objectives, neither positive nor negative.

The finding that is most stable and also makes theoretical sense is the negative correlation between “prerequisite” and success as well as surprise. Whereas it was non-significant in the Selous Scouts subsample, a model where these correlations were assumed to be invariant fits the data. This is the variable that most directly applies to the notion of friction as randomness, and reiterates von Clausewitz’s (1832/1997, pp. 19–20) notion that war is “...a calculation of probabilities.” Whereas the variable for obvious reasons does not address the multitude of random events that can occur, it does account for a situation where success is dependent on a particular probability. The implication is evident: the more necessary conditions that have to be fulfilled, the less likely it is that an operation will be successful.

SUMMARY

The strongest correlation is also the most expected. Although the estimate may be inflated due to the coding procedure, it is apparent that surprise is essential for the success of special operations; surprise is to special operations what massing is to conventional warfare.

Other results are more puzzling. There is no correlation with the number of objectives, even when the inadequacies of the coding and the aggressiveness of special forces are considered. This and similar results should of course not be interpreted as implying that such aspects are irrelevant. Barring the possibility that data have been somehow inadequate, it would for obvious reasons not be sensible to assign objectives without consideration for keeping the number within reasonable limits. One possible interpretation of the absent correlation is that this parameter of simplicity was never seriously violated. However, it is also conceivable that the number of objectives is not important as such, but whether this requires that more preconditions are met.

A certain redundancy was found with regard to the parameters of "time" and "place" with regard to "prerequisite," which turned out to be a more potent aspect. The size of the attacking force was found to be significant only in the Finnish subsample, where it may be an outcome of other factors, such as large units often being used for taking prisoners, especially during the winter season. It can be argued that the coding was rather crude, but the result does not suggest that a squad-sized element would automatically be subjected to less internal friction than a larger force, or at least, not in a manner that affects the likelihood of success.

Accordingly, the decisive parameter found in this study is not internal friction or the complexity of objectives, but "prerequisites," or essentially the extent to which a force must rely on luck. This is a parameter that in particular ties in with von Clausewitz's notion of friction. If an operation is highly dependent on a precondition such as the enemy reacting in a certain manner, on particular equipment, or any similar prerequisite, and there is no room for improvisation, the laws of probability may soon turn out to be unfavorable. A thought experiment may illustrate the underlying problem; presume that some required special equipment is 80% reliable and there is an 80% chance that the enemy will react in a desirable manner. Crude mathematics would suggest that the chance of success is still 2:1 if these two prerequisites are independent of one another, but given all unforeseeable sources of friction, even if the likelihood of something unexpected occurring may be small, the "true" odds may already have turned against the operation. If another, "hidden" prerequisite (e.g., unexpectedly unfavorable weather or a chance encounter with other enemy units) would have a probability of 20% or higher, the outlook would immediately become bleaker. This is probably why von Clausewitz dissuaded from complicated maneuvers and "stratagems," since they presuppose too much. It is notable that the parameter of "prerequisites" is also correlated with achievement of surprise. In military parlor and also elsewhere, this is well known as the principle of never assuming.

The study has demonstrated that statistical analysis may very well be used to test notions on tactics, under the condition that results are interpreted with caution. It is conceivable that a model that better accounts for potential interaction effects among parameters would provide further insights. The downside of the method used here is that it rests entirely on linear approximations, and may not fully catch the intricate interplay among parameters. However, regardless of whether significant associations are demonstrated, statistical results cannot prescribe action, and even if they could, a commander or entire unit is often forced to react to a situation rather than having the freedom of action to choose optimal conditions. However, statistical analyses can, in the manner advocated by von Clausewitz, aid in critically questioning ideas that are taken for granted.

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The Shining Path's Employment of Psychological Warfare during its Terrorism Campaign in Peru, 1970-1992

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Psychological operations are an important component of special operations campaign planning. It is critical for military commanders and staffs to understand the propaganda of the opposing side. This article examines a compelling example of how terrorist organizations use ideology to justify political violence. Unconventional warfare and psychological operations practitioners will be interested in how the Shining Path employed political indoctrination to establish its cadres and build support among the rural and urban masses. What follows is an in-depth look at the Shining Path's psychological warfare campaign against the people and government of Peru from 1970 to 1992.

Keywords: terrorism, counterterrorism, insurgency, psychological operations, unconventional warfare, Peru

Psychological operations are an important component of special operations and should be integrated into campaign plans. It is critical for military commanders and staffs to understand the psychological operations of the opposing side. This article examines a compelling case study in how terrorist organizations use ideology to justify political violence. Space does not allow for a review of the theoretical body of literature concerning political violence. The focus will be on the granular detail of the Shining Path member's activities as they relate to psychological warfare. The author employed a historical research methodology, which was limited in scope to available reports, and has taken into consideration the inherent bias of memoirs, interviews, news reports, and government documents. Degregori (1994) argued that the Peruvian intelligence estimates were either inaccurate or politicized and he also criticized senior government officials for not using the intelligence they had available to develop an effective policy or military strategy. He wrote, "Thus it appears that intelligence services also downplayed the Shining Path phenomenon during the early years of its existence" (p. 71). While this is likely correct, most of the analysis the various intelligence services produced are remarkably precise. The author evaluated each document on its merit and compared it with the historical knowledge we have amassed on the conflict.

The Shining Path began open warfare against the Peruvian Government in 1980. However, the organization was established a decade before its first attack. The research conducted during this project identified three significant points. From 1970 to the beginning of the armed conflict,

the Shining Path used the public school and university system to develop junior leaders and conduct political indoctrination of the masses. This was completed in 1980, and the Shining Path built upon this foundation and used its ideology to justify terrorism and human rights abuses in the pursuit of its goals. Finally, the Shining Path's extreme violence went beyond the tolerance level of the population who turned their support to the government. What follows is an in-depth look at the Shining Path's psychological warfare campaign against the people and government of Peru (GOP) from 1970 to 1992.

CONSTRUCTING THE BASE

Manuel Rubén Abimael Guzmán Reynoso founded the Shining Path following an ideological disagreement with the leaders of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP). He was born into a broken family in Tambo, Peru on December 3, 1934, and his family later settled in the southern Andean city of Arequipa (GOP, 1980a, p. 2). He excelled during his schooling and went on to earn two doctoral degrees at the National University of San Agustín and took a teaching position there (UNSA, 1958). The Peruvian Ministry of Education reopened the *Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga* (National University of Saint Christopher of Huamanga, UNSCH) in Ayacucho city in 1959, among other regional national universities to develop rural areas and provide educational opportunities for young people. In 1960, Guzmán accepted a position at UNSCH and moved to Ayacucho where he would live until he was forced to go underground in late 1978 (GOP, 1981; UNSCH, 1981). In 1965, Guzmán traveled to China and witnessed first-hand the preparations for Mao's Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. There he learned to use explosives while he attended a course on revolutionary warfare that he described as "an unforgettable example and experience, an important lesson, and a big step in my development, to have been trained in the highest school of Marxism the world has ever seen" (Guzmán, 1988, p. 75). This involvement endeared him to the Maoist version of Marxist-Leninist socialist ideology. Following his return from China, Guzmán began to deviate from the pro-Mao faction of the PCP, the *Bandera Roja* (Red Flag, BR). He went back to China for a short period in 1969. During this trip, he received instruction in the use of propaganda (Strong, 1992; Poole & Renique, 1992; GOP, 1980a; 1981). In 1970, Guzmán, along with a few others, was expelled from the BR. He then founded the Shining Path. This point marked the divergence from the legal left as the Shining Path eschewed non-violent means of political change.

Guzmán used his position and influence at UNSCH to build the structure of the Shining Path in the methodology of the Maoist People's Protracted War. Peruvian anthropologist Degregori (1990, p. 41) asserted Guzmán's use of the university was the "decisive factor" in the establishment of the organization. He became the course director of the *ciclo básico* which was a mandatory first-year course for university students that taught "the scientific concept of society" (Strong, 1992, p. 30). This became a method of initial indoctrination for students who came from across Ayacucho and the surrounding region and provided Guzmán the opportunity to evaluate them for future use as cadres. One former student of Guzmán's was Nicolás Paredes Calla. In an interview with Gustavo Gorriti (1983a, p. 2), he recalled that Guzmán "was dry and formal, but was appreciated by the students." He continued, "When he presided over a political discussion between students, he did not intervene and allowed the discussion to play out, then he would

join the conversation to illuminate a point or add something we did not know about.” Strong (1992, p. 31) interviewed many former students from this period. One stated, “Everybody was in awe of him but concentrating totally. It was as if he had a halo around him. He lectured using a blackboard, speaking with a cold, intellectual passion which was academic rather than political.” He continued, “He was relating ideas to the social conditions which bore them. It was not so much the things that he said but the way he said them – he was captivatingly dynamic.” Another student explained that they had nicknamed Guzman, “Shampoo” because “he washed your brains, he cleaned your thoughts when confused; he clarified problems, he had an answer for everything.” And yet another proclaimed, “Whatever he said was the last word on any subject.” This went beyond the usual admiration young students sometimes have for their professors and provides an initial sign of how the cult of Guzman developed. Guzman used this influence to instigate a student protest that resulted in expelling the U.S. Peace Corps contingent, led by David Scott Palmer, from the university and Ayacucho. He then went on to be promoted to department head, which carried the additional responsibility of university hiring and used this to recruit like-minded professors to the university. Palmer reflected in a 1982 *Caretas* interview, “the University did not participate in it [Sendero activities], but the radical elements used the University’s facilities” to further their cause (Gorriti, 1983b, p. 70; Palmer, 1986, p. 134). McClintock (1999) argued that another advantage of Ayacucho was the isolated political environment whereas a more metropolitan city would have offered a wider range of ideas and less dependence on one hegemonic professor. Guzman’s position and authority at UNSCH was critical to the initial formation of the Shining Path.

