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

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Broken Windows: Special Operations and Clausewitz—Theory, Politics, and State Military Violence in the Limited Wars of the Twenty-first Century

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American societal enmity following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, drove the narrative of the Global War on Terror and its legal justification in the Authorization to Use Military Force. The commitment of regular and special operations military forces into the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reflected this enmity that Carl von Clausewitz noted was the wellspring of war. As American enmity and these wars wind down after eighteen years, anxiety replaces enmity. Special operations become ever more the force of choice by policymakers in pursuit of objectives within the narrative to reduce societal anxiety over terror attack at home. Outside a theater of the active form of war that conforms to the model of the phenomenon of war in politics that Clausewitz defined, can Special Operations be a military task at all—or solely an actor in a world of broken windows—answering only to itself and to a political directive in response to society's anxiety toward personal safety, crime in the form of terror, and a legal opinion.

Keywords: special operations, law enforcement, politics, theory, war, society

> I think we can all agree this is a good day for America. Our country has kept its commitment to see that justice is done. The world is safer. It is a better place because of the death of *Osama bin Laden*. President Obama, May 2, 2011, White House Briefing. (Wilson, Whitlock, & Branigin, 2011)

The legitimacy that underlies the narrative of the Global War on Terror lay in the concept of justice, of righting the terrible wrong inflicted on the United States in the terror attacks perpetrated by members of Al-Qaeda, under the direction of Osama bin Laden on September 11, 2001. President Obama channeled the enmity and ultimate satisfaction of many Americans when he reportedly said on confirmation of the killing of bin Laden by a US Navy SEAL, "We got him" (Wilson et al., 2011). Perhaps more than any other single event in the ten years following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, and the continuing expansion of Special Operations mission tasks since 2011, the death of bin Laden provided the hope for closure for the American people. That closure did not happen.

The purpose of this paper is to explore Special Operations from the perspective of our understanding of the phenomenon of war. The lens for this examination begins with the

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traditional analytical model for the manner and method through which military violence is directed and subordinated to a political process. The critical question here is the continuing relevance of the model presented by Carl von Clausewitz to Special Operations in the seemingly never-ending war against the perpetrators of terror.

By all accounts today, the killing of bin Laden gave no sense of closure, if only because the wars cannot end. The preemptive killing of terror suspects and the preparation and training of forces in weakly governed or failing states, ones that may harbor these suspects, across the past eighteen years, and with no end in sight, denies that closure, especially in the light of declining American enmity. The killing of terror suspects is a matter of justice in the quote from President Obama on the death of bin Laden. It is the concept of justice, a criminal model responding to societal anxiety, rather than enmity, that forms the core characteristic that may require a new analytical model for the political direction of Special Operations expansion and mission sets. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force of 2001 and 2002 formed the basis for the legal codification of the expression of American enmity, providing the current and continuing support for the legitimacy of an American-led Global War on Terror (AUMF, Cong. Record, Vol. 147, 2001; AUMF, Cong. Record, Vol. 148, 2002). "Our War on Terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not stop until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated" (Bush, White House, September 20, 2001). It is the attenuation of what I describe as "the work of politics," the requirement for a process of consensus in the determination of the direction and scope of military action, that leads to a conclusion that Special Operations missions sets no longer require consensus in societal enmity, but only a legal justification for political decision-making against societal anxiety.

Clausewitz (1984) described the nature of the phenomenon of war as embedded in the phenomenon of politics. War was a continuation of political process with violent means. Fundamentally, war was about hostile feelings backed up by hostile intent, requiring a level of enmity necessary for the effort to be expended against a political aim (p. 76). If a principle purpose of politics is the mitigation of societal differences, here at the international aggregate, then violence was, and is, a legitimate means to achieve that mitigation in one's own interests (p. 76). He proposed that war consists of several forms. He described pure or extreme war as a form in which there is no limiting agent to prevent continual escalation of military means. This failed logically, hence the definition as extreme, because when applied to human beings in the real world, such a continuing escalation was impossible. The physical limitations on a human ability to fight without pause created friction that, along with a political aim, created limits to the expansion of war, preventing the extreme form from occurring. Thus, war was always limited by both the political aim that directed its object, and the friction imposed by the real world on human beings engaged in war (pp. 78–83).

War then fell into two primary categories (Lauer, 2018) (Figure 1.) The first was those wars fought for absolute political aims. These wars had the military object or aim as the complete overthrow of an opponent, the destruction of the means and will to resist, and the imposition of peace on the victor's terms. Napoleon introduced this concept with his wars that sought absolute ends using military force. Wars with an absolute political aim provide justification for the mobilization of an entire society, the focus of enmity, simplifying the "work of politics" toward the political aim. Wars fought for final victory were and are rare(Clausewitz, 1984, pp. 579–81). They have a simple, holistic political and physical logic that carries through toward peace, despite the ups and downs of victories and defeats along the path(p. 582). The War of the American Revolution, the American Civil War, and the Second World War reflect this kind of war. Most wars, however, are not fought for absolute political aims.



FIGURE 1 Logic of War: the Aim Gap in Limited War. By the author.

The second category that Clausewitz proposed was wars of limited political aims. Nearly all wars fall into this form (pp. 601–602). Wars, such as the Wars of German Unification in the Nineteenth Century, American interventions in Central America and the Caribbean of the Twentieth Century, and all wars fought by the United States after 1945 fall into this category. Clausewitz noted that these wars do not have the simple, holistic logic of wars of absolute political aims. He noted that the more military violence was reduced in these types of war, the more the political dominated. Thus, the logic of these wars depended on the perceptions of the political actor in terms of accomplishment of the aim in the application of violence. Reason and chance become the key characteristics due to the requirement for the political creation of legitimacy through narrative, not necessarily related to societal enmity in the prosecution of war (pp. 89, 582, 603–607) (Figure 2).

Limited wars are not only limited in means but limited in the hostile feelings that define the nature of the phenomenon of war. Following the Second World War, American wars of limited aims demanded an overarching narrative that substituted for the societal enmity inherent, for example, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, that led to the US entry into the war. The narrative to counter Communism became the dominant motive legitimacy for the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Following the end of the Cold War, lacking a definable narrative, war required a very specific set of circumstances for legitimacy, such as the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 provided once again, and unique to the period after 1945, a powerful societal enmity, expressed as hostile intent, as political narrative legitimacy for US military response as the Global War on Terror. The Authorization to Use Military Force gave politics the added legitimacy of legal support in the continuation of military action, its ethical and moral warrant, and the goal of justice. A strictly limited war, using limited military means, held powerful enmity in support of the political aims through the invasion of Iraq and



FIGURE 2 Clausewitz Fascinating Trinity. By the author.

Afghanistan. As the wars descended into societal chaos and local insurgency against American and allied forces, the failure of resolution stilled the enmity that legitimated the invasions. Thus, although not always attained from the original intent, peace as an end to military action remains the purpose of the military engagement per Clausewitz' model (pp. 90–91).

The authors of *Chasing Ghosts* noted that

> even as the public continues to support the general 'war on terror,' it appears to have soured on one of its main tactics. Opposing the terrorist 'adversary' remains important, and concerns about becoming a victim of terrorism and about likely future attacks have not notably waned since 2001. But the public has clearly lost much of whatever enthusiasm it ever had for the most extreme counterterrorism measure: lengthy armed ground conflicts in distant lands. (Mueller & Stewart, 2016, p. 53)

By 2006, 56% of Americans responding to a CNN poll were opposed to the war in Iraq (Koch, 2006).

