


SPECIAL OPERATIONS JOURNAL

Editor: Christopher Marsh
Associate Editor: James Kiras

Included in this print edition:
Volume 4 Issue 1 (2018)





Two Awakenings, One Process: Implications from the Sunni Realignment in Iraq, 2006-2007

Diane Maye

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Florida, USA

There are several competing beliefs regarding how political factions at the sub-state level choose to align and realign during a state of armed conflict. This research draws upon current literature to provide a framework for comparing the Anbar and Baghdad Awakenings of 2006–2007. This research concludes that alignment and alliance building is a process based on structural constraints only at the point of institutional maturity, therefore the critical point in the realignment process for the U.S. military is at a point between an individual's realignment and the wider community's perception of their success.

Keywords: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, irregular warfare

There are several competing beliefs regarding how political factions at the *sub-state* level choose to align and realign during a state of armed conflict. The literature on this topic can be divided into four broad categories: historical literature on the ethno-sectarian violence, international relations literature on alliances and coalitions, sociological literature on the theories of motivation, and complexity theories on self-organizing social systems. This article will assess two realignments that took place in Iraq post-2003 at the sub-state level. While there is an abundance of literature on the history of the Iraq war, alliances at the international level, coalition politics, and micro-behavior (at the individual level), there is a gap in the literature on the variables affecting alignments and alliances in a state of civil war, civil insurrection, or where internal militant factions challenge state sovereignty. This research draws upon current literature to provide a framework for comparing the Anbar and Baghdad Awakenings of 2006–2007. This research concludes that alignment and alliance building is a process based on structural constraints only at the point of institutional maturity; therefore the critical point in the realignment process for the U.S. military is at a point between an individual's realignment and the wider community's perception of their success.

ALIGNMENT AND ALLIANCE DEFINED

Alignments and alliances are strategies used by organizations to gain a mutual benefit, or to maximize utility. In the realm of political science and the study of international relations, the

Correspondence should be addressed to Diane Maye, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, FL USA. E-mail: mayed@erau.edu

standard definition for “alliance” comes from Bruce Russett, who described an alliance as, “a formal agreement among a limited number of countries concerning the conditions under which they will or will not employ military force” (Russett, 1971, pp. 262–263). The challenge with this definition is that it does not take into account alliances that take place within a country, or between factions in a state of civil war or civil insurrection. Nor does it take into account alliances that take place between countries assisting factions within a particular country.¹ For the purposes of this study, the term “alliance” will not be used in the traditional sense, but rather as a way to describe a formal security arrangement between previously competing political/military factions. Likewise, an alignment, for the purposes of this study, is used in the broadest sense to refer to a formal or informal relationship between two armed political or military factions, for the purposes of mutual security cooperation and mutual policy coordination on security issues (Barnett & Levy, 1991; Langer, 1950).

IRAQ'S HISTORY OF ETHNO-SECTARIAN VIOLENCE

There is an abundance of literature on the history of ethno-sectarian violence and sociopolitical divides in Iraq.² After the fall of the Ottoman Empire and from its inception as a nation-state in the 1920s, Iraq has remained an amalgamation of hostile ethnic, national, and religious entities forced together by the British after World War I. Socially, Iraq is divided into three major ethnic groups; each is based in different areas within the country. Sunnis dominate areas in the center and the west of the nation and make up approximately 20% of the population. The Shi'ia reside primarily in the south and account for nearly 60% of the Iraqi people. The historically oppressed Kurdish minority lives in the north and accounts for approximately 20% of the population.

Like many Middle Eastern countries, Iraq's public-sector accounts for a significant portion of the economy (Bellin, 2004, p. 139). During the rule of Saddam Hussein, Iraq had a highly centralized, command economy, controlled by the state. The nation still relies on oil revenue, a major dividing factor amongst the three major ethnic factions, to sustain its economy. When the Ba'ath party lost power, the Sunni minority was unable to maintain primary control over the oil producing regions in the northern and the eastern parts of the country. The division of oil revenue is a source of major contention between the once powerful Sunni minority, the Kurdish-controlled oil rich northern areas, and the Shi'ia dominated parliament. During the initial occupation phases of the Iraq war, the U.S. and coalition forces adhered to the “big bang”³ approach for instituting neoliberal economic reforms, and by using this method the coalition overlooked many unique challenges facing Iraq at the time: a post-authoritarian government, a weak middle class, residually socialist institutions, and the forces of Islamic fundamentalism.

Most historians agreed that for democracy to succeed in the country, Iraq had to maintain political institutions that represented all Iraqis fairly and equally. After the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, Iraq operated as an occupied government under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). During this period, U.S. and coalition officials worked with Iraqis in developing a new political system, which better represented minority factions, like the Kurds, Turkmen, and Christians. Iraq's constitution, approved in 2005, established a parliamentary democracy consisting of three branches: judicial, executive, and legislative. The judicial branch is a consolidated federal judiciary based on European civil and Islamic religious law. The executive branch

consists of a chief-of-state (President), a head-of-government (Prime Minister), and a Council of Ministers. The legislative branch consists of a unicameral council of representatives, of which the majority faction selects the Prime Minister.

The major structural obstacle impeding Iraq's political development was the historical ethnic and sectarian divisions amongst the Arab Shi'ia in the south, the Kurdish populations in the north, and the Sunni Arab populations in the center and west. Because the ethnic imbalance had the propensity to ignite sectarian civil war, coalition policy makers urged the Iraqis to develop a type of proportional representation. In theory, the ethnic divisions could have served as a check against one another's power. Instead, the fractious decision-making and majority-representation created more alienation and resentment amongst the disparate parties.

During this period, disgruntled insurgent groups and former Ba'athists gained more ground and became increasingly effective at targeting coalition forces. The radical Islamist, Abu Musa'b al-Zarqawi is credited with integrating *Salafist* ideology into a cohesive fighting force to counter the American and coalition presence. In 2004, his network pledged allegiance to the broader Al Qaeda terrorist organization, and was known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). As such, by 2006, American policy makers feared that if U.S. forces pulled out of the region too soon, the nascent Iraqi government would be faced with overwhelming opposition from the insurgency and an ethnic civil war (Ottaway, 2005). To counter AQI and radicalized elements of the Iraqi society, U.S. and coalition forces stayed in the country much longer than they initially planned. The conundrum for Iraq was that in order for the nation to gain security, Iraqi-led forces had to generate enough control of their own territory, but without U.S. and coalition forces in the region the nation would have quickly spiraled into civil chaos.

For macro-level political reasons, in 2006 and 2007, Iraq's Sunnis realigned with U.S. forces to battle AQI (Kuehl, personal communication, May 2, 2014). Concurrent to the surge of U.S. forces in the region and the U.S. military's doctrinal change in late 2006, Sunni tribal leaders in the western Anbar province of Iraq experienced a "*Sahwa*" or "Awakening" movement, which led them to side with U.S. and coalition forces. Later, as more leaders joined the movement, these "Sons of Iraq" were organized into a formal program and paid by the U.S. forces to fight insurgent groups.

Explanations of the alliance that formed between U.S. forces and the tribal sheikhs of Anbar province as well as the broader Sons of Iraq (SOI) movement in 2006 and 2007 are often attributed to monetary factors, or relative personal gains. Several policy makers have argued that the reason the Sunnis aligned with the U.S. is because the U.S. military paid them to do so (Public Radio International, 2009).⁴ The Sunni Awakening (or *Sahwa*) movement was actually connected to a much larger movement within Iraq at the time, fed by the Sunnis' widespread discontent of the central government as well as the rise in Al Qaeda's criminal activities in their sectors and villages. The central government could not keep pace with the spread of the criminal organizations and by late 2005, Al Qaeda had complete control over many Sunni areas, especially in west Baghdad and the western provinces of Salahuddin, Tamim, Ninewah, Diyala, and Anbar.

The surge proved to be successful in the short run, yet was difficult for war planners to distinguish which surge component—the military reinforcement or the doctrinal change—was most effective in Iraq, primarily because there was such little variation in force employment during this period (Biddle, et al., 2012). Military historian Stephen Biddle carefully noted, "the modest scale of reinforcements in 2007 suggests that doctrine may actually have been the decisive factor. Without observing independent variation in troop density and doctrine, however,

it is impossible to make a definitive statement as to their relative causal impact” (Biddle, et al., 2012, p. 39). Yet, a third factor, a massive Sunni political and military realignment, proved to be another important (and at times overlooked) component in the success of the surge.

STRUCTURAL ARGUMENTS

State-Level of Analysis Arguments

Much of the literature on why groups align or realign comes from the realist and neorealist school of thought in International Relations. There are four major theoretical debates at the foundation of how and why alliances form in the international system of state actors. The first can be found in the balance of power theorists like Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson (1993), Kenneth Waltz (1979) and, most recently, John Mearsheimer (2001). Balance of power theory is one of the basic pillars of the realist theory of international relations. Realists argue states balance against the rising power since it creates a vital problem for their national security. Since states are living in an anarchical self-help world, they should act in a way as to balance against rising state actors.

The second major theoretical debate behind alliance formation takes us one step beyond the realist balance of power doctrine and considers security to be the foremost concern of policy makers. This camp is often referred to as “neorealist.” The neorealist literature suggests that the distribution of power in the international system provides the most convincing theoretical explanation for the origin conflict (Waltz, 1979). The leader of this school of thought is Stephen Walt. In his seminal work, *The Origins of Alliances*, Walt challenges the realist balance of power theory and questions whether states will choose to balance or bandwagon against threats. He also examines how states choose alliance partners. After a close examination alliance structures in the Middle East, Walt argues that a “balance of threat” thesis provides a better grasp on alliance formation than variables of ideology, foreign aid, and political penetration. Furthermore, Walt shows that factors such as geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions can be just as important elements in alliance politics. Walt also claims that aggregate power (including population, individual and military capabilities, technical prowess, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggregate intentions) all affect the level of threat. Walt posits that balancing is more common than bandwagoning, but weak states are more likely to bandwagon against rising power (Walt, 1987, 1997).

Randall Schweller (1994) argues that balancing and bandwagoning are not dichotomous activities because the motivation for bandwagoning and the motivation for balancing is quite different. He shows that bandwagoning is associated with change and balancing with maintaining the status quo. He argues that status quo states have self-preservation in mind; therefore, their behavior will tend to be balancing. On the other hand, revisionist states have a desire to change the status quo, therefore may bandwagon, or accept forms of aggression. Mearsheimer (2001) asks whether states systematically engage in aggression as their relative power increases, and what determines whether great powers balance as opposed to bandwagoning, buck-passing, or appeasing. Mearsheimer argues on the side of offensive realism, in that he suggests that in a world of uncertainty and anarchy, leaders are likely to seek more power and enhance prospects for survival.

The third major theoretical approach has its roots in economics. Mancur Olson’s (1965) work, *The Logic of Collective Action*, is an important underpinning in the academic field of social movement theory, revolutions, and cases of collective state actions. In the same camp, Robert

Keohane (1984) and Joseph Nye (2004) provide the foundation of neoliberal institutionalism. Like the realists, neoliberal institutionalism focuses on the state as the central unit of analysis. Neoliberals do not deny the anarchic nature of the international system, but instead, they focus on game theory in the explaining state behavior. Game theorists seek to show, through the employment of games, how rational actors behave under a set of circumstances.

The fourth major theoretical approach can be attributed to Glenn Snyder (1984, 2002) in his work on alliance formation. Snyder synthesizes the neorealist, neoliberal, and historical analysis into a general, multi-faceted theory of alliance formation. Snyder looks at several factors: costs, benefits, systemic forces, non-systemic incentives, conflicting interests, and the effects of bargaining. Snyder amalgamates these factors into a generalizable model alliance formation.

Sub-State (Sub-National) Level of Analysis Arguments

There are two areas of scholarly literature that address how groups form and coalesce at the level beneath the state (sub-state). The first area is an extension of the neorealist literature; it carries the same assumptions as the neorealist literature with the exception of the level of analysis. Instead of the level of analysis being at the state level, these authors look at inside the state (Christia, 2013; Posen, 1993; Wilcox, 2000). The second area that addresses how groups form at the sub-state level comes from the comparative politics literature on coalition formation (Riker, 1962).

Neorealist Departures

Posen (1993) applies fundamentals of the realist tradition of international relations theory to conditions at the sub-state level in his work on the security dilemma and ethnic conflict. He addresses how the competition for power and security unfolds in states where the sovereign is no longer in control. Posen concludes that realist international relations theories can help explain and predict the “intensity of military conflict among groups emerging from the wreckage of empires” (Posen, 1993, p. 43). He also shows that the security dilemmas in these situations make the risk of conflict quite high. Wilcox (2000) argues that coalitions between warring factions in the Yugoslav civil wars, which had three distinct political factions, are best explained through balance of power theory. Like Wilcox, Christia (2013) finds that at the sub-state level of analysis, alliances manifest based on the distribution of relative power, not identity factors such as race, language, or religion.

The second area below the state level of analysis comes from the comparative politics literature on coalition formation. Much of the work in the field assesses political coalitions using bargaining theory. This field developed around a theory of political coalitions: the postulation that politicians are inclined to form coalitions that are just large enough to win, but not any larger (Riker, 1962). This gives them the maximum payoff (winning an election) for the minimum price (attracting votes), or a *minimum winning coalition*. Other literature in this field assesses coalitions in terms of the circumstances and environment under which they form or combinations of both (Axelrod, 1970; De Swaan, 1973; Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh, 2004; Strom, Budge, & Laver, 1994; Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988).

The 19th century military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz famously described war as “a continuation of politics by other means.” Despite the fact that politics and war are intertwined, the authors of the comparative political theory on coalitions generally do not apply their theories to political factions that were in a state of armed conflict; however, theories on minimum winning coalitions yield some interesting hypotheses, which pertain to alliance formation at the sub-state level when armed conflict is taking place.

Two-Level Games

Robert Putnam (1988) deviates from the state-centric literature in his theory of “two-level games” whereby he shows how domestic politics and international relations are intertwined (Putnam, 1988, pp. 427–460). He argues that when domestic decisions need to be made, policy makers will take the concerns of domestic players into account and work to build coalitions. On the international level, however, policy makers simply look for decisions that will benefit their state.

The notion of two-level games is important when discussing the U.S. intervention in Iraq. From the standpoint of the U.S. policy maker, there were several important international-level foreign policy decisions being made that impacted the outcome of the war, stabilization, and reconstruction efforts. Those decisions took into account broad issues dealing with the region as a whole, balance of power considerations, as well as economic and diplomatic ties with regional partners. Concurrently, military commanders on the ground had to make tactical military decisions on a daily basis. Ideally, those tactical decisions would have aligned with changing U.S. foreign policy objectives. Empirical evidence suggests that commanders on the ground were likely driven by the politics of more existential threats, like coalition building between local Iraqi counterparts, not state-level concerns (Kuehl, personal communication, May 2, 2014).

From the standpoint of the Iraqis, who have a multitude of political factions, there were certainly international-level considerations as well as domestic level win-sets that did not coincide. Furthermore, the literature also suggests that in order for there to be an international agreement between both the U.S. and Iraq, the “win-sets” of both countries must overlap. In 2009, these win-sets overlapped to the point where the U.S. and Iraq could negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), but it is possible that domestic-level considerations were ignored when those decisions were being made. Furthermore, as time progressed, these win-sets changed, as did domestic and international considerations on each side.

AGENT-BASED ARGUMENTS

Agent-based arguments for how groups coalesce look at individual actions, versus environmental or structural conditions. These arguments are based on the idea that people make choices based on what others do, and in making those choices people affect others. The micro motives of individuals in war are especially important when assessing the actions on non-state actors; however, this sort of analysis is cumbersome and rarely performed in the academic literature. Paul Staniland (2010) looks at the causes of insurgent cohesion and fragmentation in his dissertation on insurgent groups. His analysis is at the micro-level; looking at individual actors within armed groups, their rivals, and motivations. Likewise, in a 2011 study by RAND, 36 cases of reintegration in Afghanistan were studied and 71% of the cases cited “grievance” as a key factor for deciding to switch sides (Jones, 2011).

Identity

Another way of looking at how groups align is to look at identity considerations, such as religion, race, or ethnicity, similar to the way many historians describe the demography of Iraq. Posner (2004) assesses this theory when explaining the institutions and ethnic politics in Africa. He looked at groups of ethnically homogenous people on either side of two artificially construed colonial boundaries and shows that ethnicity helped explain differences in political alignment, not national identity. This is a common argument when looking at politics in Iraq; it is naturally assumed that factions will align based on religious or ethnic considerations, like Sunnis aligning with other Sunnis, or Kurds aligning with other Kurds. To the contrary, Posner's work does not predict what will happen when there is a fracture *within* religious and ethnic groups or when there are multiple competing groups vying to align for power.

Weberian Sociology

The German social scientist, Max Weber stressed the importance of charismatic leadership in his analysis of power and legitimate authority (Weber, 1978). While charisma itself is difficult to define, Weber notes that charismatic leadership is often found with Prophets, demagogues, war heroes, and popular political leaders. Charismatic leaders often lead social movements by performing heroic deeds through unconventional means. In the Middle East, charismatic leadership is often found in religious and political leaders. During the 20th century, the Middle East saw a succession of political leaders who were typically deemed to be a source of legitimate authority after a *coup d'état* or social revolution. Samuel Huntington (1968) also emphasized the importance of charismatic leadership in the absence of traditional sources of legitimacy or where political institutions are very weak. Specifically, he notes, “[i]nstead of the party reflecting the needs of the state, the state becomes the creation of the party and the instrument of the party” (Huntington, 1968, p. 91). Huntington defines institutionalization as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” (p. 12). Furthermore, Huntington suggests political institutions have “recurring patterns of behavior” and are strongest when they are adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent (p.12).

COMBINING STRUCTURE AND AGENCY

Micromotives and Macrobehavior

Schelling's (1978) work *Micromotives and Macrobehaviors* assesses the aggregation of individual micro-motives as an expression of societal macro-behavior. One of the key models that Schelling uses is in the notion of “critical mass,” which is the point where a sufficient number of individuals adopt a change in a social system so that change becomes self-sustaining. Schelling also introduces the concept of feedback loops applied to social behavior.

Complexity Theory and Self-Organizing Systems

Rooted in the study of non-linear dynamics, complexity theory in the social sciences looks at how micro-systems and events can cause complex behaviors at the macro-level. Complexity theories take into account both agency and structure as well as a multitude of variables contributing to initial conditions, many of which do not act in a linear fashion. The theorists postulate that these layers of interactions produce self-reinforcing feedback loops, many of which depend on strong prior conditions. Complexity theory is characterized by nine basic concepts: survivability, co-evolution, emergence, agent-based systems, self-organization, self-organized criticality, punctuated equilibrium, and fitness landscapes (Axelrod, 1997; Axelrod & Cohen, 1999; Kauffman, 1993; Lewin, 1992; Richards, 2000).

The complexity literature in the social sciences is a departure from neorealism on three major fronts. First, non-state actors are important when looking at the evolution of the international system (Jervis, 1997). Complexity models are important in the analysis of sub-state alignments and alliances because there is a propensity for multiple layers of belligerents and actors (Jervis, 1997). Second, equilibrium is not as meaningful a concept. Whereas in the realist literature, the concepts of balancing and bandwagoning to restore the balance of power are key strategies for state survival; the literature on complexity theories looks at evolutions, dynamic systems, and patterns of change. Third, the complexity literature takes into account both agency (in terms of micro-motives) and structure (in terms of initial conditions). In terms of the perpetuation of complex behavior and the reinforcement of specific actions taken by militant groups, various scholars have introduced the concept of “violence markets” whereby actors are economically incentivized to continue fighting regardless of what the conflict is doing to the “state” at large (Elwert, 2015). The concept of a “violence market” combines both agent-based economic incentives with structurally-based broad ideological and political goals.

CASE 1: ANBAR AWAKENING

In its beginning, the Sunni political and military realignment was largely tribal. From the onset, Sunni tribal leaders viewed the Shiite-led Iraqi government with distrust, and by 2005, Anbar’s tribal leaders were enduring years of social, religious, and economic conflict with AQI. AQI leaders posed a direct threat to the traditional power of the sheikhs and openly challenged their rulings in religious and social matters (Cigar, 2011). Sheikh Ali Hatim al-Suleiman, of the 3 million strong al-Dulaymi confederation, wanted to strike back on AQI in 2005, but realized that such an effort would provoke an even stronger retaliatory response (Cigar, 2011). He also realized that the tribal leaders needed American support to be effective, but openly cooperating with the Americans would not garner popular support with the general Sunni population (Cigar, 2011). By mid-late 2005 the tribes were already in open warfare against Al Qaeda, but they did not have support from the U.S. forces in the area (Montgomery, 2009).

In Anbar province, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha is often credited as the founder of the Anbar *Sahwa* movement. Like al-Suleiman, Abu Risha was another prominent sheikh from the al-Dulaymi tribe. For most of his life he had lived as an opportunist; during the strict economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. after the Gulf War he was well known for smuggling oil and conducting highway robberies along the vast stretch of desert highway that separates Iraq from

Syria (D. Abdul Karim, personal communication, October 27, 2017). In 2006, he approached U.S. Marine forces operating in Anbar province to build an alliance to fight AQI. His move couldn't have been more appropriately timed; the commander there, Lieutenant Colonel Sean McFarland, was facing a rapidly deteriorating security situation. Earlier that year, the U.S. Marine's headquarters-level intelligence staff had concluded that, "there was little the U.S. could do to stifle the insurgency in Anbar" (Gordon & Trainor 2012, p. 248). Extraordinary measures would be needed in order to secure the area.

Abu Risha was the first tribal leader to encourage his followers to join the local police forces in Anbar Province to fight against the insurgency. Other tribal leaders followed suit, and the *Sahwa* spread throughout the province. Later, U.S. forces discovered the killing of his three brothers and his father by AQI may have motivated Abu Risha to switch sides (Gordon & Trainor, 2012, p. 251). As his movement grew, he founded a formal council for *Sahwa* matters, including dozens of Sunni tribal leaders from his region. The collaborative pattern "spread rapidly through the province" and thousands of young Sunni men joined the local police forces (Wilbanks & Karsh, 2010, p. 59).

The Anbar Awakening was particularly successful because the Sunnis knew exactly where the AQI fighters lived and how to target them (Wilbanks & Karsh, 2010, p. 59). The legitimacy of Anbar's tribal leaders was instrumental in the recruitment and retention of young Sunni men. Because it was so successful, the Anbar Awakening became the model for exploiting the fissure between Sunni insurgent groups and the general Sunni population (Office of the Special Investigator for Iraq Reconstruction, 2011). The integration and focus on tribal leaders was also important, because they ended up providing the critical link between Sunni politicians in Baghdad and former military officers working at the local level.

CASE 2: BAGHDAD AWAKENING

When then the commander of the U.S. Army's 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, then-Lieutenant Colonel Dale Kuehl, arrived in western Baghdad in late 2006, he recalled there was no rule of law, no municipal services, and violence was very high (Kuehl, personal communication, May 2, 2014). Over the next several months, the violence did not abate. By May 2007, a succession of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks over the course of two weeks killed over a dozen of Colonel Kuehl's soldiers. Like Colonel McFarland had done in Anbar province, Colonel Kuehl took extraordinary measures to redirect the momentum of the campaign.

One of the first leaders of the Awakening movement in Baghdad, Sa'ad Ghaffoori (aka Abu Abed), had worked as an Iraqi Army intelligence officer under Saddam Hussein. By late 2006, AQI was controlling the population in his upper-class neighborhood of Ameriyah in western Baghdad through kidnapping, torture, and murder (Kuehl, 2009, p. 77). Tactically speaking, Ameriyah was in an ideal position to hit Radwaniyah Palace Complex, the biggest coalition base in Iraq, with Katyushas and other Soviet-era artillery pieces stolen by AQI fighters. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, AQI fighters had vowed to protect Ameriyah's residents from Shi'ia militias and American soldiers. Without the rule of law, however, AQI grossly abused their power and the residents of the neighborhood, which was deemed by many AQI operatives as the capital of the Islamic State in Iraq. Abu Abed's own brothers were tortured and beheaded by Shi'ia militias because of the lack of security in the area.

Encouraged by the success of the Anbar Awakening, and with the help of a local imam, in May 2007 Abu Abed took charge of the *Sahwa* movement in Ameriyah. Over the course of the next several months, Abu Abed worked with the U.S. military to gain control over the neighborhood. The collaboration aided both sides: Abu Abed's men gained military support from the U.S. Army and the U.S. Army gained critical intelligence. The new intelligence aided operators in targeting AQI members and helped U.S. forces find their weapons caches (S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, April 17, 2016). Then the Awakening movement spreads to other provinces. In 2007, former Ba'ath party members Baqubah aligned with U.S. forces and provided intelligence on AQI strongholds in the city (Kagan, 2009, p. 118).

Sons of Iraq

The SOI's intimate knowledge of the local population, insurgent strongholds, and access to reliable intelligence facilitated the efficiency and success of the *Sahwa* movement. With the help of U.S. forces and momentum gained from tactical successes, the *Sahwa* quickly spread to Baghdad's other sectors, including: Hayy Al-Jamia, Adhimiya, Dora, and Khadra. By early 2008, the SOI had grown to a force of over 100,000 (Ahmed, 2008). Many of the SOI leaders were former Iraqi officers and soldiers under Saddam Hussein (S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, April 17, 2016). The men were familiar with formal military doctrine as well as unconventional warfare, small arms, and guerilla tactics. Once the U.S. formalized the program, SOI members were paid the equivalent of \$300 USD per month for providing security services (Bruno, 2009; S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, April 17, 2016).

ALIGNMENT AND ALLIANCE FORMATION

The Awakening movement allowed the U.S. to take advantage of the internal cleavages amongst the Sunni population, seize the momentum, and provide stability. The combination of the surge in U.S. forces, Army doctrinal changes and the Sunni Awakening led to a decrease in violence and a strategic pause which enabled the U.S. forces to negotiate a SOFA with the Iraqi government and develop a plan to withdraw from the region. In addition, the decrease in violence led to a gradual improvement in the ability of the Iraqi Army to control and hold ground during operations.

In both the case of Abu Risha and Abu Abed, the individuals had a grievance. In the case of Abu Risha, it was AQI's lack of respect for tribal authority and the fact they murdered his family members. In the case of Abu Abed, it was AQI's indiscriminate use of violence and the lack of security in his neighborhood. Both men sensed an opportunity for advancement, both in terms of security for their area and in political opportunity (S. Ghaffoori, personal communication, April 17, 2016). Over time, this led to their individual realignment with U.S. forces. The next steps in the realignment process were significant battlefield successes against AQI, leading to their rise as popular figure. Only then did the realignment happen at a macro-level, across a sector of the society. It is important to note that within that sector of society, many have the same grievances as the popular figure. Once a macro-level alignment took place, U.S. forces were able to institutionalize the SOI program. It is important to note that the bulk of the realignment process in both cases was ideological. Most of the steps involved in the early phases were not economic

in nature. Only when an ideological shift occurred, buffered by an opportunity for economic and political security, did realignment take place.

The issue for host nation and coalition forces is that in order for the realigned factions to aid in counterinsurgency, they must be able to self-organize and protect themselves, as well as their communities. The realigned factions also had a leading figure, which convinced others to join the cause. The problem is that self-organization by militant groups, especially those with a leading figure, are perceived as a threat to the state and entrenched politicians. There was also a problem with the legitimacy of the organization. While the U.S. and many Iraqi citizens appreciated the efforts of the SOI, they were never truly seen as a legitimate organization.

Yet, in essence, it was the SOI that reflected the U.S.'s counterinsurgency doctrine of population-centric, rapidly adapting, tactical-level resistance. The Sunni realignment in both Anbar and Baghdad also demonstrates that the impetus to "change sides" often happens on a personal level before it grows into an ideological movement. Likewise, the Sunni Awakening shows that realignment is often initialized because of betrayal and opportunities for advancement, and not necessarily by monetary gain. As the Awakening movements grew, it became a way for former military members and jobless men to find meaningful employment (Chakmakchi, personal communication, August 11, 2014). So, while initial recruitment was ideologically driven, over time it became a security business (Chakmakchi, personal communication, August 11, 2014).

This analysis suggests that political factions will realign based on individual considerations that then develop into macro-level movements. Thus, nor agent-based nor structure-based arguments alone can explain the process by which the leaders switched sides. Thus, it is important to combine both agency (in terms of micro-behaviors by political actors) and structure (in terms of initial conditions) when assessing both the Anbar and Baghdad Awakenings. An important concept within the self-organization literature is the idea of "critical mass." Theories of self-organization suggest that individual considerations aggregate to a point of critical mass in order to become macro-level movements. In the case of Iraq, there were individuals like Abu Abed and Sheikh Abu Risha who decided *as individuals* to align with the Americans, but the macro-level Awakening movement did not gain momentum until enough individuals had joined the SOI. Both Abu Abed and Abu Risha were charismatic leaders, who propelled a wider social movement.

Yet, there is no consensus on whether or not a single personality can shape an entire movement. Colonel Simon Gardiner, a now retired Army Civil Affairs Officer that served in Iraq during the surge, points to the importance of personal leadership in countering insurgency (Gardiner, personal communication, May 17, 2014). Equally important during the *Sahwa* was the role of a leading figure, like Abu Risha or Abu Abed, who had charisma and leadership capabilities, as well as the ability to convince others to "switch sides."

On the other hand, then-Major General John Kelly, who was the Multi-National Force-West commander during the height of the surge, states that "[n]o single personality was the key in Anbar...[i]t was a combination of factors, not the least of which...was the consistent command philosophy" (Kelly, 2009). It is important to understand that under the previous regime in Iraq there was a cult of personality that promoted the adulation of Saddam Hussein. Likewise, a leading figure in Arab politics often dominates, which is common in authoritarian governance (Sassoon, 2011, p. 175). So, it is not surprising, from a cultural standpoint, that the actions of one person would be celebrated by elements of the Iraqi populace.

The importance of charismatic leadership as a source of legitimate authority was seen during the Sunni Awakening, but perhaps underappreciated by coalition forces, which were more accustomed to legal-rational and traditional sources of authority. In the aforementioned cases, the U.S. didn't approach Abu Risha or Abu Abed with the notion of realignment or switching sides. To the contrary, the U.S. military's role came later; the military was needed to gain them battlefield success, which in turn gave them more legitimacy and more popular support. The rapid rise of Abu Abed as a charismatic leader is especially important, as his power rested on his image of being able to perform heroic deeds, often by what were seen as irrational or untraditional means. So, the critical point in realignment for the U.S. military is not in the institutionalization of security programs, but the point between an individual's realignment and the perception of their battlefield successes.

Therefore, it is logical to conclude that in their formative stages, political factions typically behave in accordance with agent-based considerations. As the political groups mature, they typically follow a charismatic leader to the point of institutionalization. Once political groups mature to the point of institutionalization they are more likely to behave in accordance with structural theories from the neorealist literature. This suggests that alignment and alliance building is a process based on structural constraints only at the point of institutional maturity. When the political party or militant group is not institutionally mature, it will rely more upon charismatic leadership or agent-level motivations. Once the group has matured, it will behave more in accordance with the neorealist literature and less on the authority of the charismatic leader.