Throughout the 1970s Guzman and his followers would build the Shining Path and prepare the organization for a future armed struggle. Guzman had witnessed first-hand the failure of the Cuban-inspired uprising in 1965 and criticized the effort as a “petit bourgeois militaristic deviation to ensure defeat, against which President Mao had written long ago when referring to the wandering guerrillas of Chinese history” (Gorriti, 1992, p. 174). The Peruvian military’s defeat of the Cuban-supported groups galvanized Guzman’s belief in Maoist doctrine. He most certainly also observed the effectiveness of the Viet Cong’s successful employment of a modified Maoist People’s Protracted War in Vietnam. As the organization grew, the younger more energetic members called for action, but Guzman implored them for patience. He explained, as Mao had written, that political development was the key at this point in the struggle and the time for military action would come later. “The insurrection process itself” he expounded “was a gradual creation of ever expanding base areas where the party acted as the new de facto government, strengthen itself while the government progressively weakened to the point of collapse” (Gorriti, 1992, p. 175). Guzman used his outreach program at UNSCH to spread these ideas to the peasant Indians throughout the Ayacucho region during this period.

The Shining Path also used the Peruvian education system as an indoctrination tool in the region. As part of the Peruvian government’s regional development strategy, the UNSCH had a three-year degree and certification program for primary and secondary school educators. This allowed Guzman the opportunity to identify students during their first year at UNSCH, often in the *ciclo básico* course, and then develop them in their second and third year as Shining Path cadres. Upon graduation, they would return to their village schools and propagate the Shining Path’s message. This coincided with the government’s expansion of secondary schools in rural areas. A local leader in Ayacucho described his thoughts concerning the rural youth, “They need to be instructed, they need someone to give them orientation, they need courses...” He

continued, “to see if in that way they can move forward, get out of slavery, free themselves from deception. Otherwise they will continue to be poor and exploited” (Degregori, 1994, p. 60). Degregori assessed that these types of statements imply that this instruction and orientation must come from the outside. If that was the case, which is probable, and the need and desire for education existed, then Guzman and his cadres were ready and willing to fill the educational gap. A study that was part of the Peruvian truth commission, but was not published as part of the final report confirms this process. However, the authors temper their assessment with the caveat that not all the educators at UNSCH were associated with Guzman and the Shining Path. A Peruvian man who was raised in rural Ayacucho during this period stated, “...the villagers believed in the professors, this was the main arm of the Shining Path...” (GOP, 1980b, p. 3). Another explained “there were various professors that taught economy, politics, and philosophy. They taught the students about class warfare, the Chinese revolution, and the Bolshevik revolution” (GOP, 1980b, p. 3). Yet another asserted, “The Shining Path chose to indoctrinate the most intelligent young people as leaders who could influence their friends and neighbors” (GOP, 1980b, p. 4). These locally-recruited young leaders would be the key link in the Shining Path’s ability to influence and psychologically control the rural population in the Andes (Tarazona-Sevillano, 1992). Jaymie Patricia Heilman (2010) identified the absurd irony that Guzman manipulated the university to turn the students against the very educated class that they originally aspired to join. McClintock (1999) argued the economic downturn in Peru stifled the upward mobility of these first generation university students and drove them towards the promise of the Shining Path’s ideology. Moreover, a 1984 government report concluded that UNSCH was still being used for ideological indoctrination some 5 years after Guzman left the university (GOP, 1984). The use of the established government’s education system was a critical factor of the growth and integration of the Shining Path in Ayacucho.

INDOCTRINATING THE CADRES

Another important factor in the spread and growth of the Shining Path was the establishment of *escuelas populares*, or popular schools in rural areas. They began in 1976 and were used to complete the indoctrination of the most dedicated students. In the schools, they studied Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, guerrilla warfare, and the teachings of Guzman. The Shining Path also established popular schools in impoverished neighborhoods on the outskirts of Lima (Smith, 1992). A 1977 *Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional del Perú* (National Intelligence Service, SIN) report assessed that there were as many as 500 popular schools in the capital (GOP, 1977). A former Shining Path cadre recalled a UNSCH student recruited him and meetings were held twice per week (Nicario, 1987). One former student wrote, “... the Shining Path chose the most intelligent youngsters for indoctrination, the ones who were leaders that could influence their colleagues and friends...” (GOP, 2001, p. 5). Another explained, “...the popular schools were more profound, guerrilla strategy was studied in-depth, as was the conduct of warfare, how to integrate into the population, and how to displace the government” (GOP, 2001, p. 6). While the Shining Path claims it selected only the brightest students to attend the schools, the researchers for the truth commission disagree. The researchers asserted, “In reality, it was the young people that did not question, did not rebel or attack the orders of the party that the Shining Path preferred to develop” (GOP, 2001, p. 6). The report does not provide any direct evidence to

support this assertion, but it is plausible that blind faith and allegiance to Guzman would outweigh raw intellect in the selection process. The Shining Path also used the schools in rural areas. An image captured from the period shows a commissar lecturing to the peasants while armed students stand in the background in a military formation with assault rifles slung across their back (Portocarrero, 2012). These popular schools were important to the Shining Path because they facilitated the deep psychological preparation of the most enthusiastic young followers and the indoctrination of local people from whom they required support.

As the Shining Path expanded across a rural Ayacucho province, it developed bases that would support the eventual transition to guerrilla warfare. It employed psychological techniques aimed at the population of these rural areas to distance them from the Peruvian government and to support for the revolution. The Shining Path provided essential services that a government should provide and were sure to make the locals understand that the government in Lima did not care about them and was unwilling to expend the resources to provide these services. La Serna (2012) argued that these experiences at the local level were more instrumental than political ideology in gaining support from locals. He describes an event from the early 1980s that demonstrates the effectiveness of the Shining Path in the village of Quispillaccta. The Shining Path leader in the area presided over a people's trial of a notorious cattle thief. The villagers had been complaining to the authorities since November of 1977, but the police and the legal system failed to take action. Additionally, the traditional power structure, which the government counted on to handle local matters, was not efficient or strong enough to resolve this issue. The Shining Path, however, did have sufficient power and sentenced the man to death and immediately carried out the execution. Moreover, Heilman (2010) recounts multiple examples of governance provided by the Shining Path members who sentenced to death various local notables with long histories of abusing their power and abusing the poor and uneducated in their communities. These examples of swift justice, which could not be duplicated by the government, endeared the local population to the Shining Path. While the Shining Path had success in some areas, the indigenous population did not support it in others. A U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 1981, p. 15) report assessed, "Shining Path members have encountered hostility from peasant communities, which refuse to feed or shelter them." However, in areas where the Shining Path replaced the government or served as the *de facto* government, they established support bases for future operations.

In 1979 and early 1980 the Shining Path leaders held multiple meetings or "congresses" to develop their plans. Guzman and the Shining Path elite who attended these congresses codified the core ideology that would carry them through the revolution. In September 1979 the first convention was held, and from which they published a paper titled "To Define and Decide" that provided the basis for the following sessions (Shining Path, 1979). The sessions in early 1980 focused on a detailed academic review of diverse writings such as Washington Irving's *The Life of Mohomet* and Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* and *Macbeth*. They discussed former insurgent leader Hugo Blanco's methods and Hugo Neyra's book *Los Andes: Land or Death* in an in-depth look at peasant mobilization in the 1960s. The result of the conferences was the decision "to develop through actions the militarization of the party" (Shining Path, 1980, p. 3). While open debate was encouraged, it is clear that Guzman established his unchallengeable control of the organization and expelled multiple members who diverged from his thought. Four slogans were developed that would be used to indoctrinate the cadres and the peasant supporters: "The masses clamor to organize rebellion"; "Actions speak"; "Let us begin to tear down the walls"; and "Raise the banner of optimism and let enthusiasm overflow" (Gorriti, 1999, p. 28). The final

result of this series of meetings was that the Shining Path would begin its war for which it had been so long in preparation.

On April 2, 1980, Guzman opened the “First Military School of the Party” which would train cadres and prepare for the beginning of the war. A drawing that commemorates this event known as *Primera Escuela Militar* depicts Guzman looking very professorial with a jacket and open collar slamming his fist on the desk while he lectures to a formation of uniformed cadres. Hanging on the wall in the background is a red communist flag and photos of Marx, Lenin, and Mao (Hinojosa, 2005). The school was divided into two major sections and went on until April 19th. This first section covered the development of the Shining Path’s ideology and Guzman provided detailed instruction to the cadres who attended, which provided them with the ideological grounding that would carry them through the challenging times ahead. The second section was dedicated to the military aspects of conducting guerrilla warfare (Gorriti, 1999). The school ended with a speech by Guzman (1980) entitled “We are the Initiators” in which he culminated all of his writings and political philosophy into one concise work that provided clarity and direction to his followers. This speech established what would later be referred to as “President Gonzalo Thought” which was the further development of Marx-Lenin-Maoist Thought. In the speech he harkened back to the revolution in France, where the proletariat “efficiently seized power once in the Paris Commune” through violent action only to have victory taken away by revisionists. He attacked the U.S. and the Soviet Union and denounced them as imperialist superpowers that must be destroyed. It is an interesting and nuanced fact that he criticized the Soviet Union but not China, which had been undergoing major changes since the death of Mao in 1976. He stated that, “There is nothing to discuss. Debate has ended,” referring to the congresses and that firm decisions had been taken and there was no going back. Using terms such as “heroic destiny” and slogans such as “the future lies in guns and cannons,” he implored the listeners to take up arms. He ended the speech with “Let us initiate the armed struggle!” (Guzman, 1980, p. 330). The statement concluded the military school and opened the war against the Peruvian government.

TRANSITION TO GUERRILLA WARFARE

Following the military school, the Shining Path transitioned from political development to guerrilla warfare. Many observers of the internal conflict in Peru consider the attack in Chuschi on May 17, 1980, to be the beginning of the conflict (Gorriti, 1999; Heeg, 2016; La Serna, 2012). This event was designed to prevent the local populace from voting in the election and to garner support for the movement. Guzman had convinced his followers that the electoral process was worthless and the only way to reach their goals was to overthrow the government. Additionally, the Shining Path circulated a two-page document to “Our Heroic Combatant Population” which explained in messianic terms that the war had begun (Shining Path, 1981). The attacks throughout May and June led the CIA to remark on the strength of the Shining Path’s psychological operations, “Despite the limited scope of the terrorism, it has had a strong psychological impact and political impact” (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1981, p. 17). However, the attacks did not draw much attention from the politicians in Lima. This was an advantage for the Shining Path’s leadership because it allowed them to continue to prepare for the conflict while conducting guerrilla attacks and consolidating their position in the mountains.