In the matter of terrorism, however, the American people continue to own a powerful personal anxiety about the external criminal threat that may exist from terror organizations.

> Although there are multiple reasons to have expected an erosion of concern about terrorism since 2001, poll data suggest that the fear of terrorism has shown little sign of waning in the United States. Special fear and anxiety have been stoked and maintained by the fact that Islamist terrorism seems to be part of a large and hostile conspiracy that is international in scope, and rather spooky in nature. Fear of such terrorism is more like that inspired by domestic communists during the Cold War than like that generated by domestic terrorism. Public opinion is the primary driver behind the extensive and excessive counterterrorism efforts undertaken since 9/11, and officials and elites are more nearly responding to public fear than creating it. (Mueller & Stewart, 2018)

Thus, policymakers are free to anticipate public support for what is principally the legal basis for direct political action with no "work of politics" to sustain the narrative legitimacy of the ongoing military response. Legitimacy is assured by the legal authorization notable for answering the anxiety. The expansion of Special Operations mission sets in the absence of political risk drives the movement away from the traditional understanding of the relationship between politics and the military aim. This distant expression of a lost enmity creates the need for a different form of analysis and an attempt to locate what form that new method might take. Thus, Special Operations after September 11, 2001 appears to lie outside of the analytical model described by Clausewitz and may constitute a new form of extreme or pure political war, rather than within a phenomenon of war. Alan Lamborn noted of political interaction that "the process of politics involves the pursuit of interdependent outcomes in the context of participants' beliefs about the importance and nature of just relationships, procedures, and outcomes" (Lamborn, 1997, p. 190).

This definition implies that there is a never-ending "work of politics" demanded by the nature of the phenomenon of politics, a process rather than a definition. Clausewitz' model that subordinates war to politics recognized the necessity for this process in the determination of the military aim, consonant with the nature of warfare and its wellspring in societal enmity. Without this "work of politics" warfare might become, as noted by Lawrence Freedman in regard to a perception of "the type of war Americans would like to fight," that war took on an

> unreal quality.… It was for political entities that were not fearful, desperate, vengeful, or angry; that could maintain a sense of proportion over the interests at stake and the humanity of the opponent. It was a view that betrayed a detached attitude to the well-springs of conflict and violence, the outlook of a concerned observer rather than a committed participant. It ignored the physicality of war and war's tendencies to violence and destruction. (Freedman, 2013, pp. 218–19)

Do Special Operations in all their varieties and enormous scope today need an analytical model specifically directed toward a continuing societal anxiety, rather than enmity? "More than 17 years later [*after 9/11*], the Global War on Terrorism initiated by President George W. Bush is truly global, with Americans actively engaged in countering terrorism in 80 nations on six continents" (Savell, 2019).

Is it war if there are no hostile feelings or hostile intent expressed in enmity? Are Special Operations acting according to a general societal anxiety associated more to crime than war? (Figure 3). Does this movement to public anxiety rather than enmity undermine the ultimate moral purpose and moral boundaries expected in the violent resolution of the process of politics and the justification for United States military action in the delivery of death to our adversaries?

It is my suggestion here that the theory of Special Operations, as it applies beyond support to a politically engaged theater of war, resides today outside the phenomenon of war. It is not war. It is the work of community policing—broken windows—at the international political aggregate, with hellfire missiles and Barrett .50 caliber sniper rifles. The authors of the theory of broken windows noted that

> the essence of the police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community itself. The police cannot, without committing extraordinary resources, provide a substitute for that informal control. On the other hand, to reinforce those natural forces the police must accommodate them. (Kelling & Wilson, 1982)



FIGURE 3 The Phenomenon of War: The Violent Resolution/Mitigation of Political Differences in the Twenty-first Century. By the author.

The theory of broken windows today is often challenged as inadequate to describe crime reduction and for fostering an aggressive police mentality. Here it provides a theoretical construct for placing and justifying the variety and scope of Special Operations outside the political process of justification for military operations in a theater of war. And therein lies the problem. The variety, and multiplicity of Special Operations in its many manifestations, as noted of Foreign Internal Defense, for example, "focuses on building viable institutions that respond to the needs of society" (JP 3-22, 2010, p. ix; Madden et al., 2016, pp. 18–20; Watts, Baxter, Dunigan, & Rizzi, 2012). These types of operations take on the theory and form of international community policing in weak nations, described by Francis Fukuyama as neo-patrimonial states that exhibit a lack of capacity to secure their own societies. He noted, a state "that is weak and checked by a multitude of subordinate political forces is ineffective and often unstable" (Fukuyama, 2014, pp. 24–28). It is in these types of states that Special Operations most often conducts its "broken windows" theory in application, to reinforce informal societal control mechanisms without; however, the resources or ability to provide that informal control that leads to the aim of a continuing reduction in the terror threat in weak or failing states.

An example of responding to anxiety occurs in the basis for the domestic response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. As the first Chief of Domestic Security for the State of Florida, our priority was the reduction of anxiety. The lead agency for the domestic response to terror attack was the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. The priority was toward the rescue of victims of terror attack in funding for the police, fire/rescue, and especially the hospital response capabilities (State of Florida, FDLE, 2001–2018). Four of six goals of the program, since its inception in 2001, refer to the mitigation or reduction of the effects of terror attack, especially for victims of such an attack, as

an example of the domestic attempt to reduce societal anxiety. The domestic logic of terror response focused on relieving anxiety as an essential, and continuous, police task in the treatment of terror attack as a crime that could be solved after its occurrence.

Further, the never-ending nature of Special Operations work in failing or weak states recreates the conditions under which the United States Marine Corps operated in the Caribbean and Central American nations of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. Absent a theory of the society and the effect of the creation of a powerful new security force and the effect of this new element on the local political conditions and elites, the creation of societal anxiety is a likely result. In each of the countries mentioned above the creation of powerful security elites led to the overthrow of their ruling elites and the establishment of dictatorships built on the power base of the *Guardia Nacional* or equivalent (Roorda, 1998, pp. 2, 18, 21; Calder, 2006, pp. 53–61; Renda, 2001, p. 36; Schmitz, 1999, pp. 46–57, 154–157). Special Operations requires both a theory of its own operations and a theory of the society in which they act to judge the possible political outcomes that increase, rather than reduce, the anxiety existing in these societies concerning the policing power that Special Operations enhances (Marsh, Kenney, & Joslyn, 2015, p. 100).

Analyzing Special Operations as police work relieves the politician from having to worry about the "work of politics." While enmity, hostile feelings and intent, is the wellspring of war, societal anxiety for criminal terrorist attack is the basis of legal action in the conduct of Special Operations under the phenomenon of policing. If so, Special Operations faces a crossroads. Outside a theater of the active form of war that conforms to the model of the phenomenon of war in politics that Clausewitz defined, can Special Operations be a military task at all—or solely an actor in a world of broken windows—answering only to itself and to a political directive in response to society's anxiety toward personal safety, crime in the form of terror, and a legal opinion.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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Improving Special Operations Forces Measurements of Effectiveness in Security Cooperation

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The U.S. Government recently adapted U.S. policy, code, and joint doctrine to provide greater authorities to the Department of Defense to conduct Security Cooperation (SC). U.S. policy and law now requires increased transparency into the effects of these activities towards the achievement of U.S. national security objectives. In response to these changes, U.S. Special Operations Command should implement changes in education and training to improve the capacity of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to assess and plan for SC activities and to monitor and evaluate the results of these activities. SOF can enable greater fidelity through learning to develop objectives that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound (SMART). SOF can then link SMART objectives to planned "Theory of Change"-driven operational approaches and systematic assessment, monitoring, and evaluation methods to learn and adjust current and future SC activities to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of internal processes and activities, measure progress along SC lines of effort under execution, and better account for the return on investment reaped from their Security Cooperation lines of effort.