NOTES

1. See also: (Booth, 1987; Liska, 1962; Snyder, 1997; Walt, 1995; Wilkins, 2012).
2. See also: (Bengio, 1998; Lewis, 1995; Tripp, 2007; Yitzhak, 1995).
3. The 'big bang' approach to economic reform suggests market-oriented reforms should be implemented before entrenched politicians can block them. See: (Islam, 2006).
4. For additional background on how the Army uses money as a weapon system see: Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapon System" April 2009 <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-27/09-27.pdf>; (Petraeus, 2008).

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The Strategic Relevance of Modern Foreign Internal Defense and Security Force Assistance Initiatives

James M. DePolo

U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA

This article highlights the necessity for the U.S. Department of Defense to increase focus and commitment of resources toward foreign internal defense and security force assistance capabilities. It analyzes reductions in defense resources among simultaneous emergent threats, which predicates the need for increasingly efficient and persistent force multiplication effects abroad. Modern analysis of a successful security cooperation vignette is utilized to conceptualize the potential impacts of effective foreign internal defense efforts, which further enabled export of security cooperation strategy through third party partnerships. This article shows key lessons learned through historical venues among the armed services, which outline imperative considerations in developing future security cooperation programs. It explores various modern approaches utilized by the service components to help illustrate challenges and opportunities, which are helping to shape future partner capacity-building platforms across the armed services.

Keywords: conventional forces, foreign internal defense, foreign security forces, security cooperation, special forces, SFA security force assistance, special operations forces, TAA- train, advise, assist

As the United States prepares to deal with adversaries and to help defend partners, it is at the risk of becoming overextended. US national security resources are shrinking as its challenges are expanding. US engagement with friends and foes alike, therefore, must reconcile this potential mismatch between resources and requirements, and between means and ends. (Binnendijk, 2016)

The current state of military affairs for the U.S., when aligned against economic principles, shows an increasing demand with a decreasing supply. As the scope of threats across the world continues to increase and military resources continue to decrease, the U.S. faces growing challenges which require innovative strategic focus to help balance supply and demand disparities. A study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments highlights this trend in stating “the Navy and Marine Corps are facing a fundamental choice: maintain current levels of forward presence and risk breaking the force or reduce presence and restore readiness. . .this choice is driven by the supply of ready naval forces being too small to meet the demand from Combatant Commanders, as adjudicated by the Secretary of Defense” (Clark and Sloman, 2016, p. 1). Growing challenges with terrorism, both domestic and abroad, cannot be

Correspondence should be addressed to James M. DePolo, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, USA. E-mail: james.m.depolo.mil@mail.mil

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solved strictly with military offensive capabilities. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may have depleted both the American resolve for war and the bank accounts to fund large-scale operations. At the same time, current and potential threats must be engaged to help maintain world order and progress.

In an environment representative of resource and demand imbalance, variables that can help remedy the offset become highly influential. Considering scenarios in the national and global security domains, an updated security strategy of the U.S. becomes fundamentally paramount. Through the evolution of prominent global security situations in recent years such as those involving ISIS, the U.S. continues to assess and adjust national security strategies and strategic defense guidance. In December 2016, then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter epitomized the notion of evolving U.S. security strategy in the Middle East and “elsewhere,” highlighting the change in approach from one of direct U.S. engagement of the enemy to engagement through capable partners (Carter, 2016). Using ISIS as an example, the contemporary defense strategy of the U.S. continues to show increased global focus on building partner capacity. With strategic guidance showing an increased focus on building partner capacity, a predominant question arises: how can the U.S. military contribute to the accomplishment of strategic security objectives through increased focus on security cooperation (SC) activities?

Background and Significance

Over the past 50 years, Department of Defense (DoD) SC activities, specifically foreign internal defense (FID) and security force assistance (SFA) have displayed positive impacts on national defense strategy throughout the world. Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), National Security Strategy (NSS), and National Military Strategy (NMS) helps validate the need for effective FID and SFA in support of contemporary security strategy. Associated with relatively low resource costs in comparison to large-scale troop deployments, FID and SFA can prove vital among DoD efforts to accomplish national security objectives. In a contemporary operational environment (COE) characterized by increased resource constraints and heightened threats, the innovative and programmatic implementation of FID and SFA will become strategic catalysts to accomplishing future defense objectives.

Across the armed services, there is a growing application of partner capacity-building efforts which include formalization of concepts and programs. Within the U.S. Air Force (USAF), permanent educational infrastructure was recently established in the realm of advisory capabilities focusing on building partner capacity (Zadalis, 2013). Most significantly perhaps are efforts observed across the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and U.S. Army. USMC efforts include the creation of a security cooperation command as well as a Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) for advisors (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2016). On another front, the current Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), recently announced an initiative to create permanent SFA brigades over the next five years (Milley, 2016). Relatively new constructs across the services, these programs will continue to develop in support of evolving national defense strategy.

Methodology

This research supports the importance of more robust and updated FID and SFA practices in relation to the present and future global environments. It explores the current and evolving

threats to national and global security while analyzing relevant constraints associated with the defense budget, elements of national power, national will, and political implications of U.S. military activities abroad. Review of strategic guidance highlights the challenges and opportunities for the U.S. military in the areas of FID and SFA as they align against the QDR, NSS, NMS, and recent DoD guidance for SC. A modern vignette articulates the effectiveness of FID and SFA when properly implemented as part of defense strategy. Assessment of the COE associates defense strategy to show DoD successes and challenges associated with FID and SFA paradigms. Simultaneously, this research ties tactical and operational procedures and effects with strategic objectives.

The analysis here examines programs across the armed services aimed at building partner capacity, while demonstrating their efficacy in the realm of national defense strategy. Evidence of successful FID and SFA over time, when balanced against cost-benefit analysis, helps validate the argument of this monograph, and the implications for FID and SFA in support of defense strategy. Unclassified data in regard to ongoing FID and SFA missions along with an increased global demand for military activities also support the thesis. Recent articles, best practices, lessons learned, and vignettes also aided in the development of this monograph.

CHALLENGES FACING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

In comparison to the past century, the exponential threats the U.S. and her partners face today are not as linear or defined. Among the hazards associated with the current environment are physical threats posed by both nation states and non-state actors. From Russia's reemergence and recent operations in Ukraine and Crimea, to China's increasing escalation of confrontational activities in the Pacific, to Iran's nuclear programs to the continued unpredictability of North Korea, nation states continue to be at the forefront of global security concerns. To further complicate matters, non-state actors and organized criminal organizations continue to threaten sovereignty around the world. From the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and continued hostilities from Al Qaida, to drug trafficking organizations (DTO) and other organized crime groups, the demand for defense resources continues to increase.

A review of defense requirements and defense resources depicts the national defense budget and the size of the joint force remaining key subjects of debate and uncertainty. The 2014 QDR Executive Summary highlights this outlook in stating "the QDR demonstrates our intent to rebalance the Department itself as part of our effort to control internal cost growth that is threatening to erode our combat power in this period of fiscal austerity" (U.S. DoD, 2014, p. iv). More powerful perhaps is a quote from former President Obama in describing his view of the global security environment, in his opening letter for the 2015 NMS which reads "[a]s powerful as we are and will remain, our resources and influence are not infinite" (Obama, 2015, p. 2). Understanding the problematic economic situations in the U.S. and around the globe, it is easy to comprehend genuine concerns and high scrutiny pertaining to federal defense expenditures. A general lack of agreement in defense budget among defense representatives, Congress and political leaders continue to dilute measures of predictability when it comes to defense resources.

In 2016, the federal budget process showed continued disagreements as the President's request of five hundred thirty-four billion dollars was undercut by the Congress, and in the end five hundred twenty-two billion was authorized (U.S. DoD, 2015b). With Congressional

lack of punctual defense budgeting for the commencement of a fiscal year since 2008, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter continued to stress the correlation between a stabilized defense budget and defense readiness (U.S. DoD, 2015b). Debates over the defense budget continued to escalate in 2016, when Carter threatened to recommend a veto of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act if it contained a “raid on war funding” which would increase risk to U.S. national defense (U.S. DoD, 2016b). Similar budget matters continue to be problematic with unresolved issues going into 2018. The impacts of continuing uncertainty in defense budgets, when combined with a scaled reduction in joint force strength present even more of a challenge to the supply of defense resources.

Military personnel costs continue to comprise a significant portion of the DoD budget, and showed a 46% increase between 2000 and 2014 (U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 2014). Following the force surges for Iraq and Afghanistan circa 2007–2010, U.S. Military ground force numbers were at their highest level since the end of the Cold War (Coleman, 2014). With the joint force continuing to shrink from peak numbers in 2010 of 1,430,985, the Army and USMC continue to endure the majority of the reductions (Coleman, 2014). During the peak year, the Army consisted of 566,045 troops while the Marines counted 202,441 active duty personnel (Coleman, 2014). Moving forward to 2015, the Army’s troop strength was down to 490,000 with projected reductions of another 40,000 between 2016 and 2018 (U.S. DoD, 2015a). Under the new Presidential Administration, this trend was reversed in 2017 with an end strength of 476,000, still down around 90,000 from 2010 (U.S. DoD, 2015a). As the USMC continued to reduce troop strength from 186,000 in 2015, the Marines reached their target of 182,000 in 2017 (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2016; U.S. Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Concepts and Programs, 2015). Although reducing the force structure can help reduce the DoD base budget, there are also extensive budgetary implications associated with funding large-scale operations. Between 2015 and 2016 the Overseas Contingency Operations budget added approximately sixty billion dollars to the overall defense budget, with the majority aligned against Afghanistan (U.S. DoD, 2016a, pp. 1–2). Outside of extensive monetary costs, other factors exist which contribute to the challenges to current defense strategy.

Central to the 2015 U.S. National Military Strategy assessment of the strategic environment is globalization which continues to bring increases in new technology. Though technology enhances many capabilities of the U.S., it also challenges traditional advantages of the U.S. in the realm of the military and defense capabilities (Dempsey, 2015, p. 1). Challenges and opportunities associated with the cyber environment warranted the creation of the DoD Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) in 2010, which continues to grow in scope and resource requirements. The budgetary dialogue continued for the 2017 defense budget with an increase from 2016 of roughly nine percent requested for the CYBERCOM authorization (Pomerleau, 2016). Considering the cyber environment, this is yet another element which indicates the complexity associated with growing requirements to counter increasing threats around the world, and further highlights the need to streamline the U.S. approach to defense strategy.

The U.S. continues to develop and enhance ways to negotiate the turbulent global security environment, with efficiency in the employment of limited resources becoming more critical. With increases in global threats and reductions in resources, current defense strategy may soon prove invalid to meet the desired endstates. To help offset the supply/demand inequalities, the U.S. must work to increase the supply of resources, or at least the effects of the defense resources available. An increased focus on force multiplication methodology which can reduce

resource requirements while providing effective outcomes will be key to meeting national security objectives. One key way the U.S. Military can increase efficiencies and effects is through SC activities, specifically FID and SFA. Routinely ongoing throughout the world as part of Phase Zero (shape), both help to promote capable defense strategy and U.S. interests with reduced resource costs (Petit, 2013, p. 6). As the COE continues to change, an increased strategic focus on building partner capacity is simultaneously emergent.

NATIONAL STRATEGY GUIDANCE

Building partner capacity, forward presence, and military engagement are terms increasingly referred to in many contemporary strategic defense documents which all encompass DoD activities in support of national strategy. These efforts, which are used for the implementation of national defense policy, encompass a broad range of activities the U.S. conducts to achieve national objectives. Examining FID and SFA, it is imperative to understand where and how these activities fall contextually within the paradigm of SC and military engagement. This criticality exists through the exploration of national strategy, and helps tie activities into the context of strategic guidance found in national strategy documents. The relationships, definitions, and employment of FID and SFA among SC, forward presence, and military engagement activities can appear confusing in certain contexts. Exploration of various approaches to modern FID and SFA, to include both joint and Army doctrine, helps illustrate some similarities, disparities, and relationships between FID and SFA as they exist with broader SC efforts.

Within various joint and Army doctrinal publications, Figure 1 perhaps best simplifies the relationships with FID and SFA as they exist as SC activities. Observed in the chart, and echoed through Joint Doctrine Note (JDN, 2013, pp. 1–13), *Security Force Assistance*, Joint Publication




FIGURE 1 Security cooperation relationships. Field Manual (FM) 3–07.1, *Security force assistance* (2009), pp. 1–7.

(JP), 3–22 (2010), *Foreign Internal Defense*, and Army Field Manual (FM) 3–07.1 (2009), *Security Force Assistance*, SFA and FID are both subsets of SC, but are not subsets of each other (JDN, 2013, pp. 1–13). JDN 1–13 explains the relationships among FID and SFA, in which the following exist:

1. FID strictly addresses threats within a nation's borders as part of a nation's Internal Defense and Development (IDAD), where SFA encompasses both internal and transnational threats.
2. FID programs, with established objectives in support of the host nation (HN) IDAD, provide the ways (i.e., planned sequence of actions to achieve objectives), while SFA activities provide means such as SFA-qualified personnel, material, and equipment for training and/or advisory assistance to foreign forces from the tactical unit up to the ministerial level; at the tactical level, FID can also provide similar means as SFA through small training teams supporting foreign security forces (FSF).
3. Whereas FID at the strategic level encompasses all of the instruments of national power, SFA focusses on the military instrument through DoD resources.
4. SFA may provide many but not all of the activities through which FID can be accomplished. Other SC activities dedicated to the non-security sector that may support FID, such as bilateral meetings, intelligence, psychological operations or civil affairs activities, fall outside the scope of SFA.
5. SFA activities are conducted with, through, and by FSF, and the portion of SFA activities supporting an HN's efforts to counter threats from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency support FID.
6. FID at the tactical and operational level is primarily executed by Special Operations Forces (SOF); while FID is a legislatively mandated core activity of SOF, conventional forces (CF) also generate and employ organic capabilities to conduct these activities (JDN, 2013, pp. 1-4, 1-5).

Similar, yet divergent as the relationships between FID and SFA may appear, the context of FID and SFA activities addressed as subsets of SC will focus on DoD initiatives which address assistance to FSF as represented in the portion of [Figure 1](#) (Department of the Army FM, 2009, pp. 1–7). Though certain activities within the larger FID bubble may be planned and executed outside of DoD activities with the State Department or other agencies in the lead role, particular attention is given where FID and SFA overlap within the SC bubble (Department of the Army FM, 2009, pp. 1–7). In the COE, the terms train, advise, assist (TAA) are most commonly used to outline this focus area.

Within an established collection of contemporary national strategy documents, SC initiatives can be found as integral elements for the implementation of future strategy. Documents which span the recent past, present, and near-term future such as the QDR of 2014, the 2015 NSS, and the 2015 NMS, all contain evidence of the increasing utility of FID and SFA in national strategic policy. Exploring more detailed guidance for SC into 2017, additional specificity protrudes which showcases deep roots with FID and SFA in strategic guidance in the coming era of national security strategy. Summarizing the relationships shared by FID and SFA under the SC umbrella, the 2014 QDR effectively articulates some of the challenges of the COE, and how FID and SFA are programmed into the strategy as means to help meet national objectives.

2014 Quadrennial Defense Review

A document published every four years, the QDR assesses national security strategy and priorities. Beginning with the Secretary of Defense's cover letter for the 2014 QDR and throughout the document, the strategic objectives of national security policy effectively relate the importance of innovative FID and SFA as means to help achieve the strategic ends (U.S. DoD, 2014, pp. cover letter-ii). Serving as a basis to defense strategy in accordance with QDR endstates, dependence on alliances is paramount and depends heavily on U.S. DoD efforts to help grow partner capacity. Reviewing the importance of shared international understanding of the COE, the QDR outlines the context of helping to shape the strategic environment in projecting the ideals of the U.S. to develop partner capacities to eventually "play greater and even leading roles in advancing mutual security interests in their respective regions" (U.S. DoD, 2014, p. cover letter-ii).

With defense of the U.S. homeland at the forefront of national objectives, the QDR Executive Summary relates the development of partner capacity to other interrelated objectives such as the promotion of deterrence, counter-terrorism, and regional stability. Here, the QDR stresses the importance of effective SC which will promote forward presence and engagement with allies across multiple regions to help strengthen alliances (U.S. DoD, 2014, p. vi). Later as the QDR progresses to more detail on strategy, a quote from Chapter II (The Defense Strategy) of the QDR helps depict this association in stating "[b]uilding security globally not only assures allies and partners and builds partner capacity, but also helps protect the homeland by deterring conflict and increasing the stability in regions across the Middle East and North Africa" (U.S. DoD, 2014, p. 13). Referring to more specified regional approaches, the QDR focuses on specific geographical areas of concern to further articulate the need for restructure and innovation in SC as part of contemporary defense strategy.

Considering the global environment that continues to present increased demand for U.S. DoD efforts to promote security, the QDR specifies geographic focus areas to include the Asia-Pacific region, Middle East, Europe, and Latin America. In presenting the strategic aim for each of these areas, the QDR explains efforts to bolster SC efforts across all of the armed services. Specifically for ground forces that execute the majority of FID and SFA, the QDR outlines the use of persistent presence to include permanent basing and rotational forces, as well as episodic deployments to further "pursue increased training opportunities to improved capabilities and capacity of partner nations" (U.S. DoD, 2014, pp. 34–36). Relating the forecasted increase of regional engagement with the supply and demand challenge associated with increasing threats and decreasing resources, the QDR highlights the reduction of forces in Afghanistan and Iraq from a 2014 perspective. Considering the QDR is a four-year programmed document with DoD currently negotiating the operational environment nearly three years after the 2014 QDR was published, it is imperative to review more modern strategic assessments found in documents such as the latest National Security Strategy of the U.S.

2015 and 2017 National Security Strategies of the U.S.

Whereas the QDR places a higher emphasis on the military element of national power and DoD endeavors, the NSS is an all-encompassing document in the sense that it more equally balances the reliance on the four elements of national power. Through detailed exploration of the contents of this document, the aspects of the military element protrude as key factors in the

implementation of national security strategy. The President of the United States' (POTUS) cover letter in the 2015 NSS immediately set the stage for the assessment of future defense initiatives and the means to achieve national security objectives, which is further articulated in the introductory chapter of the strategy. Here President Obama stated “[a]s powerful as we are and will remain, our resources and influence are not infinite,” which projects the common theme of increased challenges and limited defense resources (Obama, 2015, p. cover letter, 2). As the 2015 NSS progressed, the validity of innovative SC practices became more visible.

The introduction of the 2015 NSS placed a strong emphasis on U.S. leadership in the global environment as a critical component to execute national security objectives. Within the realm of American leadership, the NSS tied the importance of alliances and collective action while discussing the way ahead in terms of expansion and reform of SC efforts (Obama, 2015, p. 3). The second chapter among six of the NSS, focused on security and is where the most correlation between SFA, FID, and future security strategy exist. Within the introductory paragraph of this chapter, the NSS presented the importance of SC initiatives in stating, “we will focus on building the capacity of others to prevent the causes and consequences of conflict” (Obama, 2015, p. 7). In the following sections of the security chapter, an increased focus on the strategic importance of FID and SFA was observable.

The wide variety of topics presented in the NSS's chapter on security span eight separate subsections of security policy. Amid these subsections, topics ranged from climate change to weapons of mass destruction to physical defense of the homeland (Obama, 2015, p. 7). The two which emerged with distinct influence focus on counterterrorism (CT) and capacity building as primary venues for FID and SFA in their relevance as strategic catalysts. On the CT front, without discounting global terrorist organizations, the 2015 NSS presented the Middle East as the primary geographical area of concern. Here, the NSS highlighted the efficiencies associated with SFA and its associated strategic importance through discussion of ending combat operations in Afghanistan and using a TAA approach to promote governance and stability in conjunction with CT operations (Obama, 2015, p. 10).

In addition to the 2015 NSS showcasing the strategic importance of SC, as part of President Trump's recently published NSS, the 2017 NSS further displays this trend. While summarizing the 2017 NSS in a regional context and stating ways in which the U.S. will militarily execute this strategy, verbiage such as “we will strengthen our long-standing military relationships and encourage the development of a strong defense network with our allies and partners” continues to demonstrate national attention to SC (Trump, 2017, p. 47). With the two most recently published security strategies of the U.S. portraying SC initiatives such as FID and SFA as key ingredients among other elements of national power to achieve national security objectives, the 2015 NMS remains the last unclassified version of this document and derives concepts from the NSS which are more focused from a military standpoint. Exploration of this document further validates the high demand for SC activities alongside other DoD capability sets.

2015 National Military Strategy of the U.S.

The 2015 NMS contextually parallels the QDR and NSS as a derivative strategic document while presenting more micro-level focus on DoD's roles in the execution of defense strategy. In doing so, the NMS utilizes the same enduring national interests and national security objectives as a framework for this strategy document. Going a step further, the NMS establishes three main

national military objectives: first, deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries; second, disrupt, degrade, and defeat violent extremist organizations; and third, strengthen our global network of allies and partners (Dempsey, 2015, p. 5). Within these three objectives, the increasing relevance of SC initiatives, to include FID and SFA, is most prevalent in the third objective involving strengthening relations and capabilities among partners.

With an in-depth focus on regional stability through alliances and networking with partners, this objective within the NMS discusses collective abilities promoted through cooperative activities. At the forefront of this objective's written section, detailed ways and means are described to include those associated with the following: preservation of alliances, expansion of partnerships, training exercises, SC activities, and military-to-military engagement (Dempsey, 2015, p. 9). Specificity in geographically aligned regions are later articulated while discussing details of mil-to-mil engagement. For example, in the Asian region, nations such as Japan, Thailand, and Vietnam are within those aligned against SC topics such as cyber and maritime security, while explanation of European priorities centers on the NATO alliance and defines specific SC-related and multi-national SFA-based training events (Dempsey, 2015, p. 9). The closing paragraph of this section describes SC activities as "the heart" of military efforts to provide regional stability (Dempsey, 2015, p. 10).

In addition to the NMS highlighting the importance of security force assistance-related activities in conjunction with one of its three main objectives, the NMS further relates the importance of such activities in describing the twelve Joint Force Prioritized Missions. In this section of the NMS, FID, and SFA are realized under SC activities in the explanation of the joint priority: "[c]onduct Military Engagement and Security Cooperation—the U.S. Military strengthens regional stability by conducting security cooperation activities with foreign defense establishments. Such activities support mutual security interests, develop partner capabilities for self-defense, and prepare for multinational operations. Strengthening partners is fundamental to our security, building strategic depth for our national defense" (Dempsey, 2015, p. 12). Through conceptual explanation of this joint priority in the NMS, the strategic reliance on FID and SFA is evident.

Through detailed exploration of the complexities of current and emerging environments, it is evident the U.S. defense strategy considers the disparity between security challenges and available resources. In-depth analysis of four contemporary national strategic security documents further points to the increasing importance of building partner capacity and strengthening relationships among partners of the U.S. Understanding FID and SFA activities executed by DoD entities in cooperation with other governmental agencies remains a fundamental concept toward implementation of security strategy, it is important to conceptualize the achievement of strategic success. Review of a historical vignette involving complex problem sets and complex environments helps illustrate challenges and successes of past partnership ventures.

COLOMBIA: A CASE STUDY

In 2013, describing turmoil around the world, former Central Intelligence Agency Director David Petraeus and Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution explained, "Colombia has come a long way in its half-century fight against drug trafficking, insurgency, kidnapping, and murder. At a time of acute doubt over the future of the Middle East in particular, Colombia

provides a model for progress as well as a reminder of requirements necessary to enable success” (Petraeus and O’Hanlon, 2013). Through observation of a whole of government approach which included a heavy focus on building partner capacity within Colombian security institutions, the Colombian experience depicts a positive example of U.S. security strategy implementation. Peaking in the 1990s with instability, Colombia was well known for acts of internal terrorism, drug cartels, murders, and kidnappings (Tomaselli, 2013). Through a combination of Colombian efforts and U.S. assistance, though challenges still remain, Colombia has witnessed an overall impressive reestablishment of stability in areas associated with governance and security. Perhaps most impressive in Colombia’s success story is the nation’s recent actions not only to gain control of its internal security situation, but its ability to export security assistance to neighboring and partnering nations.

From the heavy influence of major drug cartel leaders such as Pablo Escobar in the 1980s, to the rise of left wing insurgencies in the 1990s, Colombia continued to experience a series of threats which undermined domestic stability “tearing at the national fabric of social cohesion, and challenging the government’s monopoly of power” (Long, Helmus, Zimmerman, Schnaubelt, & Chalk, 2015, p. 60). Late in the 1990s, a combination of growing power and influence among insurgent groups and challenges within the Colombian Military (COLMIL) showed a drastic deterioration of internal security. Boldly transitioning from traditional insurgent tactics, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was able to mobilize successful, large-scale conventional combat tactics against the Colombian Army, and in 1997 was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. (U.S. Department of State, 2016). By 1998, FARC offensives against Colombia military units produced considerable results, but were not the only security concerns for the Colombian Government (Moyar, Pagan, and Griego, 2014, p. 14).

Outside of increased battles with insurgents and Colombia’s security forces, violent crime plagued many cities and towns. In 2000, Colombia led the world as the nation with the highest murder rate (Nation Master, n.d.). Furthermore, kidnappings, attacks against security institutions, along with other violent crimes conducted by cartels and leftist extremist organizations, continued to contribute to the unrest around the country. Assessed as too unstable for many, several hundred thousand affluent Colombians secured visas and departed their homeland for other, more secure places to live (Moyar et al., 2014, p. 14). At such a pace, without outside assistance, Colombia’s government may have reached a point of failure to maintain power and influence across the country. As U.S. foreign policy experts recognized the impact of the fragile Colombian state as a major threat to regional security and U.S. interests, in 1999 Colombia’s President Andres Pastrana requested assistance from the U.S., in an effort which would later be called “Plan Colombia” (Restrepo, 2016).

Fast forwarding 10 years, data collected from 2000–2011 revealed a 92% reduction in kidnappings, 45% reduction in homicides, and 71% reduction in terrorist attacks, with an estimated reduction in cocaine production by 61% (U.S. Department of State, 2011). Once a nation where its inhabitants fled the borders for their own safety, Colombia now sees flourishing tourism and boasts perhaps the most capable security institutions across the Americas. This drastic turn of the tables did not come without cost or dedication on behalf of multiple leaders, agencies, and foreign support. Colombia’s resurgence is primarily due to Colombia’s own efforts, yet the influence of American military and other governmental support are not to be discounted (Petit, 2013, p. 120). The overarching strategy which helped bring about Colombia’s

success story, Plan Colombia, encompassed a whole of governmental approach, though it was often scrutinized as being overly focused on Colombia's military and police (Petit, 2013, p. 123).

Through the incorporation of diplomatic, information, military, and economic efforts, Plan Colombia displayed overlapping objectives among the two major players. For the U.S., countering the exportation of narcotics from Colombia and economic development were at the forefront of policy objectives, where the Colombian government also prioritized promotion of internal peace and security as well as economic development (Veillette, 2005, p. 2). At the heart of the strategic objectives of both nations, enhancing the capabilities of Colombian security institutions served as the basis for policy implementation. The strategy led by Colombian President Alvaro Uribe beginning in 2002 reflected a change to where security was viewed as the top priority for Colombia, and would provide the conditions for improvements in governance and economic development (Moyar et al., 2014, p. 25). In efforts to set these conditions, Uribe began to increase resources to the Colombia Military which included doubling the Colombian defense budget to four percent of the gross domestic product, an increase in the size of the Army by 60,000 personnel, and the creation of five joint commands responsible for the regional operational areas of Colombia's major threat groups (Long, et al., 2015, p. 62). As Plan Colombia continued to evolve with security force capabilities at the forefront of Colombian policy, U.S. Military support to Colombia paralleled Uribe's strategy.

An enduring regional ally of Colombia, prior to Plan Colombia the U.S. traditionally maintained a force cap of 400 military and 400 military contractors for support to Colombia Security institutions (Moyar et al., 2014, p. 26). Through a combination of factors to include the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in 2001, authorization through executive order granting increased authorities for funding and operations in Colombia, and increased requests from Colombia for more U.S. aid to the COLMIL, the U.S. force cap doubled in military personnel to 800 and increased to 600 contractors (Moyar et al., 2014, p. 26). U.S. funding to Plan Colombia significantly increased from 276 million dollars in 2001 to 808 million dollars by 2003, followed by a relatively stable level from 2004–2010 with figures between 600–700 million dollars (Restrepo, 2016). Included in these aid packages were costly military expenditures on key equipment such as helicopters in which the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade tripled its number of aircraft to more than 100 helicopters (Restrepo, 2016). Within the expansion of aid, U.S. military personnel support remained a key component of Plan Colombia.

As influential as monetary support and equipment were to the Colombian security institutions, a significant contribution from the U.S. came as SC activities focused on advisory efforts. A similar notion remains within the current U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) posture statement which includes the lines of efforts conducted in the GCC's Area of Responsibility (AOR). Here the document states "*building partner capacity* is the cornerstone of everything we do" (Tidd, 2016, p. 14). Looking at Plan Colombia from its inception to the current SOUTHCOM activities in Colombia, persistent FID/SFA activities remain a main effort. With a range of partner capacity-building advisory efforts, varying in authorities, techniques, locations, focus areas, target audience, and U.S. military forces involved, both U.S. SOF and conventional forces have continued to remain critically involved in Colombia's resurgence for more than fifteen consecutive years.

Prior to the formalization of Plan Colombia from 1999–2000, USSOF were at the forefront of engagement with Colombian security intuitions (Moyar et al., 2014, p. 17). Starting with a mere 65 advisors from the U.S. Army's 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) (Airborne) between

1999 and 2001, small groups of advisors focused on three Colombian counter-narcotics battalions and a newly-created brigade headquarters (Moyar et al., 2014, p. 17). The efforts which were relatively limited in scope trained more than 2,300 Colombian troops on light infantry and airmobile tactics, human rights training, and staff planning processes (Moyar et al., 2014, p. 17). As U.S. commitment to Plan Colombia progressed regarding U.S. military advisory efforts, additional U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) SOF advisors from across the services participated in various capacities and specialized focus areas. With the 7th SFG maintaining the largest role as far as command structure and persistent engagement, during the peak of the 7th SFG's engagement in the 2003–2004 timeframe, battalion-sized formations of special operators spearheaded FID efforts involving building partner capacity across the Colombian National Police and Colombian Army. As the demand for special operators needed for combat operations across Afghanistan and Iraq increased circa 2007–2010, SOUTCHCOM-focused USSOCOM forces became more involved in Middle Eastern combat roles, which resulted in a decrease in USSOF advisory resources for Colombia (Moyar et al., 2014, pp. 26–35).

Maintaining a steady demand for American support with a continued force cap of 800 U.S. military personnel, SC activities involving advisory efforts increasingly involved conventional U.S. forces. Whereas in the past, the focus of advisory efforts had been predominantly SOF-led efforts, U.S. conventional advisory efforts slightly changed the scope of mil-to-mil engagement. The U.S. Military Group (MILGRP) stationed in Bogota, Colombia assumed the lead as the major U.S. entity providing advisory support, and executed with more focus on logistics and operational planning at the strategic to brigade levels. In 2007, 80% of all advisory efforts in Colombia were being executed under the MILGRP by conventional U.S. forces. Whether the preponderance of advisory efforts was delivered by SOF or conventional forces, a key takeaway involves the persistent and influential engagement of advisors in support of Colombia's successful recovery as a nation.