Guzman dedicated his organization to Mao's concept of continuous revolution and desire to spread communism across the world. This provided justification for the use of violence and terrorism as a psychological adjunct to the Shining Path's war on the Peruvian government. Guzman deployed examples from Peruvian history to motivate his followers:

Violence is inscribed in the deepest core of our history. The conquistadors used violence to subject these lands and to submit them to colonial domination; Tupac Amaru unleashed violence in defense of rights and demands which mobilized hundreds of thousands of indigenous peasants; yesterday and today violence is the peasantry's usual medium in its unfinished struggle for land...violence is in the centuries of history in our society. (Poole & Renique, 1992, p. 55)

Moreover, he explained the reason that the extensive history of violence had not produced a better system in Peru is that former revolutionaries had not coordinated their action properly. He proposed that the Shining Path would guide the revolutionary power of the peasantry and urban proletariat to victory. Guzman interpreted the world in a binary form, black or white, good or evil. He believed that they must totally and permanently destroy the system so that they could install a communist society. The population did not receive this extreme form of violence well, and this would eventually reverse the psychological preparation that Guzman had so shrewdly employed from 1970 until 1980.

Government intelligence reports from the early 1980s disagreed on the level of sophistication of the Shining Path's psychological operations. In May 1982, the *Guardia Civil Dirección de Inteligencia* (Civil Guard Directorate of Intelligence, DINTE) published a report called "Study of the Development of the Shining Path" which underestimated the organization's propaganda ability. It asserted, "The PCP-SL is a clandestine organization and because of that reason they do not have official propaganda methods, we detected only that its elements distributed un-printed flyers to incite agitation" (GOP, 1982a, p. 15). In contrast to this assessment, and as explained in the above paragraph, the Shining Path did have the capability to produce professional propaganda in support of its wider psychological operations campaign. However, the report did go on to list propaganda themes used by the *Movimiento de Obreros y Trabajadores Clasistas* (Class Laborers and Workers Movement, MOTC) which was a Shining Path front organization in Lima that was controlled by the Metro Lima regional command. MOTC was employed in Lima to perpetuate discontent and generate support for the Shining Path in the urban slums of the capital city. In many aspects, this 39-page report was accurate, but it is clear that the authors of the report were not fully aware of the Shining Path's activities. A second report titled "Assessment of Counter-subversive Psychological Intelligence" is much more detailed and showed how Mao integrated propaganda and political warfare into revolutionary warfare and is a rare example of a government report that takes this into consideration. The report lists general and specific effects that the Shining Path would like to achieve along with supporting themes. Examples of general effects include convincing the population that the government cannot provide for their needs and that the Shining Path will triumph. An example of a specific theme was used to discredit the National Police commando unit, known as "Sinchis" in the eyes of the population. Additionally, the report listed four methods that the Shining Path was using as means to meet its goals: disinformation; white, gray, and black propaganda; ideological education; and clandestine activity (GOP, 1982b). The second report has a better appreciation of the Shining Path's psychological operations capability.

The Shining Path's violence was not limited to the government but they also imposed it on members of the population who were perceived to be supporting the government, as well as the legal left. McClintock (1999) asserts that only 17% of the Shining Path's victims were government forces. An article in the newspaper *El Diario* described the rationale, "On the one side, [there is] the fascist government...its right-wing, center, and left-wing allies [and] on the other side, the PCP-SL, the working class, the peasantry...There is no room for intermediate positions. Either you side with the people and its struggle or you side with the reaction and its repressive apparatus" (Poole & Renique, 1992, p. 2). This was not mere talk, the Shining Path's leaders believed in action. On May 13, 1981, they executed Portirio Suni, a local leader and member of the legal left in Puno. On May 21, 1981, Shining Path members executed an Australian nun, a school-teacher, a former head of a local defense group, and the former mayor of Huasahuasi village in the central Andes. They were executed in the main plaza of the village. Sister MacCormack's crime was caring for orphans and working to provide food for poor members of the community. On May 23, 1981, Paul Lobet Lind, who was the mayor of Pachacamac near Lima, was killed for erasing Shining Path graffiti in his village. The Shining Path considered Suni, Sister MacCormack, and Lobet "enemies of the people because they were involved in grassroots political and social programs not directly related to PCP-SL's political and military organization" (Poole & Renique, 1992, p. 2). The weekly magazine *Caretas* noted that a Shining Path member explained the reasons behind the killings, "This is a revolution, and anyone who opposes it will be crushed like an insect" (McClintock, 1999, p. 68). These types of murders which continued throughout 1981 and 1982, demonstrated that the legal left and general population were also targets, combined with increased guerrilla warfare against the government as the Shining Path built momentum towards its goals.

The most egregious attack by the Shining Path was conducted in the villages of Lucanamarca and Huancasancos in Ayacucho department on April 3, 1983. In response to a local defense group killing a member of the Shining Path and other lesser acts of resistance, 70 Shining Path members entered the town and murdered 79 locals including women, children, and the elderly (GOP, 2003). The incident in Lucanamarca was a turning point for the mostly successful psychological operations campaign the Shining Path had maintained since 1970. Guzman intended this event to send a strong message to the population to increase support and decrease the level of resistance against them. In a 1988 interview Guzman gave to newspaper *El Diario*, he took full responsibility for the massacre stating that it was planned and directed by the Central Committee. He went on to explain the actions: "In that case, the principal thing is that we dealt them a devastating blow, and we checked them and they understood that they were dealing with a different kind of people's fighters, that we weren't the same as those they had fought before. This is what they understood" (Guzman, 1988, p. 33). The "they" and "them" to which Guzman is referring is complicated and nuanced. He was attempting to send a message at multiple levels. In addition to intimidating the government and coercing the population these actions and explanations were meant to motivate the members and supporters of the organization. Guzman does not go so far as to apologize, but he does admit there were excesses in the attack, excesses that he dismisses as part of war. He quoted Marx and Lenin and explained they have taught that insurrection and revolution are serious matters. He then invoked Mao: "Chairman Mao Zedong taught us about the price we have to pay, what it means to annihilate in order to preserve, what it means to hold high the banner, come what may." This massacre made the Shining Path a household name across Peru and drew international attention.

Following the atrocity in Lucanamarca, the population's perception of the Shining Path's political facade began to change. A U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA, 1981, p. 2) report described the unique brutality of the event and stated how children, women, and the elderly were "machine-gunned to death and the corpses later mutilated by the attackers." On April 8, 1983, a U.S. Embassy cable read, the "Marxist Lima daily *El Diario*, noted for its pro-SL slant, acknowledges possibly that some 'innocent' persons died but attributes massacres to SL vengeance on villagers who had cooperated with the government and turned in terrorists" (DOS, 1983, p. 3). The cable then explained the difficulty of interpreting information that came from the emergency zone, and offered this tentative conclusion:

The SL has come a long way from the romantic days of 1980, the image of Sherwood Forest tended to linger, even after developments took a bloody turn in late 1981, but the replacement image of methodical ruthlessness served Sendero's purposes. With government forces on the run, Sendero's efficient assassinations and widening sphere of operation produced a public impression of inexorable menace. When government forces attacked in February and March, they destroyed that impression. Now, it would seem, Sendero is raising the price of opposition. (DOS, 1983, p. 3)

As a contributing factor to the attack the cable assessed, "The reported indiscriminate victimization points to crimes on aroused passion as much as ideological dedication" (DOS, 1983, p. 3). The attack on Lucanamarca had a devastating psychological impact on the population and forced them to remain passive about supporting the government or the insurgents, an outcome that did not match Guzman's goals.

The success of the government's military offensive in early 1983 directly impacted Guzman's control of the growing organization, which resulted in a decrease in the effectiveness of his psychological operations campaign. The Embassy cable explained the difficulty in communications within a clandestine organization and identified the young age of the lower level leaders. It concluded, "Lieutenants and sub-lieutenants—some little more than teenagers, swayed only in part by ideology and much by emotion, opportunism and fear—can mobilize support groups and engage in actions without direct control by Sendero's top leadership" (DOS, 1983, p. 4). The problem was much worse for the command and control of the organization, and that as the military offensive progressed senior Shining Path leaders departed and left younger members in charge. One former guerrilla fighter stated in an interview, "The told us to prepare for war, to defeat the enemy, and we believed them...", but "they escaped through here and we were screwed. They handed us over; they had practically sold us out. They didn't act like real men" (Poole & Renique, 1992, p. 65). A former Shining Path supporter and school-teacher stated, "the worst thing Sendero did was to rely on very young kids...they left young sons of the community in charge" (Poole & Renique, 1992, p. 65). These young members, who lacked experience, maturity, and ideological resolve, did not act according to Guzman's guidance. They abused their power and took advantage of their positions of authority for personal gain. Another contributing factor in the rural areas was that there was little respect for the young men in the Andean culture. The result was that the Shining Path lost creditability among the population, which undermined its early successful psychological indoctrination.