Keywords: Security cooperation, measuring effectiveness, special operations, planning, assessment, evaluation

"Security Cooperation provides ways and means to help achieve national security and foreign policy objectives" (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 23, 2017, pp. I-1). By coordinating U.S. security and foreign policy objectives with the objectives of allied and partner nations, the Department of Defense (DoD) can employ Security Cooperation (SC) to promote stability, prevent conflicts, and reduce the requirement to deploy U.S. military forces into combat (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017, pp. I-1). The U.S. government (USG) conducts extensive efforts to coordinate and synchronize SC activities to improve their effectiveness and efficiency in a fiscally constrained environment. These efforts include the introduction of SC - focused presidential and defense policy, legislation, and joint doctrine. These policies and legislation

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TABLE 1
RAND SMART Objective Evaluation Framework (Mcnerney et al., 2016, 10–11)

Criterion	*Definition*	*Evaluation Questions*
Specific	Objective is discrete; describes what is expected, by whom, and for/with whom	- Does the objective focus on a single intended outcome? - Does the objective indicate who has the responsibility to help achieve the objective? - Does the objective indicate its principle target in the partner nation?
Measurable	Success is clearly & objectively defined; a regular, observable, objective, and sustainable method of measurement is in place	- Has a unit of measurement been established? - Has a baseline for measurement been established? - Does the objective indicate "how much" or "how many" units should increase or decrease? - Can USG officials observe significant change from the baseline? - Is there a system in place to regularly & objectively monitor progress? - Is it sustainable?
Achievable	Requisite authorities, programs, & resources in place; partner-nation agreement secured; political & fiscal risks duly considered	- Do the authorities & programs exist to achieve the objective? - Are sufficient USG resources likely? - Is there a way to overcome resource constraints? - Has the partner nation been consulted about how to achieve the objective? - If so, has the partner nation offered any resources (financial or otherwise)? - Does the partner nation have the capacity to absorb the USG resources & programs required to achieve the objective?
Relevant	Contributes to strategic goals; focused on significant partnership outcomes; prioritized & hierarchically organized	- Is the objective aligned with higher-level planning goals? - Is the objective nested within a hierarchy of objectives? - Is the objective challenging? - Is the objective framed in terms of partnership outcomes rather than process-level inputs or outputs?
Time-bound	Establishes a deadline or reasonable time frame for completion (generally, no more than five years)	- Is there a deadline or time frame for completion of the objective? - Is the deadline/time frame reasonable in terms of USG priorities & available security cooperation resources? - Is the deadline/time frame five years or less?

require the DOD to improve how it plans, assesses, monitors, and evaluates DoD SC activities to improve the ability to measure the effectiveness of these activities (Obama, 2013; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2016, pp. 14–15; U.S. Congress, 2016).



FIGURE 1 AM&E framework.

United States Special Operations Forces (SOF), under the force provision of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), conduct combined training and Security Cooperation with partner nation security forces globally in support of Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCP). SOF routinely conduct Security Cooperation, specifically Defense Institution Building (DIB) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) which "is the set of DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capabilities of [foreign security forces] and their supporting institutions" (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 23, 2017, pp. II-7). DoD policy considers DIB and SFA to be subsets of Security Cooperation. The purpose of this study is to provide methods for SOF to improve their ability to assist in the measurement of the effectiveness of their SC activities. Synergized research of the latest legislation, policy, and joint doctrine as well as think tank and academic literature determined that to improve the ability of SOF to assist in measuring the effectiveness of their SC activities, USSOCOM should adapt how SOF plan, assess, monitor, and evaluate these activities.

To provide these methods, this paper will first provide necessary background to enable an understanding of the SC enterprise as it exists within the USG. The paper will then provide an understanding of how SOF can fuse the recent, substantive changes in U.S. policy, law, and doctrine with best practices from the civilian academic evaluation community of interest to assist in improving how SOF conduct planning, assessments, monitoring, and evaluations of their SC activities. The paper will conclude with consolidated recommendations to enable an improvement of the measurement of the effectiveness of SOF SC activities facilitating learning and adjustment to increase the effectiveness or efficiency of future activities, measurement of

progress along SC lines of effort under execution, and better accountability of the return on investment for the United States.

BACKGROUND

The Department of Defense defines Security Cooperation to encompass

> "all DOD interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote U.S. interests; enable [partner nations] to provide the U.S. access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with U.S. defense objectives" (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 23, 2017, pp. II-7).

To employ such a broad scope of activities, an extensive number of organizations play a role in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of Security Cooperation. Within the USG, no single organization or even branch of the government holds sole responsibility for the effectiveness of Security Cooperation as both the executive and legislative branches have roles and responsibilities in enabling its employment. The executive branch enacts Security Cooperation but the legislative branch provides the authorities, appropriations, and associated oversight to do so.

The main organizations that play a role in the delivery of Security Cooperation in support of U.S. objectives include the State Department, the Department of Defense, and partner nations agreeing to the SC efforts. The key State Department components consist of its headquarters, Regional and Functional Bureaus, and Chiefs of Mission and Country Team staff within U.S. embassies globally. The key Department of Defense elements include its Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) or USD(P), the Joint Staff, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands, their associated Service and Special Operations components, the Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attachés, Security Cooperation Organizations, and DoD staff within U.S. embassy Country Teams, and the Service and Special Operations implementers. Of course, partner nations and their respective government ministries, services, and security force institutions and providers play a critical role as well. These organizations influence the effectiveness of the provision of Security Cooperation in a panoply of ways. Thus, SOF can and should improve their ability to measure the effectiveness of their SC activities, but the size of the larger SC enterprise limits even the most effective SOF efforts to improve to only assisting in the larger whole of government efforts to measure the effectiveness of these activities.

PLANNING FOR SECURITY COOPERATION

Planning for Security Cooperation nests within the larger architecture of U.S. strategy development and execution. Based upon presidential guidance contained in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), presidential and secretary of defense guidance within the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) guidance within the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP), Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands

(CCMD) develop CCP, to operationalize the CCMD strategies (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, pp. A-1 – A-3. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 23, 2017, pp. III-6 – III-3).

Special Operations Forces will plan for Security Cooperation at all levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical, with associated levels of fidelity. At the strategic level, SOF plan Security Cooperation through their coordination within GCCs, at USSOCOM as a Functional Combatant Command (FCC), at Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) in their capacity as geographic component commands, and at the country-level through their coordination in the development of Country Team Integrated Country Strategies (ICS) and defense-focused Country Security Cooperation Sections (CSCS) or heretofore "Country Plans." These various stakeholder touchpoints require SOF planners able to assist in strategic SC planning at the respective levels of fidelity be they global, regional, or country.