Reviewing the resultant data as part of what may be considered a role model for a theatre SC plan, Colombia's data is impressive. The following key results apply:

1. COLMIL forces continue to successfully target and kill Senior FARC leaders. Since 2008 they have killed the overall commander of the FARC, two "second in commands" and numerous other senior tactical and operational leaders associated with the secretariat leadership of the FARC (Stone, 2011).
2. All of the 1,099 municipalities in Colombia are under Colombian governmental control, and by 2014 the country's homicide rate reached a three-decade low (Restrepo, 2016).
3. Between 2002–2015 the FARC was reduced from approximately 21,000 to 6,000 (Alsema, 2018).
4. Kidnappings continue to decrease: In 2000 kidnappings were at a high of 3,572 per year and by 2015 kidnappings had dropped to 277 per year. Wherein 2000 the vast majority of kidnappings were the acts of insurgent groups, by 2015, 75% of kidnappings were not associated with these groups and were attributed to common criminals (Gurney, 2015).
5. Comparing security expenditures of the U.S. to showcase the return on investment for Colombia: by 2015, the U.S. had spent \$10 billion on Colombia as compared to 1.6 trillion dollars spent for Afghanistan and Iraq combat and reconstruction efforts, which equates to approximately 10 billion dollars spent every 29 days (Restrepo, 2016).

Results from a deliberate and concentrated effort in internal security display a completely different environment from Colombia in 2000. Along with Colombia's continued security progress on a larger scale, the FARC and Colombian Government finally reached a peace accord in the late summer of 2016, after more than 50 years of fighting (Kerry, 2016). Though the Colombian populace voted and later rejected the details of the agreement by a thin margin in votes, the Government continues to work to progress with the successful gains made by the agreement between both the FARC and the government to end the fighting (U.S. Institute for Peace, 2016).

Colombia's national security success within its own borders continues to expand in the realm of regional SC initiatives. What can be considered "U.S. SC by proxy" or "leading from behind," Colombia continues to receive and fulfill increasing numbers of requests for SC support from regional partners (Tickner, 2014). Between 2009 and 2013, Colombia's International Affairs Office of the Colombian National Police reported the training of more than 20,000 security personnel from forty-seven different countries in security-related tasks and operations (Tickner, 2014). Colombia's increasing capability to support U.S. and regional security strategy through the execution of FID and SFA reflects a unique and relevant correlation between low-cost, low resource, and effective execution of national security policy. A summary of Colombia's resurgence highlights the implications of U.S. SC activities, and is visible through comments from Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander of USSOUTHCOM where he states, "[a]fter 51 years of armed conflict, Colombia—a strategic ally, friend and preeminent partner—is on the verge of ending the hemisphere's longest-running guerilla war. Thanks to its own efforts and our sustained assistance, Colombia has been transformed from a near failed state into a major regional player with significant political influence, world-class security forces, and a growing economy" (Tidd, 2016, p. 14).

PROGRAMS AND LESSONS FROM SFA AND FID IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Looking across the U.S. military services, advising FSF continues to become more common. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) provided the most notable platform for conventional military forces in advising FSF, as stressed from a strategic perspective through former Secretary of Defense Gates' comments in 2007 when he stated "...arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries" (Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2008). For SOF, specifically U.S. Army Special Forces, though the theaters and authorities have changed for certain missions, SFA and FID have remained a constant and highly sought application. Looking back to U.S. military efforts in the early days of combat operations in Afghanistan from a doctrinal perspective, SOF operations did not fall under SC activities. Arguably however in practice, as USSOF partnered with Northern Alliance Forces to topple the Taliban regime in late 2001–2002, American advisory efforts were ongoing and unknown to the world at the time, the long-term future of partner capacity-building in Afghanistan was born. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 showed early success in dismantling the Iraqi

regime, and as the environment unfolded and strategies changed, the U.S. military again found itself with a need to employ advisory operations on a large scale.

Summarizing the recent history of the U.S. Army's path to increased focus on building partner capacity which parallels the other services, an article written in the November-December 2014 *Military Review* perhaps best summarizes the process in stating "[t]hus, after the Vietnam War, Special Forces honed their advising capabilities and deployed military advisors to numerous regions around the globe—albeit typically in much smaller advisor teams—while the conventional Army generally lost its advising capability until the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts after 9/11" (Hajjar, 2014, p. 25). Prior to the GWOT, Army Special Forces maintained their traditional role of advising regionally aligned FSF, as depicted in the Colombia scenario. As U.S. military SC and combat efforts continued to increase post 9/11, SOF from across the services assumed growing roles in partner capacity-building, with their highest concentration of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2013, with USSOF operating in 78 countries, the USSOCOM Commander Admiral William McRaven considered partner capacity-building to be "the best approach to dealing with some of the world's most complex security problems" (Marshall, 2013). Though SOF have advised a combination of Afghan and Iraq militias, SOF, conventional military forces and police units, the preponderance of SOF efforts in these two areas has been with elite military forces (Long et al., 2015, pp. 1, 43–44). Outside of USSOF, the growing demand for SFA and FID capabilities has led to increased conventional force involvement around the world.

Across the armed services, SFA and FID have become more common practice with increased resources committed to advising foreign militaries. For example, within the USAF, in formalizing the process to meet increasing global demands for general purpose force air advisors, the USAF Air Advisor Academy was created in 2007 as a permanent training organization under the USAF's Air Education and Training Command (AETC) (Zadalis, 2013, p. 4). By 2013 the Air Advisor Academy trained 3,400 airmen (Zadalis, 2013, p. 5). Since reaching full operational capability the same year, the academy now trains up to 1,500 airmen annually who "will advise counterparts in a multitude of nations across every region, supporting a wide array of contingency and peacetime missions around the world" (Zadalis, 2013, p. 5). Observing the U.S. Air Force's increased focus on SC activities, it is also important to consider modern joint CF efforts, which contribute significant amounts of forces to global SC endeavors.

The increased involvement of CF in SC activities associated with training and advising FSF through efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world since 9/11 is noteworthy. Among many programs, terminologies, and mission sets, the Army and Marines have utilized several prominent programs to execute these duties. Between various efforts, some of the most symbolic include military transition teams (MiTT), Brigade Combat Team SFA deployments, the Army's Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) paradigm and the USMC Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG), and Marine Free Military Occupational Specialty (FMOS) initiative (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2016). All with distinct formations, backgrounds, merits, and challenges, these initiatives executed in support of national security strategy, have remained flexible to meet the demands linked to complex security environments.

Joint Military Transition Teams

Similarities with situations in Afghanistan and Iraq displayed an increased need for building FSF. Programs which involved the most diversity for the services' contributions to building partner capacity in Afghanistan and Iraq centered on MiTTs. In the period circa 2003–2006 MiTTs in Afghanistan and Iraq were often ad-hoc organizations composed of a combination of Active duty, Reserve, and National Guard forces (Nagl, 2013, p. 5). These hastily created teams varied in size from eleven to sixteen personnel, lacked standardization in military occupational specialty composition, and received training varying in content and quality (Nagl, 2013, p. 5). With a high demand for qualified SFA resources, the U.S. Military increasingly institutionalized the MiTT construct.

By 2006, formalization of the MiTT concept was more solidified, with the Army taking the lead through the establishment of a permanent cadre as the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division (ID) was missioned to form the cadre and lead centralized MiTT training at Camp Funston, Fort Riley Kansas (Parker, 2009). Through this process, 10 to 15-man teams composed of servicemen from the Army, Navy, and Air Force were brought together as a team, and spent two months organizing as a MiTT (Parker, 2009). After organizing and receiving formal training, a MiTT would later deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq to advise FSF (Parker, 2009). The formalized MiTT training concept was executed at Fort Riley through 2009, at which time it transitioned to the re-activated, 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk, with a throughput of up to five thousand advisors per year (Morgan, 2009). Further prioritization and institutionalization among the MiTT architecture developed at the Department of the Army level. Here, senior leaders were designated to serve dual-hatted as senior advisors to foreign leaders, as well as commanders for MiTTs. These key leaders were selected through scrupulous annual command selection boards and participated in the formalized MiTT training process. The rapid expansion of the MiTT concept was shortly followed by a rapid decrease, which paralleled the force reductions and withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq between 2010 and 2014. The MiTT formations eventually dissolved and gave way to Brigade SFA deployments.

Army Brigade Combat Team Security Force Assistance Deployments

Through various techniques, missions, and formations, Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) have been executing SFA missions since the inception of the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. As early as 2010, Regional Command East in Afghanistan began to employ Army BCTs as modern SFA missions, which would later show the end of the traditional MiTT era and would pave the path for future SFA BCT missions (Gwinn, 2015, p. 66). With more employment in Afghanistan which has continued through the ongoing force reduction, similar BCT SFA deployments began in Iraq in 2014 in conjunction with the rise of ISIS. Under this construct, Army BCTs train and deploy with organic resources and personnel assigned to the deploying unit.

The exact composition of advisory teams within a BCT varies by mission. Factors leading to a general lack of uniformity include variances in targeted partner audiences, locations, force caps, and other environmental considerations. An example of a contemporary BCT SFA deployment to Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2016 involving advisory efforts from 2nd BCT, 4th Infantry Division (ID) help illustrate this paradigm. Here, the BCT manned approximately thirty advisor billets ranging in officer ranks from the BCT Commander (Colonel) down to a First

Lieutenant, and also included Non-commissioned Officers, DA Civilians, and contractors. This advisory team's targeted audience included commanders and staffs across four Afghan National Defense Forces to include an Afghan Army Corps, the Kandahar Provincial Police of the Afghan National Police, and Afghanistan Border Police. In other locations, task organizations, advisor team composition, and detailed roles of a BCT's advisory efforts can vary.

Pre-deployment SFA training a BCT receives is also variable depending on the assigned SFA mission set and other factors involving training levels and readiness guidance. As the MiTT paradigm faded and troop withdrawals from the Middle East continued, so did the scope of employment of the 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk. With the deactivation of the 162nd BDE in 2014, only the 3rd BN of the 353rd Regiment still remains as the source for training BCTs tasked to execute BCT SFA missions (Joint Readiness Training Center, n.d.). Reduced in scale, the 353rd currently runs a one-week SFA Advisor's course at Fort Polk and can also tailor mobile training teams to conduct home-station training for BCTs. One key tenet associated with building partner capacity which was more prevalent through the formalized MiTT concept but lacking through the SFA BCT model involves selection and training of advisors. Where SOF benefits through rigorous selection processes and incorporates partner-building/advisor skill set training into pipeline training, the void in these formal processes can be detrimental to conventional SFA efforts.

In addition to training challenges, BCTs face other complexities. For example, a SFA-designated BCT is often tasked with multiple deployment requirements within the assigned SFA mission, to include unilateral, or combined security-related activities. In some cases, as with the 2/4 Infantry BCT (IBCT) that also deployed a battalion simultaneously to Kosovo, a unit identified for a SFA deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan may be further tasked to execute various mission sets across different theaters. Though the main effort for the 2/4 IBCT deployment was SFA-related, the BCT conducted a decisive action mission readiness training exercise to maintain its core combat mission essential task (MET) proficiency levels, and later executed a one-week mobile training team event provided by the 3/353rd Battalion from Ft. Polk. Adding to the challenges of the SFA BCT concept, while considering unit readiness under the Army's Sustained Readiness Model (SRM), this type of situation poses significant challenges in the realm of training, mission command, and offset deployment timelines, which directly impact security capabilities at the national level.

Under the Army's 2016–2017 Strategic Readiness Guidance, the Army aimed to regain tactical prowess in combined arms operations while improving key aspects of strategic readiness in support of the NMS, through the SRM (Headquarters, DOA, 2016b). Under the SRM, a BCT is expected to maintain a relatively consistent level of proficiency in its core wartime METs, regardless of other deployments or emergent mission requirements. In the case of a BCT designated to execute a SFA mission, the challenge of maintaining decisive action/combined arms proficiency with SFA task training requires a delicate balance of multiple requirements. With the BCT often spread across two or more continents, having forward and rear command structures, it is also common to have subordinate units on different deployment/redeployment timelines, all of which can negatively impact collective BCT combined arms proficiency. Experiencing many of the same challenges of the SFA BCT deployment mission, the RAF concept is another common contemporary approach to meet the objectives of national security strategy.

Regionally Aligned Forces

The global footprint of U.S. forces changed drastically beginning in 2011, through a combination of large-scale troop withdrawals from Iraq as well as overseas base closures. Simultaneously, the idea of RAFs highlighted the strategic future landscape for governmental and military leaders. In January 2012 the Secretary of Defense of the U.S. outlined this future concept through strategic guidance, stating

[a]cross the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations including those in Africa and Latin America whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity. Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities. (Panetta, 2012)

This guidance to the components was further developed by the Army and eventually led to the employment of the RAF concept involving Army Brigades. In March of 2012, the CSA, General Ray Odierno, explained the 2013 initiation of the RAF concept in describing the involvement of the Total Army, also referred to as the “Total Force” (Active, Guard, and Reserves), with a purpose of “improving partner capacity, sustaining strong relationships, and to assist our Joint, Interagency, International, and Multinational partners in building a stronger global security environment” (Odierno, 2012). Later that year, the first RAF mission commenced with the 2nd Armored BCT, 1st ID (2/1 ABCT) out of Fort Riley, Kansas providing support to U.S. Africa Command. Since 2013, Army Brigades from the Total Force have been aligned against the six GCCs to execute RAF missions and deployments.

The RAF concept is designed to provide culturally and regionally-focused forces to GCCs for employment in support of their respective TSCPs with a heavy focus on SCA such as SFA. A RAF can be expected to conduct a wide variety of missions and tasks to include operational missions, bilateral, and multinational exercises with foreign partnered-nations along with other SCA as directed by the GCC. While an Army BCT may assume a RAF mission and related deployments, not all of the BCT will deploy and/or various units and key personnel may deploy to various locations at different times. The RAF construct involves leaving behind elements that can be reorganized as needed to continue training for future requirements or deployment in support of the RAF, as well as emergent tasks outside of the RAF requirements (Odierno, 2012). With the decentralization of forces necessary to meet the demands associated with the RAF concept, key challenges affect functions such as mission command as well as collective training requirements. This broad array of requirements poses additional challenges to the BCT’s training competencies.

A review of the 2014 CSA Strategic Guidance and Priorities showcases the flexibility required from a RAF BCT. Here, the BCT is expected to be trained to decisive action and globally responsive while simultaneously regionally engaged (Headquarters, DOA, 2014). Similar to the SFA BCT mission challenge in regard to readiness, the RAF concept can have negative impacts on a unit’s MET proficiency. Combining the training requirements and skills required to meet the demands of RAF specific missions, along with skill sets required for a BCT to remain globally responsive and competent in decisive action skills often prove challenging to

maintain. Along with challenges associated with the RAF concept, the RAF concept provides several key opportunities at the strategic and lower levels.

The RAF concept directly supports national strategic priorities in several key ways. When considering the processes involved to execute RAF deployments at the BCT to theater levels, there is a direct correlation with strategic priorities such as global responsiveness through improving deployment processes (Headquarters, DOA, 2014). In the realm of increasing deployments of forces across many regions, the RAF paradigm further enhances capabilities and relationships among partners, through multinational exercises and training events. A generally new concept with only three years since its inception, the RAF model will continue to take shape and serve as a solid foundation as a “way” to promote national security strategy.

United States Marine Corps Advisors

With a rich history in advising foreign militaries dating back to the early twentieth century in South and Central America, again in Vietnam, and most recently through actions in the Middle East through the GWOT, the USMC continues to exert influential leverage in the realm of building partner capacity around the world. As early as 1915, the USMC was influential in building partner capacity in support of U.S. national strategy through advisory efforts associated with the “Banana Wars” in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic (Rosenau et al., 2013, p. 9). The foundations established through advisory initiatives in Latin America continue to prove influential within today’s USMC advisory infrastructure. During this historical era, Marine advisors were challenged with increasing responsibilities outside of military-focused advisory roles. Leading constabulary organizations, Marines were involved with early whole-of-government approaches to promoting U.S. policy, often involving aspects of diplomacy, economics, law and order, as well as traditional military advising activities (Rosenau et al., 2013, pp. 10–16). As enlisted Marines often served as officers within such constabulary organizations, the increased responsibility, power, and influence associated with these billets often led to highly sought after Latin American posts for Marines (Melson, 2011, p. 13). One Marine NCO’s self-description of his duties and responsibilities while serving as an officer in the Haitian Constabulary (Gendarmerie d’ Haiti) in the 1920’s reads:

[h]is duties in this connection are manifold; he is responsible for the training of the native soldiers, their proper feeding and clothing, [and] instruction in their duties as police. He also is financial advisor of one or more towns. He is in charge of paying the civil officials of his subdistrict. These sub-districts are often spread over a large territory and he must make frequent inspections. He must also maintain friendly relations with the native officials in the different towns. For it is only by the cooperation of these officials that he can observe the workings of the courts, [and] the progress of the towns of which [he is the] financial advisor. (Melson, 2011, p. 13)

Similar in nature to some of the more contemporary advisory responsibilities of Marines in the GWOT, some of the experiences and key lessons learned include the importance of adequate pre-deployment training as well as the challenges associated with language and cultural barriers (Rosenau et al., 2013, p. 9).

As the USMC played an important role in advising South Vietnamese Forces in the 1950s-1970s, a variety of programs and experiences provided valuable lessons which continue to be integrated into the modernization of the USMC’s advisory methodology. With two main advisory programs

including the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) and Combined Action Program (CAP), advisor selection and pre-mission training contributed to varying degrees of success between the two (Rosenau et al., 2013, p. 31). Considering the two programs, an overall assessment reveals considerable investment in predeployment training and more detailed selection for advisors were generally more prevalent as part of the VNMC structure in comparison to the CAP, which resulted in considerable more challenges for the CAP advisors and mission (Rosenau et al., 2013, pp. 32–34). Similar lessons learned were later carried forward and revalidated as the Marines provided advisory efforts during military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Marine support to SC from 2003–2012 in Iraq and Afghanistan provided major partner capacity building support to the GWOT across a range of programs and formations. In Afghanistan and Iraq, Marine efforts varied in scope from small ad hoc Marine teams assisting U.S. Army Special Forces working with Afghan Commando Battalions, to part-time advisors with Iraqi Army units, to more deliberate efforts involving the 3rd Marine Division formally aligned against the advising mission for the Afghan National Army’s 201st Corps (Rosenau, et al., 2013, p. 55). Amid a long list of advisory and partnering efforts and organizations which Marines supported or led, some of the more formal endeavors included Marine MiTTs, Police Transition Teams, Coalition Military Assistance Training Teams, Advisor Support Teams, and Border Transition Teams (Rosenau et al., 2013, pp. 35–74). To date, the role of the Marine Advisor in Afghanistan continues to be at the forefront of U.S. and Coalition efforts in places such as Helmand Province where the Marines have a long history of combat and advisory operations.

In addition to the ongoing partner capacity-building efforts across the Middle East, USMC advisors continue to be paramount in the promotion of national security policy around the globe. The establishment of the MCSCG helped formalize the structure and focus of these efforts. Created in 2011 at Fort Story, VA, the MCSCG was established “as a unique command that consolidates all facets of SC to include advisor skills, training and assessment expertise, and security assistance program management” (U.S. Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Concepts and Programs, 2014).

Further institutional efforts within the USMC and the MCSCG in the realm of building partner capacity, includes a recent focus on tracking advisory experience, education, and skills across the ranks for talent-management purposes. With the creation of a Marine Free Military Occupational Specialty (FMOS) labeled Foreign Security Force Advisor (0570/0571 for enlisted/officers, respectively) in December 2014, and continued annual screening of personnel files, the USMC is aggressively maintaining visibility on these key skill sets within the ranks (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2016). Beyond a starting point in regard to the establishment of an advisory command and identification of advisory skill sets, with continued efforts in this arena, the USMC is postured to further enhance their ability to build partner capacity globally.

THE ARMY’S LATEST INITIATIVE: FUTURE SFA BRIGADES

In light of some of the key challenges with current practices and future demands associated with national security strategy, the Army is developing a new command architecture to help promote objectives centered on building partner capacity. The SFAB concept addresses several of the Army’s prevalent challenges to include impacts on BCT readiness associated with the RAF and

SFA BCT concepts, increased persistent engagement capabilities, and the ability of DoD's largest ground force to better support subsequent defense strategy. This structure, which stood up its first SFAB in 2017, is designed to encompass an entire Army Advisory Corps, composed of six brigades and two division-level headquarters (Headquarters, DOA, 2016a, p. 19). Serving as the Army's 39th CSA, in June of 2016 General Mark Milley publicly highlighted the versatility of capabilities of the Army in supporting GCCs with an operational SFAB as early as 2018 (Milley, 2016). With this first SFAB aligned against the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility, plans call for two more SFABs to activate by early Fiscal Year 2019 (Headquarters, DOA, 2016a, p. 7–8). Following these activations, three additional brigades, two divisions, and the corps headquarters' activations will follow (Headquarters, DOA, 2016a, p. 7–8). Now in the execution phase, this initiative displays the ability to best address current and future strategic requirements of the Army.

As the Army's force structure and end strength numbers continue to evolve in relation to DoD budgetary guidance, crafting the SFAB concept remains a work in progress. With the eventual goal of the SFA initiative centering around five active duty and one Army National Guard brigade, fully-manned organizations are not templated (Headquarters, DOA, 2016a, p. 4, 8). Describing a "cohort" type of architecture, General Milley envisions a skeletal framework of brigades that replicate modern combat brigades without manning these formations with lower enlisted personnel (Milley, 2016).

Encompassing the six templated SFABs, two are templated to be established as armored and four as infantry brigade variants (Headquarters, DOA, 2016a, p. 7–8). Manning of the SFABs consists primarily of NCOs and officers, with commanders and advisory team leaders being more senior in nature and proven former commanders with key and developmental billets successfully executed prior to assignment in the brigades (Headquarters, DOA, 2016a, p. 7). As part of the assignment process to the SFA organizations, personnel will undergo a formal training process.

As the CSA states, the formations will have a "little flavor of Special Forces in there and a flavor of the Foreign Area Officer program." Within these "flavors," majors will fill the roles of company commanders, and training for personnel assigned to the SFABs will include cultural and language skill set development brigades (Headquarters, DOA, 2016a, p. 7). Furthermore, SF Officers and NCOs will also serve among the ranks of the SFABs to provide residential expertise for the designed purpose of the SFABs. In the realm of training for future SFAB soldiers, in 2017 the Army stood up a permanent military advisor training academy (MATA) at Fort Benning, Georgia. With the MATA already training future advisors, the CSA's prioritization of SFA focus within the Army is clear (Headquarters, DOA, 2016a, p. 7). Creating this new advisory corps is a complex endeavor striving to better support strategic requirements.

Reviewing some of the key challenges associated with the current RAF or SFA BCT paradigms involving unit readiness and global engagement between partnered nations, the SFAB concept appears to address both. With the intent to produce regionally-focused units with SFA expertise, these brigades will be allocated to the GCCs for SFA employment, with the additional capability to perform as conventional combat units in cases of national emergency (Milley, 2016). Based on the cohort type of organization, the SFAB ranks could rapidly be filled with soldiers to round out the formations as combat units. In cases such as Operation Inherent Resolve or Resolute Support, where SC activities involving train, advise, and assist are key aspects of the mission, senior leaders, and staff members would be better equipped to serve

dual-hatted functions within the advisory division or corps as well as key advisors to foreign senior leaders. As a concept in its implementation phases, the Army staff continues to address some of its associated challenges.

With recent controversy among uniform items and roles which at a glance, parallel those of U.S. Army SF, General Milley has taken time to dispel rumors which have fueled such debates. Highlighting the distinct roles and capabilities of SF, the CSA stressed the differences in the mission sets of the two organizations where the SFABs will focus on conventional FSF and specialties such as general purpose aviation, artillery, sustainment, and infantry formations, SF specializes on smaller special purpose indigenous forces (Myers, 2017). In explaining the differences in employing the two organizations, General Milley states, “There is no intent to replace Special Forces, or to compete with Special Forces. This (the purpose of the SFAB) is a unique mission gap that needs to be filled” (Myers, 2017). Additionally, rumors of the SFABs wearing the earned and highly coveted SF “green beret” have also been dispelled as SFAB soldiers will not be entitled to green berets and will instead wear brown berets. Still in an infant state, the Army’s senior leaders continue to streamline the future construct to maximize the efficacy of this complex endeavor.

CONCLUSION

The world continues to experience growing threats and complexities related to regional and global security. As a global leader, the U.S. continues to face challenges in the realm of strategic security implications as growing concerns continue to mount in the arena of national security and projection of defense strategy. In an era of both domestic and international economic stress, national resources aligned against defense allocations are increasingly restricted and managed with extreme caution. With recent force drawdowns across the services, the challenges presented for security institutions continue to progress along expansive paths. Updated outlooks in the realm of strategic assessments and security strategies leads to changes in the ways and means the U.S. DoD will achieve future strategic endstates.

Change in national security strategy increasingly relies on SC activities such as FID and SFA. The notion of increasing focus towards building partner capacity continues to underwrite strategic defense methodology across a wide spectrum of programs, concepts, and strategic documents. Assessments from key defense documents, to include the U.S. QDR, NSS, and NMS all reveal this growing approach. Expressed concisely during perhaps President Obama’s final speech to a large military formation in December, 2016 at MacDill Airforce Base, President Obama highlighted a new strategic outlook while discussing the fight against terrorists in the Middle East in stating “we should ask allies to do their share in the fight, and we should strengthen local partners who can provide lasting security” (Obama, 2016).

The U.S. has a long history involving building partner capacity through FID and SFA. From the earliest days of U.S. military history, advising foreign militaries and building partner capacity has been an imperative aspect of the Defense Department’s lineage. With successful endeavors such as those in Colombia, the joint force has demonstrated the powerful resolve of well-executed SC programs across troubled regions. Further assessment of Colombia’s ability to export FID and SFA, or U.S. “SC by proxy” scenarios now taking place in Central and South America exemplify the progressive potentialities existing in the defense arena. Across the services modern initiatives,

concepts, and programs show the continued expansion of focus and capabilities related to strategic guidance and national defense strategy. Comparing a multitude of factors across the COE, the armed services' obligations and commitments increasingly support partner capacity-building.

With robust capabilities in the land, sea, and air domains, U.S. partner capacity-building platforms continue to expand across the services. Future SC programs which incorporate FID and SFA activities must be executed while considering key lessons learned from historical application as well as through the assessment of contemporary challenges. First, service command architectures must maximize centralization of the entities involved in the execution of FID and SFA, as is observed with the MCSCG model. Second, personnel serving in capacities focused on building partner capacity must be carefully selected and properly trained. Third, billets and/or career tracks established through service programs must be career enhancing and professionally appealing. Fourth, engagement strategies must be persistent in nature to foster rapport, trust, and access. Finally, expansion of SC within SFA and FID capability sets must increase capacity building efforts in areas such as cyber and other influential contemporary domains.

In summary, the U.S. continues to represent global leadership with the ability to project military power and influence worldwide. Among turbulent conditions, the strategic reliance on DoD's ability to build partner capacity continues to evolve with increasing importance. As the future asymmetric environment encompasses growing uncertainty and complexity, the U.S. Military must remain poised to meet the associated demands. Variations in contemporary defense strategy, further supported through increased dedication of resources by the services highlights the future relevance of FID and SFA in accomplishing national security objectives.

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Cyber War Has Arrived?

John Bahadur Lamb

Department of Criminology, Birmingham City University, Birmingham, UK

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks America readied itself to strike back against those it knew to be responsible. After failed diplomatic attempts to get the fundamentalist Taliban government of Mullah Omar to hand over bin Laden, a joint UK/USA invasion of Afghanistan was launched. However, unlike previous invasions, this campaign would not use large-scale deployments of troops but instead would make use of approximately 300 Special Forces operatives supporting intelligence agency staff. This paper argues that conducting an invasion in this way matches the theory of cyberwar proposed by Arquilla and Rondfelt (1993).

Keywords: Afghanistan, SOF, Cyber War

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the United States of America (USA) quickly identified the Islamist leader Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization Al Qaeda as being behind the attacks (9/11 Commission, 2004). A series of diplomatic efforts were made to try and secure the handover of bin Laden by the Taliban government of Afghanistan, but these attempts were repeatedly rejected by the group on the basis that bin Laden could not be linked categorically to the attacks (9/11 Commission, 2004). These rejections, coupled with the wound to America's collective psyche caused by 9/11, meant that America turned its retributive gaze upon the country hosting both the group and its leader: Afghanistan. The decision to respond with force was made easier due to both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) having invoked, for the first time in its history, Article Five of the Washington Treaty, thus declaring the 9/11 attacks as an attack against all of its member states (NATO, 2001). From this flowed a tide of political goodwill unleashed around the globe which saw states such as Pakistan and Russia offer support to the USA (Gannon, 2005; Rashid, 2008). Despite NATO invoking Article Five, the invasion would be launched bi-laterally by the USA and the United Kingdom (UK). This UK-USA alliance successfully invaded Afghanistan in 2001 disrupting Al Qaeda's safe haven, destroying some of its fighting capability and capturing or killing many of its commanders. Known as Operation Enduring Freedom, this invasion would evolve into the longest war in the USA's history and become a conflict whose efficacy has been discussed widely (Bergan, 2011; Bolger, 2014; Burke, 2011). Not wanting to add to the wide array of literature available on the later stages of the conflict, this paper instead looks at the lesser documented first two years of Operation Enduring Freedom.

This paper argues that these first two years (2001–2003) are somewhat of an oddity for several reasons. First, a very small number of Western troops were involved. Second, these troops were drawn primarily from UK-USA special operations forces (SOF) and were heavily aided by intelligence operators who were on the ground. Third, despite NATO and UN approval, the operation was carried out under a joint UK-USA command structure. These three reasons mean that the strategy of the early years of Operation Enduring Freedom has more in common with previous special operations forces raids than with previous invasions seeking regime change. Effectively, this paper presents a case study of Operation Enduring Freedom between 2001 and 2003 which argues that of these three it was the use of SOF with imbedded intelligence specialists that ultimately led to the success of the invasion. To support this argument this paper utilizes the theory of “cyber-war” articulated by Arquilla and Rondfelt (1993) as its frame of analysis which it uses to show how the invasion of Afghanistan matches and even potentially exceeds the model which they proposed.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 2001- 2003

Once the diplomatic attempts to have bin Laden handed over had failed it was inevitable that military action would take place against the Taliban government of Al Qaeda. America needed, in the face of the attacks, to both be seen to be responding for domestic and international political reasons and to also vent some of the anguish the attacks had caused the American people. Given that America, as the world’s only superpower, has the largest and best equipped military on earth, with hindsight it now appears anomalous that the invasion of Afghanistan was not launched using a more traditional invasion plan. For example, when George Bush Senior sought both to curb the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and potential regime change in the First Gulf War, huge numbers of men and materiel were amassed in Saudi Arabia, a massive air campaign was launched, and then the massed troops deployed over the borders (Gordon & Trainor, 1995). Known as “shock and awe,” this style of invasion is designed to shock an enemy into not being able to respond by the complete surprise destruction of command and control networks and to awe them into not wanting to fight through the application of overwhelming force (Haney & Thomsen, 2007).