USE OF PROPAGANDA

Guzman used symbology in psychological operations to enhance his image and that of the Shining Path. As the internal conflict developed so did the concept of the “cult of Guzman” and his position as the “Fourth Sword of Marxism” following in the footsteps of Marx, Lenin, and Mao (Degregori, 1990, p. 26; Poole & Renique, 1992, p. 46). While Guzman was charismatic, he did not reach the level of other revolutionary leaders such as Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, or Maurice Bishop (McClintock, 1999, p. 64). Instead, Guzman relied on his intellect to convince followers of his ideology and the infallibility of scientific Marxism. He eschewed the Socratic Method and relied on his interpretation of history. Guzman never wore camouflage or military-style clothing, which was the case with other revolutionary leaders. He always dressed in a jacket, shirt with open collar, well-groomed hair, clean shave, and glasses. He often had a book in his hand, meant to augment his image as an intellectual (Strong, 1992, p. 41). He used the Marxist title of “Comrade” combined with his *nom de guerre* Gonzalo which was developed later into the more lofty title “President Gonzalo” (GOP, 1980a, p. 32). In the Andean highlands, where peasants considered the sun was an important mystical object, the Shining Path developed the name “Doctor Paka Inti” (McClintock, 1999, p. 64). In Peruvian society, the title “Doctor” is a sign of respect associated with graduate level education. In Quechua, *paka inti* means red sun. This title was very prestigious and respectful and shows the level to which the cult of Guzman had proliferated. A member of the Central Committee wrote admiringly of Guzman in 1989: “I give you my greeting and full and unconditional submission to the greatest living Marxists-Leninist-Maoist on earth: our beloved and respected President Gonzalo, chief and guide of the Peruvian revolution and the world proletariat revolution, teacher of Communism and party unifier.” He added, “I give you my greeting and full unconditional submission to the scientific ideology of the proletariat: Marxists-Leninist-Maoist and Ganzalo Though, the all-powerful and infallible ideology that illuminates our path and arms our minds” (Starn, Degregori, & Kirk, 2005, p. 351). The member continued this rhetoric for three paragraphs before beginning his actual letter to the committee about a recent trip to Bolivia Strong (1992, p. 43) wrote, “Guzman’s former political colleagues asserted that *El Maestro* (‘The Master,’ another of his nicknames) was a cold, calculating thinker and strategist whose heart was swallowed up by his mind.” In spite of this reputation he was able to generate emotion and enthusiasm for the cause among his followers. The Shining Path used these psychological techniques to build the cult of Guzman, which was critical for the development of the organization.

The Shining Path also employed multiple forms of propaganda to enhance Guzman’s image. A PCP document from 1969 explained how to conduct propaganda and stated: “A picture is worth 10,000 words.” The propaganda element created a poster in the early 1980s based on Eugene Delacroix’s classic painting of Marianne leading the people during the French Revolution of 1789. The Shining Path’s version shows Guzman in his usual professor garb and book in hand leading a group of indigenous Andean people. Marianne is in the background and the French flag replaced by the red flag of communism and her musket with bayonet upgraded to a modern assault rifle. The men of the group are raising their assault rifles in victory while an Incan princess and a peasant mother holding a baby look on approvingly. The purpose of the poster must have been to reach back to the enthusiasm of the French Revolution although it is doubtful if any of the peasants would have comprehended the nuance. These posters, some

of which were dated as early as 1981, took many forms, but they all seemed to project Guzman as a savior of the people. One version from 1985 shows Guzman holding the red flag of communism, his book not present, standing above and behind a group of armed militant workers. The text reads: “5 years of popular war” and “Proletariats of every country unite!” Along the bottom, the poster reads: “Partido Comunista del Perú” which was the name that Guzman and his followers preferred for their organization (Shining Path, 1988a). Another technique the Shining Path used was graffiti. Loyal supporters painted wall-sized murals similar to the posters, and they protected them from defacement with physical violence (Burt, 2005). These propaganda methods were distributed throughout Peru and were meant to reinforce the image of Guzman as the heroic leader of the people’s revolution.

Additionally, the propagandists produced graffiti and posters that did not include Guzman as the central character. They used graffiti to exploit the socioeconomic differences between military officers and enlisted personnel with slogans such as “Soldier – you are from the village, if you stand by the officer you let us die.” One junior officer recalled from his time in the emergency zone, “The Shining Path also wanted to harm us psychologically. They would paint messages on the walls that read: Officers eat meat; Soldiers suck on the bones” (Martos Ruiz, et al., 2012, p. 291). Many of the posters consist of similar artwork, and while most are in Spanish, some contain Quechua phrases. One poster, which is dated August 1984, shows a peasant worker with communist flag and an AK-47 leading a large group of peasants carrying flags, machetes, and assault rifles. On the bottom of the poster is a quote from Mao Zedong describing how millions of peasants can rise like a tempest and overthrow the corrupt government. Another poster shows armed men and women together rising up and reads: “The Rebellion is Just” which is likely an attempt to convince the population that joining the cause is morally and ethically correct. Yet, another poster reads: “The black actions of the reactionary Belaunde, armed forces and police” and shows a scene where soldiers and police commandos known as “Sinchis” are murdering innocent civilians, an apparent response to the human rights abuses by the military and police. Other posters seemed to be designed to support the Shining Path’s various military strategies. One reads: “Conquer Bases! Develop, construct, defend” which seems to support the concept of developing base areas to support the guerrilla warfare effort. A poster from July of 1985 shows a peasant in chains with newly inaugurated President Alan Garcia looking down on the peasant with whip in one hand and an evil looking white dove in the other. In the background, the top commanders from the various military and police branches are looking on with angry expressions on their faces, the message is clear, the new government will continue to oppress the peasants (Shining Path, 1985). It is difficult to determine how effective these posters were, but they demonstrate sophistication and an understanding of the population on the part of the Shining Path in the execution of their psychological operations campaign.

The Shining Path was adept at taking advantage of continuing government abuses. In spite of the improving human rights record of the Garcia Administration, government forces committed a massacre in Lurigancho prison on October 4, 1985. The *New York Times* (1985) reported that the prison held 500 prisoners and the majority were associated with the Shining Path. The prisoners began to riot at 3 pm as the guards conducted a routine search of a cell block, a fire broke out, and 30 prisoners were killed. Unconfirmed reports stated that many of the burned bodies had bullet wounds. The Shining Path turned the incident into a political victory and named October 4th “Prisoner of War Day.” The leftist weekly magazine *Qaehacer* quoted a spokesman for the organization as saying, “The country is seeing a

campaign against us, the prisoners of war, and against the people. This campaign of genocide has increased with the government of Alan Garcia, which is merely the latest stage of reactionary power” (Poole & Renique, 1992, p. 10). On June 19, 1986, a similar event occurred at three Lima prisons: Santa Barbara, Lurigancho, and Fronton which resulted in the death of 158 prisoners and three prison guards (DOS 1986; GOP, 2003). By the end of June, the Shining Path (1986a) published and distributed a propaganda pamphlet about the incident titled “Day of Heroism” which condemned the actions of the Garcia government. The quick response by the Shining Path is notable and shows that they had the ability to quickly develop and produce counter government propaganda.

The propaganda arm developed a sophisticated print media capability. As early as 1974 they were publishing multiple newspapers at UNSCH such as *Voz Popular* and *Bandera Roja*. According to a SIN report Osman Morote, the second in command of the Shining Path, met clandestinely with a reporter from the left-leaning weekly *Oiga* for an interview in April 28, 1982 (GOP, 1981). The report also stated that in December 1982, multiple magazines named Guzman “Man of the Year” and published many of his ideas and ideological analysis. The Shining Path relied on these left-leaning periodicals to broadcast its message. Perhaps the most influential of the publications was *El Diario* which provided tacit support to the Shining Path until 1987 when the organization gained direct control of it (Smith, 1992, p. 159). *El Diario* also published a critical and often-quoted eight-hour interview with Guzman in 1988 which provided an exclusive window into the complex mind and intricate thoughts of President Gonzalo. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, *El Diario* was used as a method of transmitting the messages of the organization and often blended the propaganda drawings and paintings of Guzman into the background of the cover. For example, the January 6, 1988, special supplement of *El Diario* shows a picture of Guzman standing in the background in his standard professor outfit holding a Shining Path flag and a book: in the foreground are bold block letters describing the content which is the plan to continue the development of guerrilla warfare (Shining Path, 1988b). The Propagandists also demonstrated an understanding of their target audience by always publishing a sports section in the back few pages. Through direct and indirect control of various print media sources, the Shining Path was able to employ a sophisticated system to disseminate its message.

FINAL GRASP AT POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION

The appeal of the Shining Path to the population changed over time from a euphoric beginning to disarray by 1990. Lurgio Gavilan Sanchez grew up in an economically challenged household in a small village on the eastern slope of the Andes and joined the Shining Path as a teenager with aspirations of changing the political landscape of the Peru. Political indoctrination was an important feature of guerrilla life, and Gavilan and his contemporaries were taught Gonzalo thought. He recalled the biblical comparison, which Guzman often used in his writings and speeches, of the rains that will fall and wipe away all that is old. He quoted the words of President Gonzalo: “We must bathe in blood, because there cannot be an authentic revolution without a river of blood, and from this a new socialist state will be created without contamination” (Gavilán Sánchez, 2012, p. 58). Gavilan also recalled that when not actively fighting government forces, following the teachings of Mao and their instructions from the Central

Committee, they integrated into the population and helped with farm work and other projects, which endeared them to the population and garnered support. This was similar to the civic action projects that the government forces used at the local level. As the years went by, Gavilan and his comrades became disillusioned with the abuses of the Shining Path and the difficult life of a guerrilla fighter. He actually had secret conversations about leaving the column with a fellow member named Rosaura, which is significant because it was an offense punishable by death. Gavilan was captured by the Army during an ambush and later joined and fought for the government as a Peruvian Army soldier. By the late 1980s, the euphoria concerning the Shining Path had dwindled. A U.S. government report assessed that the primary reason for joining the Shining Path was “out of fear from threat of death or disfigurement” (DOS, 1987). The transition of hope to the reliance on coercion as a method of recruitment and control contributed to the downfall of the Shining Path.