SOF planners can improve their ability to assist in the measurement of the effectiveness of their SC activities via an understanding of how to enable the coordinated development of SC objectives that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound (SMART) and the ability to design a "theory of change"-driven operational approach in the development of SC plans (McNerney et al., 2016, p. 2; Paul et al., 2015, p. 3; Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2015, p. 11).

SMART OBJECTIVES

DoD policy requires that Country Plans nested within overarching CCP "will identify specific lines of effort that represent the significant security cooperation initiatives planned for the country, and will articulate specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound objectives in support of such initiatives" (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2016, p. 14). By developing SMART objectives during the planning of Security Cooperation, SOF planners enable aligned assessment, monitoring, and evaluation efforts that will synergistically improve SOF's ability to assist in the measurement of the effectiveness of their SC activities—to include "how well security cooperation activities align with U.S. national security priorities" (McNerney et al., 2016, p. 2).

In an enterprise consisting of large organizations, it is difficult to effectively manage and organize the various tasks that the enterprise must perform for it to succeed in its mission and to determine how well the enterprise succeeds. Effective goal, or objective-setting, facilitates success in performance management. The DoD- funded RAND Corporation determined that the SC enterprise should employ "the mnemonic device SMART" to assist in developing "well-written objectives" that will facilitate process improvement and process accountability (McNerney et al., 2016, p. 2).

RAND's "SMART Objective Evaluation Framework" enables the development of these objectives while acknowledging that attempting to incorporate all available criteria into one objective statement or paragraph can be cumbersome (McNerney et al., 2016, p. 10, 107). To enable the employment of all or many of the SMART criteria in SC objectives, planners may consider adding other components within a plan to augment the articulation of the "SMARTness" of the objectives. RAND suggests the addition of an associated:

- Partner nation objective— "a broader, longer-term, and more aspirational goal"
- Strategic/mission analysis— "that provides the foundation for the [objective]"
- Concept development— "spells out more precisely what is intended in terms of objectives, when, by what means, and by whom" (McNerney et al., 2016, pp. 109–113).

SOF planners should focus on answering the SMART criterion as they write SC objectives during their plan development.

The following offers an illustrative, notional example of the employment of SMART criteria in the development of a SOF-focused SC objective to enable the planning of an associated country-level line of effort nested within a respective CCP.

Objective: Within four years [Time-bound], U.S. Special Operation Forces employed by Special Operations Command Europe [Specific] utilizing Title 10, USC, Sections 332 (Defense Institution Capacity Building), 333 (Building Capacities) and 345 (Regional Defense Counter Terrorism Force Protection) authorities and funds [Achievable] enable the Pineland Ministry of Defense [Specific, Achievable] to establish a special operations battalion-sized unit capable of deploying company-sized task units [Specific, Measurable, Achievable] for six month rotations in support of U.S.-Coalition or Alliance stability operations [Specific, Achievable, Relevant] primarily focused on a train, advise, assist, and accompany mission [Specific, Measurable] to build the Counter-Terrorism capability and capacity of a host nation special operations battalion [Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant].

The example above displays how SOF planners should incorporate the SMART criterion into Country and CCMD as well as Theater Special Operations Command and USSOCOM Campaign Support Plans to provide synergistic focus on the development of a partner nation capability that should answer U.S. foreign policy and defense objectives. Additively, these SOF-focused SC objectives enable the development of planned efforts to assess, monitor, and evaluate the progress of SC lines of effort. From a SMART SC objective, SOF planners can design a supporting "theory of change"-driven operational approach to align required inputs and SC activities along a line of effort to produce required short-term outputs or results and longer-term outcomes or effects to achieve the objective.

THEORY OF CHANGE-DRIVEN OPERATIONAL APPROACH DESIGN

Once SOF planners have coordinated effectively with other SC enterprise stakeholders to develop SMART objectives they intend to achieve through the implementation of SC activities, they should frame their planned lines of effort upon what the civilian evaluation community refers to as theory-driven intervention programs (Chen, 1990, pp. 39–45). SC activities such as DIB and SFA involve implementing education and training to transform partner nation security institutions and associated security forces into more effective institutions and security forces. This process possesses many similarities with social programs that the civilian evaluation community evaluates via program theory related theory-driven evaluation (Williams & Morris, 2009, pp. 62–64).

Civilian evaluation experts define program theory as "a set of interrelated assumptions, principles, and/or propositions to explain or guide… action" aimed at "the purposive and organized effort to intervene in an ongoing social process for the purpose of solving a problem

or providing a service" (Chen, 1990, pp. 3–6). The RAND Corporation defines the concept of a "theory of change… [as] the underlying logic for how planners think elements of the overall activity, line of effort, or operation will lead to desired results" (Paul et al., 2015, p. 3). The use of program theory or a theory of change in the development of a logic model of how a SC plan, program, or line of effort should function enables a deeper understanding of how the proposed set of planned SC activities should create required change in a partner nation's security institutions and forces.

The theory of change logic model creates a conceptual system. Inputs in the form of required resources such as SOF trainers, equipment, partner security forces, a program of instruction, and logistics enter into a planned set of SC activities such as a DIB program coupled with SFA activities. The theory of change logic model then delivers outputs such as trained and equipped security forces supported by an effective supervising ministry of defense in the short term and outcomes or effects such as a capable security forces unit that remains organized, trained, equipped, and sustained by a ministry of defense which values a military force led by elected civilians in the long term (Paul et al., 2015, pp. 15–21).

With this deeper understanding of how a SC line of effort should accomplish SMART objectives in support of U.S. foreign policy and defense- related security objectives, SOF planners can identify the assumptions about the causal mechanisms within their theory of change, the linkages between the various components of the theory, and the effects of the given operating environment and then plan their assessments, monitoring, and evaluations to validate or invalidate their assumptions (Paul et al., 2015, p. 87). If SOF planners use the "Ends, Ways, Means, Risk" strategic construct, the resource inputs offer the "Means," the theory-driven line of effort of SC activities offer the "Ways," and the outputs and outcomes of a trained and equipped, civilian ministry-led SOF unit capable of deploying to train and advise host nation security forces in support of combined operations offer the "Ends." The assumptions made in designing the theory of change-driven operational approach represent "Risks."

The assumptions made in the SC planning represent risk in the theory-driven construct because if the assumptions prove false, then they represent a break down in the "chain of logic" in the theory (Paul et al., 2015, p. 87).

> Breaks in the chain of logic could stem from some sort of execution failure (inputs not being provided, activities not being executed, or activities not being properly executed) or from some sort of disrupter or barrier that is preventing inputs from being transformed into outputs or keeping outputs from realizing intended outcomes (Paul et al., 2015, p. 87).

Upon identifying a risk in the form of a SC planning assumption, SOF planners can plan and/or execute steps to mitigate the risk to enable the plan to continue towards planned objectives— RAND refers to these mitigations steps as "workarounds" (Paul et al., 2015, p. 87). The employment of a theory-driven operational approach, like the use of SMART SC objectives, enhances SOF's ability to assist in measuring the effectiveness of the SC activities.

By deeply analyzing the chain of logic in developing the theory of how SC activities should affect change in a partner nation's security institutions and/or forces, SOF planners enable the analysis of what might go wrong before, during, and after the execution of the SC plan (Paul et al., 2015, p. 87).

Before execution, SOF planners can focus on the theoretical assumptions made in the development of their plan and ask, "What could go wrong with the planned … effort?" (Paul

et al., 2015, p. 87). They can then attempt to mitigate these risks to their mission by determining potential solutions and by focusing initial assessments on these potential risks (Paul et al., 2015, p. 87).