Given that America maintains large numbers of troops in both Turkey and Saudi Arabia it had the ability to conduct a shock and awe style campaign against Afghanistan. Yet the choice was made to launch an altogether different style of invasion. This different style of invasion appears to have been conceived as an “invasion light” which would make use of a minimal number of special operations forces supported by air power and local allies (Wright & The Contemporary Operations Study Team, 2010). Why such a different approach was taken can potentially be explained by several factors. First, there were on-going clandestine operations, run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), taking place in Afghanistan in 2001. The existence of these operations, most notably JAWBREAKER, provided the UK-USA alliance with foundations, which included intelligence networks, on which they could quickly build (Berntsen & Pezzullo, 2005). Second, there was a desire amongst political and military chiefs in both capitals to act as quickly as possible. Speed was seen as being of the essence so that key individuals in the Taliban and Al Qaeda could not escape into the border areas of Pakistan. Equally, there appears to have been the view that speed of operation was important in order to demonstrate the

consequences of striking America (Rashid, 2008). Third, the terrain of Afghanistan makes a conventional shock and awe style invasion difficult as moving large numbers of troops and materiel in country are hindered by mountainous terrain, difficult allies (Pakistan) and ungoverned spaces (Federally Administered Tribal Areas). Fourth, the UK-USA coalition may have learned the lessons of the failed Soviet invasion of 1979.

JAWBREAKER refers to a CIA-led series of operations which took place in Afghanistan (Berntsen & Pezzullo, 2005). While many of the details of these operations are still classified there is enough material in the public domain, in the form of memoirs from CIA officers, to offer some analysis of these missions. Originally about establishing CIA teams in Afghanistan as a means of checking both Iranian and Pakistani intelligence services and influence from spreading through Afghanistan, JAWBREAKER quickly became the de facto lead in the invasion until 2003 (Berntsen & Pezzullo, 2005). While JAWBREAKER teams were deployed throughout Afghanistan the main effort centred on the north of the country where they could support the Northern Alliance. A loose collection of warlords drawn from differing ethnic backgrounds (but centered on the Tajiks), the Northern Alliance had never been fully subdued by the Taliban despite its assassination of its leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud, the day before 9/11 (Burke, 2011). While the alliance lacked commanders drawn from the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan the Pashtuns, it represented a motivated, if poorly equipped, proxy army of roughly 30,000 local nationals who could be drawn upon instead of foreign troops.

Despite the motivation of the Northern Alliance it could never have defeated the Taliban on its own. This was primarily due to it possessing only rudimentary levels of equipment, having poor command, control and communication systems, especially between differing factions of the alliance, and most significantly of all was outnumbered by the combined Taliban and Al Qaeda forces by an approximate ratio of 3:1. The Northern Alliance had only held out till 2001 by retreating to the Korengal Valley which offers impressive natural fortifications as it is accessible by just a single road which is surrounded by steep cliffs. That this valley is easily defended against assault is evidenced by the name given it by the Soviet Army during its invasion, in English, the Valley of Death, as despite huge resources in men and material they failed to take the ground from Massoud. Such failure by the Soviets is indicative of their entire war in Afghanistan and the knowledge of this may be one of the reasons why JAWBREAKER may have been favored over a more conventional invasion.

Launched in December 1979, by the Soviet Union after the collapse of the puppet Communist regime in Kabul, this invasion would last twelve years, see upwards of 620,000 troops experience combat, have 115,000 deployed at any one time but would ultimately end in failure for the USSR. Despite this huge commitment of resources, the Soviets were unsuccessful in Afghanistan due to strategy and tactics which were unsuited to the sort of conflict being fought. The Soviet strategy consisted of traditional style sweep, clear, and destroy missions which made use of large-scale troop deployments. These tactics resulted in the brutalization of the Afghan population and actively sought to drive people from their homes so as to deny the Mujahedeen sanctuary. Yet, such a strategy is clearly unsuited for fighting a guerrilla war. At a strategic level such methods envision fighting a conventional enemy who can be drawn to a field of battle and engaged with artillery, air strikes, and infantry. Insurgents, who hide amongst the population and rely on ambush and lightning raids, are very difficult to target with such methods. At a tactical level many of the units deployed lacked the operational flexibility to respond to such hard moving and difficult to identify foes. Thus, the Soviets and Mujahedeen eventually reached a stalemate where the

Russians controlled the urban centers and the Afghans controlled the other 90% of the country. Such a situation was clearly untenable, especially in a reforming Soviet Union undergoing glasnost and perestroika. The last Soviet troops withdrew in 1989.

It is arguable that the first two years of Operation Enduring Freedom were a direct attempt to not repeat the mistakes of the Soviet experience. Yet, until more documents are declassified one can only hypothesize about the reasons for why the decision was made to use such a different approach to the invasion. Thus the debate about the military and political reason for why it took the form it did is inevitably limited. However, the invasion did take place and there is sufficient source material in the public realm to allow one to argue that this invasion mirrors Arquilla and Rondfelt (1993) theory of cyberwar.

CYBERWAR AS THEORY

Arquilla and Rondfelt (1993) hypothesized that, given sufficient technological support, small highly mobile units would be able to defeat a larger, better prepared, and better equipped force during conflict. Such an outcome is highly likely, they argue, because

Advanced information and communications systems, properly applied, can improve the efficiency of many kinds of activities. But improved efficiency is not the only or even the best possible effect. The new technology is also having a transforming effect, for it disrupts old ways of thinking and operating, provides capabilities to do things differently, and suggests how some things may be done better, if done differently. (Arquilla & Rondfelt, 1993, p. 144)

This information revolution, as they call it, then leads to the dismantling of existing hierarchies and diffuses and redistributes decision-making power across networked components of the organization to smaller, potentially weaker actors. However, while conventionally these actors may be seen as weaker, granting them a greater degree of autonomy and decision-making power allows for a greater tactical and strategic flexibility which offsets the lack of traditional military capability. As an example we can compare the significant military power possessed by an armored brigade against that of a four to eight man SOF team. In a traditional conflict the armored brigade has superior firepower, more resources and the ability to absorb greater numbers of casualties. However, a brigade's size means that a certain level of bureaucracy will be involved in its running as this is the only way to ensure that it has the fuel, food, ammunition, and orders it needs to function. The effort of organizing such a large number of different variables means that command and control is often fairly rigid and, as such, some tactical and strategic flexibility is lost, whereas the four to eight man special operations team can operate almost independently with greater mobility and with much smaller resupply needs. Most important of all, given the right technological advances, the Special Forces team, arguably, can deploy nearly the same firepower capability as the armored brigade through the use of weapons such as artillery, fast air, and other long range precision weapons provided by partners drawn from conventional forces.

However, tactical and strategic flexibility coupled with a light, fast-moving, and mobile team is not all that is required for cyberwar to be successful. Such small units not only need improvements in communications in order to be able to call in supporting firepower, they also need technology which leads to improvements in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. As Arquilla and Rondfelt (1993, p. 148) argue

Cyberwar refers to conducting, and preparing to conduct, military operations according to information-related principles. It means disrupting if not destroying the information and communications systems, broadly defined to include even military culture, on which an adversary relies in order to “know itself”... It means trying to know all about an adversary while keeping it from knowing much about oneself. It means turning the ‘balance of information and knowledge’ in one’s favor, especially if the balance of forces is not.

In essence, three elements have to successfully come together for cyberwar to be successful. First, small, highly mobile, networked teams have to have sufficient power devolved to them to allow them to act and react quickly to battlefield situations. Second, these teams must have sufficient communications capabilities to allow them to offset the weaknesses their small size and lack of firepower creates. Third, these teams have to be nodes in a larger network which retains sufficient centralized control to collect, analyze, share, and exploit intelligence rapidly so that the teams in question can be in the right place at the right time to be able to systematically disorganize the enemy. Thus, any campaign which uses a cyberwar style of centralized strategic control coupled with devolved tactical action will be non-linear in its approach and will strike the enemy across a broad front as and when opportunities emerge. Yet, this non-linear approach to conflict also raises one of the oddest aspects of the cyberwar theory which is the possibility that defeat of an enemy may not necessarily coincide with its destruction. Instead, cyberwar maintains that it is

an approach to conflict that allows for decisive campaigning without a succession of bloody battles. Cyberwar may thus be developed as a post-industrial doctrine that differs from the industrial-age traditions of attritional warfare...wars may be won by striking at the strategic heart of an opponent’s cyber structures—his systems of knowledge, information, and communications. (Arquilla & Rondfelt, 1993, p. 162)

To summarize, theoretically cyberwar is a mode of conflict which combines mobility, devolution of tactical decision making, and the ability to deploy state-of-the-art standoff weapons with a central command network whose task is to provide as close to real time intelligence as possible to enable those on the ground to disorganize the enemy and thus cause a defeat potentially without excessive loss of life. The author argues that the invasion of Afghanistan from 2001 and 2003 is a good example of this theory in practice.

CYBERWAR IN PRACTICE

In order to give an accurate picture of this “theory in practice” we have to look back to the double embassy bombing which took place in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi in 1996. The first major offensive by bin Laden against the USA, these attacks set in motion a series of events that put in place the foundations of the later invasion and are partially responsible for the adoption of methods which mirror that proposed by the cyberwar theory. Up until the bombings, U.S. counterterrorism concerns had focused on Islamist groups such as the Iranian backed Hezbollah and the various Palestinian organizations (Hoffman, 2006). While the CIA did have a bin Laden unit, its activities and scope were limited as his organization was not thought to pose a large threat to U.S. interests (Coll, 2005). In fact, bin Laden was building his networks and had openly declared war on the U.S. and her allies (Hoffman, 2006). Once it became obvious that Al

Qaeda and thus bin Laden were behind the embassy bombings, more emphasis was put on establishing an intelligence picture of his network's capabilities, sanctuaries, and training areas. The CIA quickly identified Afghanistan as being a key location where bin Laden was able to recruit, train, and plan for attacks against the West (Coll, 2005). To this effect an early version of JAWBREAKER was inserted into Northern Alliance territory in order to offer intelligence and communication assistance with a wider aim of collecting intelligence for a possible raid to capture or kill the senior leaders of Al Qaeda. Hampered by a lack of political will and infighting within the CIA (Berntsen & Pezzullo, 2005) this team was withdrawn before achieving anything concrete and cruise missile attacks were launched against two training bases and a chemical plant in the Sudan which was thought to be making chemical weapons for Al Qaeda. These strikes achieved very little and were arguably counterproductive as the plant in the Sudan was later discovered to be a pharmaceutical business producing much needed drugs for the region (Coll, 2005).

Despite the failure of the Clinton administration strikes and the withdrawal of the original JAWBREAKER team, this use of a small number of intelligence operators, supported by special operations forces and with access to high tech, stand-off weapons (cruise missiles and air power) is the genesis of what would become a fully-fledged deployment of the cyberwar model used in the first two years of Operation Enduring Freedom. Yet there are two parallel versions of the early years of this invasion; the "official" account which recounts that the invasion launched officially on October 7th, 2001 as Operation Infinite Justice (quickly changed to Operation Enduring Freedom to avoid accusations of it being solely about revenge) with the first ground troops being deployed on October 19th, 2001. Then there is the "shadow" account of the invasion which differs significantly. This shadow account suggests that the first Americans into Afghanistan were a JAWBREAKER team consisting of a mixture of CIA intelligence specialists, members of the CIA Special Activities Division (its in house paramilitary unit) and Joint Special Operation Command (JSOC) forces. This unit was deployed in Northern Alliance territory at least twelve months before the bombing started and had potentially been there for a much longer period (Berntsen & Pezzullo, 2005).

This team was the foundation on which the invasion was built and it developed some very significant and unusual methods that would ultimately lead to the fall of the Taliban and the dismantling of Al Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. This team was fully integrated into the various Northern Alliance units with members offering both intelligence and tactical advice to Afghan Commanders as they fought the Taliban (Coll, 2005). Once more Special Forces deployed into Afghanistan and the JAWBREAKER team retained control of these assets and attached them to their existing deployments (Berntsen & Pezzullo, 2005). This makes the original part of Operation Enduring Freedom the first time since the Vietnam War that U.S. military units were under the command of civilians in an active battle space. This is significant because it allowed for the complete sharing of all intelligence between the CIA and the special operators. This flow of intelligence went both ways with the CIA providing both complete satellite imagery coverage of the country to the SF teams and any human intelligence or signals intelligence leads to the location of high value targets. Equally, the SF teams provided tactical information, human intelligence, and captured materials back to the CIA. Here we can clearly see the flattening of traditional hierarchies and the adoption of a networked approach to information sharing which is central to the cyberwar thesis. Equally, we can also see the central structure operating not so much as a command and control facility but rather as a coordinating

body providing rapid intelligence to tactical level units to allow them to attack targets of opportunity. This willingness to work across traditional organizational boundaries can be seen when one looks at how the integration of SOF and CIA went further than just the sharing of intelligence. The JAWBREAKER teams would deploy as a mixed unit of SOF/SF and CIA personnel alongside their designated National Alliance commander.

Such combining of intelligence and SF personnel gave these teams incredible tactical flexibility and allowed them to have a much larger impact on battles than their size suggest, exactly as was predicted would be the case by the original cyberwar argument. Using real-time communication with their base in the Panjashir Valley these teams were able to access satellite imagery of Afghanistan and thus identify where Taliban and Al Qaeda were amassing large numbers of troops or where they had developed significant defensive lines (Wright & The Contemporary Operations Study Team, 2010). This enabled the teams to advise their Northern Alliance allies about how to circumvent defences or where would be best to attack them. This, as evidenced by their rapid advance across the country, offered a huge tactical advantage to a commander on the ground as it allows one's plans to be drawn up with full knowledge of what the enemy appears to have prepared for and demonstrates the central tenet of the cyberwar doctrine in full effect. By utilizing drones, satellites, and the numerous other intelligence gathering capabilities available to the CIA (Cockburn, 2016) Central Command was able to give the tactical level teams an almost complete understanding of enemy dispositions while maintaining the secrecy of their own deployments.

Also, the free mixing of SF soldiers and CIA personnel meant that each JAWBREAKER detachment had at least one linguist fluent in the local dialect (Berntsen & Pezzullo, 2005). This allowed for free and easy communications with their Afghan allies but also had an intelligence benefit. In many locations the Northern Alliance was able to intercept Taliban/Al Qaeda signals which were sent over commercially available radios in clear speech (Wright & The Contemporary Operations Study Team, 2010). Having a SF soldier or CIA officer who was fluent in the language enabled the rapid exploitation of this signals intelligence within the unit at the front line. This represents a complete flattening of the signals intelligence process with zero delay experienced between interception, translation, and action that is not usually possible as signals are usually intercepted, interpreted, and analyzed away from the battle space which delays their delivery to commanders. Arguably, this exploitation of the Taliban/Al Qaeda communications network further demonstrates how the invasion matches the cyberwar theory.

Each of the teams also contained a Forward Air Controller who carried a piece of equipment called a Special Operations Forces Laser Acquisition Marker (SOFLAM). This equipment meant that each JAWBREAKER team had access to the full range of U.S. air power. The ability to call in numerous air strikes on targets which had been identified by either the satellite or signals intelligence and which were then designated with a laser by forces on the ground made for a devastating combination. The high levels of accuracy enabled by the SOFLAM meant that each team was able to wield firepower above and beyond that which is usually available to small units. This ability to designate targets and direct devastating and accurate air strikes on to targets would be invaluable to the teams deployed and is credited with being the tool which allowed the Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban.

While each of these elements in itself brings a tactical advantage to the troops on the ground it is arguable that the combining of them into small, highly adaptable, and flexible teams and the

linking of these teams to a wider network made the JAWBREAKER approach taken in Afghanistan so effective. For example, one of the JAWBREAKER teams deployed in Afghanistan, Team 555, was tasked with supporting the Northern Alliance commander in the northeast of the country who had the strategically important task of capturing the Bagram Air Base from the Taliban and thus opening up the main roadway towards the capital of Kabul (Wright & The Contemporary Operations Study Team, 2010). Unbeknownst to the team, this Northern Alliance battlegroup was entirely mounted on horseback and fought from the saddle in a way reminiscent of Genghis Khan where swathes of riders would storm forwards in lightning strikes disrupting the enemy and overwhelming isolated groups of fighters before withdrawing to strike again (Berntsen & Pezzullo, 2005). As such, the team would be expected to ride with them and for most soldiers the requirement of having to fight from horseback would be a daunting and possible mission compromising development as they would not possess the skills or resourcefulness to be able to adapt. However, demonstrating the inherent flexibility of Special Forces and the varied backgrounds they come from, a team was put together of soldiers with experience of horse riding in the southwest of the U.S. (Wright & The Contemporary Operations Study Team, 2010).

While the ability to ride a horse is useful in this situation one must question how much use even Special Forces soldiers can be as advisors when engaged in a type of mobile warfighting they have previously never encountered. Also, this battle group of the Northern Alliance was due to take on a well dug in portion of the Taliban who were equipped with modern 4 × 4 vehicles, heavy weaponry, a smattering of ex-Russian tanks which had been recommissioned from those left after the Soviet withdraw and who outnumbered the horsemen by 3:1 (Wright & The Contemporary Operations Study Team, 2010). If one applies classic military thinking to such a battle the outcome seems to be a forgone conclusion with the horsemen of the Northern Alliance on the losing side. What swung this battle in favor of the Northern Alliance was the use of the cyberwar model. By utilizing central intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination combined with immediate communications, tactical flexibility and superior precision firepower the horse-riding Northern Alliance and its associated SF team successfully defeated the well dug-in and prepared Taliban/Al Qaeda forces. This was achieved by both targeting enemy armor for precision strikes and circumventing the main defensive positions by riding round the flanks and thus causing large numbers of the enemy to surrender.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the invasion of Afghanistan between 2000 and 2003 appears to match the idea of cyberwar very closely. It saw smaller, highly mobile, and conventionally weaker forces rapidly defeat an entrenched, better equipped, and better trained enemy. This was, the paper has argued, achieved through the use of rapid intelligence sharing, the devolution of tactical control to field commanders, and the willingness to work across traditional organizational boundaries. Despite the success of the campaign, once the initial invasion was over, traditional military command was re-established and the devolved, networked approach to warfare was replaced by the staid doctrines of the mainstream U.S.-led coalition which are unsuited to fighting such unconventional wars. As such, it is unsurprising that the immediate

success of 2001 to 2003 have almost all been reversed and the Taliban are now back in control of much of the country.

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Factors Affecting Willingness to Fight for One's Own Country: The Case of Baltic States

Virgilijus Rutkauskas

Institute of Social Welfare, Lithuanian Social Research Center, Vilnius, Lithuania

It is critical for special operation forces practitioners and military planners to understand the willingness of the Baltic population to defend their homeland. The author shows that people who share strong national pride, confidence in government and the armed forces, and financial satisfaction are more likely to sacrifice their lives for their country. Moreover, such socio-economic factors like gender, age, employment, education, marital status, living place also allow researchers to predict an individual's attitude towards will to fight. This article provides a framework for understanding and recommends methods of increasing willingness to fight among the population of the Baltic region.

Keywords: willingness to fight, unconventional warfare, Baltic countries, public opinion polls

"Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting"

Sun Tzu

In democratic countries with well-developed economic systems, willingness to fight for one's own country is decreasing. There are a number of explanations for this: external security has been assessed as increased; general living standards currently are at a higher level compared to some decades ago; economic standing is improving; society is nearly free to choose the way of living. Because of a more prosperous life and growth of longevity, peace in general has been assessed as naturally given and more valuable than any kind of confrontation. However, this does not ensure the absence of confrontation itself (although armed conflicts have become shorter and more localized), while form, speed, and employed techniques, such as unconventional, hybrid, or non-kinetic, during the conflict are becoming more sophisticated. Ongoing armed conflicts in the Middle-East or Eastern Ukraine and continuation of tension in the Korean Peninsula remind international society how realistic armed disasters could be.

The importance of armed forces is obvious, and they must be prepared to withstand any aggression. Considering instability in some regions around the world, questions on security and defense have recently found a place among top issues in international agenda. This is the case for continental Europe as well as hybrid conflict in Eastern Ukraine showed how

Correspondence should be addressed to Virgilijus Rutkauskas, Institute of Social Welfare, Lithuanian Social Research Center, A. Goštauto Str. 9, Vilnius LT-01108, Lithuania. E-mail: virgis.lstc@gmail.com

Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/uops.

fragile the peace could be near the borders of the European Union. After defense related cost-cutting for a number of years, the great majority of countries started to increase military funding as noted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (n.d.). However, there are two main forms of preparedness for possible armed aggression: one part is what we see (material preparedness like military expenditure); another part is a less observable one; however, it is not less important and it deals with so called “soft issues” like population willingness to fight for one’s own country. For instance, psychological preparation of society played a key role in the early phase of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine (Dykyi, 2016), thereby making society’s attitude towards willingness to fight to become vital.

Observable and unobservable sides of preparedness to fight for one’s own country are closely interlinked and hardly could be effective without one and another. Especially for small countries with relatively limited abilities to provide funding for defense as the Baltic countries citizens’ willingness to fight for one’s own country is of foremost importance in ensuring freedom. The latter becomes even more vital considering asymmetric characteristics of Russian new generation warfare and non-kinetic measures used (see Stringer & Napier, *in press*). Besides, for the potential enemy, a strong willingness to fight for one’s own country is an indicator that should be considered, because this usually strongly correlates with the costs of possible conflict. Low levels of willingness to fight for one’s own country could be identified as “broken will to resist” which, for the aggressor, gives additional levers to reach its goals and is in line with the writings of Sun Tzu: “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” Thus, the level of willingness to fight for one’s own country is a primary target for both home and for potential enemy forces; only the attempt to affect it is achieved from different approaches.

The attitude of societies towards willingness to fight for one’s own country is a primary target for special operation forces (SOF) in general and information, psychological, civil affairs operations units in particular. Thus, what kind of factors are playing a role here? Which of them are the main ones? Are there any ways to influence in the desired direction? What kind of results could be expected? The aim of this paper is to discover the main factors that contribute the most to the individual’s attitude towards willingness or unwillingness to fight for one’s own country within the Baltic states (the methodology presented here, however, could be used for other countries or regions). To reach this aim the following tasks have been set: First, review of existing literature and declaration of main factors affecting willingness to fight for one’s own country. Second, present the methodology for quantitative analysis. Third, quantitatively assess individual level data for all three Baltic countries to identify the main factors affecting willingness to fight for one’s own country. Conclusions provide suggestions for the actions to strengthen the willingness to fight for one’s own country. This article is organized based on these tasks.

WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT FOR ONE’S OWN COUNTRY: LITERATURE REVIEW

This research focuses on factors affecting a whole population’s willingness to fight for one’s own country. There are a number of reasons why the author is attempting this. First, will of a noticeable share of the population to fight for one’s own country strongly correlates with general

resistance to any kind of aggression. Second, strong willingness to fight to some extent gives a mandate and additional motivation to fight for one's own armed forces and supports their actions. Third, both issues mentioned above are to some extent important for the aggressor attempting to invade and strong willingness to fight can be a strong discouraging factor. This becomes especially vital for Baltic states as Russia's new generation warfare tends to employ unconventional measures to break the willingness to resist (Stringer & Napier, *in press*).

A responsibility for one to protect their country in general should be perceived as natural. However, in many cases this appears to be not absolutely true and may pose a concern for the country's security, as it creates an opportunity for the aggressor. Economic well-being, social attitude, and increase in general security are the main factors behind growth of opportunities in life. Accordingly, society becomes more tolerant to a wide range of individual differences and the will to self-realization in different ways increases. In line with growing opportunities, life becomes more valuable and willingness to sacrifice it while defending one's own country dwindles. Moreover, evidence (Inglehart, Puranen, & Welzel, 2015) shows that prolonged peaceful periods contribute to decrease in willingness to fight for one's own country and the *status quo* position becomes more valuable. Textbooks on international relations and armed conflicts among countries make profound revisions of causes and consequences of armed conflicts. However, in most cases they lack comprehensive explanation on civil resistance to foreign aggression as a significant part of general preparedness to fight for one's own country.

Systematic studies which assess broad or country specific factors that determine the willingness to fight for one's own country are rather rare and only after annexation of Crimea more fruitful academic discussion in Baltic countries could be observed. For the best knowledge of the author, the study *Who will go to defend Lithuania? Civic resistance assumptions and opportunities* (Ramonaitė, Petronytė-Urbonavičienė, Skirkevičius, & Vosylius, *in press*) is the most comprehensive observation of civil resistance in Lithuania which tends to discover factors affecting willingness to fight. The study's results are based solely on the survey data made in 2017 and broadly relays descriptive analysis rather than employment and some econometric techniques.

The motivation to serve in the Lithuanian Armed Forces (Vileikienė, Pocienė, & Aleknevičienė, 2015) is one of the recent research projects in Lithuania in the field of willingness to fight. The aim of this scientific study is limited to the target audience (members of Lithuanian Armed Forces) and assesses only their motives to serve their own country. Thus, the mentioned study is not that complementary in context of this research as its results imply the unconditional acceptance to fight. In the book *The will to resist: Paramilitarism and Lithuanian military security problems* (Jokubauskas, Vaičianonis, Vareikis, & Vitkus, 2015) issues close to willingness to fight for one's own country have been assessed. However, the authors focused on searching for the answers on the factors determining the willingness to fight in the historical context and explored nearly one century of Lithuanian military and paramilitary history.

The country's public opinion and assessment of the factors that determine the willingness to defend the country is analyzed in detail by Torgler (2003) in his paper "Why do people go to war?" Using individual level data of developed countries (e.g., United States, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, Germany, etc.). Torgler argues the following factors of willingness to fight for one's own country as the most important ones: pride (own country, citizenship); confidence in the armed forces; confidence in the government. Also, Torgler makes a clear distinction on how

TABLE 1
Summary of Independent Variables Affecting People's Willingness to Fight for One's Own Country

<i>Independent variable</i>	<i>Torgler (2003)</i>	<i>Anderson and Hirsch-Hoefler (2010)</i>	<i>Inglehart et al. (2015); Puranen (2015)</i>
National pride	Positive relation		Positive relation
Confidence in armed forces	Positive relation	Positive relation	Positive relation
Confidence government	Positive relation	Positive relation	
Age	Negative relation	Negative relation	Negative relation
Gender	Men – positive, woman – negative relation	Men – positive, woman – negative relation	Men – positive, woman – negative relation
Education	Negative/neutral relation	Positive relation	Negative relation
Marital status	Neutral	Married – positive relation	
Employment	Neutral	Employed – positive relation	
Income	Neutral	Neutral	
Religiosity	Neutral	Positive relation	
Political orientation	Positive relation with right political wing	Positive relation with right political wing	
Inequality		Negative relation	
Number of children		Positive relation	
In favor of military rule		Positive relation	
In favor of strong leader		Positive relation	Negative relation
Social standing (e.g. local vs. immigrant)		Negative relation with emigrants	

Source: Author based on Torgler (2003), Anderson and Hirsch-Hoefler (2010), Puranen (2015), Inglehart et al. (2015). Note: If relations are stated as positive, it means growth of the independent variable results in growth of willingness to fight; e.g. growth of national pride is positively related to growth of willingness to fight.

the willingness to fight for one's own country is determined by age, gender, level of education, marital status, employment, level of income, religiosity, political orientation, etc. (Table 1).

Anderson and Hirsch-Hoefler (2010) in article "Unequal sacrifice: Income inequality and willingness to fight wars" assess the individual characteristics of the population, which determine the willingness to fight for one's own country. The research echoes to a significant extent the above-mentioned Torgler (2003) study results and further provides new factors such as the existing inequality (mainly of income and wealth) in the country, importance of having children for the will to fight, the preferred military rule, a strong leader for country governing, and whether the respondent of the survey is a country's resident or an immigrant. Notwithstanding, that authors' opinion on the impact of some factors diverged from other research made (see Table 1, for example, education, marital status, employment, religiosity), but it does not make the results unreliable to any extent. Findings of separate researches may vary due to using different samples (countries, year) of study, its objective, the country's historical developments, etc.

According to Inglehart et al.'s (2015) article "People's declining willingness to fight for one's country: The individual-level basis of the long peace," the world's modernization, democracy, and long-running peace leads to decrease of willingness to fight. Moreover, their work distinguished individual factors of willingness to fight, such as gender, age, education, confidence in the armed forces, national pride, preference given to autocratic governing, various social




FIGURE 1 Willingness to fight for one's own country in the World (2014).
Source: WIN/Gallup International (2015).

freedoms. Moral evolution is also determined by historical experience. For example, societies in countries that lost in the Second World War now feel less willing to fight for their own countries and a share of the population claim their will to fight in case of a war is low (see Figure 1 for Germany or Japan).

Inglehart et al. (2015) distinguished Switzerland and Nordic countries in Europe as this group that has developed an exclusively modern lifestyle and prosperous economies which, in theoretical terms, should decrease their societies' willingness to fight. While this is the case for Switzerland, it is not for Nordic countries, as in their case a factor of well-developed economy is overrun by Russian aggression. As Russia continues to foster territorial ambitions, this creates additional pressure on societies in Nordic countries and the willingness to fight for one's own country remains high. These examples confirm that every individual case should be assessed with caution considering broader perspective.

"Allegiance Eroding: People's Dwindling Willingness to Fight in Wars" (Puranen, 2015) confirms the earlier ideas that national pride, confidence in the armed forces, the country's governing (from democracy/authoritarian regime) contribute the most to willingness to fight for one's own country. The willingness of the population to fight for one's own country is also assessed considering gender, age, and education (see Table 1).

Over the last decades, society has become more tolerant of gender equality, sexual preference, variant values, and beliefs, while at the same time people's tolerance towards wars' losses began to decline. Self-realization opportunities increased due to increasing income, education, longevity, and better quality of life in general. As a result, it changes the assessment of life and readiness to sacrifice life gives way to life. Moreover, attitude towards nationality, government, armed forces, or individual factors like age, gender, education, and employment make an impact to willingness to fight for one's own country. Countries that are experiencing low levels of willingness to fight for one's own country

may be an easy target for an aggressor. Thus, how to improve willingness to fight? Which factors are of foremost importance? What are the ways for responsible authorities including SOF to deal with this issue? Answers to these questions are given in the next section of this article and the situation in the Baltic countries is presented as an example.

QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF FACTORS DETERMINING WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT

For half of the last century, Baltic countries were under the occupation of the Soviet Union (current Russian Federation). Relatively small countries were basically unable to resist one of the world's great military powers. For the rest of the world, an impression has been made that Baltic countries voluntarily became members of the Soviet Union. However, the reality was totally different and for annexation of Baltic countries the Soviets used unprecedented brutal methods and put loyal government leaders into power in an undemocratic way. This sparked civil resistance in the Baltic region which later has grown to guerrilla war lasting a decade with enormous losses. Nowadays Russia takes part in military conflicts near the borders of the European Union and in the Middle East. Considering this history, Baltic countries have obvious reasons to be concerned as their neighbor to the East is constantly showing its military power and imperial aspirations.

The annexation of Crimea in late 2014 functioned as a trigger for Baltic (and other European) countries to revise and increase defense related spending. It is obvious that with greater military funding countries are better prepared to resist possible aggression. However, as mentioned in the previous section, observable military strength is only one side of the coin. So far rather negligible attention has been paid towards society's willingness to fight for one's own country. Thus, this research, in the best knowledge of the author, is the very first attempt to measure quantitatively the willingness to fight for one's own country in the Baltic region. Willingness to fight for one's own country is changing constantly and in the case of Baltic countries it should be monitored continuously. As it is presented in [Figure 2](#), willingness to fight for one's own country in the Baltic region was highest just after gaining independence in 1990; however, in later years it started to decline.