The concept of the “quota” was perhaps the most powerful psychological control technique employed by Guzman and the Shining Path’s senior leadership. This concept builds on the “cult of Guzman” and the foundation of the Military Schools and more general indoctrination in the rural guerrillas and urban fighters of the organization. The central point was that the organization was more important than the group and that members must be prepared to die for the cause (Poole and Renique, 1992). However, there was a deeper level that Guzman developed to the concept, which was the willingness or even desire to kill for the cause. He stated, “Marx has armed us then, as Lenin has, and, principally Chairman Mao Zedong taught us about the price we have to pay [the quota] what it means to annihilate in order to preserve, what it means to hold high the banner, come what may.” He continued, “...we say that in this way, with this determination, we overcame the sinister, vile, cowardly and vicious genocide” (Guzman, 1988, p. 34). The statement accused the government of systematic genocide against the poor rural and urban populations. This concept was debated extensively during the Congresses of the Shining Path, but Guzman demanded that it be accepted and those that did not agree in the end were dismissed. Gorriti (1999, p. 105) wrote of a propaganda document from late 1984 that were produced by a mid-level Shining Path leader in Ayacucho which read: “Blood makes us stronger, and if it’s this ‘bath’ that the armed forces have made for us, the blood is flowing, it’s not harming us but making us stronger.” Degregori (1990, p. 171) described how the Shining Path leaders viewed young followers; they were “a kind of clay, a mud that has to be molded by the party and its all-powerful ideology, in its image and in its likeness.” Gorriti (1999, p. 105) summarized the concept, “The vision of death as an ardent surrender to the cause, a kind of sublimed sensual passion, opened unknown horizons in each militant’s self-love. Combined with a millenarian vision and the personality cult of Guzman, this created ephemeral, fevered, and mythical forms.” The quota was a powerful psychological control mechanism that allowed the Shining Path leaders to control vulnerable and emotionally charged young followers to perpetrate horrific actions. Ironically, this indoctrination was used not so much to confront soldiers as it was to kill civilians (Theidon, 2013, p. 169). Shining Path members, under the influence of the quota concept, killed significantly more civilians than they killed government military or police personnel.

Lima was the center of gravity and the ultimate target of the Shining Path from the beginning and as the movement built momentum this became more apparent. Shining Path leaders used similar methods in the ill-governed or ungoverned slums around Lima as they did in the Andes. Burt (2005, p. 279), asserted that they “mobilized sympathy among the local population by

exploiting the institutional voids in these areas to their advantage.” In August 1986, the Shining Path produced a report titled “Developing the Popular War and Serving the World Revolution” which provided an updated status of their revolution against the Peruvian government. They divided popular war into four methods: guerrilla warfare; sabotage; selective annihilation; and propaganda and armed agitation. These four methods were established and explained, albeit with limited detail, in a review of the situation published in 1984 (Shining Path, 1984). During the time period of June 1984 through June 1986 the focus in Lima was on propaganda, which accounted for 60.1% of the effort compared to 12.0% of guerrilla warfare, 23.7% sabotage, and only 9.2% selective annihilation. For areas inside the emergency zone in which they provided analysis, the focus was on guerrilla warfare and the level of propaganda was much lower with no area above 36.2% (Shining Path, 1986b, p. 31). These figures indicate that in Lima the focus was on propaganda and agitation, while in rural areas they spend less effort on propaganda and focused on fighting the police and military forces.

As the war progressed the emphasis in Lima expanded the use of terrorism and specifically the *coche bomba*, or car bomb. A 1989 poll shows that only 15% of the population supported the Shining Path (McClintock, 1999, p. 73). As random killings and the levels of intimidation increased in the early 1990s, the population turned towards the government and supported the autocratic transition of President Fujimori. The subsequent increase in autonomy of the police and military facilitated the capture of Guzman on September 12, 1992 followed by the arrest of many other senior leaders. This led to the breakdown in the Shining Path structure and its eventual demise as an effective organization.

CONCLUSION

This article reviewed the psychological warfare campaign of the Shining Path from 1970 until 1992. While most of the existing literature has focused on the conflict after 1980, the Shining Path began the political indoctrination of its cadres and the masses in Ayacucho beginning as early as 1970. Guzman manipulated the public school and university system to conduct political indoctrination and establish an ideological and material support base for his organization. From 1980 the Shining Path built upon this foundation and used its ideology to justify terrorism and human rights abuses in the pursuit of its goals. A key component of this manipulation was the “quota,” which provided justification for extreme violence in the name of political change. However, only the most dedicated Shining Path members were influenced by this. Towards the end of the conflict, the Shining Path’s psychological operations were less efficient, which allowed the government forces to gain the upper hand. After the Peruvian security forces captured Guzman and many of the senior leadership, the organization crumbled. This case study offers special operations personnel an in-depth look at how terrorist organizations develop and execute political indoctrination and psychological warfare.

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Change Agents for the SOF Enterprise: Design Considerations for SOF Leadership Confronting Complex Environments

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The military design movement in the past generation has generated much discussion on why, how, and when to apply design thinking in military organizations. Further, there is significant debate on how design and traditional linear planning ought to integrate and compliment within a military enterprise confronting a complex, adaptive environment. Although there are multiple design schools, programs, as well as methodologies available across the U.S. Department of Defense and internationally in other militaries, the lack of research and materials for military senior leaders is of paramount concern. For Special Operations leadership in particular, design requires different consideration when set in the context of SOF unique missions as well as the composition of SOF forces in larger Coalition and Joint activities. This article provides some of the leading design theory tailored specifically for senior military leaders to provide deeper appreciation of how to foster design activities, innovation, and operational planning integration within complex Special Operations contexts.

Keywords: military design, complexity theory, military sociology, postmodernism, operational design, innovation, leadership, creativity

The last two decades of military development in both theory and practice have triggered what may be termed the “design movement” across multiple services, militaries, and agencies around the world (Beaulieu-Brossard, 2016; Banach & Ryan, 2009; Grome, Crandall, & Rasmussen, 2012; Jackson, 2013; Lauder, 2009; Paparone, 2013). For Special Operations, design concepts have also made an impact through a variety of programs, processes, doctrine, and theory (Martin, 2015; Naveh, *undated*; US Special Operations Command Headquarters, 2016; Zweibelson, 2016). While each military design sub-movement within this overarching movement appears oriented towards similar goals of increasing organizational innovation, change, critical reflection, and the generation of novel options, they might also be characterized as individual tribes battling one another (Grome et al., 2012; Paparone, 2010, 2013). Military doctrine writers, professional educators, military theorists, as well as practitioners struggle with

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what brand or design methodology they wish to apply, and how it functions with regard to detailed planning, campaign design, and the art of military leadership. For U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in particular, the unique missions and composition of Special Operations Forces (SOF) create challenging questions for how design works in the SOF context, and what SOF leadership ought to do when considering design applications for a SOCOM organization.

Today, amidst the contemporary debates on Gray Zones, trans-regional entities such as the Islamic State, and how alliances ought to function in the increasingly dynamic social-political contexts, SOF leadership may not have the necessary organizational tools for design applications, or potentially are misusing the ones they already have (Burnett, et al., 2016; Canna, 2016; Elkus, 2015; Kapusta, 2016). Many may be familiar with design techniques as well as relevant design theories, while others have led or participated in multiple design inquiries that may feature a blend of design, operational design, and detailed planning methodologies. Yet in terms of educational developments for design and leadership, our current doctrine and practice does not yet include sufficient explanation on how leaders might clearly integrate design with detailed planning, or how the role of leadership is different within design versus traditional planning or campaign design. This article provides one interpretation and suggests that future SOF doctrine as well as SOCOM education might incorporate these concepts for SOF-specific theory and practice. Many SOF leaders need greater clarification on these essential topics in order to implement and guide innovative design inquiries, generate novel options, and subsequently incorporate useful design deliverables into the detailed planning process within complex Special Operations contexts.

THE ROLE OF THE SENIOR LEADER IN DESIGN: CHANGE AGENT FOR THE ORGANIZATION

For SOF leadership attempting to leverage design inquiries within their organizations to generate novel options (innovation beyond the established or conventional processes, ideas, or frames), the concept of sociologist Karl Weick's "Change Agent as Change Poets" provides a fascinating way to frame this role (Weick, 2011). Weick presents a deep appreciation of how organizations generate new knowledge and cycle from innovation to standard practices (policy, doctrine, SOPs) with that leader firmly guiding the process. At the same time, the SOF leader is also experimenting as a military artist, attempting to set better conditions for organizational critical and creative thinking on extremely complex and adaptive problems (Buchanan, 1992; Conklin, 2008; Paparone, 2010). Thus, the SOF leader balances between military science and military art, blending them through military philosophy through the design process (Figure 1).

Weick uses the term "flux" to frame the abstract and often confusing individual and organizational thoughts when considering complex challenges. Flux is materialized "when it is imagined into hunches about forms and shapes," but one would be misled to equate this to the transition from abstract to the concrete (Weick, 2011). A "hunch" is clarified by Weick as "a sense of something we are omitting in what we are currently capable of articulating and verifying," or seen as a rich pragmatic tool for sensemaking in design (Locke et al. 2008, cited in Weick, 2011, p. 9). Organizationally, SOF encounters flux and hunches across all SOF mission sets, and SOF culture is essentially founded upon professionals that deal with flux and hunches exclusively. The cycle of flux to hunches and back to flux presents a novel way for SOF




FIGURE 1 SOF leadership and blending design with military science and art.

designers to frame the iterative nature of design endeavors. When they seek to generate options comprised largely of novelty, innovation, and self-awareness of how the organization tends to want to do business, SOF designers are able to accomplish this through iterative cycles of flux and hunches. For SOF leadership, the design inquiry centers the leadership team at a key nexus of design teams moving through the flux, gaining and refining hunches, in an iterative process that is found in all forms of military and civilian design methodologies (although couched frequently in quite different terms). Some military design methodologies call this “system logic,” “rational,” “environmental frame,” “appreciate the context,” or “system hypothesis” while essentially describing in varying degrees of effectiveness this flux-hunch cycle (Department of the Army, 2008; Graves & Stanley, 2013; Lauder, 2009; Naveh, Schneider, & Challans, 2009; U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters, 2016).