As an example, the SOF planners could look at the trainees that they expect the partner nation to provide as inputs or means for their planned SC line of effort. The SOF planners could identify risk in their planning assumption that the partner nation's Ministry of Defense will provide SOF trainees with prerequisite basic familiarity with infantry skills and equipment. The SOF planners can then assess whether this assumption is valid. If it is not valid, the SOF planners can then engage the appropriate counterparts in the Ministry of Defense to ensure that the partner nation provides SOF trainees from a trained infantry unit with similar equipment or decide to modify the logic of their plan to include additional SC activities to provide the requisite basic infantry skills (Paul et al., 2015, p. 34).

During execution, the SOF managers can focus on the theoretical assumptions made in the development of their plan and ask, "Is everything going according to plan? If not, why not, and what can be done about it?" (Paul et al., 2015, p. 87). The SOF planners in coordination with appropriate Country Team staff from the Security Cooperation Office can then monitor the training under execution to determine if the SOF trainers are conducting activities as planned and if the activities are achieving the intended short-term results or outputs.

As an example, during the execution of a Special Forces detachment's program of instruction on tactics, techniques, and procedures for training and advising a third nation's Counter-Terrorism unit, the SOF managers and Country Team staff monitor the SOF training with the partner nation trainees focusing on the plan's theoretical assumption that the SOF trainers will follow the planned program of instruction. They will then know if the SOF trainers did or did not execute the planned activities and can then analyze the potential effects of any deviations. The monitors can then attempt to determine why the SOF trainers might have deviated from the plan and if they could or should do anything about the invalid assumption.

After execution of the planned SC activities, SOF evaluators can focus on the theoretical assumptions within the plan and ask, "Were all of the objectives achieved? If not, why not, and what can be done about it in the future (either in this context or elsewhere)?" (Paul et al., 2015, p. 87). SOF evaluators can use these questions to evaluate the outcomes or effects and after the further passage of time, the longer-term impacts of SC lines of effort to both improve the effectiveness of future SC efforts and to account for the effectiveness of the executed line of effort to key decision-makers within the executive and legislative branches.

For example, six months after the completion of a SC line of effort in the People's Republic of Pineland, a specially trained team of evaluators from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict or ASD(SO/LIC) travels to Pineland to conduct an evaluation of the effort to establish a special operations battalion-sized unit capable of deploying company-sized task units for six month rotations in support of U.S.-Coalition or Alliance stability operations primarily focused on a train, advise, assist, and accompany mission to build the Counter-Terrorism capability and capacity of a host nation special operations battalion. The SOF evaluators focus on the status of the partner nation SOF trainees whom the SC plan assumed would remain in the new special operations battalion and learn that only 60% of the trainees remain in the new unit. The Ministry of Defense reassigned the other 40% to other units across Pineland. With this knowledge, the evaluators engage the Pineland Ministry of Defense to determine why they reassigned the

SOF trainees from the unit. With this knowledge, the SOF evaluators can report to relevant stakeholders that the SC line of effort failed to achieve all intended effects and provide quantitative and qualitative data to assist decision- makers in deciding how to improve future SC efforts in general and whether to continue future SC efforts specifically with the People's Republic of Pineland.

Thus, by deeply analyzing the development of a theory of change-driven operational approach focused on the achievement of objectives that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound, SOF planners can improve the U.S. ability to measure the effectiveness of SC activities. Equally important to this effort, USSOCOM must effectively train SOF on the ability to assess, monitor, and evaluate the planning and execution of Security Cooperation.

SECURITY COOPERATION ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, AND EVALUATIONS FRAMEWORK

U.S. doctrine for Joint Planning directs the Joint Force to conduct operation assessments "to identify and analyze changes in the [Operating Environment] and to determine progress of the operation" (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 16, 2017, pp. VI-129). This doctrine directs that organizations should integrate operation assessments into planning from its initiation and include it in the organization's battle rhythm to ensure effective support to the commander's decision cycle (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 16, 2017, pp. VI-129). DoD policy directs, and joint doctrine for Security Cooperation adopts, the terms initial assessment, monitoring, and evaluation which describe tasks that are redundant with tasks within operation assessments but are in line with presidential policy and legislative requirements within Presidential Policy Directive/PPD – 23 and United States Code, Title X, Chapter 16 "Security Cooperation," Subsection 383 "Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of programs and activities" (Obama, 2013, pp. 5–7; U.S. Congress).

Thus, initial assessment, monitoring, evaluations, and operation assessment combine to inform SC planning and execution enabling Combatant Commands to learn and adjust SC activities in accordance with changes in the operating environment and to increase the effectiveness or efficiency of internal processes and activities. Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation also enable Combatant Commands to better account for the return on investment reaped from their SC lines of effort (Marquis et al., 2016, pp. 2–4).

Unfortunately, studies determine that although DoD and its Combatant Commands perform assessment, monitoring, and evaluation activities, they do so sporadically and differently across organizations within DoD and often with a lack of qualified personnel trained in assessment, planning, monitoring, and evaluation of Security Cooperation (Marquis et al., 2016, p. 78). To counter this, the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy, or USD(P), issued DoD Instruction 5132.14 prescribing DoD policy for "Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise" (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017).

DoD policy now details an "AM&E Framework" with accompanying standards which USSOCOM should ensure the SOF personnel involved in Security Cooperation learn and implement. These policy framework and standards are more detailed and useful than the joint doctrine publication for Security Cooperation. DoD policy directs that "DoD will maintain a

hybrid approach to management of AM&E efforts" (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, p. 12). DoD dictates that assessment and monitoring should be a decentralized effort following DoD policy guidelines, "and evaluations at the strategic level will be centralized and overseen by the USD(P)" (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, p. 12). The policy depicts a SC planning and implementation cycle where assessment, monitoring, and evaluation serve separate and distinct functions (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, p. 13). The DoD AM&E Framework directs five phases in the cycle of which assessment, monitoring, and evaluation inform 1) initiative design documents which are SC-specific design documents to streamline SC planning, and 2) dissemination of results to enable the AM&E purposes of lessons learned and accountability.

ASSESSMENTS

To assist in improving the measurement of effectiveness of SOF SC activities, SOF planners must coordinate and ensure any cross-functional teams conducting initial assessments related to SC tasks that SOF may plan or perform include SOF subject matter experts (SME) trained on the proper topic areas to assess and analyze. DoD policy defines assessment as

> systematic analysis to provide an understanding of the context, conditions, partner capabilities, and requirements to inform security cooperation planning and implementation. Assessments are generally conducted in advance of security cooperation activities, but may be repeated to update analysis and identify mid-course corrections of security cooperation activities (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, p. 20).

Due to a limited number of SOF SMEs at the Country Team level, USSOCOM and its TSOCs supporting GCCs must seek out to determine where new SC initiatives are under consideration and ensure that trained SOF participate in all initial assessments to enable successful mission analysis prior to SC planning involving SOF.