There could be a few explanations for changes in willingness to fight. First, in the last decade of the twentieth century changes in economic systems from plan to market base were underway and it may have had an impact on the declining willingness to fight, as a number of citizens suffered from high unemployment and low income (at the end of the decade Russian financial crises affected Baltic countries to a great extent). Second, elected representatives into parliaments and mainly coalition-based governments lacked stability and strong leadership for the young democracies. Third, to some extent, populations were disappointed as changes have not presented results quickly. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the willingness to fight continued to decline most probably due to rapid economic growth, accession into European Union, and NATO. The consequences of the World Economic Recession increased general disappointment among the population in the Baltic region and, notwithstanding armed conflict in Georgia with Russia, the willingness to fight decreased further. The situation changed noticeably with annexation of Crimea in 2014 as willingness to fight for one's own country almost doubled in Lithuania. Notwithstanding this, quantitatively Lithuania is best disclosed among other Baltic countries because, to a great extent, they share the same reasons for changes in willingness to fight for one's own country over the past quarter of a century.

In this section the author will describe the main methodological issues, data sources, and assessment challenges for the willingness to fight for one's own country. Scarcity of data is a common issue for research in the field of willingness to fight for one's own country. One of the commonly used sources are World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Study (EVS) data (these data have been used by a number of other authors in the field). These global periodic surveys among a number of countries investigate respondents' opinions in different fields such as living conditions, family, religion, society, policy and economy. The main advantage of WVS and EVS is that they are based on common methodology; thus, data and results of analysis are comparable across time and location. The main disadvantage of using this data is common to all public opinion polls as answers to questions are given as opinion and could be different from factual circumstances.

Considering that WVS and EVS data are categorical variables, simple linear regression is not suitable for proper analysis and instead a *logit-probit* regression model should be used (Gujarati, 2004). Moreover, such an approach is also supported by researchers in similar fields. As a dependent variable for analysis, the individual answers to the question “*Of course we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?*” are taken with possible three answer options: “Yes,” “No,” “Don't know” (also, the respondent could refuse to give an answer, in which case this individual data is removed from further analysis). To produce as informative an




FIGURE 2 Willingness to fight for one's own country in the Baltic region. Sources: WVS (for years 1997 and 2011), EVS (for years 1990 and 1999), Civil Society Institute (for year 2015), Vileikienė et al. (2015; for Lithuania in years 2005 and 2014), WIN/Gallup International (for Latvia in year 2014), Sutkus (2017, for year 2010).

Note: Bars present share (%) of surveyed respondents who provided positive answers into question “*Of course we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?*”

assessment as possible, 16 independent explanatory variables have been chosen based on previous research (see Table 1) and presented in Table 2. Moreover, Table 2 presents numerical expression of responses that will be used further by interpreting results of analysis.

Answers to the question that represents the dependent variable (*“Of course we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?”*) in this research have two possible options (the answers “No” and “Don’t know” are treated equally as refuse to fight), thus it is common for such cases to use dichotomous (binary) *logit-probit* regression models. To explain the main factors behind willingness to fight for one’s own country for every combination of variables at least 20% of opposite indicators should appear, otherwise the explanatory power of model will decrease sharply. In case the individual respondent declared that one will fight for one’s own country, the quantitative measure “1” is assigned; in case the respondent’s answer is “no” or “don’t know” the quantitative measure “0” is assigned.

All 16 independent variables and one dependent variable have been taken to investigate issues behind willingness to fight for one’s own country for every single Baltic nation in different periods. The suitability of the whole model (1) and its outcome (2) is assessed not by coefficient of determination, as it is common for linear regressions, but by the share of classified cases (Gujarati, 2004). The case is assessed as classified when the results received by the outcome of the model (2) are the same as collected during the survey for every individual response. More than 50% of classified cases by the model allow assessing the model as suitable (however, the bigger the share the better; Gujarati, 2004).

TABLE 2
List of Independent Variables and Their Values

<i>Independent variable</i>	1990	1997	1999	2011	2015	<i>Quantitative value of answer*</i>
Gender	EE; LT; LV	LT; LV	LT	EE	LT	1 – male; 2 – female
Age	EE; LT; LV	LT; LV	LT	EE	LT	X years
Level of obtained education		LT; LV	LT	EE	LT	1 – any; 8 – university
Confidence in armed forces	EE; LT; LV	LT; LV	LT	EE		1 – high; 4 – any
National pride	EE; LT; LV	LT; LV	LT	EE		1 – high; 4 – any
Confidence in government/parliament		LT; LV	LT	EE		1 – high; 4 – any
Level of income	EE; LV	LT; LV	LT	EE		1 – low; 10 – high
Financial satisfaction	EE; LV	LT; LV		EE		1 – no; 10 – yes
Marital status	EE; LT; LV	LT; LV	LT	EE	LT	1 – married; 7 – not married
Employment status	EE; LT; LV	LT; LV	LT	EE	LT	1 – employed; 8 – unemployed
Number of children	EE; LT; LV	LT; LV	LT	EE		Y children
Religiosity	EE; LT	LT; LV	LT	EE		1 – yes; 3 – no
Political orientation		LT	LT	EE		1 – left; 10 – right
Autocratic governing		LT; LV	LT	EE		1 – good; 4 – bad
Democratic governing		LT; LV	LT	EE		1 – good; 4 – bad
Place of living (size of town)	EE; LV	LT; LV	LT	EE	LT	1 – big; 8 – small

Sources: Author based on EVS, n.d.; WVS, n.d.; and Civil Society Institute, n.d.

*Some responses are presented more concise.

$$\ln \frac{P(WF_s^i = 1)}{P(WF_s^i = 0)} = C_s^i + b_1G_s^i + b_2A_s^i + b_3Ed_s^i + b_4CF_s^i + b_5NP_s^i + b_6CP_s^i + b_7I_s^i + \tag{1}$$

$$b_8FS_s^i + b_9MS_s^i + b_{10}Em_s^i + b_{11}Ch_s^i + b_{12}R_s^i + b_{13}P_s^i + b_{14}AG_s^i + b_{15}DG_s^i + b_{16}PL_s^i$$

$$P(WF_s^i = 1) = \frac{e^z}{1 + e^z} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-z}} \tag{2}$$

where P – probability of willingness to fight (WF) for one’s own country; i – country; s – survey; b_n – coefficient; C – Constanta; G – gender; A – age; Ed – education; CF – confidence in armed forces; NP – national pride; CP – confidence in government/parliament; I – level of income; FS – financial satisfaction; MS – marital status; Em – employment status; Ch – number of children; R – religiosity; P – political orientation; AG – autocratic governing; DG – democratic governing; PL – place of living (size of the town);

$$z = C_s^i + b_1G_s^i + b_2A_s^i + b_3Ed_s^i + b_4CF_s^i + b_5NP_s^i + b_6CP_s^i + b_7I_s^i + b_8FS_s^i + b_9MS_s^i + b_{10}Em_s^i + b_{11}Ch_s^i + b_{12}R_s^i + b_{13}P_s^i + b_{14}AG_s^i + b_{15}DG_s^i + b_{16}PL_s^i$$

The importance of the independent variable of the model to the dependent one is assessed by odds ratio of coefficients. This is a specific ratio for *logit-probit* models and shows how the dependent variable (willingness to fight) could be affected in case one of the independent variables will increase by 1 and all others will remain equal (see last row in [Table 2](#)). Odds ratio is defined as the ratio of the probability of success $P(Y = 1)$ or “will fight” and failure $P(Y = 0)$ or “will not fight” ($P(Y = 1)/P(Y = 0)$) derived by the model. This ratio is assumed as the main one in assessing the importance of every single independent variable to a dependent one. The value of the odds ratio could vary from close to 0 (in case probability of failure is approaching to 100%) and to infinity (in case probability of success is approaching to 100%).

While analyzing the dependent variable, it is important to observe whether the value of the independent variable’s odds ratio is below or above 1. In case the odds ratio is 1, the probabilities of success and failure are equal to 0.5. Growth of value of independent variable by 1 with odds ratio below 1 means that the dependent variable has higher probability to success ($P(Y = 1)$) than to failure ($P(Y = 0)$). On the contrary, growth of value of independent variable by 1 with odds ratio above 1 means that the dependent variable has lower probability to success ($P(Y = 1)$) than to failure ($P(Y = 0)$). An assessment of independent variables odds ratios is presented in [Table 3](#).

TABLE 3
Connection of Changes in Independent Variable Quantitative Value and the Value of Odds Ratio

		<i>Change of independent variable</i>	
		<i>+1</i>	<i>-1</i>
Odds ratio	< 1	$P(Y = 1) < P(Y = 0)$ Will to fight decreases	$P(Y = 1) > P(Y = 0)$ Will to fight increases
	> 1	$P(Y = 1) > P(Y = 0)$ Will to fight increases	$P(Y = 1) < P(Y = 0)$ Will to fight decreases

Source: Author based on Gujarati (2004).

Depending on the distance between the odds ratio of each independent variable and value of 1 the significance of independent variable (the larger the distance the more important the variable) and the direction of impact are determined (i.e., whether certain independent variable increases or decreases the willingness to fight for one's own country). Suppose the odds ratio for the independent variable is less than 1, thus in case the independent variable will increase by 1 and all others remain equal, this will decrease the willingness to fight for one's own country (see Table 3). Based on the methodology described above impact of all 16 independent variables to dependent one, willingness to fight for one's own country is assessed in the next section.

WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT AMONG BALTIC COUNTRIES: MAIN FINDINGS

The quantitative results of the research are assessed in two ways. First, the importance of the independent variable in *logit-probit* models is assessed considering distance of odds ratio value for every single independent variable from 1 (the bigger the more important variable is). Second, to assess direction of change in independent variable and its effect on the dependent one, it is important to know whether the value of the odds ratio is above or below 1 (as it is described in Table 3). Below, the main finding of the research is presented by country in alphabetical order.

Two representative surveys in Estonia have been conducted in 1990 and 2011 (see Table 2). For every single survey approximately 8 *logit-probit* regressions have been evaluated to reveal the most suitable equation with the highest share of classified cases. The share of classified cases




FIGURE 3 Distance of odds ratios from 1 for the case of Estonia.

Source: Author's calculations.

Note: Independent variables are sorted based on average value from left to right (more important indicators are more to left).

for the case of Estonia reached 76.9% in year 1990 and 72.3% in year 2011. Both equations are suitable for further analysis as share of classified cases is well above the required 50% threshold.

Figure 3 presents independent indicators sorted by their importance to willingness to fight for one’s own country in Estonia (more important indicators are more to the left). Without the importance, research made reveals what kind of features respondents share if they want or do not want to fight for one’s own country. Also, the reader should remember that results of *logit-probit* models show probability (thus not a certainty of 100% in all cases) for every individual feature. The results for Estonia confirm broadly the main findings revealed in other researches for different countries in this field. The probability of a person to be willing to fight for one’s own country increases in case one shares the following features: man; employed; less educated; younger; lives in smaller cities; has children. Some respondents’ features impact on willingness to fight like marital status, religiosity, or level of income are harder to assess because the odds ratio fluctuates around 1. Moreover, people who are prouder of their nationality, more confident with government, or assign themselves more to the right political wing are more willing to fight. The impact of the democratic and autocratic governing factor is rather unclear in the case of Estonia because in both cases it shows nearly the same attitude. Additionally, people more confident in armed forces for the period of 2011 were more willing to fight for one’s own country; however, in 1990 the situation was contrary.

Two representative surveys in Latvia have been conducted in 1990 and 1997 (see Table 2). For every single survey approximately 8 *logit-probit* regressions have been evaluated to reveal the most suitable equation with the highest share of classified cases. The share of classified cases for the case of Latvia reached 82.1% in the year 1990 and 68.7% in the year 1997.




FIGURE 4 Distance of odds ratios from 1 for the case of Latvia.

Source: Author’s calculations.

Note: Independent variables are sorted based on average value from left to right (more important indicators are more to left).

Figure 4 presents independent indicators sorted by their importance to willingness to fight for one's own country in Latvia (more important indicators are more to the left). The probability of a person to be willing to fight for one's own country increases when one shares the following features: man; employed; well educated; older; lives in bigger cities; has children; with less income and more religious. Some respondents' features impact on willingness to fight like marital status are harder to assess because the odds ratio fluctuates around 1 in periods under assessment. Moreover, people who are prouder of their nationality and more confident with the government and armed forces are more willing to fight. The impact of democratic and autocratic governing factor is rather unclear in the case of Latvia, because in both cases it shows nearly the same attitude.

Four representative surveys in Lithuania have been conducted in the period from 1990 till 2015 (see Table 2). For every single survey approximately 10 *logit-probit* regressions have been evaluated to reveal the most suitable equation with the highest share of classified cases. The share of classified cases varies from 61.4% for the year 2015 to 83.4% for the year 1990 (in 1997 the share of classified cases was 72.3% and in 1999, 66.1%) and are well above the required 50% threshold.

Figure 5 presents independent indicators sorted by their importance to willingness to fight for one's own country (more important indicators are more to the left). The results for Lithuania confirm broadly the main findings revealed in other research for different countries in this field. The probability of a person to be willing to fight for one's own country increases when one shares the following features: man; employed; well educated; younger; lives in bigger cities; married; has children. Some respondents' features impact on willingness to fight, like religiosity




FIGURE 5 Distance of odds ratios from 1 for the case of Lithuania.
Source: Author's calculations.

Note: Independent variables are sorted based on average value from left to right (more important indicators are more to the left).

or level of income, are harder to assess because the odds ratio fluctuates around 1. Moreover, people who are prouder of their nationality and are more confident with the government and armed forces, think that autocratic governing is more suitable for the country and assign themselves more to the right political wing and are more willing to fight. The impact of democratic governing factor is rather neutral in the case of Lithuania.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on individual responses of the population in the Baltic region to the opinion polls in this research the following quantitative assessment of the factors determining the willingness to fight for one's own country is provided. Using *logit-probit* regression analysis the author shows that among the most significant factors affecting people's willingness to fight for one's own country are attitude towards national pride, confidence in government and the armed forces, financial satisfaction, as well as socio-economic factors like gender, age, employment, education, marital status, and living place. Without other responsible authorities, SOF should deal via their civil affairs operations, military information support operation, psychological operations and strategic communication in all above-mentioned fields, and influence target audiences which share similar attributes to increase the population's willingness to fight.

The following are potential actions that might increase willingness to fight among the population in the Baltic region:

- For all three Baltic countries national pride, confidence in government, and confidence in the armed forces play an important role. It is important to note that people who do not feel pride in citizenship of a particular Baltic country or are not confident in government or the armed forces will be less willing to fight for their respective nation. Thus, spreading the news about rich heritage one can be proud of will increase trust and confidence. Moreover, special attention for minorities (especially in Estonia and Latvia) should be paid to integrate them more deeply into society.
- For both Lithuania and Estonia, gender plays an important role as women are less willing to fight for one's own country. It could be the case of "separation of duties" in society meaning that the war is taken as "man business." However, to fight for one's own country does not mean to do this with weapons only and Baltic history is rich with such examples. During guerrilla war after World War II women supported freedom fighters in the region by providing information on the occupying force, preparing food, making clothes, as well as medical services. Thus, broader information contained in such examples will have a positive affect on women in particular and willingness to fight in general.
- Place of living makes a difference for will to fight for one's own country. In Lithuania and Latvia populations in bigger cities are more willing to fight for one's own country; however, the situation in Estonia is opposite. Thus, impact products to increase will to fight should be directed to large cities in Estonia and rural areas in Lithuania and Latvia.
- Older members of the population are less willing to fight for one's own country in Lithuania and Estonia; however, they have a stronger will to fight in Latvia. SOF planners should consider age based direct measures such as activities performed by younger and older

generations. Moreover, the fact that people with children are more willing to fight because they have something to defend should be taken into consideration as well.

- Better educated people in Lithuania and Latvia are more willing to fight and the reason for this is simply better understanding of the socio-economic environment. However, the situation in Estonia is slightly different because, based on research results, less educated people are willing to fight more.
- In all countries, less employed populations show unwillingness to fight. Based on this clear feature, responsible authorities should pursue information operation and show unemployed society that their country takes care of its people and expects the same in return in a case of another nation's aggression.

Baltic countries share many similarities in the field of willingness to fight for one's own country, though some differences emerged in this research. The reasons for this could be twofold: either they are technical or country dependent socio-economic factors. As for technical factors, the comparison of countries should be taken with caution because the number, frequency, time, and content of the survey when surveys have been done may vary. Country dependent socio-economic variables are more complicated to assess and to a great extent are out of the scope of this research. However, one broad observation could be that, notwithstanding similar gaining of independence in the late 1990s, the socio-economic reforms performed in all countries were different and, as a result, evolved into diverse levels of socio-economic wellbeing.

By employing these and other measures that will affect factors in the way described in this research, an increase of willingness to fight for one's own country should be expected. This would create additional support for the armed forces, and more importantly, would definitely make possible aggression by a foreign country costlier, thus acting as a discouraging factor. The methodology employed in this research could be applied easily to other countries or regions if data is available. In sum, willingness to fight should be assessed continuously for SOF planners to adapt innovative options to commanders and decision makers.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author would like to thank Mr. Jason Heeg (Selwyn College, Cambridge, England) for helpful advice on various issues during preparation of the paper and the Civil Society Institute (<http://www.civitas.lt/en>) for providing the opportunity to enrich this research with Lithuanian data for the year 2015.

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From Anarchy to Civil War: The Escalation of Violence in Iraq, 2003-2006

Jeffrey Meiser, Lydia Heye, and Kelsie McKee
University of Portland, Portland, Oregon, USA

Civil wars are often the product of low-level political violence that escalates, rather than emerging *ex nihilo* from a peaceful society. Therefore, it is important to focus on what causes the initial pattern of violence and why it escalates. This essay integrates structural and strategic theories of political violence to develop an analytical framework of violence escalation. This framework allows us to identify critical junctures where intervention may limit or halt escalation. The framework is applied to Iraq, 2003–2006 to determine how and why violence escalated, culminating in widespread sectarian civil war in 2006.

Keywords: counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, insurgency, irregular warfare, security force assistance

All members of the international community have an interest in gaining a better understanding of the dynamics of violence within nation-states. The developing world is much more likely to experience intrastate war, but developed countries are rarely far removed from these conflicts. Scholars and practitioners have written countless books, articles, and reports on political violence, but there are significant gaps in the accumulation of knowledge. First, not enough attention has been paid to the causes of the escalation of political violence. The majority of intense internal conflicts do not emerge *ex nihilo* from a perfect peace, but instead escalate from low-levels of societal violence (Anderton & Ryan, 2016; Eck, 2009, p. 370; Perliger, 2012, p. 104). However, not all instances of low-level violence are equally likely to escalate into national or regional threats. For this reason, it is vital for stability practitioners and analysts to have a theory of escalatory political violence to guide them over the uncertain terrain of decentralized and complex conflict environments. Second, scholar and practitioner knowledge of political violence is fragmented. One of the worst fractures is between the academic scholarship on civil war onset and intensity on the one hand, and policy-oriented studies of insurgency and terrorism on the other. By bringing these two strands of scholarship together it is possible to gain better analytical leverage to the problem of escalating violence.

This essay develops an analytical framework for understanding the causes of violence escalation and identifying critical junctures where intervention can halt or limit escalating violence. To gain leverage on the problem of escalatory violence, two key questions need to be answered: When and why will violence escalate? When and how should one intervene to prevent escalation?

The first section of this essay develops the framework and the second section applies it to Iraq's descent into civil war between 2003 and 2006. Violence in Iraq following the U.S. invasion was complex and multifaceted and therefore provides a good plausibility test for an analytical framework of escalatory violence. Findings also add to existing analysis of the Iraq civil war and may be useful for understanding the re-escalation of violence in Iraq in 2012 and beyond.

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE: A STRUCTURAL-STRATEGIC SYNTHESIS

The scholarship on political violence is well-developed and highly nuanced, but lacks cohesion. The division between the academic literature on civil wars and the policy-oriented literature on insurgency and terrorism is particularly harmful. Both of these strands of scholarship provide useful insights into the escalation of intra-state violence and could be mutually supporting, but rarely seem to speak to one another. This essay focuses specifically on the structural model of civil war onset and intensification and the strategic model of insurgent behavior. These are two of many approaches to political violence, but are unique in their ability to correct for each other's weaknesses and provide for a cohesive analytical framework.

First, the structural approach to civil war views the onset and intensification or escalation of violence as a product of severe state weakness or collapse (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Posen, 1993). If a state lacks the capacity to secure and provide for the population, then the opportunity, and perhaps even incentive, for violence exists. Opponents of the state may seek to build up the capacity to challenge the state for control of society or individuals may seek to band together and arm themselves for self-defense. The former suggests purposely orchestrated violence to gain power, the latter suggests decentralized violence as between rival armed groups. The structural model provides an especially insightful explanation for the emergence and escalation of decentralized violence. When state authority degrades significantly or totally collapses, the absence of central authority forces individuals to provide for their own security. Individuals coalesce into self-defense groups based on whatever community ties are strongest, which are often based on communal identities such as ethnicity, tribe, or religion (David, 1997, p. 557; Posen, 1993, p. 104). Violence between groups may occur simply because there is no higher authority to stop it, or ethnic or sectarian groups may see state collapse or weakness as an opportunity to settle old scores, upend a detrimental power structure, or capture resources. Any act of violence between armed groups runs the risk of initiating tit-for-tat retaliation and a spiral of violence (Angstrom & Duyvesteyn, 2001, pp. 194–195; Kaufman, 2006; Snyder & Jervis, 1999, pp. 16, 19–24).

The basic idea that people will tend to be more violent in the absence of state authority is highly intuitive and has long been recognized by political theorists (e.g., Hobbes, 1651/1962). However, the structural model provides a series of useful propositions about the dynamics of violence. First, violence is likely to be decentralized and communal as groups form relatively spontaneously to defend themselves or prey on other groups. Second, violence may escalate unevenly over time and space rather than exploding immediately if state authority degrades slowly and unevenly. Third, in the absence of effective governance, violence will tend to intensify as fear and hatred increases and communal rivalries become entrenched. Fourth, group identities are likely to become more entrenched the longer the duration of the violence,

decreasing the tractability of the conflict. Fifth, if the initial wave of violence is not suppressed, violence is likely to escalate in a spiraling cycle of revenge killings.

The structural model seems highly applicable to the Iraq case. Prominent scholars have argued the loss of security and state capacity following the U.S. invasion caused Iraqis to begin looking to ethnic, tribal, and family groups for the provision of security (Dodge, 2007, pp. 88–89, 93) and the collapse of the Iraqi state after the invasion triggered “a security problem driven by mutual fear” (Biddle, 2006, p. 5). Despite the obvious relevance of the structural approach, it has significant weaknesses. First, it assumes state failure and therefore cannot tell us much about how and why state failure happens. Even in a situation like Iraq, where military defeat weakens the state, anarchy does not automatically emerge, especially when an occupying army is present. In fact, one might expect an occupying army to present the problem of tyranny rather than anarchy. Second, not all ungoverned territories experience spiraling communal violence. In some settings, like Somaliland and post-communist Romania, state collapse led to the fairly rapid creation of a new political order. Furthermore, in cities like Kingston, Jamaica, what seem to be ungoverned spaces are actually subject to a “highly structured system of governance” by socially embedded criminal networks (Kilcullen, 2013, p. 95). Therefore, it is not inevitable that anarchy leads to violence; it can also lead to a new type of political order. To fully explain why violence escalates to become a national or regional threat, more attention needs to be given to the agency of groups and leaders.

A second set of scholarship on political violence fills in some of the gaps of the structural model by focusing on strategic action. The main contribution to the strategic model come from the study of insurgency. This literature has a clear and compelling answer to what causes state failure: violence entrepreneurs purposely escalate violence to influence state policy (coercion) or to methodically subvert and destroy the capacity and legitimacy of the government.¹ Violence escalates because escalation serves a strategic purpose (Eckert & Willems, 2003, p. 1185; Valentino, 2014). In the Maoist conceptualization, insurgency is protracted war that plays out in a series of stages driven by the insurgent’s ability to increase their violence capacity over time (Tse-Tung, 1961/2000, p. 113). According to David Galula’s (1964/2006) interpretation of the Maoist “people’s war” approach, successful insurgents must traverse the phases of violence from the initial stages of organization and subversion to terrorism and guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare culminating in positional warfare and an “annihilation campaign” (p. 39; see also Griffin, 1961/2000, pp. 21–22). In the early stages of the campaign, unsystematic, and even random acts of violence are used to gain attention, mobilize popular support, and undermine faith in the government. When sufficient mobilization is achieved, insurgents can implement a more systematic campaign of violence, which begins the process of armed overthrow of the existing political order and culminates in open warfare against counterinsurgent forces. Galula does not see these different forms of violence as fully distinct—they are all tools of an insurgent group and will be used to a greater or lesser degree depending upon the particular circumstances involved. This conceptualization of political violence is consistent with Harry Eckstein’s insight that “actual instances of internal war often combine different types of violence, in space and time” (Eckstein, 1965, p. 134). However, at the same time, Galula’s (1964/2006, pp. 29–42) description is based on the principle of escalation. Successful insurgencies progress through phases of escalating violence and counterinsurgents try and stop them. During these transitions between phases of violence an insurgent movement is particularly vulnerable, a point of key importance to counterinsurgents (Galula, 1964/2006, pp. 41–42).

To generate the capacity that enables them to escalate violence, violence entrepreneurs must overcome the collective action problem of mass mobilization. There are several options. First, leaders can instigate repression by the state, which lowers the cost of joining the rebellion—if you are going to be subject to state violence anyway, joining the insurgency is less costly. Second, leaders can attempt to capture “lootable resources” or otherwise gain enough funding to pay insurgents, though this has the downside of fostering a transactional relationship that can be severed when the funding runs low. Third, leaders can mobilize rebels by identifying, framing, and interpreting grievances and the powerful emotions generated by those grievances. Ideological and emotional mobilization based on grievances is easier when leaders can access existing social groups and repertoires of action, and have authentic connections to those social groups. Particularly salient social groups are defined by ethnicity and religion. Thus leaders will be most successful when adopting strategies that focus on framing grievances and courses of action in ethnic, religious, and class terms. From this perspective insurgencies grow depending on successful mobilization of a communal or social group by convincing growing numbers of that group that they are being treated unjustly and that justice can be achieved through collective action against the perpetrators of injustice, usually the state (Mason, 2009, pp. 76–80, 92–94; Davenport, 2007, pp. 7–10; Earl, 2011, p. 37; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, Ross, 2004; Galula, 1964/2006; McCarthy & Zald; Marks, 2007, pp. xiii–xiv; Sargsyan & Bennett, 2016).

Several propositions can be derived from the strategic model. First, violence entrepreneurs seek to cause state failure by attacking the legitimacy and capabilities of the state. Second, the most effective way to cause state failure is for an armed group to increase its violence capacity by mobilizing manpower and resources. Third, mobilization is facilitated by shared grievances, shared identity (e.g., ethnic, religious), funding, and state repression.

The strategic model also seems highly applicable to the Iraq case. Abu Musab Zarqawi, and his group al-Qaeda in Iraq, sought to achieve “sectarian civil war and state collapse” (Celso, 2015, p. 25). Zarqawi was part of the broader Sunni insurgency that escalated its violence against Iraqi Shia and coalition forces from 2003 to 2007 (Rayburn, 2014, pp. 97–131).² Despite the obvious relevance of the strategic model, it has a significant weakness. It assumes only two actors—the insurgent and the counterinsurgent—engaged in competitive mobilization of the populace. The strategic model does not address the possibility of large-scale decentralized violence among sub-state groups. In a nation-state riven by sectarian conflict, the state may be a spectator to violence or it might take sides, or the state may fragment with different segments of the state apparatus taking different sides in the conflict. As the structural model suggests, violence can be a highly decentralized phenomenon and follow a logic of its own that does not require centralized planning or large-scale mobilization of the population behind a political cause. Violence entrepreneurs will not restrict their violence to the state and its allies, they will also mobilize followers to kill, exploit, remove, or otherwise do harm to rival communal groups that support the state or otherwise stand in the way of success (Ash, 2017).

Combining the insights of the structural and strategic models allow for a more holistic framework for understanding how and why escalation of violence occurs. A weak or failing state encourages the emergence of armed groups that challenge the state’s monopoly on violence. Under conditions of anarchy or partial anarchy, armed groups will struggle with each other and with the state for security, resources, territory, and other goods. A mixture of fear and predatory intent encourages violence entrepreneurs within these groups implement strategies to increase their violence capacity while decreasing the violence capacity of other armed groups. Violence

entrepreneurs will escalate violence through mobilization of their communal group. Violence entrepreneurs mobilize individuals by exploiting grievances, communal ties, financial incentives, and state repression. Tactics like terrorism, assassination, kidnapping, torture, sexual assault, armed attacks, etc., are used to demoralize, coerce, and degrade the capacity of rival actors, including civilians. Violence escalates because it is in the interests of violence entrepreneurs and because there is no strong state with a monopoly on violence. Escalation is both an ends and a means—it helps violence entrepreneurs to increase mobilization and further undermines the capacity and legitimacy of the state and rival armed groups.

There are two main intervention points and two intervention strategies suggested by the structural-strategic syntheses. First, intervention (either internal or foreign) is easiest prior to the beginning of spiraling violence, before armed groups are entrenched or highly mobilized. A second best set of intervention points is when violence entrepreneurs attempt to escalate by employing new strategies, tactics, or capacities. To escalate, they must shift their strategy over time, and when these shifts happen they are vulnerable to a response by the government or intervening force. In these moments, the violent groups are attempting to do something new: they are using new equipment, communications techniques, tactics, and personnel; they are employing new narratives and attempting to shift public opinion in new directions; they are making themselves more vulnerable to state violence capacity by exposing themselves to increasingly conventional forms of combat; they are risking more to achieve more. Intervention should focus on undermining the mobilization strategies of violence entrepreneurs and restoring security. Either strategy alone is likely to be ineffective in a situation of complex, escalatory violence. Intervention can come from the state if it has enough residual capacity and/or receives outside assistance, or intervention can be international or foreign.

The rest of the paper applies the synthesized framework of escalatory violence to the case of Iraq, 2003–2006. Between 2003 and 2006–2007 violence escalated across several categories of analysis. According to the Iraq Index compiled by the Brookings Institution (2013), civilian violent deaths increased from 7,300 in 2003 to 16,800 and 20,200 in 2004 and 2005, respectively, to peak at 34,500 deaths in 2006. Deaths by Iraqi security forces follow a similar trend, increasing from 1,300 in 2003–2004 to 2,545 in 2005 and 2,091 deaths in 2006. U.S. forces suffered 486 deaths in 2003, escalating to 849 in 2004, 846 in 2005, 822 in 2006, peaking at 904 deaths in 2007. By any reasonable measure of violence, the Iraqi conflict should be designated a civil war by at least 2004 when it is clear that Iraqi and U.S. forces were being killed in large numbers.³ Violence that was dismissively referred to as “messiness” or the desperate acts of “dead enders” in 2003, became a major strategic challenge for the U.S., a problem of existential importance for Iraqis by 2004, and a major source of regional instability.