In a design inquiry, that SOF leader cannot perform the familiar leadership processes that they conduct during detailed planning or campaign design. Instead, the SOF leader must assume Weick’s role of the organizational “change poet” and experiment with the design team on the iterative flux-hunch cycle. The SOF leader must prevent the design team from permanently fixing “names that identify objects *forever*” (Weick, 2011, p. 12, italics in the original) so that the design team does not shift from perceptually based knowing (flux-hunch cycle of design) to categorically based knowing. “Categorically based knowing” manifests as the reductionist efforts and linear focus of detailed planning models such as DIME, or PMSCII, within the Joint Operational Planning Process or Military Decision-Making Process (Jackson, 2013; Paparone, 2013; Ryan, King, Bruscino, & Cox, 2010). There are great advantages to reductionism; however, the design inquiry cannot continue a valid flux-hunch cycle if they move towards categorization, the rigid assignment of specific terms or sequences, and the “alignment of roles, relationships, and responsibilities around key tasks to solve specific problems” (Weick, 2011, p. 12). This is where a SOF design inquiry remains distinct from the convergent processes of detailed planning or campaign design. This is also where many well-intended design inquiries go

awry. When planning methodologies dominate the design cognitive process, designers end up leaping right into solutions and operational planning based upon previous existing work, and therefore avoiding flux and hunches entirely. SOF leaders can use design techniques in this article to stymie that behavior.

To expand further on Weick's flux-hunch cycle in the design inquiry, "the role of the change poet in connecting flux to hunches is to help people turn circumstances into situations that make sense" (Weick, 2011, p. 12). Most significantly (and seemingly counter-productive for SOF leadership based upon most prior military education and experience), in design inquiries the SOF leader as a change poet "connects hunches back to flux" to provide generative doubt for the design team (Weick, 2011, p. 13). What may seem concrete to a design team may, in fact, be most abstract...yet at this core level most organizations will resist change because "the prospect of uncertainty is unsettling, but also because proposed changes seem too far removed from first-hand experience to have any relevance or meaning" (Weick, 2011, p. 13). Thus, the SOF leader in design must remind the design team that *everything formalized is not necessarily routine*, and that when formal organizational order is relaxed, "action becomes more varied which means that it takes more varied interpretations to render it sensible" (Weick, 2011, p. 14). This seems paradoxical, yet Figure 2 illustrates how the SOF leader is central to guiding the design team in an inquiry towards divergent processes (the flux-hunch cycle) and away from convergent processes (JOPP, MDMP, categorization, standardization, formalization, risk reduction).




FIGURE 2 The role of military leadership in convergent and divergent processes.

Figure 2 depicts two related yet distinct cycles for organizational thinking and action with military organizations. The bottom pyramid (the first group of people to the second) illustrates the constant managerial struggle for militaries to gain command and control across large organizations in time and space (Bousquet, 2009; Bousquet & Curtis, 2011; Waring, 1991a, 1991b). Most military methodologies in planning and execution work towards this effect, resulting in amazing feats of repetition, uniformity, prediction, risk-reduction, reliability, efficiency, and goal attainment (Jackson, 2013; Paparone, 2013). However, Figure 2 depicts the second group force as able to converge and produce reliable uniformity in predictable planning structures while they also tend to see these processes break down when cast within complex or even chaotic environments (Bousquet, 2008). The SOF senior leadership team, depicted in Figure 2 at the center of the convergent thinking pyramid and the divergent design-thinking pyramid, are the change agents responsible for guiding the “second group thinking” force into the flux-hunch cycle of a design inquiry where convergent processes actually inhibit innovation and high-risk experimentation. When a military organization builds repetitive processes, it becomes extremely hard to innovate, unless it is driven by failure, expansion, outside influence (public, politics), or some combination therein (Waghelstein, 1999). Convergent processes are great during periods of stability or simplicity, but become disadvantageous when emergence and the sudden change within a complex environment demand divergent thinking (Carlisle & McMillian, 2006; Stanley & Lehman, 2015).

SOF leadership, while coaching a directed design inquiry, must guide the group (depicted as the third group in Figure 2) towards the panoply of divergent concepts illustrated at the top of Figure 2. Although divergent processes feature high levels of experimentation, failure, and risk, the leader will set conditions for innovation to occur within that high frequency of divergent experimentation. Analogous to “stepping stones” by artificial intelligence theorists Stanley and Lehman, divergent experimenters are like treasure hunters willing to capitalize on risk and failure to find new paths towards novel creation (Stanley & Lehman, 2015). At some point where the design team generates the novel perspective that the leader realizes as inspirational for initial (or refined) planning guidance, that SOF leader becomes the arrow moving from the divergent top back into the convergent pyramid. Here, the design deliverable, once articulated by the SOF leader as planning guidance, works as a feedback loop where sequential planning (campaign design, planning processes) can converge in different ways working with the novel discovery from the design inquiry. The organization has a new way of thinking about complexity, and can realign resources and action so that they might “shock the system” to their advantage.

Design and innovation is high-risk, and the production of “what is possible” in design means that many explorations end in failure, dead ends, and especially the unexpected or unappreciated discoveries that the organization lacks the experience, language, and cognitive processes to initially realize. Frequently, innovators are rejected, even when they are providing a radical new way to express truth about a difficult and confusing concept (Foucault, 1983). Consider how explorers such as Christopher Columbus did this, discovering a new continent where none was expected, and much of the Western World not realizing for decades that the novel discovery was not the planned route to the East, but something completely novel and unexpected.¹ For the SOF leadership, every design inquiry requires these same divergent processes of high risk and the opportunity for novel discovery, while at the same time ever cognizant that even the breakthrough design deliverable might be missed

or discarded because the organization continues to apply outdated or irrelevant methods, language, and thinking towards the new idea. Imagine a SOF design team discovering an entirely novel direction for unconventional warfare against trans-regional enabler networks, yet the organization shoehorns the concept back into a traditional foreign fighter campaign plan *that cannot exploit the new discovery*. As Weick describes, the change agents “increase meaning [by lingering] over a present experience rather than label it swiftly, simply, and stereotypically” (Weick, 2011, p. 16). This is when design fails, and the Spanish continue to consider Columbus highly successful at finding a new sea route to the Indies.

CLEARING THE CALENDAR: HOW TIME AND PARTICIPATION MAKE DESIGN DIFFERENT

SOF leadership directing a design inquiry must not also become victims of applying the convergent processes pyramid to the divergent design-thinking pyramid. While in the convergent pyramid where traditional military planning processes permit leadership to carry busy calendars and encourage “elevator briefs” as well as tightly rehearsed decision briefs, those processes do not transfer into design (Mintzberg, 1994; Picone, Dagnino, & Mina, 2014, p. 455). SOF leadership that spend as little time with a design inquiry as an operational update or campaign design workshop will likely be unable to appreciate that design team’s journey, nor will they be able to commit the time and thought into guiding the design team through the cycles of flux and hunch. Instead, SOF leadership upon directing a design inquiry need to clear enough space on the calendar to invest their own valuable time into reversing familiar leader-centric convergent processes (read-ahead products, executive summaries, decision briefs, continuous calendar appointments) towards how a leader operates in the divergent thinking pyramid for design. They must drop their tools, in order to be open to experimenting with new ones (Weick, 1993, 1996).

Steve Jobs, while seeking to transform Apple from a high-end computer company into a novel organization that produces game-changing digital identity products (smart phones, watches, applications, even a lifestyle) approached the company transformation in a special way (Isaacson, 2012; Welch & Byrne, 2001). Jobs knew that had he gone to senior management (the top of the convergent-thinking pyramid or centralized hierarchy familiar to corporations and the military), the organizational forces and social structures within Apple would have prevented any real transformation. His ideas would get diluted, circumvented, or outright ignored (Isaacson, 2012; Welch & Byrne, 2001). Jobs instead did what organizational theorists termed a “deep dive” where he went directly to the lowest level of engineers and software professionals, bypassing layers of bureaucracy, fostering a divergent-thinking design environment while also guiding them as a change agent to spark massive organizational transformation. Jobs forced his entire organization to drop their favorite tools, and by blending organizational and managerial theory with design, Jobs accomplished major organizational transformation. The senior management had no choice but to move with the change. Jobs did not accomplish this with traditional planning sessions, briefings, or the formal existing processes that Apple used to maintain the earlier system form. He transformed the system through being a change agent and guiding this organization while remaining highly aware of the institutional forces and existing barriers that were oriented towards convergence and not divergence (Mintzberg, 1994; Wastell, 2014). Jobs is a useful example for SOF leaders to consider when they need to transform their own organizations in the face of

uncertainty and chaos in modern conflict contexts. SOF leadership face a difficult challenge with design inquiries as they demand entirely dissimilar processes, guidance, coaching, and time commitments than the dominant structures of familiar convergent organizational processes. For the SOF leader desiring the outputs of a successful design inquiry, they need to appreciate that distinction before committing the people, resources, and time.

NO SILVER BULLETS IN DESIGN, EXCEPT PERHAPS ONE FOR SOF SENIOR LEADERS

During a design inquiry, the SOF leadership team will experience their design team producing iteration after iteration of whiteboard work as they move through flux and hunches.² During this design journey, SOF leaders might expect that at some point, a design inquiry will produce a profound concept upon a whiteboard that defines the “eureka moment” for the team. Many leaders consider the “when do I know when the design output is achieved” as one of the key challenges or frustrations with investing in a design inquiry.³ For this article, SOF leadership might consider one rather radical way to appreciate any design inquiry.

When SOF leadership receives iterations of design products on whiteboards or other means, these deliverables (or works in progress) are not to be considered better understanding of an environment, a problem, a rival, or an approach. For senior leaders, they are sociological mirrors that only reflect the context of how one’s own organization interprets reality (Morgan, 1994). As sociologist Gareth Morgan explains, organizations try to build environmental and self-awareness “in a way that helps orient action to create or maintain a desirable identity...the charts that decorate the walls of the meeting room are really mirrors” (Morgan, 1994, p. 140). The senior leader does not receive more information or gain greater understanding *of the actual complex thing or process itself*. The senior leader gains greater appreciation *of how and why their own organization interacts and rationalizes* complex and highly fluid environments that resist comprehension or reject all accepted practices. While this is a key distinction within design, it might be best that SOF leadership attempt to internalize this element. Many earnest design participants may not be able to appreciate that the white board concepts are not actually what is outside in the complex environment, but more a window into how the design team (and by extension the military organization at large) tends to think and interact with the complex environment. Some designers might find a leader demoralizing if their white board work was interpreted not for appreciating the environment, *but for appreciating the organization thinking about the environment*. The design work (as well as planning outputs) reflects “the organization’s understanding of itself. . .[and are] projections of the organization’s own interests and concerns” (Morgan, 1994, p. 140). This may seem a bit abstract or too philosophical for military consideration; however, for organizational theorists, sociologists, and managerial theorists that study complexity and organizational change, this perspective possesses rather significant insight for the SOF leader directing and participating within a design inquiry (Paparone, 2010; Schon, 1993, 1995; Waring, 1991b; Weick, 1996; Zweibelson, 2016). Design deliverables and multiple whiteboard sessions become for the SOF leader a way to realize more about their own organization and how the organization seeks to rationalize a complex environment. This subsequently establishes how that leader might guide and further push the design team in future iterations of flux and hunches, and where the leader should focus efforts on organizational development or change. For an astute SOF leader, the deeper understanding of one’s organization exists just beyond the whiteboards.