"Initial assessments are required before all significant security cooperation initiatives. . . and are encouraged before all security cooperation activities" (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, p. 13). Initial assessments provide an understanding of the operational environment of any SC line of effort to include a particular focus on the current baseline capabilities of the partner institutions and security forces that will be engaged by SOF to improve their capacity (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, p. 13). The assessments allow SOF planners and SMEs to attempt to answer, "What could go wrong?" with their theory of change and identify the theoretical assumptions and potential risk to determine mitigation actions (Paul et al., 2015, p. 87). The initial assessments should analyze "host nation willingness and propensity to implement and sustain assistance, improve institutional capacity and build capabilities in the context of country or other related objectives" (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, p. 13). A proper initial assessment establishes the baseline from which SOF can theorize, plan, execute, monitor, and measure the effectiveness of subsequent SC lines of effort.

MONITORING

Monitoring the implementation of SC activities provides critical information that enables the accurate measurement of effectiveness of planned and implemented SC programs. DoD policy defines monitoring as

> a continuous process designed to provide regular feedback on the extent to which expected outputs and outcomes are being achieved to inform decisions or corrective actions. In general, results measured in monitoring are the direct and near-term consequences of initiative activities that provide opportunities to validate the theory of change throughout implementation and an early indication of the likelihood that expected results will be attained (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, p. 21).

Monitoring during the execution of SC activities should involve analysis to determine if the SOF implementing the planned activities within the SC line of effort do so according to the theory of change-driven plan or not. This analysis provides crucial information to SOF managers because it prevents what civilian evaluation experts term "black box evaluation" (Chen, 1990, p. 18).

Black box evaluation "is characterized by a primary focus on the overall relationship between the inputs and outputs of a program without concern for the transformation processes in the middle" (Chen, 1990, p. 18). Failure to determine if SOF implement a SC activity according to plan prevents the ability to determine if the theory of change is accurate or not. Monitoring during implementation enables the determination of whether or not the SC activity caused the desired effects and to what degree. For example, "Does failure [to build a well-trained partner security force] imply that the theory on which the program is based is incorrect? Or is the failure due to a problem with implementation? Or is the strength of the [SC line of effort] too low?" (Chen, 1990, pp. 18–19). SOF managers can monitor implementation to determine if it follows their plan through the employment of measures of performances (MOP) "to allow measurement of action accomplishment" (Williams & Morris, 2009, p. 70).

"A MOP is criterion used to assess friendly actions tied to measuring task accomplishment" (Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2016, pp. 8–7). "MOPs help answer the question, "Are we doing things right?" or "Was the action taken?" or "Was the task completed to standard?" (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 16, 2017, pp. VI-26). To drive the reporting of this critical information, SOF Headquarters should include relevant MOPs within their Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), specifically within their Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR). Additionally, SOF Commanders should specify the vitality of this reporting via specified tasks within written orders and reinforce the importance during "battlefield circulation" and meetings with subordinate leaders.

Measures of Performance enable SOF planners to confirm that SOF implementers, often decentralized from the planners, complete planned tasks and actions. With this assurance, SOF planners can then analyze whether the completed actions produced the desired effects. For example, a Special Forces Operational Detachment - Alpha (SFOD-A) deploys to Pineland and conducts a SC activity training Pineland SOF on the employment of a new tactic, technique, or procedure (TTP) for the effective execution of a Counter-Terrorism (CT) mission. Upon reporting the accomplishment of their planned tasks as FFIR within their CCIR for the Theater Special Operations Commander, SOF managers can then monitor whether the partner

SOF that receives the CT-focused training employs the newly trained TTP within the next iteration of the SOF SC line of effort, a measurement of effectiveness.

Monitoring also allows the measurement of effects that Security Cooperation activities can have within an operating environment. SOF planners can coordinate with other SC stakeholders and other SOF staff directorates, particularly the J2- Intelligence and the J3- Operations Directorates, to plan measures of effectiveness (MOE) to determine indications within the environment that effects take place and to what degree or scale, and ensure that relevant stakeholders in the SC enterprise collect and report these measurements to enable effective analysis.

> MOEs are indicators used to help measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time to gauge the achievement of objectives... MOEs help answer the question, "Are we doing the right things to create the effects or changes in the conditions of the [Operating Environment] that we desire?" (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 16, 2017, pp. VI-26).

During planning, for each desired effect or outcome, SOF analysts, planners, and managers must develop MOEs "that allow the accomplishment of the effect to be measured ... Each MOE must have a corresponding "threshold of success" that determines the criterion for a successfully accomplished effect or for failure" (Williams & Morris, 2009, p. 70).

Measures of effectiveness provide SOF managers indicators of progress toward achieving SC objectives and equally critical— facilitate the determination of the "causal processes underlying a program so that the reason(s) a program does or does not work can be understood" (Chen, 1990, p. 191). In combination with MOPs providing awareness of the effectiveness of the implementation of the planned activities, SOF analysts can correlate the achievement or lack of achievement of MOEs to the accomplishment of related MOPs. This analysis again provides deeper understanding of the correlation between inputs and subsequent outputs and outcomes than a black box evaluation.

For example, a SFOD-A completes a planned program of instruction aimed at increasing the CT capabilities of a SOF unit from the People's Republic of Pineland and reports the accomplishment of relevant MOPs to their supervising TSOC. During a subsequent TSOC exercise, Observer Controllers report that the same Pineland SOF unit displays an increase in their CT capabilities by their ability to perform a CT mission at the company level at night—achieving a TSOC-planned MOE. From the accomplishment of the MOP and the subsequent achievement of the MOE, the TSOC analysts can correlate that the causal theory behind their SC line of effort is functioning as planned. If, however, the SFOD-A accomplishes the MOPs but the Pineland SOF unit fails to achieve the MOE during the TSOC exercise, then the TSOC analysts might determine that there is a problem within their causal theory. This failure in correlation can then trigger deeper investigation by the analysts to determine if other intervening mechanisms disrupted the Pineland SOF unit's progress.

Thus, the assessment, planning, monitoring, and analysis of progress towards their SMART objectives, through MOP and associated MOE, enable SOF to assist in the measurement of the effectiveness of their SC activities. The final key step in measuring effectiveness and meeting the requirements of law and policy lies in effective evaluation of SOF SC activities.

EVALUATIONS

DoD policy establishes the USD(P) as the "office responsible for independent evaluations to measure the effectiveness and impact of significant security cooperation initiatives toward meeting expected outcomes" (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, p. 21). DoD policy defines evaluation as

> a systematic collection and analysis of information evidence about the characteristics and outcomes of an ongoing or completed initiative, and its design, implementation, and results. Evaluations determine relevance, value, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact as a basis for improving effectiveness and to inform decision makers regarding future plans, programs, and activities. Evaluation, distinct from assessment and monitoring, focuses on documenting the achievement of outcomes and results and in some cases the value of continuing the investment (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, p. 16).

"Evaluations will be primarily conducted at the strategic level using the appropriate methodology based on context, available resources, and data" (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, p. 16). DoD policy and joint doctrine for Security Cooperation require that evaluations "be conducted in line with the principles of usefulness, independence, methodological and analytical rigor, and cost effectiveness" (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 23, 2017, pp. V-5). The evaluation of SOF SC activities enables the analysis of longer-term outcomes and final evaluation reports. These evaluation reports should:

> Include data, findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Such information can be collected by evaluators or collected during monitoring. Findings represent the interpretation of data. Conclusions are the judgements that evaluators make about the initiative's performance, outcomes, and impacts based on findings. Recommendations for how future performance could be improved follow the findings and conclusions (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, p. 17).