Three main phases of violence are highlighted in the analysis below. First, the lack of U.S. planning for “post-conflict” stability operations and inability of political and military leaders to adapt to the rising chaos after the fall of Baghdad encouraged decentralized violence by failing to establish security. The American invasion and the anarchy that followed marked the initial phase of Iraqi state collapse and the emergence of a “security vacuum” (Pascual & Pollack, 2007, p. 7). Second, the decision to implement deep de-Ba’athification and disband the Iraqi Army exacerbated insecurity in Iraq while creating grievances concentrated in the Sunni population. These decisions decimated the capacity of the nascent Iraqi state while facilitating the mobilization of Sunni armed groups (Dodge, 2006, pp. 165–166, 2007, pp. 87–93; Cobb, 2007, pp. 49–51). Third, U.S. actions in Fallujah directly and indirectly fostered an intensified Sunni insurgency and

sectarian violence. The events surrounding the First Battle of Fallujah (April 2004) and Second Battle of Fallujah (November 2004) deepened the sectarian divide as Sunnis increasingly perceived Shias and Americans as enemies and the displacement of Sunnis from Fallujah to Baghdad caused ethnic cleansing and sectarian conflict. These events caused a high level of violence to emerge after the U.S. invasion, fostered an escalation of violence from 2003 to 2006, and set the stage for the explosion of decentralized, communal violence after the bombing of the al-Askariyya Mosque in Samarra in February of 2006.

PHASE 1: THE COLLAPSE OF THE IRAQI STATE

Invading and removing the Saddam Hussein regime from power created a security vacuum that U.S. leaders were unable and unwilling to fill during the early days of the occupation. U.S. forces stood by as looting and revenge killings spread throughout Iraq after the fall of Baghdad in early April 2003. As Cobb (2007) states, “The moment Saddam’s statue came down on 9 April 2003 anarchy erupted” (p. 49; see also Dodge, 2007, p. 88). With the Iraqi state gone, and U.S. forces concentrating on fighting remnants of the Hussein regime, there was no general provision of order and security. The remainder of this section documents the anarchy that swept Iraq after the fall of Baghdad focusing on the failure of U.S. forces to establish security due to a lack of post-conflict planning and an inadequate response to decentralized violence after the fall of Baghdad. These shortcomings undermined the U.S.’s ability to establish order after the invasion, helped to create a security vacuum, and in turn provided an initial foundation for the escalation of violence (Allawi, 2008, pp. 114–115; Dodge, 2005, p. 5).

Planning Failures and Faulty Assumptions

The failure to plan for stability operations in Iraq after the conclusion of “decisive combat operations” is the most widely recognized flaw in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Byman, 2008; Caan, 2005; 60 Minutes, 2004) and historically has been a major weakness in American operational planning (Crane, 2005). Under the war plan (OPLAN 1003–98) troops were instructed on a variety of tasks except for one: stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. *New York Times* correspondent Michael R. Gordon and Retired Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor explain, “there was no plan for the political administration, restoration of basic services, training of the police, or the reconstruction of Iraq” (Gordon & Trainor, 2006, p. 27). Providing for security and government services depended on U.S. willingness and ability to take on the role of the state or to quickly repair the Iraq state so it could do so. Early planning for the war called for 500,000 coalition troops. Instead, U.S. forces would number a paltry 116,000. Thus, U.S. forces faced an overwhelming list of tasks for establishing security and reconstruction and yet not enough troops, training, or planning to accomplish those tasks (Cobb, 2007, pp. 47–49; Gordon & Trainor, 2006, pp. 152–153).

Much of the blame for poor planning rests on Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his unrelenting drive for a small, agile force that would demonstrate the emergence of a new American way of war based on high tempo maneuver warfare enabled by precision weapons and increased situational awareness (see Boot, 2003; Boyer, 2006). Rumsfeld notoriously clashed with military leaders on this issue. Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, testified

before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee that “something in the order of several hundred thousand soldiers” would be needed for the invasion (quoted in Youssef, 2014). He was quickly rebuffed by Rumsfeld’s Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s statement, “the notion that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq are wildly off the mark” (Youssef, 2014). Secretary of the Army Tom White defended Shinseki’s assessment, much to Rumsfeld’s displeasure. Both Shinseki and White left their positions with significantly reduced influence; White was asked to resign soon after he made his supportive comments (Frontline, 2004; Youssef, 2014). General Tommy Franks, commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), was responsible for carrying out the war plan and reportedly acquiesced to pressure from Rumsfeld to keep the invading force as small as possible (Gordon & Trainor, 2006, pp. 28–29, 103).

The desire for a light-footprint was supported by the assumption that the “post-conflict” phase truly would be a no-conflict phase and would not require a large troop presence to provide security. In March of 2003, Vice President Dick Cheney declared, “my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators” (quoted in Woodward, 2006, p. 151). Wolfowitz voiced similar assumptions, testifying to Congress, “It’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his Army. Hard to imagine” (quoted in Packer, 2003). The assumption of a quick victory followed by a rapid drawdown and withdrawal permeated the planning process. According to CENTCOM planners, not enough time or “intellectual energy” was dedicated to stability operations. Lacking policy guidance, CENTCOM planners never made stabilization a priority. The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) led by Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (U.S. Army, Ret.) had the main responsibility for governance efforts, but Garner was brought into the planning process late and the ORHA was not resourced for the immense task ahead of it. Poor stability planning left the U.S. vulnerable to any unexpected security challenges. And with only enough forces for combat, any intensification of violence could seriously threaten the U.S.’s ability to respond to both security and governance needs (Cobb, 2007, p. 48; Gordon & Trainor, 2006, pp. 139, 146; Woodward, 2006, pp. 104–146).

Operation Failures and Post-Conflict Anarchy

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was quickly deemed to be victorious. The invasion started on March 20th and by April 9th U.S. forces were pulling down the statue of Saddam Hussein in the center of Baghdad. The sudden victory seemed to vindicate Rumsfeld’s concept of a new way of war. However, the early victory in major combat operations was not the end, but rather the beginning of an extended stabilization mission. One of the first problems to emerge was looting of government buildings. Seventeen of Baghdad’s twenty-three ministry buildings were destroyed. None of the ministry buildings, save the Ministry of Oil complex, was guarded. The lack of a U.S. response was a signal of the buildings’ vulnerability and was symbolic of a society suddenly lacking order and authority, but it also allowed for important government departments and services to be attacked. The looting of ministry offices destroyed the infrastructure of the central government (Allawi, 2008, p. 116; Cobb, 2007, p. 49; Gordon & Kifner, 2003; Pelletiere, 2007, p. 68).

The looters took anything of value, from computers to furniture. Once everything was looted, the buildings were set aflame. Former Minister of Trade, Defense, and Finance Ali A. Allawi argues that much of the looting was done with strategic intent, and not necessarily for monetary goals.

According to Allawi, many of Iraq's former security officials joined the looters to methodically destroy the Iraqi government's databases and infrastructure. In their attacks on the ministry buildings, they wiped out files, burned documents, and destroyed records in an attempt to blur any paper trails that could expose individuals connected to the old Hussein regime. The former officials systematically raided hospitals, power plants, and oil fields for equipment. They were determined to weaken any effort at governing Iraq after the conflict. With the ministries stripped of their resources, later attempts to restore order would be increasingly difficult because the government infrastructure had been destroyed (Allawi, 2008, pp. 115–116; Cobb, 2007, p. 49).

U.S. military troops in Iraq were ordered to not interfere with the looting. When the 1st Marine Division was approaching Baghdad mass looting was apparent, but when General Mattis briefed his troops, he explained "We didn't come to Iraq to shoot some fellow making off with a rug" (quoted in Gordon & Trainor, 2006, p. 428). Mattis's Marines did little to alleviate the chaos. They attempted to secure some hospitals and critical buildings, but their focus was on combat, not on stopping the looting (Gordon & Trainor, 2006, p. 428). Marine Corps Lieutenant Nathaniel Fick experienced the chaos and confusion first-hand. Fick and his battalion reached Baghdad on April 10th and took up a position in Saddam City, a Shia neighborhood in northern Baghdad. Fick quickly became concerned with the looting and violence he observed. The Marines maintained a somewhat pacifying presence during the day, but at night, the looting, revenge killings, and gun battles terrorized entire neighborhoods; U.S. forces were not allowed to intervene. Conditions in other parts of Iraq mirrored the situation in Baghdad. According to Fick, "a finite supply of goodwill toward Americans evaporated with the passing of each anarchic day" (Fick, 2006, p. 316; Wright, 2008).

In the weeks following the invasion, disorder hit Shiite cities like Karbala, Basra, and Najaf. In Basra, the British Army made some of the same mistakes as U.S. forces did in Baghdad. British forces did not have enough troops to stop the looting and did not see halting the looting as a priority. They saw it as Iraqis celebrating Hussein's removal. Some of the looting was impetuous, but much was also organized. Known criminals were seen looting hospitals, banks, government buildings, and even houses. The failure to halt the looting led the citizens of Basra to realize that their security was not a top concern to British forces. One British military commander remarked that they did not have enough troops to stop the looting. Yet, other lower ranked British troops said that they largely tolerated the looting. They only stopped the looting if looters were firing weapons (Hills, 2003, p. 39; Wither, 2009, p. 620). The British's inability to establish security in Basra allowed the security vacuum to spread past Baghdad and into southern Iraq. Interviews with Iraqi citizens in Basra revealed that some men kept kill lists primarily made up of Ba'ath party members. Many young men were consumed with an obsession for revenge killings. And with no one to provide security, many young men were imposing their revenge for the years of oppression under Hussein (Santora, 2003).

Chaos was deadly in the holy city of Najaf where Shiites quickly launched into a fight over who would control the holy sites like the Imam Ali Mosque, where Shia cleric Abdul-Majid al-Kohei was killed. Witnesses say that al-Kohei was killed by men of a competing Shiite group. The mosque and the city are two very important holy sites to Shiites, so the mob violence and death of one of their most important clerics raised serious concerns among Shiites. Al-Kohei was an important figure among the Shia and U.S. officials had put their support behind the cleric in the hopes that he could help maintain peace in Najaf and among the Shia clerics. The ability of the U.S. to establish a post-Ba'athist government in Najaf

depended heavily on al-Kohei's leadership. From the setbacks in Baghdad, to political tensions and violence in Basra and Najaf, the lack of order provoked severe security concerns throughout Iraq (Black, 2003; Smith, 2003).

Escalation of Violence and Potential Intervention Points

Immediately following the invasion in May 2003 there was significant deadly violence and by 2004 the number of civilian deaths had doubled. Much of the initial violence can be attributed to the security vacuum created by the invasion, a vacuum that U.S. leaders were unwilling to fill. The poor planning for the stability phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the inability to effectively adapt were the first steps leading toward the escalation of violence in Iraq. The breakdown of authority that followed the U.S. invasion of Iraq was a critical event. The Iraqi population expected U.S. forces to establish order; when this expectation was not met, they began to question the credibility and capabilities of the U.S. (Allawi, 2008, pp. 94–95; Dodge, 2005, pp. 9–10). Violence entrepreneurs of various sorts (vigilantes, jihadis, former-Ba'athists, and criminals) tested U.S. resolve to bring order, and the U.S. was found wanting. In particular, former regime elements sought to damage the capacity of the Iraqi state through destruction of information and infrastructure. Looting and revenge killings were reactions to the breakdown of authority rather than attacks on authority, but were high damaging nonetheless. The inaction of U.S. leadership in response to the violence and disorder was a major planning and operational failure.⁴ By tolerating the anarchy that followed the invasion, U.S. forces allowed for opportunistic and sporadic looting and revenge killing to grow into more widespread and systematic violence. The lack of governance also encouraged the emergence of militias to provide security, and in some cases other services (Hubbard, 2007). Strong opposition to decentralize violence could have preserved the remnants of the Iraqi state, limited sectarian violence and the formation of armed groups, and engendered more trust and cooperation between Iraqi citizens and U.S. forces.

PHASE 2: ANARCHY AND INSURGENCY

In the days after the fall of Baghdad, the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), led by Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (Ret.), began to implement a de-Ba'athification program. The ORHA plan would have let some mid- and lower-level Ba'athists keep their jobs if they renounced their Ba'athist ties and had a clean criminal record. At first, the U.S. Army supported the plan by leading ceremonies in which former Ba'athists renounced the regime. These ceremonies seemed to be working and were especially successful in the Mosul area. However, the plan did not last. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) replaced ORHA on April 21, and Garner was replaced by L. Paul Bremer on May 11. Bremer's first CPA Order replaced the ORHA's plan with a very different approach (Terrill, 2012, pp. 12–13).

Bremer signed Order 1, on May 16, 2003, de-Ba'athifying all government institutions by removing thousands of Ba'ath Party officials from their jobs and prohibiting them from being employed in any state-run agency or business. This was especially onerous because many industries were state-run in Iraq, meaning that many middle managers at state-owned factories lost their jobs. According to Toby Dodge, "de-Ba'athification purged the civil service of its top layer of management, making between 20,000 and 120,000 people unemployed, removing its

institutional memory” (Dodge, 2007, p. 88).⁵ Many of the individuals affected by Order 1 were low ranking members and only joined the Ba’ath party because the government was the biggest employer and because of the rewards and opportunities given to those loyal to the party. In some professions, like teaching, Ba’athists were paid 50 times more than their non-Ba’athist counterparts. Iraq’s educational system was severely impacted by the de-Ba’athification process. Proponents of de-Ba’athification would not stand for Ba’athist teachers to keep their jobs and keep teaching Iraq’s young people. Over 1,700 university professors and employees were fired along with several thousand primary and secondary school teachers. De-Ba’athification also affected the students. High-school and college men who previously would have been in class were idle and prime recruits for the insurgency (Terrill, 2012, pp. 20–25).

CPA Order 1 was issued to recognize the Ba’ath party’s part in human rights abuses in Iraq and prevent bad actors from influencing the future government of Iraq (Bremer, 2003a). Yet, the inherently flawed order created major challenges to Iraq’s security and stability and is one of the most widely criticized post-invasion decisions made by American leaders.

CPA Order 2, signed on May 23, 2003, ended the existence of the Iraqi security and intelligence forces. The million-man Iraq army had already scattered, but instead of seeking to reconstitute the army—as many U.S. military and civilian leaders wanted to do—Bremer gave the order to disband it. Order 2 dissolved a list of 26 government entities including the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Information, and all of Iraq’s military organizations. Section 2 ordered that the assets of these entities be transferred to the CPA to be used “for the benefit of the Iraqi people” (Bremer, 2003b). Section 3 cancelled all military ranks and terminated all employees of Iraq’s security agencies. Perhaps the most superficial portion of the order was the section on the New Iraqi Corps. This section recognized the need for an Iraqi army to achieve security in Iraq. Yet, the phrasing does not indicate any concrete plans. Instead, the order vaguely refers to “plans to create in the near future a New Iraqi Corps, as the first step in forming a national self-defense capability” (Bremer, 2003b). The undermanned U.S. Army and Marine Corps could have used help from the Iraqi army for stabilization missions and could have benefitted greatly from local knowledge, public support, and translating assistance that the Iraqi army could have provided (Al-Ali, 2014, pp. 66–68).

With over a million former political officials and members of the armed forces out of work, the conditions for an insurgency could hardly have been better. Ex-soldiers had training, access to arms, and now, significant grievances against the coalition forces. Former soldiers and Ba’ath officials formed a natural leadership and recruiting pool for insurgent groups. In addition, many former Ba’ath officials had access to substantial wealth to fund anti-coalition operations. This group of disposed Sunni men contributed enormously to the rising insurgency in the summer of 2003 (Robinson, 2008, pp. 3–5; Terrill, 2012, pp. 38–39).

CPA Orders 1 and 2 exacerbated the lack of effective stability planning and operations. The elimination of the army and deep de-Ba’athification of the civil service decimated the capacity of the Iraqi state (Dodge, 2006, pp. 165–166, 2007, pp. 87–93; Cobb, 2007, pp. 49–50). The orders also helped spread sectarian animosity across Iraq. The CPA’s orders affected Sunnis the most because they made up the bulk of Ba’ath Party membership, which led people to see the policies as anti-Sunni and pro-Shi’ite. CPA Orders 1 and 2 incited a lot of contempt from the innocent who were caught in the destruction of the Ba’ath party and from Sunnis with a disdain for U.S. sectarian favoritism (Robinson, 2008, pp. 3–5; Terrill, 2012, pp. 15–18).

Escalation of Violence and Potential Intervention Points

This initial alienation of Sunnis, followed by the sectarian policies of the Bremer administration and the Iraqi government, played a major role in instigating violence (Isakhan, 2015, pp. 21–35; Robinson, 2008, pp. 3–5). The loss of security and administrative capacity created by CPA Orders 1 and 2 led Iraqis to begin looking to ethnic, tribal, and family groups for the provision of security (Dodge, 2007, pp. 88–89, 93). While there was no immediate explosion of violence after the CPA orders, a major increase in violence occurred in early 2004 (Brookings Institution, 2013). CPA Orders 1 and 2 eliminated what remained of the Iraqi state and created a large pool of aggrieved individuals united by sect and professional relationships, with access to significant streams of funding—all these factors facilitated the mobilization by violence entrepreneurs. As Linda Robinson notes, much of the violence that unfolded in 2004 and after can be traced back to decisions made in the spring of 2003 (Robinson, 2008, p. 3).

Not only were de-Ba’athification and the elimination of the Iraq army particularly onerous, evidence suggests there were other more effective plans available. People like Jay Garner and CIA Station Chief for Baghdad, Charlie Sidell, were aware of the awful potential of Order 1 and made their concerns known to Bremer. The escalation of violence in 2004 could have been mitigated if the original ORHA plans were used. Garner’s alternate de-Ba’athification plan would have only terminated 6,000 employees. Furthermore, President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice claimed to be completely surprised by Bremer’s decision to disband the Iraqi Army. President Bush stated in an interview, “the policy had been to keep the [Iraqi] Army intact” (Bush quoted in Terrill, 2012, p. 18; see also Al-Ali, 2014, pp. 69–70). If de-Ba’athification had been used more sparingly and parts of the army had been reactivated, it would have been much easier to limit and de-escalate violence in 2004 and beyond.

PHASE III: THE BATTLES OF FALLUJAH AND DESCENT INTO SECTARIAN CIVIL WAR

By 2004, the city of Fallujah was known as the center of Sunni insurgent activity in Iraq. Violence in Fallujah escalated from a deadly confrontation between U.S. soldiers and Iraqi protesters on April 28, 2003 to daily attacks on coalition forces, culminating in two battles with the U.S. Marines in 2004. The conflict in Fallujah escalated violence in Iraq for three main reasons. First, Sunnis increasingly saw themselves under attack by U.S. forces. The violent confrontation on April 28th and the First Battle of Fallujah cemented this judgment in the minds of Sunnis. Second, Sunnis perceived Shias to be increasingly supportive of the U.S. occupation and Shia approval of the devastation of Fallujah during the second battle demonstrated this point. This perception was a shift from a more unified opposition to the U.S. occupation notable during the First Battle of Fallujah. Third, fighting in Fallujah led many Sunnis to relocate to Baghdad, displacing Shia from mixed neighborhoods, leading to tit-for-tat violence when Shia resisted and subsequently a Shia ethnic cleansing campaign against Sunnis in Baghdad.

An analysis of the third phase of escalating violence shows the interacting dynamics of violence entrepreneurs seeking to escalate violence in the context of continuing anarchy in Iraq. Events in Fallujah between April 2003 and November 2004 show the escalation of the anti-U.S. insurgent violence overlapping with increased sectarian violence. During this time period the insurgency increased its violence capacity, which allowed it to hold territory, including

Fallujah and other parts of the Sunni Triangle. At the same time, Sunni insurgent leaders increasingly saw Shia as part of the problem, while al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi began to leverage sectarian animosity to increase his status among the Sunni insurgents. In the context of a loss of status and what was increasingly viewed as a hostile U.S.-Shia governing alliance, Sunnis banded together for self-protection and promotion of their group interests. Predatory actors like Zarqawi purposely exacerbated sectarian animosity to further build up the violence capacity of Sunni insurgents and increase the anarchy in Iraq. His vision was of an intense sectarian civil war forcing U.S. withdrawal followed by Sunni victory over the Shia and the establishment of an al-Qaeda caliphate in Iraq (Fishman, 2006, pp. 112–113).

The April 28th Demonstration and the Rise of the Insurgency

Under Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime, Fallujah had a thriving government-supported smuggling industry and the many Fallujans were employed in Saddam's security, intelligence, and military forces (Hashim, 2006, pp. 24–26; Head, 2013; Rosen, 2006b, p. 140). Fallujah had a reputation for being a conservative, predominately Sunni city (Hashim, 2006, pp. 24–26; Graham, 2005, pp. 1, 3; Rosen, 2006b, p. 139; West, 2013, p. xv). After the fall of Saddam's regime, de-Ba'athification, and the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, many Fallujans found themselves unemployed, leading many to join the insurgency. Fallujans were part of the broader Sunni Arab community that saw de-Ba'athification as "de-Sunnification" because Saddam's regime was deeply tied to the Sunni Arab identity (Hashim, 2012, p. 173; Pampinella, 2012, p. 102). The senior Sunni cleric in the region warned the residents that the U.S. wanted to turn Iraq over to the Shia (West, 2013, p. 6). Residents believed that the U.S. soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division patrolling Fallujah showed pornography to their children and used their night vision goggles to spy on their women. Fallujans regarded the U.S. forces as a threat to their values, pride, and honor (HRW, 2003). In response to the loss of power and deepening uncertainty, many Sunnis began to look to their tribes and mosques for leadership, guidance, and support. The mosque became a unifying place. The mosque acted as a provider of welfare and in some cases it acted as an arms depot, a source of news, and a rallying point (Al-Khalidi & Tanner, 2006, p. 13; Hashim, 2006, p. 115; Rosen, 2006b, pp. 24–27; Pampinella, 2012, p. 101; Staniland, 2010, p. 1640).

Underlying tensions in Fallujah became violent in late April 2003. On April 28, 2003, Saddam Hussein's 66th birthday, there was an anti-occupation demonstration. Reports of what occurred vary widely. Around 200 men, women, and children broke curfew and participated in the demonstration, which began at the mayor's office and the former Ba'ath party headquarters where paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division were staying. The paratroopers began to make threats over a microphone in the streets and slowly the demonstrators moved on. Later on that evening, the demonstrators reconvened and decided to march to a schoolhouse where another platoon was staying. School had been out of session since that March so the demonstrators came in with the goal of removing U.S. soldiers from the schoolhouse in order for school to resume. Shots were fired from the crowd of demonstrators leading to the paratroopers in the schoolhouse to fire back at the crowd (Chandrasekaran, 2003; HRW, 2003; West, 2013, p. 19). Whether or not the U.S. forces fired indiscriminately varies amongst the accounts of the attack; although during an investigation by Human Rights Watch, there was little to no evidence of the U.S. forces being fired upon, but an estimated 15 Iraqi men, women, and children were killed

and up to 70 were wounded (HRW, 2003). No American fatalities were reported. Six months after the incident, Jamil Karaba, a Fallujan and former Ba'athist, was arrested for having allegedly planted gunmen amongst the demonstrators to instigate the U.S. troops to attack. According to West (2013, p. 13), "Provoking an incident was a centuries-old guerrilla stratagem for turning the people against the soldiery. And this time, as so often in the past, it had worked."

As news of the incident spread, the Sunni population in the area and many prominent leaders in the community were vocal about their distaste for the occupation, calling for people to join the insurgency. The senior imam, Sheikh Jamal chanted, "All Americans leave Iraq!" along with a large crowd the day following the attack in front of the mayor's office (West, 2013, p. 13). Just two days after the attack, another demonstration occurred in Fallujah to protest the prior attack. The protestors were unarmed but were apparently fired upon by another U.S. Army convoy passing through the city. Iraqis were killed and 16 were wounded (HRW, 2003).

Over the next year tensions continued to grow between the U.S. forces and the Iraqis within the al-Anbar province and in Baghdad. Clashes between the two groups started to become a daily occurrence (Rubin & McManus, 2004). After the April 28th incident, Taha Bedawi, the pro-Coalition mayor of Fallujah advised the 82nd Airborne Division to leave the city for fear of retribution for the deaths of the Fallujans. The 82nd Airborne was then replaced with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment who carried out consistent, thorough nighttime raids that in turn cultivated a stronger anti-coalition sentiment amongst the Fallujan population. Tensions were aggravated by the bombing of the Al Hassan mosque in July of that year killing the imam and several Iraqis. Fallujans claimed the death and destruction was caused by a U.S. missile. Within hours, a crowd gathered and began to chant, "There is no God but Allah, America is the enemy of God" (West, 2013, pp. 15–16).

First Battle of Fallujah, April 1-May 4, 2004

On March 31, 2004, four U.S. contractors employed by Blackwater Security Consulting were providing security for flatbeds sent by a catering company to pick up kitchen equipment. As the small convoy drove through Fallujah, it was ambushed and the four contractors were killed by small arms fire. After the shooting died down, a mob swept through the vehicles looting the valuables and burning the vehicles. The Americans' bodies were burned, partially dismembered, and dragged through the streets; two were hung from a bridge, where they remained for hours. The horrors were captured by both Western and Arab media outlets and caught the attention of the Bush administration (Flynn, 2006; Gentleman, 2004; Graham, 2005, pp. 1, 3; West, 2013, pp. xvi-3).

Initially, the U.S. believed the attack to have been organized by the al-Qaeda leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, but over time, it became increasingly clear that a different al-Qaeda commander was responsible, Ahmad Hashim Abd al-Isawi, a native Fallujan. According to one source, al-Isawi stage-managed the display of the American bodies, making sure the media would be there to document the atrocities. Al-Isawi, later labelled the "Butcher of Fallujah" by U.S. analysts, quickly gained a reputation throughout the region and Iraq as a whole for his brutality and was the driving force behind the escalating violence in Fallujah (Robinson, 2013, pp. 6–9).

President Bush accepted the recommendation of key advisors—CENTCOM commander U.S. Army General John Abizaid, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld—and ordered immediate retaliation. Unbeknownst to President Bush, Marine leaders opposed this approach because they feared a full scale attack on short notice would likely result

in high casualties for both the U.S. forces and Fallujah civilians. Nevertheless, Operation Vigilant Resolve, also known as the First Battle of Fallujah, began April 4, 2004. The battle quickly gained criticism from the international press and from foreign leaders, such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair. In response to the criticism, the U.S. announced publicly on April 9th that they would call for a unilateral ceasefire, allowing for negotiations between the U.S. forces and the local leaders to commence. The U.S. appeared to reach an agreement with local leaders on April 19th but fighting continued until May 1, 2004 when President Bush called the Marines to pull back due to the continued international criticism for the operation and deteriorating support for the occupation as a whole. Many of the Marines expressed their frustration with Bush's decision, believing that they had left a job half done. The insurgents in the area took the departure of the U.S. troops as a signal for victory and Fallujah became a trophy of the insurgency (Allawi, 2008, p. 276; Graham, 2005, pp. 1, 3; West, 2013, pp. xvi–3). Over the course of the battle, around 600 civilians and fighters were killed, which comprised over half of the Iraqi civilian deaths that month (Head, 2013; Iraq Body Count).

During the fighting, the Shiites in the area were moved with sympathy for the Sunni Fallujans and supported their defense of the city (Hashim, 2006, p. 212; Rosen, 2006b, p. 19). Sheikh Fadel al-Gaidy said, “Sunni and Shia are together. All of Iraq is Fallujah” (quoted in Anderson, 2004). Shiite sheikhs throughout the Al-Anbar province and Baghdad were calling for their followers to donate blood and food to those in Fallujah (West, 2013, p. 91). Likewise, Sunni insurgents from Fallujah sent aid to the Shiite insurgents in places such as Najaf where Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army were active (Rubin & McManus, 2004). An Iraqi man from Baghdad, Mouyed al-Muslih, told a *New Yorker* reporter, “Before, there was no common ground between Sunni and Shia...but now there is. The reason is because the Iraqi people are tired of the occupation and the humiliation of soldiers pushing in their doors and stealing from them and bothering their women and sticking guns in their faces” (quoted in Anderson, 2004).

Second Battle of Fallujah, November 2004

The U.S. forces had taken control of most of Fallujah during the first battle but handed over control of the city to a group of former Ba'athist generals who are now known as the “Fallujah Brigade.” In consultation with the head of Iraq's security and intelligence services, Major General Muhammed Shahwani, U.S. generals James Mattis and James Conway chose Mohammed Latif and Jassim Saleh, both former Ba'athist generals, to lead the brigade. Initially, Latif came to Shahwani with the idea of military to military relations with the U.S. forces in the city of Fallujah by placing a group of former generals in charge of the city (West, 2013, p. 192). Both Latif and Saleh had promised the American forces that they would be able to bring order to the city and calm the growing the insurgency by leading the brigade. Many leaders looked at this situation with uncertainty, most notably Ali Allawi, the interim Defense Minister of the Iraqi government, who said at the time, “It was the equivalent of the poachers becoming the gamekeepers” (quoted in Allawi, 2008, p. 279). Instead of pacifying the insurgents and maintaining order, members of the Fallujah Brigade were sympathetic to the insurgents and General Saleh even openly backed the insurgency (Allawi, 2008, p. 278; Hashim, 2006, p. 43–44; West, 2013, p. xvi). Fallujah became home to the headquarters of three predominant insurgent groups: Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Islamic Army of Iraq, and the 1920's Revolution Brigades (Allawi, 2008, p. 338; Nance, 2015, p. 4). Over time, the insurgency began to push

beyond the borders of the city of Fallujah as they began to target the nearby Marine bases and those entering the region, primarily Shiites. Foreign fighters began to flock to the city and the insurgent groups there began to export their forces to other cities such as Baghdad, Samarra, and Ramadi. During the summer of 2004, Fallujah became a no-go zone for the U.S. forces. The U.S. stopped funding the Fallujah Brigade in September (Rubin & McManus, 2004).

The U.S. needed to secure the Sunni stronghold of Fallujah before the elections in January 2005 in order to ensure that the elections were free and fair (Graham, 2005, p. 4; Hashim, 2006, pp. 43–44). On November 4, 2004, President Bush gave the order for the Marines to re-intervene in the city of Fallujah in Operation Phantom Fury, which is known today as the Second Battle of Fallujah. Some contend that the U.S. re-intervened in Fallujah in part as an act of retribution for the incomplete operation in April (Allawi, 2008, p. 340). During this battle, many argue that the U.S. used more indiscriminate tactics, not putting forth much effort to distinguish the insurgents from the other Fallujan civilians, thus fueling anti-U.S. sentiment. Hundreds of thousands of Fallujans fled the city before and during the beginning of the second battle to western Baghdad and the surrounding regions. There were curfews imposed with no electricity or water in the city. The U.S. forbade men of military age (under the age of 45) from leaving the city as well. Such tactics had been used elsewhere in cities such as Najaf and Samarra (Berenson & Burns, 2004; Vick, 2004). The second battle lasted until December 23, 2004, and resulted in 1,200 dead⁶ and 250,000 of the 300,000 displaced. The deaths in Fallujah accounted for over 70% of the deaths in Iraq that month (Allawi, 2008, p. 339; Ardolino, 2013, p. 163; Graham, 2005, pp. 3–4; Hashim, 2006, pp. 46–47; Rosen, 2006b, p. 19; West, 2013, p. xvi).