ALTERNATING THE TEMPO FROM DIVERGENCE TO CONVERGENCE AND BACK

How does a SOF leader blend design deliverables with detailed planning methodologies? Where does “initial or refined planning guidance” come from, and how does the SOF Command Team guide the organization through various divergent and convergent processes? These are important questions. However, existing military doctrine does not provide much clarity on the design to planning gap (Grome et al., 2012; Zweibelson, 2015). For SOF leaders that implement a design inquiry, that design team likely is pursuing divergent processes while simultaneously multiple planning teams elsewhere within the organization are pursuing sequential (linear) detailed planning processes that rely upon convergent methodology. The SOF leader is often square in the middle, and as the head of the organization is responsible for guiding and instructing both activities without one another trampling upon the other.

The design process is iterative, but not sequential. This means that cycles of flux and hunches move in unexpected and non-linear ways. A design team may start in one direction, and after extensive whiteboard collaboration and discussion, move to wipe the boards and start anew upon an entirely different path. Frequently, it is the SOF leader that realizes when a design team has moved towards convergence and requires a redirection towards another cycle of flux; that leader forces the design team to wipe the boards or apply other divergent heuristic aids to generate novel options. Figure 3 illustrates this with the arrows on the left side of the SOF leader comprising iterations of divergence and critical reflection (thinking about how the organization thinks...and why this is).




FIGURE 3 SOF leaders as change agents in design and detailed planning cycles.

The SOF leader, upon receiving a design deliverable that provides the necessary innovation or novel perspective upon the complex situation, now motivates the convergent linear (sequential) process for the rest of the organization by issuing initial or refined planning guidance. This is not the design deliverable itself, nor should the design team attempt to frame the deliverable as suggested by the Commander's initial planning guidance.⁴ That is the role of the SOF Commander, and it likely occurs tacitly (impossible to define or articulate, yet demonstrating deep knowledge and experience) (Gondo & Amis, 2013; Schon, 1992; Zweibelson, 2016). Tacit knowledge occurs within design as well as detailed planning; however, one moves towards divergence while the other focuses the organization in convergent ways (Zweibelson, 2016).

Convergence does occur within the iterative design process; however, it is when that SOF Commander (or designated design leader) appreciates that the design team requires convergence towards a new direction in design thinking. Should a team be diverging in multiple novel options, there must be some form of selection and refinement so that the design team cycles through additional iterations of flux (abstraction) and hunches (loose coupling to evidence generating novel understanding). In his sociological research, Weick further explains that hunches are a feeling that one gets when something is omitted in what one thinks they can already articulate and verify (Weick, 1996). In order to appreciate these hunches (seeking those omissions), the SOF leader might coach the design team through wiping boards or applying a heuristic aid such as the semiotic square.⁵ With the semiotic square, it operates as a divergent generating process where the design team is motivated to explore hunches by detailing first what they feel they can already articulate and verify. Figure 4 demonstrates the core concept of the semiotic square heuristic aid for design inquiries.




FIGURE 4 Semiotic squares as heuristic aids for SAF leadership leading design inquiries.

The semiotic square is called a “heuristic aid” in that it is a cognitive tool that helps a design team think about their thinking. It is a sensemaking process, not an analytical one and thus forms out of the design team’s contextual interaction with the dynamic environment. This is different than an analytical process (found in convergent planning) where one simply collects the data or even metadata, and pours it into the established analytical model to produce metrics and results (Snowden, 2010). The semiotic square generates different results every time, and often the process is non-repeating and emergent. Yet the semiotic square is, for the SOF leader guiding the design inquiry, both a divergent as well as convergent process.

The SOF leader might direct a design team to present their latest hunches after significant discourse and whiteboard work within the flux-hunch iterative cycle. Once that team converges upon a frame of “what the system logic is, and what we do not like about it, and how we might move the system towards a better state for us,” this becomes “concept A” for the semiotic square depicted in Figure 4. Concept A is one design proposed solution, yet the SOF leader now challenges the design team to consider what Concept B might be, in that B must be dissimilar and even incommensurate with Concept A. Design teams might diverge here somewhat; however, Concept B only acts as a foil or reflection of their original Concept A. Next, the SOF leader challenges the team to establish what Concept C might be, where C is a hybrid of both A and B. Most design teams quickly generate a Concept C, in that convergence is a far more familiar process for military professionals. For the SOF leader, as the change agent leading the design, all of the concepts set the team up for the real challenge of generating Concept D. Here, we see an example of heightened divergence and the conditions for significant innovation. The team cannot use Concept A, B, or C and must establish what Concept D might involve. This heuristic aid applies to nearly any design challenge, and only motivates a design team towards divergent concepts where the hunches are used to structure A, B, and C, and the team must now return to Weick’s “flux” to consider what else there might be. The semiotic square is one of several heuristic aids that aid the change agent in generating the non-linear, emergent cycle of divergent design. Experienced SOF leaders will see past the white board products and persuasive deliverables that a team generates early in the flux-hunch cycle, and coach them towards deeper design exploration to generate novel options.

After using cognitive tools such as the semiotic square and forcing design teams to “wipe the boards” to continue iterations of flux-hunch, the SOF leader may realize or discover a design deliverable that influences the organization to accomplish relevance in the dynamic system. When this occurs, that SOF leader constructs initial (or refined) planning guidance using the language, methods, and processes of the detailed planning cycle. This is where a design deliverable is converted into detailed planning guidance to generate a very different cycle of convergence, sequential planning, and feedback realization. When a SOF leader can maneuver from one cycle to the other, influencing both and inspiring or coaching progress in different ways, they are able to be the change agents of their organization. When leaders misapply language or methods, or confuse one cycle for the other, the organization generally suffers. Planning without design leads to failure, while designing without considering the real needs of convergent planning and action leads to design deliverables that appear meaningless, or entirely incomprehensible.

CONCLUSIONS: THE CHANGE AGENT BLENDS DESIGN WITH PLANNING

Current design doctrine, particularly for Special Operations Forces, lacks the depth of explanation and technique for how military leaders initiate and guide a design inquiry as well as implement the design deliverables into planning guidance for detailed operational planning. This article provided one approach and utilized sociological and organizational theory as well as design philosophy to explain the different processes that design and detailed planning pursue. SOF leaders should appreciate their organizational frame, and become reflective practitioners where they critically self-examine what typically are tacit methodologies and behaviors (Lichtenstein, 2009; Schon, 1992). The SOF leader should not misapply one methodology with another, such as seeking a design inquiry to produce briefings such as those that a campaign-planning group might produce. Similarly with mixing methodologies, language also must make different applications in that words have meaning. Their meaning changes dependent on the context; many linear planning terms such as “end-state,” “problem,” “line of effort,” “center of gravity,” and others work in one context, but fail to explain in the other. The social construction of language means that our deeper justifications behind our terminology reflects our societies, organizations, and cultures (Hatch & Yanow, 2008; Paparone, 2008; Schon, 1993). This means that design inquiries require novel language at times, and *emergent processes or new methodologies* that are created by iterative cycles of a design team moving from flux (abstraction) to hunch (new conceptual structure) and back (Bingham & Kahl, 2013; Schon, 1995; Tsoukas, 2009). The SOF leader guides and mentors this iterative and non-linear cycle differently than they do for a sequential and linear campaign design.

SOF leaders also might consider how they approach the concept of “risk” within both the divergent design cycle, and the convergent detailed planning cycle. Both treat risk differently, and both require nuanced adjustments as the organization continues their endeavors. SOF leaders should self-appraise how much interaction they have with a design team, and consider whether a design inquiry topic demands a SOF leader “dive deep” into transforming their organization (Yu & Bower, 2010). This cannot be done with intermittent slide presentations or elevator briefs; it can only be executed through extensive and iterative cycles of critical reflection, novel experimentation, and setting the conditions for innovation.

Although there are no “silver bullets” in design, the SOF leader can at least philosophically and sociologically appreciate that the design work done by an inquiry presents a window into how their organization “makes sense of complexity” within their own values, culture, belief system, and identity. The distinction is nuanced, yet essential for leadership consideration. Even if a design team does not realize their white board work (or narrative, or other deliverable) is not the challenging topic they are wrestling with; it is *how they think about thinking about that topic*. The self-reflective SOF leader might be able to gain significant perspective on both the overarching conflict context as well as how their own organization thinks about thinking (Schon, 1993; Tsoukas, 2009; Weick, 2006).

A SOF leader, when directing design inquiries as well as parallel planning efforts, must also be heedful of the challenges regarding divergence and convergence for their organization. Special Operations Forces operate in extremely complex, dynamic environments where frequently the strategic guidance is vague at best. In these contexts, the SOF leader cannot manufacture design in the same mechanical structures that produce exceptional detailed planning. Nor can they reverse the process and attempt to have the detailed planning endeavor gain

the highly experimental and fluid processes that provide the design inquiry with the conditions for innovation.