DoD policy delineates between outputs and outcomes based upon the timing of these effects within the operating environment. While the Department of Defense considers outputs to be "direct, tangible results of initiatives [that] often serve as documentation of progress during implementation and monitoring," DoD best defines outcomes or impacts as "long-term, cumulative effects of interventions over time on what they ultimately aim to change (e.g., capabilities, security conditions)" (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, p. 22). These outcomes should tie back through the theory of change-driven operational approach to the achievement of the specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound SC objectives providing lessons learned for the SC enterprise and accountability for key decision maker oversight within DoD and the U.S. Congress.

The capability and capacity to conduct these external, independent evaluations require a level of expertise difficult to find in DoD civilian and military personnel. So much so that via Section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Congress added to U.S. Code, Title X, Chapter 16, Section 384, "Department of Defense security cooperation workforce development" (U.S. Congress, 2016).

Congress passed this legislation to task the Secretary of Defense "to oversee the development and management of a professional workforce supporting security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense, including— (1) assessment, planning, monitoring,

execution, evaluation, and administration of such programs and activities. . .” (U.S. Congress). The purpose of this legislation

> is to improve the quality and professionalism of the security cooperation workforce in order to ensure that the workforce— (1) has the capacity, in both personnel and skills, needed to properly perform its mission, provide appropriate support to. . . evaluation. . . of security cooperation programs and activities. . . and ensure that the Department receives the best value for the expenditure of public resources on such programs and activities. . . (U.S. Congress).

This legislated program tasks the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to manage the implementation of the new program. The program provides for the establishment of a new SC-focused civilian career path to include professional certifications and the establishment and maintenance of “a school to train, educate, and certify the security cooperation workforce” (U.S. Congress).

DoD policy requires both Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands to “conduct and support evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017, pp. 10–11). Therefore, key personnel within USSOCOM and the TSOCs supporting the GCCs should enter the new legislated Security Cooperation workforce development program to effectively prepare and enable them to conduct these strategic level evaluations and their supporting assessment and monitoring efforts.

The evaluation of SC initiatives, activities, and programs build upon the preceding efforts to enhance SOF’s assessment, planning, and monitoring of SC activities to provide useful, relevant, and analytically rigorous feedback that enables SOF to improve their future employment of Security Cooperation to achieve U.S. objectives and to measure the effectiveness of SC activities as a responsible return on the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Research in this study finds that the U.S. Government has taken valuable steps via legislation, policy, and doctrine to improve the collective ability of the numerous organizations involved in the SC enterprise to measure the effectiveness of SC initiatives, activities, and programs. USSOCOM, as the force provider for U.S. Special Operations Forces, can enable SOF to improve their ability to assist in the measurement of the effectiveness of SOF SC activities via the following recommendations.

1. Develop SOF-specific training and education, coordinated with DSCA, explicitly focused on SC assessment, planning, monitoring, execution, evaluation, and administration of SC programs and activities.
2. Ensure SOF employ SMART criterion in the development of SC objectives during all SC planning.
3. Ensure SOF design SC lines of effort employing a Theory of Change-Driven operational approach.
4. Ensure SOF learn and implement the AM&E Framework in accordance with DoD policy.

5. Ensure SOF coordinate to make certain that any cross-functional teams conducting initial assessments related to SC initiatives that SOF may plan or perform include SOF SME to enable successful mission analysis.
6. Ensure SOF Headquarters include relevant MOPs and MOEs within their CCIR FFIR and that SOF Commanders specify the vitality of this reporting via specified tasks within written orders and reinforce the importance during "battlefield circulation" and meetings with subordinate leaders.
7. Enable key personnel within USSOCOM and the TSOCs supporting GCCs to enter the newly legislated Security Cooperation workforce development program to enhance SOF capability and capacity to conduct assessments, monitoring, and evaluations.

CONCLUSION

With appropriate education and training, SOF involved in SC assessment, planning, monitoring, and evaluation can learn to design and incorporate SC objectives that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound or "SMART," to facilitate the development of plans employing a theory of change-driven operational approach. SOF within USSOCOM, GCCs, and their supporting TSOCs can employ these theory of change-driven operational approaches, along with appropriate MOP and associated MOE, to assess, monitor, and evaluate SOF SC activities to assist in improving the measurement of their effectiveness. This improvement in the measurement of effectiveness facilitates the ability of SOF and the larger SC enterprise to 1) learn and adjust current and future SC activities to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of internal processes and activities, 2) measure progress along SC lines of effort under execution, and 3) better account for the return on investment reaped from their SC lines of effort.

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The Use of Special Operations Forces to Counter Terrorist Networks in the Megacity and Urban Environment

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The Special Operations Community, the nation's premier counterterrorism tool has long prided itself on being adaptable and able to meet new challenges. However, a growing theory that terror networks are moving to an urban and megacity environment means that the Special Operations Community will need to continue adapting to meet the changing dynamic of the terrorist network. While countering terror networks or urban operations are not a unique or new concept, the complexities and dynamics of the urban and megacity environment means that Special Operations Forces will need to adapt to match that of the terror network's urban capabilities.

Keywords: megacities, urban warfare, counterterrorism

INTRODUCTION

On 8 August 1993, four United States servicemen were killed in a remote-control detonated roadside bomb supporting an operation to oust Somali warlord Mohammad Farad Aideed from power and restore stability to the Somalian civil war. The attack led to a chain reaction that resulted in the deployment of further US servicemen to the region, led by members of the military's elite Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) (Smith, 2011). On 3 October 1993, a routine mission to capture Aideed's top lieutenants, resulted in the downing of two black hawk helicopters and the resulting death of nineteen US servicemen following a catastrophic attempt to secure and retrieve the downed helicopters and their personnel. The 3 October event would be seared into the memory of Washington and war-planners and forever remembered as the Black Hawk Down incident, following the title of the hit novel and Hollywood movie, *Black Hawk Down*. The Black Hawk Down incident, though operationally successful in the fact that it achieved its main objective of capturing Aideed' s lieutenants, seared a lasting memory in the minds of the military, in particular the special operations community and how it deals with urban combat.

For the special operations community, urban warfare is not a particularly new concept. JSOC had been familiar with past incidents of urban warfare and is a key component of Special Operations Forces (SOF) training (Naylor, 2015). But most of the studying and lessons learned came through the lens of other countries' urban engagement and through the lens of large armies in the urban terrain and not so much through small-unit study. Additionally, up until 1993, SOF, while trained to execute irregular warfare, these were limited to only a few specific

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missions that were often not directly related to Counterterrorism (CT). However, on 11 September 2001, the SOF community would need to adjust to a new challenge that would overtake its mission set as the primary focus for the twenty-first century.

The terror attacks of September 11th would not merely change how the US military perceived the threatening world around it, but it would also change how the US military defended itself, and SOF would be at the forefront of that plan. Since September 11th and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the focus of the US military and particularly that of the SOF community has been one to execute a mission of countering terrorist networks. The successful mission to kill September 11th mastermind and Al-Qaida (AQ) leader Usama Bin Laden (UBL) on 1 May 2011 was one of the crowning achievements for the SOF community. However, it was just one of many CT operations executed by SOF. Since September 11th, SOF has been at the forefront of conducting CT operations to kill and capture terrorist that threaten the US and its interests abroad. To further cement their status as a critical component to the nation's CT needs, Vice Admiral Joseph Maguire, a former special operator commander was nominated to lead the nation's National Counterterrorism Center (Office of the Director of National Intelligence ODNI, 2018). A sign that SOF mission has a future role in how countering terrorist networks is to unfold.