The fragile alliance between the Shiites and the Sunnis against the occupation proved to be short-lived. Some Shia leaders continued to support Sunnis against coalition forces (Janabi, 2004); however, support was crumbling and sectarianism increasing. Some Shia believed that the Sunnis in Fallujah deserved their fate for harboring actors such as Zarqawi who openly used sectarian rhetoric and targeted Shiite communities (Hashim, 2006, p. 212; Khalil, 2004; Rosen, 2006b, p. 19). As the Sunni insurgency gained in strength, it increasingly “focused...on attacking Shia as a way of creating the chaos they hoped would allow them to regain political control” (Al-Khalidi & Tanner, 2006, p. 8). According to Nir Rosen, the movement of displaced Fallujans to western Baghdad was when “the cleansing of Shia began” (Allawi, 2008, p. 447–448; Rosen, 2006a). The refugees of Fallujah needed homes and Shias in Sunni neighborhoods were instructed to leave by Sunni militias or civilians in order to make room for newcomers. Death threats, kidnappings, and murder were tools of coercion. Violence entrepreneurs such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and organizations such as the Association of Muslim Scholars promoted and justified such sectarian attacks for the Sunni extremists (Allawi, 2008, p. 447–448; Al-Khalidi & Tanner, 2006, pp. 3, 11; Rosen, 2006a). Zarqawi said in a letter in February 2004:

We here are entering a battle on two levels. One, evident and open, is with an attacking enemy and patent infidelity. Another is a difficult, fierce battle with a crafty enemy who wears the garb of a friend, manifests agreement, and calls for comradeship, but harbors ill will and twists up peaks and crests... If we succeed in dragging them into the arena of sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger and annihilating death at the hands of these Sabeans. (Zarqawi, 2004)

These attacks were motivated by sectarianism and by the idea that the Shia were pro-occupation. Zarqawi stated, “The battle of Fallujah removed the ugly mask of the damned Rafidha [a derogatory term for Shia among Sunni extremists], whose hatred [for Sunnis] was manifested

in this battle ” (quoted in Hashim, 2006, p. 47). Zarqawi in September of 2005 declared war on the Shia although the Sunni community was quick to condemn it. The condemnation of Zarqawi’s call to war did not satisfy actors such as Muqtada al-Sadr, a radical Shia cleric, who refused the Sunni leaders’ apologies unless they named Zarqawi an infidel, which none did, thus heightening the sectarian tension and polarization (Rosen, 2006a).

Escalation of Violence and Potential Intervention Points

Violence significantly increased during the Second Battle of Fallujah as demonstrated by the spike in the civilian deaths in November 2004 (Brookings Institution, 2013). However, this escalation of violence had its roots in the April 28, 2003 protest and the First Battle of Fallujah in May of 2004. From late 2003 through 2004 Ba’athist Jamil Karaba, and al-Qaeda in Iraq commanders Ahmad Hashim Abd al-Isawi, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi succeed in mobilizing Sunni Arabs to fight U.S. forces and engage in a sectarian war with Shia. According to one scholar, the “hostile social environment was used by insurgents to provoke American forces into using indiscriminate violence and further radicalize the population” (Pampinella, 2012, p. 102). The anti-Shia violence instigated by violence entrepreneurs deepened the sectarian polarization in Iraq suggesting that the violence was a cause of sectarianism, not the other way around (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007, p. 188). This is an important point because it suggests the importance of violence entrepreneurs in catalyzing inter-communal violence.

Shia violence entrepreneurs responded to Sunni violence by forming death squads to carry out revenge attacks on Sunnis. Shia death squads were often affiliated with one of the main Shia militias such as the Badr Corps of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), or the Mahdi Army (or Jaysh Al-Mahdi) of the Sadr Trend group led by Muqtada al-Sadr. Members of these groups were often also members of the Iraqi security forces, especially police forces controlled by the Interior Ministry, led by SCIRI member Bayan Jaber Solagh (Hubbard, 2007, pp. 352–355).

The perceived indiscriminate violence of the U.S. forces in Fallujah beginning in the attack on April 28th through both of the battles sparked Iraqi animosity towards the U.S. that shortly turned into sectarian violence. The U.S. forces initially intervened in Fallujah to prevent the further mobilization of violence entrepreneurs, but the consequences of their intervention further perpetuated the legitimacy of the various insurgent groups in the region. Furthermore, the abrupt end to the First Battle gave a platform for the insurgent leaders and violence entrepreneurs to recruit. As aforementioned, many took the departure of the U.S. forces as a signal for victory. The failed formation of the Fallujah Brigade and the following anarchy in the city gave the insurgency crucial space and time to emerge, giving rise to many insurgent groups based on sectarian principles. If it were not for the quick departure of the U.S. forces, Fallujah may not have acted as a catalyst for sectarian groups and violence entrepreneurs.

U.S. forces lost the chance to engage effectively with Fallujans very early in the occupation by responding aggressively to the April 28th protest. They also failed to take any action that would change the Fallujan perception of the United States as a hostile occupier. The First and Second Battles of Fallujah reinforced that perception while also seeming to reinforce the Sunni insurgent narrative of the U.S. and Shia-led government as an anti-Sunni alliance. Overall, the U.S. did not do enough to combat sectarian narratives and violence caused by violence entrepreneurs. The structural-strategic framework suggests the importance of identifying violence entrepreneurs and doing everything possible to undermine

their strategies of escalation. By the time of the Second Battle of Fallujah violence entrepreneurs had succeeded in escalating from the decentralized violence of anarchy to the more focused and intense violence of a sectarian insurgency.

CONCLUSION

The events detailed above led directly to the destruction of the al-Askariyya Mosque in Samarra in February of 2006 and the subsequent wave of violence that struck Iraq (Dodge, 2007, p. 89; Cobb, 2007, p. 51). Most analysts focus on the destruction of the Mosque's Golden Dome as the moment when civil war began, but it is important to acknowledge the almost three years of violence that led to this point. The Samarra bombing was the equivalent of a declaration of war on Iraqi Shias. It intensified an ongoing sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shia marked by death-squad kidnappings and murders, suicide bombs, sectarian cleansing, and various other forms of deadly mayhem (Cobb, 2007, p. 51; Dodge, 2007, p. 89). According to Dodge (2007, p. 93), the sectarian violence "was not an inevitable result of regime change but a direct response to the collapse of the state." The sectarian security dilemma emerged from the security vacuum of state collapse and the subsequent cycle of violence instigated by the attacks of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and perpetuated by Shia reprisals, consistent with the structural-strategic framework of escalating violence. According to Nir Rosen (2006a), "Shia militias led by the Mahdi Army took the offensive against Sunnis when it was clear that the Sunni resistance had reconciled with al-Qaeda, and Iraqi nationalist groups, including the Association of Muslim Scholars, began supporting al-Qaeda's attacks on security forces and providing Zarqawi's men with shelter in late 2005." Policy analysts Pascual and Pollack (2007, p. 11) argue that de-Ba'athification and Sunni fear of rising Shia power led Sunnis to look increasingly to foreign jihadis for security.

While the al-Askariyya Mosque bombing and violence that followed was shocking, it was not without precedent or warning. The failure of the United States to restore order quickly after the fall of Saddam Hussain created an atmosphere of disorder and a permissive environment for violence. De-Ba'athification facilitated an increase in violence by decreasing state capacity while increasing the grievances of Sunnis, which were heightened further by the U.S. response to the April 28th protest and the First Battle of Fallujah. The Second Battle of Fallujah heightened sectarian tensions and marked the beginning of pervasive, decentralized violence in Baghdad. Throughout the conflict, Maoist people's war insurgency and sectarian civil war coexisted: "The nationalist and Islamist Sunni insurgents [were] waging a war against U.S. forces and their local collaborators, using a combination of selective violence (where they enjoy a measure of territorial control) and indiscriminate violence (mostly via suicide bombings) in areas where such control eludes them" (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007, p. 187).

The findings of this study also help make sense of what worked about the "Iraq Surge" and strengthens our knowledge of both preventative measures and responsive measures. In essence, the structural-strategic framework answers the question: The Iraq surge worked in practice, but does it work in theory? The combination of structural and strategic theory explains why the policy of killing and capturing of high value targets (violence entrepreneurs) was sensible and effective, but

alone was not enough. Political authority had to be restored and sectarianism restrained, which was the result of the Sunni Awakening. The reason for the return of violence in 2012 was largely the failure to restraint sectarianism. In moving forward U.S. and Iraqi leaders must prevent backsliding by continuing to pay attention to both the structural and strategic aspects of political violence.

NOTES

1. Violence entrepreneurs are individuals that seek to inspire, shape, and direct collective violence to achieve their goals. For further discussion see della Porta (1995, p. 12) and Götze (2004, p. 681, note 19).
2. As Rayburn (2014, pp. 97–131) notes, there were lulls in the violence but the overall trend is clearly escalating violence (see also Brookings Institution, 2013).
3. While most civil war scholars agree with this statement, some databases do not label the violence in Iraq as a civil war, as noted by Scarcelli (2017).
4. For example, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously downplayed the violence with his comments: “Freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things” (quoted in Loughlin, 2003).
5. Others estimate 30,000 to 50,000 (Terrill, 2012, p. 21).
6. The Red Cross in Baghdad reported that 800 of the 1,200 were civilians killed (Inter Press Service, 2004; Singal, Lim, & Stephey, 2010).

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The Role of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) as an Evolving Threat to International Security

Steven R. Johnson

Department of the Air Force, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, USA

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) is evolving and diversifying activities globally presenting persistent threats to security and governance. TOC growth parallels globalization trends including technology, communications, and transportation advances that facilitate geographically dispersed connected networks. Combating TOC (CTOC) requires integrated approaches that incorporate diverse resources, authorities, and permissions across elements of national power. Constraints related to political will, interoperability, and capacity continue to limit multilateral cooperative activities. The U.S. government should take a leadership role, forging international cooperation through efforts to build capacity and integrate diverse capabilities toward common objectives while integrating U.S. Special Operations Forces' capabilities into CTOC efforts globally.

Keywords: transnational organized crime (TOC), special operations, networks, counterterrorism, illicit activities, building partner capacity (BPC)

Throughout history civilizations have faced threats that seek to disrupt civil society and undermine effective governance. In order to develop effective activities to challenge such problems one must understand the environment in which they occur and seek to gain a common understanding of the problem to be addressed prior to developing the strategy and approach. Transnational organized crime (TOC) is a threat which spans the globe and poses a significant challenge to the international community. The rise of transnational organized crime began to take place as early as the 1970s but it largely occurred during the 1990s (Picarelli, 2011, p. 6). The increased advance of TOC in the 1990s is often attributed to the rapidly changing international environment that experienced dramatic advances in technology and communications, globalization of the economy, and a shifting geo-political environment creating an increasingly interconnected global community (Picarelli, 2011, p. 6). These factors contributed to the evolution of organized crime from principally domestically oriented groups with central hierarchies to broad reaching networks that operate seamlessly across geographic boundaries (Picarelli, 2011, p. 6).

The expansion of TOC has led states and international organizations to develop strategies and implement actions to address the problem. In particular the approach taken by the U.S. to address TOC is outlined in the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime from

July 2011. This strategy highlights the significance of the problem as it relates to U.S. national interests. Additionally, international support for the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime demonstrates the resolve of the international community to understand the problem and seek opportunities to pursue strategies aimed at preventing the growth of TOC and actively confronting TOC to disrupt ongoing activities. To date approximately 90% of the nations across the globe have ratified this convention (Albanese, 2012, p. 11). Continuous unified efforts will have to be undertaken across the international community if states want to achieve goals to disrupt TOC and diminish the circumstances that allow TOC to expand.

In examining the emergence and expansion of transnational organized crime as an international security concern and exploring current U.S. government and United Nations approaches to the problem one finds that efforts to address the complexity of TOC require vast resources, multi-agency collaboration, and significant cooperation across the international community. Within the scope of this broad approach, what is the role of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in combating transnational organized crime and more specifically what is the role of special operations forces (SOF) in contributing to the overall DoD effort to combat TOC? How can SOF capabilities be applied to directly and indirectly confront transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and what authorities currently exist to support the execution of these efforts?

The DoD and in particular special operations forces can leverage unique capabilities to assist in the development of necessary capacity worldwide to combat TOC. DoD placement, access, and intelligence collection and analysis capabilities can directly contribute to efforts to identify and disrupt specific TCO networks and when significant pending threats to national security exist, special operations forces can be leveraged to execute sensitive targeting operations focused on high value individuals. Additionally, DoD planning and joint synchronization experience can be utilized to support multiagency synchronization to commit unified action against TCOs. However, in order for DoD to provide necessary capabilities, U.S. legislation and DoD authorities and appropriations must be aligned for these purposes.

This article focuses on examining existing strategies and efforts to combat TOC from the perspective of the U.S. and seeks to provide recommendations for consideration to integrate the unique capabilities of U.S. special operations forces into the overall approach. Moreover, this research will seek to identify existing authorities for DoD efforts to combat TOC and explore potential shortfalls that require adjustment or expansion of authorities.

HOW TO DEFINE AND CHARACTERIZE TOC

When one seeks to understand and ultimately define transnational organized crime it is important to understand each component of the overall concept individually that results in the integrated definition. It is also necessary to understand that transnational crime does not necessarily represent a new classification of crime as it can be considered an extension of existing criminal activities or violations of law, taking place beyond the borders of one single country (Albanese, 2012, p. 1). Essentially, transnational crimes can be broken into three categories based on broadly defined objectives, “provision of illicit goods, provision of illicit services, and the infiltration of business or government operations” (Albanese, 2012, p. 2). Furthermore, a definition of organized crime that represents a consensus definition incorporating various

elements from numerous scholars is outlined as follows: “a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are often in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of public officials” (Albanese, 2012, p. 3). Recognizing these perspectives on transnational crime and organized crime one should also consider the characteristics of TCOs in order to inform the overall definition of transnational organized crime.

One of the most significant advances for TCOs is their ability to act as dispersed networks that establish linkages with other criminal networks and legitimate businesses to conduct their activities (Williams, 1994, p. 60). This effectively establishes an enterprise model for illicit activities; therefore, lessons can be learned by examining the operations of transnational corporations which leverage similar methods (Williams, 1994, p. 60). Through this approach one can focus on international supply chain that requires partnerships from the initial design and production of products, through transshipment and distribution, and ultimately to market access and product delivery (Williams, 1994, p. 60). Furthermore, TCOs demonstrate their understanding of the need to establish and maintain strategic partnerships that present opportunities to gain access to new markets or expand market share within current markets (Williams, 1994, p. 61).

As an enterprise, TCOs seek to maintain their structure and ultimately pursue profit driven activities requiring TCOs to focus on supply, demand, market regulation, and competitors (Albanese, 2012, p. 9). This leads to an understanding that TOC can be driven by a demand for illicit products and services in consumption countries while highlighting the difficulty states face in maintaining rule of law within their sovereign territory (Edwards & Gill, 2002, p. 207). TCOs can be further characterized by their network structure in which they are typically based in one country while executing various components of the operations in other countries that present favorable conditions with the least amount of risk or high payoff to offset increased risk (Shelley, 1995, p. 464).

For the purposes of this research, transnational organized crime will be defined as it is defined in the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime:

self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence or while protecting their illegal activities through transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms. (U.S., 2011, n.p.)

RAPID EXPANSION BASED ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES

The emergence and expansion of transnational organized crime aligns with the time in history when significant advances in technology were occurring at a rapid pace (Picarelli, 2011, p. 6). Organized crime began to expand beyond national borders and develop transnational enterprises during the 1970s and advanced steadily until the 1990s (Picarelli, 2011, p. 6). In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, through the emergence of the internet into the public market and an increasingly globalized economy, TOC began to expand at a much more rapid pace (Picarelli, 2011, p. 6).

Transnational criminal organizations conduct various criminal activities that have widespread impacts on legitimate markets and goods, government income generated through taxes on

legitimate commerce and trade, and ultimately, consumers and consumer confidence (Realuyo, 2015, p. 7). The continued expansion of the global marketplace at an unprecedented pace creates opportunities for TCOs to exploit vulnerabilities in the interconnected systems and intermingle illicit activities with legitimate transactions at the speed of technology (Realuyo, 2015, p. 7). This point can be further understood by highlighting the connection of TOC expansion with the growth of international business and specifically focusing on technological advances including business applications of computers, international communications, and commercial airline travel (Shelley, 1995, p. 465). One of the principle points to note is that TCOs “follow the trends of international business” (Shelley, 1995, p. 466). TCOs are further characterized by their ability to diversify while integrating illicit activities with legitimate international economic activities without disrupting the markets (Williams, 1994, p. 59).

IMPACT OF TOC AND TCOs' RELATIONSHIP WITH PUBLIC/GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

TOC has widespread impacts on the social conditions within the countries in which TCOs operate and their activities undermine governance and rule of law driving instability which creates an environment conducive to the expansion of criminal activities (Shelley, 1995, p. 467). TCOs' exploitation of legitimate economic activities further limits legitimate investment and development, creating an economy that becomes increasingly reliant on illicit activities for sustenance and ultimately integration into international markets (Shelley, 1995, p. 483).

TCOs are adept at corrupting officials within governments including those tasked with disrupting their activities, such as law enforcement officials and compliance officers (Williams, 1994, p. 59). TCOs' corrupting activities undermine government legitimacy, rule of law, and democratic institutions (Shelley, 1995, p. 468). This penetration reduces the effectiveness of the state's institutions to combat TOC (Shelley, 1995, p. 470). As corruption activities continue around the world, it becomes increasingly evident that they contribute to instability, particularly in states where senior government officials are involved in TOC by design (Levi, 2012, p. 42).

In addition to corruption activities that take place within a state, some evidence indicates corruption among state officials acting in a diplomatic capacity (Zabyelina, 2013, p. 346). In some cases this is the result of criminals seeking to corrupt officials to leverage them for criminal purposes and in other cases the officials or their accompanying family leverage their position as a means to conduct criminal activity with limited risk due to diplomatic relations and immunities (Zabyelina, 2013, p. 345). The primary example of officials operating in a foreign capacity being corrupted by criminals for nefarious purposes is demonstrated by cases of visa malfeasance in which officials support criminal activity to falsely issue visas, support visa procurement, and counterfeiting activities (Zabyelina, 2013, p. 352).

TOC EXPANSION INTO CYBER CRIME

The internet has proven to be a beneficial platform for information exchange around the world but it has also increased opportunities for TCOs to engage in electronic theft and electronic commerce for illicit purposes (Levi, 2012, p. 43). The internet provides users with a degree of anonymity not

present in physical interaction including confidentiality and deniability (Etges & Sutcliffe, 2008, p. 91). Underlying conditions can contribute to the emergence and expansion of cybercrime, in particular geographic centers such as populations that are exposed to technical expertise through education opportunities in areas where there are limited economic opportunities (Levi, 2012, p. 40). Moreover, the impact is far greater in those states that encourage cyber activity, are not capable of effectively countering or preventing it, or in some cases, agents of the state are actively involved (Levi, 2012, p. 40). Some of the main geographic centers for cybercrime activities are located within Brazil, Russia, South Korea, India, and China (Glenny, 2012, p. 146).

Cyber criminals require two unique skill sets to be successful in cybercrime, hacking abilities, and social engineering (Glenny, 2012, p. 146). Hacking allows access to data necessary for criminal activity and social engineering supports the ability to convince victims to engage in activities on their computer that are not in their best interest allowing the cybercrime to take place (Glenny, 2012, p. 146). Expansion of TOC into the cyber realm is a reflection of the fact that criminal activity flourishes where there are lax or confusing laws and where the capabilities and capacities of law enforcement are limited or ill structured (Etges & Sutcliffe, 2008, p. 92).

STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES TO ADDRESS TOC

With international recognition of TOC as a strategic issue that must be addressed, the preponderance of efforts to combat TOC center on law enforcement and judicial activities to confront the problem (Dandurand, 2007, p. 226). International recommendations include the necessity to strengthen legislation within states to allow effective law enforcement and prosecution of TCOs (Dandurand, 2007, p. 226). In addition, increased efforts come with the realization for a need to ensure capacity exists to effectively confront TOC and therefore requirements for developing and training additional capabilities across the international community exist (Dandurand, 2007, p. 226).

The scale and scope of TOC makes it clear that no one country acting alone will have the capability to contain TOC, not even within its own borders (Fijnaut, 2000, p. 124). Interagency cooperation is required within states and across the international community in order to be effective against the problem but barriers to cooperation including limited information sharing and a lack of consensus about how to pursue the problem continue to undermine cooperation (Dandurand, 2007, p. 229). Furthermore, within the international environment and across functional systems exist discrepancies in regulation and compliance standards that essentially establish specific areas that act as hubs for functions of various TOC systems (Calderoni, 2014, p. 135).

UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC GUIDANCE, DIRECTION, AND AUTHORITIES

The International Crime Control Strategy (ICCS) of 1998 was developed as a multiagency effort in response to Presidential Decision Directive 42 (PDD-42) of 1995 (Wagley, 2006, p. 6). The ICCS included eight goals focused on protecting U.S. borders and extending defense beyond the borders, denying safe-haven, countering financial crime, preventing international trade exploitation, addressing emerging threats, and enhancing international cooperation and rule of law

(Wagley, 2006, p. 6). This initial effort to protect the U.S. from the impacts of international crime likely contributed to increased international attention to the developing problem of TOC.

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted in November 2000 and provides guidance to the international community regarding the need to address TOC and specific activities states should adopt to increase effectiveness and cooperation against the problem (UNODCCP, 2000, p. 11). The convention provides definitions in order to develop common language that facilitates cooperation across the international community and it identifies four crimes traditionally associated with TOC, “participating in organized crime groups, money laundering, corruption, and obstruction of justice” (UNODCCP, 2000, p. 11). In addition, the convention goes on to outline “serious crimes” which represent offenses that would constitute punishment through confinement for four years or more and “minor offenses,” creating the framework that requires states that ratify the convention to enact legislation to address these offenses (UNODCCP, 2000, p. 11). It further requires states to implement domestic measures to address crimes associated with TOC and provides specific practices such as bank transparency and cooperation with domestic law enforcement on efforts associated with money laundering (UNODCCP, 2000, p. 11).

Throughout the negotiations process it became evident that in order to effectively address the problems associated with TOC it is necessary for government agencies and departments to work together and across governments (UNODCCP, 2000, p. 12). One of the main mechanisms for cooperation requires states that ratify the convention to provide for extradition and mutual legal assistance beyond those agreements that already existed through regional or bilateral agreements (UNODCCP, 2000, p. 13). This provision supports an environment conducive to international cooperation with the ends of prosecution and conviction in mind. Some restrictions on extradition apply based on domestic laws and existing agreements and treaties, as well as minimum thresholds for punishment (UNODCCP, 2000, p. 13).

In order to address states’ capacity to combat TOC, the convention calls for states to develop and maintain training facilities and programs, as well as calling on states to provide resources to further this requirement in developing countries where resource constraints may be prohibitive (UNODCCP, 2000, p. 12). The convention also calls on states to adopt preventative measures including “taking of security precautions, training of officials, keeping of general records about crime and specific records to control key activities, such as the import/export of firearms and the issuance and verification of travel documents” (UNODCCP, 2000, p. 12).

The Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) was approved in July of 2011 and centers on a “single unifying principle... [to] build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat TOC and related threats to national security and urge...foreign partners to do the same” (U.S., 2011, p. 4). In accordance with the definition of transnational organized crime included within the strategy, the strategy highlights key elements of the threat including penetration of state institutions, corruption, threats to governance, threats to the economy and strategic markets, crime-terror-insurgency nexus, drug trafficking, human smuggling, trafficking in persons, weapons trafficking, intellectual property theft, cybercrime, and the role of facilitators (U.S., 2011, p. 5–8). In addition to the aforementioned key elements, the strategy outlines regional priorities for the Western Hemisphere, Afghanistan and Southwest Asia, Russia and Eurasia, The Balkans, West Africa, and Asia Pacific (U.S., 2011, p. 9–11). Within these regions key threats include Los Zetas Cartel, Sinaloa Cartel, Dawood Ibrahim, Russian syndicates and oligarchs, Jose

Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, and Cehng Chui Ping (U.S., 2011, p. 9–11). The breadth of the threat outlined within the strategy clearly demonstrates the global reach of TOC and the threat it poses to the international system, specific regions, and individual states.

Furthermore, the strategy outlines a strategic approach aimed at reducing TOC to a manageable public safety problem from its current state as a national security threat (U.S., 2011, p. 4). The strategic approach consists of five policy objectives supported by a series of priority actions and supporting actions (U.S., 2011, p. 13). The policy objectives are focused on protecting Americans and partners, improving partner capacity and capabilities to address TOC, protecting strategic markets, targeting for defeat the most significant threats, and building partnerships and seeking cooperation (U.S., 2011, p. 13–14). The priority actions focus U.S. government activities to ensure intelligence and information sharing, safeguard financial systems and markets, strengthen interdiction, investigations, and prosecutions, disrupt drug trafficking, and build capacity, cooperation, and partnerships (U.S., 2011, p. 15–28). Within the scope of strategic guidance provided by the U.S. government it becomes clear that to establish environments that are generally stable, the U.S., including the U.S. military, should conduct significant activities during the pre-crisis phase in conjunction with partners in an effort to avoid conflict or at least be prepared prior to crisis (Peterson, 2013, p. 25).

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 expanded existing counter drug authorities for the DoD to include “activities to counter transnational organized crime” within sections 1012 and 1014 which are section 1004 of the NDAA for FY 1991, as amended and section 1022 of the NDAA for FY 2004, as amended, respectively (NDAA, 2014, p. 193). The NDAA for FY 2015 provides a definition for transnational organized crime that is the same definition included in the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (NDAA, 2014, p. 192). Following the inclusion of CTOC in the NDAA FY 2015, section 1004 was rescinded and § 333 (U.S. Code, n.p.) and § 284 (U.S. Code, n.p.) were added to 10 U.S. Code. 10 U.S. Code § 333 provides the authority for DoD to

provide training and equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building the capacity of such forces to conduct one or more of the following: Counterterrorism operations; Counter-weapons of mass destruction operations; Counter-illicit drug trafficking operations; Counter-transnational organized crime operations; Maritime and border security operations; Military intelligence operations; Operations or activities that contribute to an international coalition operation that is determined by the Secretary to be in the national interest of the United States. (U.S. Code, n.p.)

10 U.S. Code § 284 provides the authority for DoD to “provide support for the counterdrug activities or activities to counter transnational organized crime of any other department or agency of the Federal Government or of any State, local, tribal, or foreign law enforcement agency for any of the [following] purposes” (U.S. Code, n.p.).

Types of Support for Agencies of United States: maintenance, repair, or upgrading of equipment; transportation of personnel; establishment (including small scale construction) and operation of bases of operations or training facilities; counterdrug or counter-transnational organized crime related training of law enforcement personnel; detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air, sea traffic, and surface traffic; establishment of command, control, communications, and computer networks; construction of roads and fences and installation of lighting; establishment of

command, control, communications, and computer networks; provision of linguist and intelligence analysis services; and aerial and ground reconnaissance. (U.S. Code, n.p.)

Types of Support for Foreign Law Enforcement Agencies: establishment (including small-scale construction) and operation of bases of operations or training facilities; detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air, sea traffic, and surface traffic; establishment of command, control, communications, and computer networks; provision of linguist and intelligence analysis services; and aerial and ground reconnaissance (U.S. Code, n.p.).

In addition to the authorities captured in the NDAA, SOF executes additional training engagements via Title 10. Under 10 U.S. Code § 322, Special operations forces: training with friendly foreign forces, SOF are authorized to conduct training with armed forces and other security forces of a friendly foreign country when the primary purpose of the training is to train U.S. SOF (U.S. Code, n.p.). This type of training is often referred to as a Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and it is designed to permit U.S. SOF elements to engage in training events with partners globally in an effort to develop and sustain relationships while maintaining U.S. DoD readiness.

Section 1206 of Public Law 109–163 approved by Congress in 2006, authorizes “global train and equip” activities used to enhance capabilities of foreign military forces (U.S. Code, n.p.). This authority and the accompanying appropriation allows DoD to more effectively engage partner military forces to create sustainable military capabilities that will ultimately provide support to U.S. security interests globally (U.S. Code, n.p.). The execution of this authority goes beyond what is permitted under the authorities previously mentioned in that it allows for a more comprehensive development of a capability by permitting the permanent transfer of equipment for operational purposes.

DEVELOPING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

In order to achieve the necessary results to limit the national security threat of TCOs, U.S. government departments and agencies will need to establish and maintain partnering relationships with counterparts in other countries, as well as with other U.S. government departments and agencies. These partnerships can facilitate information sharing and operational speed when they involve a sufficient level of mutual trust and they are sustained through continuous engagement. No individual agency or country has the necessary reach, authority, or resources to address the threat from TOC without collaboration and cooperation with other partners globally.

Within the current international environment, nations are increasingly cautious about the deployment and employment of large-scale combat forces to address threats, making the use of special operations forces a preferential alternative (Donaldson, 2014, p. 37). DoD support to strengthen other governments’ capacities to address international and internal threats largely through programs focused on military assistance and development have been conducted by special operations forces and can be characterized as those efforts that exist within the space between peace and large-scale conflict (Reynolds, 2014, p. 63). Future special operations focus areas include the expansion of an interconnected special operations network designed to leverage forward operating small teams “to deter aggression, build situational awareness, understand local

conditions, shape the operating environment, train new partners, and gain actionable intelligence” (Donaldson, 2014, p. 37) This approach requires persistent presence and sustained engagement with key and developing partners (Adams, 2014, p. 38). As of 2014, SOF on average were deployed to more than 70 countries worldwide (Adams, 2014, p. 39).

DOD SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

Historically, DoD counter threat network (CTN) efforts have centered on support to countering weapons of mass destruction proliferation and smuggling, as well as support to counter drug efforts through DoD detection and monitoring responsibilities and DoD support in key production and transit countries (Wagley, 2006, p. 15–17). In addition to DoD’s assigned role as the lead in the U.S. government for detecting and monitoring drug trafficking in the maritime and air domains, DoD resources and capabilities can provide additional means to address TOC, especially through the use of DoD’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, unique equipment, and planning, coordination, and synchronization expertise. Furthermore, DoD special operations forces can provide training for specialized skills and the use of specialized equipment that can contribute to partner’s capabilities to confront TOC. In order to understand what unique capabilities special operations can provide it is important to understand the definition of special operations and what activities are at the core of its capabilities. “Special Operations are explained as small unit tactical actions performed by specially organized, trained, and equipped forces aimed at achieving strategic and operational effects” (Morrison, 2013, p. 40). Special operations forces operate in environments where other U.S. government agencies may not have access. SOF core activities include “Direct Action [DA], Special Reconnaissance [SA], Unconventional Warfare [UW], Foreign Internal Defense [FID], Civil Affairs Operations [CAO], Counterterrorism [CT], Psychological Operations [PSYOP], Information Operations [IO], Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction [CP-WMD], Security Force Assistance [SFA], Counterinsurgency [COIN] Operations, and Activities Specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)” (Morrison, 2013, p. 41).