Finally, SOF leaders should seek out a variety of heuristic aids to apply when a design inquiry requires greater divergence of thought. This does not seem to be as much a concern for the reverse, as most military professionals have experienced years of convergent structures for a majority of their professional education; thus getting a group to converge it intrinsically easier for many. Divergence is not, and this article provides one example of a useful heuristic aid with the semiotic square. The semiotic square has been used in design inquiries and education in USSOCOM, the Canadian military, as well as within other military and governmental enterprises with a variety of results.⁶ It is not a silver bullet either, but a SOF leader equipped with such a cognitive tool should have greater flexibility to guide a design inquiry while assuming the role of the change agent. It is through these processes that military organizations generate novel understanding, and this new knowledge as well as design experimentation forms the basis for the next generation of design doctrine, practice, and theory.

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NOTES

1. Columbus famously died not realizing he had discovered a new continent, despite making the trip multiple times. This is a useful example on how the social construction of reality has tremendous impact upon individuals making sense of uncertainty, particularly when their paradigm’s logic does not correlate with reality.
2. At the Joint Special Operations University, design faculty enables this cycle by forcing design teams to “wipe the boards” periodically through exercises as well as design inquiries with SOCOM organizations. This process challenges the design team to re-frame, jettison unhelpful concepts, and gain fresh perspective.
3. The author bases this upon numerous senior leader engagements on design, including discussions with senior military from the Canadian Army, Royal Netherlands Land Warfare Centre, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and U.S. Special Operations organizations.
4. Planning guidance ought to use detailed planning language; however, this does not force the design deliverable itself to be formed with planning language. It is up to that SOF leader to articulate planning guidance using planning language after appreciating the design deliverable constructed with what necessary or novel concepts and language that design team required.
5. The semiotic square is just one of many design heuristic aids available for designers to apply. Design teams should attempt to build “tool boxes” of many different cognitive tools and heuristic aids and experiment frequently with them. No two design inquiries should ever follow the same methodologies, sequences, or generate the same deliverables in the same way that repetitive detailed planning processes attempt to be consistent.
6. This author participated in design education with the Canadian Forces College in 2015–2016 where the semiotic square was implemented. The author is also the Course Director for the USSOCOM Joint Special Operations University for design programs where various classes of students as well as SOCOM design teams conducting design inquiries utilized the semiotic square from 2015 to 2016.

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REVIEW ESSAY



Kilcullen, David. *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013. 342 pp., \$27.95 (hardcover). ISBN 978-0-19-973750-5

Kilcullen, David. *Blood Year: The Unravelling of Western Counterterrorism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. 288 pp., \$24.95 (hardcover). ISBN 978-0-19-060054-9

Reviewed by **Colonel Tod Strickland**
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Few contemporary authors tackle the problems associated with using military force in the modern age with the alacrity and depth of perception of David Kilcullen. So frequently is he cited that it is almost no longer necessary to recount his background: an Australian Army officer, advisor to American Generals and Administrations on counter-insurgency and insurgencies, and a prolific writer with four commercially published books, numerous articles, and doctrinal publications to his credit. Examining his two most recent works, *Out of the Mountains* and *Blood Year*, provides clear testament to why his works are in such demand, and offers special operations leaders insights and analysis that are rarely as accessible as they will find here.

Out of the Mountains examines the issues that Kilcullen sees as accompanying the end of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In broad terms he offers a potential theory of action for using military force in a world that has experienced radical population growth, is increasingly urbanized, inter-connected, and largely centered on the littoral areas of the globe—what he, and others, refer to as *megatrends*. The book is at once a comprehensive and detailed treatment of the subject matter, drawing from numerous and varied sources to substantiate and reinforce his central argument: that modern militaries need to re-engage with the challenge of fighting irregular conflict in the urban littoral while acknowledging that many of the conditions that might have been previously assumed, have now fundamentally changed. In the author's own words "that things aren't where we left them when we headed off into the mountains after 9/11" (p. ix).

Kilcullen starts strong, introducing the idea of a city as a biological system. The metaphor is powerful and serves as a foundation for the rest of the book. Military professionals who seek to understand what they will be facing into the future will likely find Kilcullen's model to be both practical and easy to integrate into their thinking. Subsequently, the author begins to examine the future operating environment by conducting an analysis of the 2008 attack in Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), before bringing in examples from irregular conflict from around the

world. His narrative of the LeT attack serves to illustrate many of the points that Kilcullen seeks to make, and reflects both the detailed analysis and broader interpretation that are the author's strengths. It is chilling in its detail and its implications.

Where the book suffers, to a degree, is in its prescriptions for the future and how best to handle the complicated morass that will likely exist if current trend lines continue. Kilcullen's thoughts on using "co-design" (pp. 258–259) or "focusing on resiliency" (p. 242) are helpful, but limited. Similarly his thoughts on leading from the rear and enabling the local population to design the solutions to the problems that they are facing seems to disregard the fact that local citizens would be on hand when the problem set begins, and, in his model, would be unable to prevent the problems from growing to where military intervention is required. To assume that the presence of military force will somehow enable unique solutions to be found is to, in some ways, disregard the experience of history. The track record for finding local solutions when military intervention occurs is sketchy at best.

Blood Year serves a different purpose. If *Out of the Mountains* can be classed as an examination of one possible future, its potential challenges, and some areas to consider as solutions, *Blood Year* is an examination of the past. Rather than detail options and best practices, in a marked departure from any of his other published books, here Kilcullen recounts the West's engagement with the middle East and how successive failures in strategy have given rise to the situation that now exists. Like his previous work, this too is comprehensively researched and thoroughly sourced, but this time there is a difference; Kilcullen was a participant in the creation and operationalization of the strategies that were attempted between 2001 and 2016.

Anyone familiar with his previous efforts will see that he has kept the same strong narrative style to which his readers have become accustomed. The standards of scholarship are high, with detailed notes enabling the interested to seek and find further details. The index contains a noteworthy element, incorporating timelines into the entries for various countries, and insurgent groups; thus it is possible for a reader to examine what elements of Iraq the book covers in a given year by a quick glance to the index. This is an interesting tool that other scholars would do well to utilize.

Kilcullen's central argument here is that the very strategy created by the West in the aftermath of 9/11 carried with it the seeds of its own demise, and that without a new strategy, the "disasters will continue" (p. 4). The fact that Kilcullen was part of the system that created some of the strategies, and bears a degree of responsibility for how they were implemented, changed, and evolved, is not lost on him, and he willingly acknowledges such stating "I know this strategy intimately, because I was part of the team that devised it. So if this story is really a confession of failure, then it's my failure too" (p. 5).

Equal parts history and commentary, *Blood Year* offers a completely different set of lessons for potential practitioners. Rather than being a critique of tactical or operational processes, this book is targeted at those who create strategy or have to then implement it on the ground. It is a subtle warning against hubris and the unwarranted belief that military power automatically transforms itself into military solutions. It is also a quiet demand for recognition that when one's strategy is failing it is not time to maintain the status quo, but instead it is time to re-examine the problem set and validate whether one's actions are having the desired effect on the operating area.

The book's single biggest strength is that it provides a concise synopsis of how the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) came to exist, evolve, and, to a certain extent, endure in the

Levant before commencing limited operations across the globe. The range of readers who will benefit from Kilcullen's treatment of the subject is significant. His conclusion, offering strategic options for the future, also warrants detailed reading; if only so that there is an understanding of the three strategic choices between "Compliance... Competition... [and] Cooperation" (pp. 212–213). The sole weakness of note is the fact that the book is hostage to the timeframe in which it was written and published (released in 2016). It could not predict how the degree to which the strategic context was to change between 2016 and 2017, with a new President, BREXIT, the capture of Mosul, and resurgent actors dominating the strategic agenda.

David Kilcullen is a capable scholar who has transformed his academic abilities into influence, and relevance, in strategic discussions concerning the Mid-East. His recent works continue to display the comprehensive detail, solid scholarly practice, and rare insight that he first brought to the public's attention with *The Accidental Guerrilla* and *Counter-Insurgency*. Readers interested in either the potential operating environment of the future or an account of recent challenges would be well served in reading either, or both, of Kilcullen's most recent books.



BOOK REVIEW



Daase, Christopher and Davis, James W. (eds and trans). *Clausewitz on Small War*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015. 251 pp., \$84.95 (hardcover). ISBN 978-0-19-873713-1.

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For those familiar with Clausewitz's writings on small wars, mostly written in the form of a series of lectures delivered at the Prussian War College in 1810 and 1811 under the title "Lectures on Small War," these writings have offered insight into insurgency, terrorism, and partisan warfare for over two hundred years. However, given that these writings were not translated into English from the original German until the current volume, that was a very small group indeed. Many acted as if *On War* was Clausewitz's ultimate academic achievement and, because it only contains a brief chapter on people's war, such must have been far from Clausewitz's thinking. The present volume by Daase and Davis not only now provides us with an excellent English translation of these lectures, but they also put to death the faulty assumption that Clausewitz was uninterested, if not downright unacquainted, with small wars and insurrections.

Besides the writings of Clausewitz himself, which includes in addition to the lectures the *Bekanntnisdenschrift* (or Testimonials) of 1812 plus the chapter on "The Arming of the People" (*Volksbewaffnung*) from *On War*, the credit for putting the myth of Clausewitz's disregard for small war to rest goes equally to James Davis, whose introductory chapter not only puts Clausewitz in context, but also articulates the most important aspects of the writings collected here and how they relate to insurgency, terrorism, partisan warfare, and even special operations (which are seen as critical but secondary to the main military effort).

Those who have over the years disregarded Clausewitz as irrelevant to the modern age will have to rethink their positions and argue their points anew, for Clausewitz certainly wrote clearly and masterfully on issues such as the interrelationship between national identity and war, the economic logic of warfare, and low-intensity conflict and asymmetric conflict. As Davis puts it, "the near exclusive focus of Anglo-Saxon scholars on the unfinished work *On War* obscures the true breadth of Clausewitz's strategic thought, which extends to the prosecution of wars of national liberation, guerrilla-style warfare, light-

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unit tactics and their relationship to the overall strategy, and the political economy of sub-state warfare” (p. 10). Davis goes so far as to argue that “Clausewitz’s thinking on war in general is closely linked to his analysis of Small War” (p. 10). This reviewer certainly agrees, and highly recommends this book for those interested in developing a more complete understanding of Clausewitz and/or gaining deep historical insight into insurgency, partisan warfare, and the role of special operations over time.

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