According to a recent assessment conducted by Feickert, U.S. Army SOF is composed of approximately 33,000 soldiers including Active, Reserve, and National Guard components, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) includes approximately 19,500 personnel, Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) includes approximately 10,000 personnel, and Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is composed of approximately 3,000 personnel (Feickert, 2018, p. 3–6). Within the U.S. Army, special operations capabilities include “Special Forces (SF), Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and Civil Affairs” which execute their mission by working by, with, and through indigenous partners (Cleveland, 2013, p. 136). These capabilities represent DoD’s dedicated military forces to execute “unconventional warfare [UW]..., foreign internal defense [FID] or small-unit combat advisory programs, psychological and influence warfare, and civil-military operations (Cleveland, 2013, 136). Deployed SOF missions include FID which is focused on training and development of local forces globally (Donaldson, 2014, p. 32). Air Force special operations are composed of special operations aviation capabilities assigned to “assess, train, and advise partner nation aviation units” as well as provide aviation support to FID missions (Feickert, 2018, p. 4). Air Force special operations also includes Special Tactics experts consisting of “Combat Controllers,

Pararescuemen, Special Operations Weather Teams, Combat Aviation Advisors, and Tactical Air Control Party (TACPs) (Feickert, 2018, p. 4–5). NSWC is composed of “Special Warfare Operators, known as SEALs and Special Warfare Boat Operators, known as Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC). MARSOC missions include direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, information operations, and unconventional warfare” (Feickert, 2018, p. 6). In addition to service specific special operations capabilities, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is tasked to “study special operations requirements and techniques, ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations exercises and training, and develop joint special operations tactics” (Feickert, 2018, p. 6–7).

“In special operations the enemy will be prepared; the question is, when will he be least prepared...” (McRaven, 1995, p. 18). Understanding the enemy and acting in a decisive manner against the enemies’ exposed vulnerabilities provides a strategic advantage to the attacking force. This is demonstrated by special operations through the understanding of relative superiority as described by William H. McRaven in *SPEC OPS*. “Relative superiority is a concept crucial to the theory of special operations. Simply stated, relative superiority is a condition that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy” (McRaven, 1995, p. 4). In addition to the concept of relative superiority McRaven outlines six principles of special operations – “simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose” (McRaven, 1995, p. 8–23). McRaven highlights that, “it is these principles that allow special operations forces to achieve relative superiority” (McRaven, 1995, p. 8). Overall, special operations techniques and capabilities can be leveraged to support broader efforts to diminish the threat posed by TOC.

A recent RAND study designed to assess special operations partnerships in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia identified several overarching best practices which included the need to focus on capability development as a higher priority than short-term operational gains, focus support on sustainable efforts and existing intelligence infrastructure, and develop lasting partnerships through consistent engagements and established trusting relationships (Long, Helmus, Zimmerman, Schnaubelt, & Chalk, 2015, p. 73–92). SOF historically engage in missions to develop or enhance the capabilities of partners in order to collectively combat national security concerns. Lessons learned in areas where SOF previously operated can contribute to the understanding of how to employ SOF capabilities in support of the overall mission to combat TOC.

CASE STUDY: PLAN COLOMBIA

In the early 2000s, U.S. policy as it related to Colombia was to “strengthen democratic institutions, promote respect for human rights and rule of law, intensify counter-narcotics efforts, foster socio-economic development, and address immediate humanitarian needs” (Noriega, 2005, p. 57). U.S. policy justification was tied to the understanding that conditions in Colombia represented a potential destabilizing effect for the broader region (Veillette, 2005, p. 12). These policy issues were effectively addressed via U.S. support to Plan Colombia which was a six-year program, initiated in 2000, that sought to align government efforts in support of a common strategic approach (Noriega, 2005, p. 59).

Security in Colombia has been impacted over the last 50 years by internal criminal and terrorist threats. In order to address these threats, the government of Colombia developed and pursued Plan Colombia in conjunction with support from the U.S. SOF played a major role in efforts to improve the security situation in Colombia within the scope of Plan Colombia. As of 2005, assessments of the progress of Plan Colombia showed improvement in the public safety category and advances in economic confidence which was largely attributed to the improved security situation (Veillette, 2005, p. 8–11). Additional assessment input noted sustained quality, availability, and price of cocaine and heroin in the U.S. despite advances in interdiction of drugs and eradication of illicit crops (Veillette, 2005, p. 3).

Plan Colombia was composed of 10 key elements referred to as strategies, economic, fiscal and financial, peace, national defense, judicial and human rights, counter-narcotics, alternative development, social participation, human development, and international oriented (Marcella, 2001, p. 27–29). Plan Colombia key elements can be grouped into focus areas on economic development and security (Marcella, 2001, p. 7). Security concerns in Colombia were essentially fueled by narcotics production and trafficking as both anti-government forces, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC) and Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), and self-defense forces, such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia - AUC), utilized the illicit narcotics trade as a means to fund and resource their efforts (Marcella, 2001, p. 7). A counter argument to this position is that the illicit narcotics trade is not the cause of instability, but rather a symptom and contributor to an already “fragile socio-political system” in Colombia and the broader region (Flynn, 2001, p. 1). This comes with the realization that any effort to address the issues in Colombia must include efforts focused on countering the illicit narcotics trade (Flynn, 2001, p. 1).

Initially U.S. aid in support of Plan Colombia included “support for human rights and judicial reform, expansion of counter-narcotics operations in Southern Colombia, alternative economic development, increased interdiction efforts, and assistance for Colombian police” (Marcella, 2001, p. 7). The primary program leveraged by the U.S. to execute its support was the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) which included support to other nations in the Andean region as well (Veillette, 2005, p. 1). Four-fifths of the overall aid package was earmarked for support to Colombian security forces based on the understanding that Colombia first had to establish security (Hylton, 2010, p. 100). This approach was essentially developed due to wide ranging problems across Colombia that were rooted in limited government control and presence in large portions of Colombian territory, historic violence and civil conflict, and deep rooted social issues related to inequalities (Noriega, 2005, p. 59). Efforts to improve the overall situation in Colombia could not be successful without the ability of Colombian security forces to provide rule of law and security throughout Colombian territory (Marcella, 2001, p. 3).

U.S. military support in Colombia initially focused on providing training support to Colombian counterdrug units and over time expanded to include Colombian forces conducting counterinsurgency operations (Reynolds, 2014, p. 66). Under Plan Colombia, U.S. SOF were tasked to develop Colombian special operations capabilities in support of the broader plan (Peterson, 2013, p. 27). U.S. SOF support to Plan Colombia can be characterized as military efforts that do not represent the main effort and the principal means leveraged by SOF have not been lethal action (Reynolds, 2014, p. 65). The main limitation placed on U.S. SOF has been that U.S. SOF is not authorized to accompany Colombian forces or act as advisors in combat situations (Reynolds, 2014, p. 65). However, over the course of continuous U.S. SOF

engagement, Colombian SOF has achieved significant operational success and advanced to the point of competence that Colombia is an exporter of SOF training to other countries within the region (Peterson, 2013, p. 27).

CONCLUSION

TCOs represent an expanding threat to U.S. national security and actively undermine stability globally. U.S. SOF activities and capabilities can contribute to the development of partner's capacity to combat TOC and enhance international and interagency cooperation globally. Additionally, when directed, specialized SOF targeting can be engaged to address the most pressing national security threats. Due to the dispersed networked operations of TCOs, focused efforts to directly confront key individuals and functions will require the alignment of international strategies and development of unified approaches. DoD planning, coordination, and synchronization expertise can provide necessary support to the development and execution of unified approaches.

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Publicly Available Information: Modernizing Defense Open Source Intelligence

Peter C. Gruters

U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Airforce Base, Tampa, Florida, USA

Katherine T. Gruters

Unaffiliated Scholar, USA

As the realm of Publicly Available Information continues to be codified by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), it is time to redefine the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) discipline to leverage the digital data domain effectively. This article recommends focusing on the modernization and redefinition of Defense OSINT to yield the best results. It highlights the value of the proliferation of OSINT sources in the Digital Age. This article recommends professionalizing Defense OSINT by establishing an enlisted military OSINT occupation, identifying specialized OSINT skills for recruitment, documenting OSINT best practices, standardizing Defense OSINT training, establishing a service lead to leverage industry experts, and updating all relevant DoD policy and Service regulations. It also includes a brief account of policymakers urging these types of changes.

Keywords: OSINT – Open Source Intelligence, PAI – Publicly Available Information, data, tradecraft, training, industry, military occupation, exploitation, digital domain, Emerging Technology

The type of information that is vulnerable to intelligence collection has morphed and multiplied since the advent of the Digital Age. Conversations and transactions have moved out of the shadows and into the open internet, increasing the value of the digital domain for intelligence exploitation. But the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures have not adapted to this new environment effectively. DoD's intelligence services must take deliberate steps in order to fully leverage the open digital domain. This article provides a strategic roadmap to begin that transformation.

Over the last few years, DoD senior leaders and lawmakers in the Beltway have been using a new term to define this growing, open digital domain. They are calling it Publicly Available Information, or PAI (U.S. Department of Defense, 2016). But what is PAI? The DoD formally defined PAI in 2016 as:

Information that has been published or broadcast for public consumption, is available on request to the public, is accessible on-line or otherwise to the public, is available to the public by subscription

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or purchase, could be seen or heard by any casual observer, is made available at a meeting open to the public, or is obtained by visiting any place or attending any event that is open to the public. Publicly available information includes information generally available to persons in a military community even though the military community is not open to the civilian general public. (p. 53)

The bottom-line is that if your husband, wife, child, or mother could obtain access to the information, then it is PAI. This seems to be identical to the definition of open source information, which is “information that any member of the public could lawfully obtain by request or observation as well as other unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 171). Thus, PAI is open source information.

It follows that the exploitation of PAI for intelligence purposes is the discipline of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). OSINT is defined as “relevant information derived from the systematic collection, processing, and analysis of publicly available information in response to known or anticipated intelligence requirements” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). Please note, though, that PAI is more than just the internet, and it is leveraged by more than just the intelligence mission set. For example, public affairs personnel monitor broadcast news stations (another form of PAI) for relevant military stories.

As PAI continues to be codified by DoD, it’s time for military intelligence professionals to redefine the OSINT discipline to effectively leverage this domain. This article recommends focusing on the modernization and redefinition of Defense OSINT to yield the best results.

The DoD must take the following steps to meet this current need and to combat future threats:

- Professionalize Defense OSINT by establishing an enlisted military OSINT occupation for each service, and an accompanying service structure (i.e., OSINT Squadrons and/or Companies)
- Identify the specialized skills on which recruitment efforts should focus when filling OSINT Analyst billets
- Document and proliferate best practices for OSINT collection and exploitation
- Build an OSINT curriculum and standardize Defense OSINT training
- Establish a service lead to leverage industry experts and build OSINT tools and training
- Review/Update DODI 3115.12 and fast-track the approval of DODD 3115.HH, and all associated OSINT/PAI DoD/service regulations, to capture current PAI sources and technology

OSINT SOURCES HAVE PROLIFERATED

In the past, OSINT sources were relatively limited in number and static in nature. Print media, such as books, newspapers, and magazines, published new information at a comparatively slow pace. Today, with the widespread use of the Internet, everyone is reporting information to the world constantly. As a result, the set of PAI data has increased rapidly in both size and type. Social media apps, blog posts, electronic records and public forums, the dark web, internet databases, commercial and handheld photos, streaming live broadcasts, etc., have become

publicly available. And they are rich with valuable information that can be processed into timely intelligence.

PRIVATE IS NO LONGER PRIVATE

People and governments are self-publishing treasure troves of information on the open web, providing key context to the information that could be collected via traditional intelligence means. This global exposure of information gives the DoD an opportunity to leverage PAI and to incorporate it with our core intelligence domains. Of course, while this information is now public, the DoD must still abide by the Constitution, statutory and civil liberties protections, intelligence oversight regulations, and terms of use before collecting OSINT.

Private citizens have an unrestricted digital footprint that is making their personal space public. Consider one's home, for example. Our homes used to be the ultimate sanctuary from the public world. But now, one could intrude on their own privacy by uploading pictures of events in one's home to social media. Or, when someone purchases a home, the transaction information, interior pictures, and floorplans may have become public. Even voter registration information has become publicly available. And there are entities, like political candidates and marketing departments, that buy or sell PAI. If all of this is hard to believe, then search your name in Google or Bing. Especially if you have any social media accounts, you may be surprised by how much of your personal information is available for the public to see and use.

Perhaps the most personal aspect of this shift is that conversations that used to take place at home have been moved into the public domain. You might publish your opinions on a blog, "like" a social media comment, or state your personal beliefs in reply to a friend's post. All of these bits of information reveal more about us as individuals than was ever publicly available before. And when revealed by a foreign adversary, their composite can provide valuable intelligence insights.

Furthermore, our information is out on the web even if we try to keep it hidden (and many people don't even try). There are things that we do in everyday life that force us to participate in an increasingly open society. For example, as a result of targeted online marketing, after revealing their interest to sellers by browsing for a new item, individuals get bombarded by advertisements via social media and even junk "snail mail." Other actions that create an inadvertent digital footprint include simple Internet usage, owning a smartphone, or purchasing an item.

RESTRUCTURING OUR DOD OSINT CAPABILITY

Due to this proliferation of PAI sources, the DoD should leverage PAI in support of intelligence operations more effectively. This need will become even more critical in the next decade, as advances in the digital domain continue to accelerate. With its current outdated structure, the DoD cannot exploit this vast array of sources in a timely manner that is also responsive to the asymmetric fight while meeting dynamic Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployment requirements. A centralized OSINT capability will no longer meet the needs of worldwide military intelligence operations. Rather, the DoD Services must establish a specialized, organic military

occupation to fill this void. Adequate exploitation of the world of PAI requires cultivating a specialized OSINT career field that is dedicated to the professionalization of its members.

Additionally, the DoD has demonstrated that our intelligence capability is stronger and more cohesive when all of the INTs work together at the unit level. The SOF Community used multidisciplinary intelligence teams downrange and has documented the successes that model has won. The DoD must now include specialized OSINT professionals on those teams and/or establish units providing reachback capability to support forward forces. In the Air Force, the model would come in the form of an OSINT Squadron attached to an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Group. Leveraging PAI for the purpose of OSINT is the future of ISR, and the DoD must prepare, educate, and train Airmen to be able to collect, process, exploit, and disseminate (C-PED) this information to warfighters effectively and efficiently.

WHO TO RECRUIT: A FIRST HAND OBSERVATION

Deployed units in the fight need analysts that are dedicated to this work. For example, while forward deployed, our unit made the request for OSINT analysts through Headquarters. However, those service members do not exist by career field in any service. In response, the DoD Services sent several batches of analysts that they assessed could perform OSINT functions. Some sent linguists, others sent All-Source analysts.

The most successful OSINT performers in the field were junior linguists (E-3 to E-5). These individuals were effective when they arrived because they were tech-savvy and had been self-educated on relevant tools like social media apps. In addition, they translated foreign media sites on the fly and provided the cultural context that others lacked.

In general, we noticed that the best OSINT analysts were computer savvy and could maneuver through the Internet intuitively. They knew which applications harbored the most useful information for the intelligence question and had an awareness of the interconnectedness within social media that resulted in more accurate mapping of real-world networks. They were also familiar with the latest tools and data sources and had knowledge of languages. But it would be naive to expect linguists to be spared for every OSINT requirement when they have their own specialized function to perform. The DoD must create an occupation dedicated to performing this work, enabling those professionals to maintain an agile knowledge base of emerging technology.

TRAINING DEDICATED OSINT PROFESSIONALS

Some of the core concepts that a future OSINT analyst must understand include online marketing strategies, cutting-edge technology, big data analytics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. A robust and flexible training program will be crucial to the success of the enlisted OSINT career field. Technology is constantly evolving, so OSINT training development must also be continual. This is in contrast to the way the DoD has traditionally approached curriculum development and will require a shift in culture to achieve (Davitch, 2017). However, its importance cannot be overstated.

Also, in order to coordinate the DoD's disparate PAI training efforts, it should establish one of the Services as the Training Lead. This lead must leverage industry experts to maintain awareness of emerging tools and technology. New technological developments must be integrated into the OSINT training program as frequently as possible. Future OSINT tools must be an automatic force multiplier, not a human manual labor burden. And in order to stay abreast of the latest developments in their field, future OSINT analysts should attend an annual refresher course. This is similar to the structure of a linguist's training regimen. The DoD must create experts that will be able to keep up with current and future technology.

A MANDATE FROM POLICYMAKERS

There is a history of U.S. government officials requesting that the DoD focus on OSINT. In 2005, the Final Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction identified that,

the need for exploiting open source material is greater now than ever before. Today, the spread of information technology-and the ever-increasing pace at which it advances-is immune to many traditional, clandestine methods of intelligence collection. Whereas advanced technological research once occurred only in large facilities and within enormous government bureaucratic institutions, today it can (and does) occur in nondescript office parks or garages, and with very small clusters of people. And for these new challenges, many open source materials may provide the critical and perhaps only window into activities that threaten the United States. (2005, p. 378)

There was a similar call 12 years later in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY17. Therein, the House Armed Services Committee stated that the DoD is relinquishing the world of PAI to our adversaries, allowing them the freedom to pursue "recruitment, fundraising, and strategic messaging" unabated in that space (U.S. Congress, 2016, p. 246). The Committee expressed concerns about the "fundamental lack of policy, doctrine, and procedures" relating to the use of currently available PAI tools (U.S. Congress, 2016, p. 246). And although the Committee specifically addressed the value of PAI for intelligence purposes, they also mentioned its utility for "force protection, targeting, battlespace awareness, and other traditional military activities" (U.S. Congress, 2016).

An INT has evolved without parallel growth within the DoD Services. After a dozen years of delay, the DoD must now act with urgency to modernize and professionalize OSINT. The world has changed and the military must change with it.

LOOKING FORWARD

Investing in and reshaping an already established INT is a simple solution and a step in the right direction for the DoD Intelligence Community. It would require modification to existing, outdated OSINT policies. For example, most service documents do not reference any of the aforementioned PAI sources, or even call out PAI by name. The DoD should start by ensuring that all relevant policies and regulations reflect the battlespace in which it currently fights, not that of the last decade.

The DoD should not develop a “new” INT to meet this challenge. It is clear that the professionalization of OSINT will redefine the boundaries of our core intelligence domains, but an entirely new discipline would be superfluous. It is also evident that government is not structured to develop new tools independently. The DoD must leverage industry partners that have already developed tools, apps, and systems to maneuver through the Internet seamlessly and successfully.

SOF is out front and has a successful short-term plan going forward, but more research needs to be done to formalize the list of skills necessary for this new occupation. However, DoD does not need to reinvent the wheel. It should look to the tech industry—leaders in business analytics, online marketing, data analysis—to identify who the OSINT analyst of the future is and to build an adaptive training program that can keep pace with technology in this field. DoD cannot afford to succumb to inertia and continue to do things the way it always has when it comes to combatting threats in the dynamic Digital Information Age. OSINT is the future of ISR and the DoD must adapt to it quickly.

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REVIEW ESSAY

Twelve Books Every Green Beret Should Read: An Annotated Bibliography

Jason Heeg

University of Cambridge, UK

Harrison B. Gilliam

US Army Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, USA

William J. Dickinson

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, USA

Three senior Special Forces personnel developed this annotated bibliography to provide new team members with a resource to develop upon the doctrinal foundation they gained during the Qualification Course. They formulated it for NCOs and captains serving their first year on an operational detachment alpha. The military art and science pillars of history, theory, and doctrine drove the selection of the books. If one were to read one of these books per month, in no particular order, during their first year on a team, they would be much better prepared to overcome the challenges they will face during their career.

There are many reading lists circulating among the Special Forces community.¹ But none of them are focused specifically towards developing the new unconventional warfare practitioner. The authors formulated this annotated bibliography for NCOs and captains serving their first year on an operational detachment alpha. A forthcoming second edition focuses on 18 series senior NCOs, warrant officers, and field grade officers. The military art and science pillars of history, theory, and doctrine drove the selection of the books. The recent graduate of the Special Forces Qualification Course should be well grounded in unconventional warfare doctrine. Therefore, the list below is concentrated on the theory

and history of the craft. Readers will certainly want to add books to this collection, but it would be at the peril of making it an unwieldy conglomeration with no start or end point; moreover, such lists already exist. The purpose of this article is to provide a realistic and manageable way forward to maximize the limited time available for study. If one were to read one of these books per month, in no particular order, during their first year on a team, they would be much better prepared to overcome the challenges they will face during their career.

Bank, Aaron. (1986). *From OSS to the Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces*. Navato, CA: Presidio Press. In 1943, Colonel Aaron Bank was a young lieutenant assigned as a training officer at Camp Polk Louisiana when he answered a call for personnel with foreign language skills. This led him to an assignment with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that culminated as the first commander of the 10th Special Forces Group in Bad Tolz, Germany. Bank's memoir chronicles his OSS training, operations as a Jedburgh team leader in occupied France, and commander of Operation Iron Cross, which was meant to infiltrate a group of German POWs into Austria and kill Hitler. He then writes about his time in the Pacific theater at the end of the World War II and his time in the Korean War. Senior Army leaders pulled from Korea to a staff job at the Pentagon where, along with LTC Russel Volckmann, he conducted the initial estimates and staff work to establish an unconventional warfare capability in the U.S. Army. Bank was then sent to Fort Bragg to stand up the 10th Special Forces in 1952, which were ordered to deploy to Germany in response to Soviet agitation in Berlin. He gave up command in 1954. This book is critical to the understanding of the early heritage of Special Forces.

Conboy, Kenneth and Andrade, Dale. (2000). *Spies and Commandos: How America Lost the Secret War in North Vietnam*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. Kenneth Conboy and Dale Andrade are both well respected military historians specializing in irregular warfare subjects. This book looks at operational plan 34A which was established by the CIA in 1961 and passed to the Military Assistance Command - Vietnam, Special Operations Group (SOG) in 1964. SOG terminated the program in 1968 after a Defense Intelligence Agency counterintelligence team illuminated the wide-ranging North Vietnamese penetration for the agent network. Conboy and Andrade concentrate on the period when SOG was responsible for the program. The focus of the program was to insert singletons and small teams into North Vietnam to build a resistance movement that would cause disruption against the communist government. The operation was a complete disaster, and the book outlines the mistakes made first by the CIA and then repeated by SOG. An in-depth study of this operational plan 34A will provide the unconventional warfare practitioner valuable lessons learned in the art of mission planning, training, infiltration, and agent handling.

Guardia, Mike. (2010). *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann, The Man Who Escaped from Bataan, Raised a Filipino Army Against the Japanese, and Became the True "Father" of Army Special Forces*. Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers. Mike Guardia is a former U.S. Army officer and historian. His book chronicles the exploits of Russell Volckmann in the Philippines during World War II and provides the "Volckmannists" justification that he should replace Aaron Bank as the father of Special Forces. Volckmann's leadership, actions, and bravery during the war certainly inform this debate, but his work after the war is also important. Volckmann authored the early unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency doctrine including: *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare* and *Operations Against Guerrilla Forces*. The recognition he received from this work led to his assignment as the Chief of Plans, Special Operations Division of the Office of the Chief Psychological Warfare. In this assignment, he was instrumental in the bureaucratic battle to establish the 10th Special Forces Group.

Guevara, Che. (1998). *Guerrilla Warfare*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Che Guevara was a Latin American revolutionary who fought alongside Fidel Castro in the insurgency that ousted Cuban President Fulgencio Batista in 1959. He was killed in Bolivia while attempting to foment a revolution there in 1967. Guevara wrote the book following the insurgency, and it is a collection of tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been used as a blueprint by many a revolutionary throughout the world. Unlike Mao's theory, Che's methods were never successfully exported. The book perpetuated the "myth of the guerrilla" and downplayed the importance of the auxiliary and underground that were significant to the successful insurgency in Cuba. The purpose was to ensure that guerrilla leaders could consolidate power over the Communist Party leaders in Havana. The book was used in training course conducted in Cuba during the early 1960s, as the students employed these methods across Latin America, they all failed. Observers have cited multiple reasons for the failures, but recent scholarship shows an emerging idea that it was successful counterinsurgency operations, not a flawed theory that was responsible for the defeats. By 1970, Castro admitted that the *foco* method was only applicable to Cuba and could not be used in other countries.

Korda, Michael. (2010). *Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia*. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers. Michael Korda is an accomplished author of biographies and historical non-fiction as well as a former editor, spanning 40 years with Simon & Schuster, of which he is the Editor-in-Chief Emeritus. His account of T.E. Lawrence is an unbiased and balanced portrayal of the life, the achievements, and the vision that made the man. Korda's depiction of Lawrence's childhood and developmental years establish the base of knowledge in culture, language, and history so crucial to his success. Its utility in understanding the attributes and qualities required of an advisor to gain rapport, influence, and loyalty remains unparalleled. Of particular interest are the chapters covering Lawrence's post-war years in which he sought anonymity and dealt with the personal impact of his service, as well as his prescience in forecasting the difficulties that were to come from the Great Powers division of the Middle East.

Lederer, William and Burdick, Eugene. (1958). *The Ugly American*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company. William Lederer and Eugene Burdick were journalists, authors, and keen observers of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. *The Ugly American* is a work of fiction based on events that occurred in Asia during the 1950s. The chapters include vignettes and short stories of American hubris that provide powerful examples of how not to build rapport. The author's entertaining style offers valuable lessons in cross-cultural communication and regional understanding. This book should be on the desk of everyone assigned to Special Forces Command and should be studied and consulted regularly.

Malcolm, Ben with Martz, Ron. (1996). *White Tigers: My Secret War in Korea*. Washington: Brassey's Inc. Major General John Singlaub wrote in the forward, "If the Korean War is the forgotten war of American history, the story of unconventional warfare operations in that conflict is the most unknown part of it." This statement highlights the importance of this book. Colonel Ben Malcolm was a young infantry officer when he was assigned to the 8240th Army Unit as an adviser in its Guerrilla Division. He spent a year on the island of Wollae-do working with the 4th Battalion of the 1st Partisan Infantry conducting operations in North Korea. This memoir focuses on the tactical level execution of these operations and offers unique insight into many facets of unconventional warfare. Malcolm describes the tribulations of a young untested officer "advising" very experienced and battle-hardened partisans, which is a situation many new Special Forces personnel may find

themselves in. He explains how they used maritime and airborne methods of infiltration and exfiltration. Importantly, while most books on this list cover logistical issues, Malcolm devotes a chapter titled “The Logistics Nightmare” to the difficulties of sustaining guerrilla operations in a denied area. Finally, this book fills an important gap in the history of unconventional warfare between the OSS or WWII and the formation of the Special Forces in 1952.

McRaven, William. (1995). *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, Theory and Practice*. New York, NY: Presidio Press. Admiral McRaven served a long career in U.S. Naval Special Warfare and retired as the commander of USSOCOM. This book is based on his thesis when he attended Naval Postgraduate School. The book establishes the *theory of relative superiority* and provides a framework for predicting the probability of mission completion for direct action operations. The theory is based on the six principles of special operations: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose. McRaven wrote, “Simply stated, relative superiority is a condition that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy” (p. 4). After explaining the theory in chapter one, he goes on to examine eight historical special operations raids through the lens of his theory. The primary drawback of the book is that the theory cannot be effectively applied to other special operations mission sets outside of direct action. However, recent scholars have modified McRaven’s theory and applied it to special reconnaissance and unconventional warfare.²

Parker, Geoffrey (Ed.). (1995). *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Geoffrey Parker is the Andreas Dorpalen Professor of History at the Ohio State University and one of the most distinguished experts in military history. The book is a survey of general warfare from the Greek phalanx until the end of the Cold War. Considering Mao’s dictum, “One must first understand conventional warfare; then one must understand revolutionary warfare; finally, one must apply this understanding to a specific situation” it is critical that the unconventional warfare practitioner have a deep knowledge of conventional warfare. This is one of the best books to meet this need. One drawback is that it focuses on the Western way of war. However, it does introduce non-western concepts that the reader can take away for further study based on regional focus or personal interest.

Stejskal, James. (2017). *Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 1956–1990*. Philadelphia and Oxford: Casemate Publishers. James Stejskal is a retired Special Forces Warrant Officer and former CIA case officer. He served two assignments in Berlin, which he describes as the “epicenter of the Cold War.” The Special Forces unit assigned there is generally referred to as “Det-A,” although it had many official and non-official designations during the time it was active. As one would expect, the author looks back at Det-A’s unconventional warfare mission and much can be learned from studying the tactics, techniques, and procedures that unit members employed against their advisory. Less known is the counterterrorism mission set that Det-A took on. This included the European region, but unit members also participated in OPERATION EAGLE CLAW in Iran. Stejskal has partially filled a critical gap in our understanding of unconventional warfare, and his work is timely considering the current geopolitical situation in Europe. As LTG Charles Cleveland noted in the foreword, “It is also important that as the unconventional pendulum swings back into vogue, that current practitioners and policy makers recognize that as the saying goes, there is little new, more often it is simply the history we don’t know” (p. vi).

Von Dach Bern, H. (1965). *Total Resistance: Swiss Army Guide to Guerrilla Warfare and Underground Operations*. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press. In the early days of the Cold War,

Military Leaders in Western European nations were faced with the very real threat of Soviet Aggression. While planning to counter a Soviet invasion with conventional force, the wiser military professionals also identified a need for an unconventional option as well. Such a professional was Swiss Major Dach Bern. Unlike the U.S. which could create dedicated Unconventional Warfare capability, Switzerland lacked the manpower and financial resources necessary for a dedicated Special Warfare arm. Working against military brass, while searching for a solution, Major Bern believed that his small country would not withstand an initial Soviet invasion. He felt, however, that with the right information and training, all citizens would have the ability to act as the guerilla fighters, auxiliaries, or underground members necessary to resist Soviet occupation and eventually restore Swiss freedom. From this idea arose the book *Total Resistance*, a seven-volume series addressing the technical execution of the art of resistance for both soldier and citizen alike. Begun in 1957 this work is a truly ground-breaking series on the basics of guerrilla warfare. MAJ Bern was hopeful that the information within the manual would enable his countrymen to fight at great lengths in resisting any invasion. Feeling it was his responsibility to provide the needed instruction to his homeland, MAJ Bern's unwavering advocacy of unconventional warfare resulted in him never being promoted again. He would retire after 25 years at the rank of Major as a respected military theorist. As to the volume, though widely read amongst Swiss military officers, its advocacy for harsh methods, some of which fell outside the Law of War, resulted in the work never being wholly adopted by the Swiss Army. The book was translated in 1965 at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, with a favorable forward by COL (R) Wendell W. Fertig who had in-depth knowledge on the subject of Unconventional Warfare, through his leadership of a resistance element in the Philippines during World War II. *Total Resistance* is an excellent primer for all Soldiers searching for a basic understanding of Unconventional Warfare.

Zedong, Mao. (2013). *Mao on Warfare: On Guerrilla Warfare, On Protracted Warfare, and Other Martial Writings*. New York, NY: CN Times Books, Inc. Mao Zedong was the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 1935 and was the architect of the CCP victory over the Chinese Nationalists in 1949. He then ruled China until his death in 1975. He wrote his theory of revolutionary warfare following the Long March in 1935. Unlike the *foco* theory, Mao's Peoples Protracted Warfare model has been adapted and employed successfully in other countries such as Vietnam and Nicaragua. The three-phase model is adaptable and flexible but is challenging to the Western mindset because of the "revolutionary flow" component that allows for an insurgency to move backward in the process. Peoples Protracted Warfare is based on patience or waiting for the enemy to lose domestic political support, which presents a second significant to U.S. policymakers. Mao's concepts provide the theory that underpins U.S. UW doctrine, and a competent Special Forces soldier must have in-depth knowledge of this work.

NOTES

1. Perhaps the best is the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project's *Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography* edited by Dr. Summer Newton. <http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/13-01654%20ARIS%20IW%20Bibliography-small.pdf>.
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