While the SOF community is learning and adapting to become an efficient and effective CT tool, so too are the terrorists learning to adapt and evade capture and elimination. Just as the SOF community-utilized history and lessons learned to adapt, terrorist networks like AQ and more recently, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), have taken lessons learned from past SOF failures and are adapting to evade capture. The failure of the SOF community in Mogadishu to fight in an urban setting is a lesson that is not lost on terror groups. In fact, UBL had later claimed that AQ members were in fact involved in the Black Hawk Down incident and claimed credit for some of its success (Meek, 2013). Despite conflicting confirmations of such claims, terrorist groups are increasingly using an urban environment to plan and execute operations. Attempts to counter these networks in the urban environment are not only studied and executed by US special operators but are a growing problem and mission set for multiple countries facing similar threats by terrorist networks.

In 2002 following a particularly horrific attack by Palestinian terrorists, Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield. The mission was to identify and apprehend the terror cells responsible for the attack, along with other attacks that had been plaguing the Israeli people. This resulted in a three-week-long operation – where Israeli SOF played a leading role – much of the fighting had taken place in the dense urban environment of the West Bank. Though Israel had been successful in eliminating the terror cells responsible for many of the attacks, it would not completely eliminate the terror threat and Israel would regularly find its SOF units engaged in urbanized CT operations. While Israel and the US find themselves engaged in protracted CT operations, particularly in an urbanized environment, other countries such as India are also familiar with the need to execute CT operations in an urbanized environment.

On 26 November 2008, ten members of the Pakistani terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) launched a particularly horrific attack on the Indian megacity, Mumbai. For three days ten men kept the megacity under siege and eluded Indian CT police as more than 164 people perished in the subsequent attacks (CNN, 2015). While the Indian military and in particular its CT forces were familiar with terror groups, particularly from Pakistan, the Mumbai attacks resulted in a new type of threat that would change how India and the CT community would combat terror groups.

While the Black Hawk Down incident, Israel's CT operations in the West Bank and India's response to a heavily urbanized terror attack are all different in their underlying causes, they all share a common theme and trend that is emerging for the SOF community and how it responds to an urbanized terrorist threat. Additionally, all three are the subject of countless Military Operations on Urban Terrain studies, including those studied in SOF practice and military doctrine. These three particular cases offer a unique understanding of a complex urban environment, a resilient terrorist network and innovative applications used by terror networks to execute attacks.

For much of the twentieth century and even in the beginning of the twenty-first, conventional CT thought suggested that terrorist networks and those that support them were removed from the population and sought isolation. With notable exceptions, it was commonly believed that despite the potential for a friendly environment, most terror groups trained, operated, recruited and planned in remote locations. This worked for many years, despite complexities associated with isolation, such as removal from money sources, recruits and distance from targets. However, the explosive growth of the urban population, particularly in the global south, coupled with the effectiveness of current CT efforts, means terror groups will need to adapt and find a new safe haven for conducting future operations. One of these options is a possible migration of terror networks to large urban environments, most notably megacities, where law and order is often depleted and opportunities are plentiful for terror networks to exploit.

MEGACITIES AND THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

Megacities, as defined by the United Nations' 2011 World Urbanization Prospects of 2011 are cities that contain a population of more than ten million inhabitants (United Nations, 2002). In 1970 only thirty-nine million people lived in what can be classified as a megacity. By 2011, 359 million live in what are classified as megacities and in 2025, 630 million people are projected to live in megacities, some 13.6% of the global population, respectively (United Nations, 2002). This does not seem to account for a significant part of the population, but a similar UN report suggests that in 2008 more than 3.3 billion, or just over half of the global population lived in urban environments. As the urban population grows and state and local authorities find it increasingly difficult to manage the security and safety of the urban environment, it will be increasingly favorable for terror networks to find refuge in the urban environment, particularly that of megacities. While many reasons exist as to why terror groups will find an urban environment – particularly that of a megacity – favorable versus a more secluded environment. One of the primary reasons is as cities develop and the populations become more diverse, their will increase semi-autonomous regions in the urban environment. These autonomous regions are arguably more isolated from the larger urban environment and will offer a unique environment for terror networks to operate with impunity. Additionally, the complex physical infrastructure, coupled with the complex socio-infrastructure will mean any attempt to counter-terrorist groups will be challenging in the urban and megacity environment. The potential for terror groups to find safe haven will mean that terrorist will have a new opportunity to launch attacks against their targets, recruit an endless supply of people and potentially, hold enough land, resources and populace to become a significant challenge for the local and state authorities to counter.

Evidence to suggest that terror groups are becoming more urbanized and the growth of the urban environment is becoming more complex and terror groups are moving to a megacity environment (Neuringer, 2017). Because of this movement to the urban and megacity environment SOF, which is

already at the forefront of CT operations, will continue to be a critical tool on combating terrorist networks. But in order to meet the challenges and new dynamics of the urban terrorist, SOF will need to take lessons learned from previous engagements utilize new methods of operations, new tools for intelligence and innovative methods for countering an ever evolving terrorist threat.

A New Mission for a New World

The term Special Operations Forces (SOF) is used in this paper to describe the units that make up the United States' Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Where otherwise noted, the term SOF is used to denote a joint venture between the units that make up JSOC. These include the Army's 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta, otherwise known as Delta; The Navy's Special Warfare Development Group (SEAL); and the Air Force's 24th Special Tactics Squadron. Additionally, where otherwise noted, units made up of JSOC's Intelligence Support Activity (ISA), are also included in the definition of SOF units. While this paper will look predominantly at United States focused SOF missions, where noted SOF units will be analyzed supporting other countries, to include Israel and India. However, the predominance of lessons learned and applications for future learning and usage will be that of supporting US forces.

While one of the initial mission sets for SOF units was CT, their application before September 11th, was limited. Prior to September 11th, the majority of SOF missions were predominantly focused on counter-proliferation and combating the trafficking of nuclear-related materials, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fear of weapons proliferation (Naylor, 2015). While SOF units had trained for a variety of missions to include CT activities, the real-world applications were limited by senior defense leaders – who's memories of the 1993 downing of two Black Hawk Helicopters, resulting in the death of nineteen service members – were still raw in the minds if senior leaders. Despite this, SOF units were at the forefront of many notable activities, including the killing of Colombian drug lord, Pablo Escobar and the apprehension of Serbian mass murder, Goran Jelisic, missions that would hone SOF skills and be valuable to lessons learned for future operations (Naylor, 2015). During these operations, SOF units would hone their skills and prepare for future warfare of the twenty-first century. Following the September 11th attacks, SOF would be at the forefront and in the US Global War on Terror (GWOT) and would be instrumental in executing CT missions. SOF units would learn, adapt and execute ever more complex missions. However, despite this explosion in application SOF units will face a new challenge as the country's preeminent CT force.

Despite their training to counter terror networks, as noted, the explosive rise in urban populations means that terrorist groups are finding new sanctuary and new opportunity in the urban environment, particularly that of the megacity environment, which offers a unique opportunity for terrorist groups the thrive. While SOF units have developed their skills to fight in an urbanized setting, their exists unique challenges for SOF units in countering terrorist groups in the urban and megacity environment – close proximity to non-combatants, multiple opportunities for assimilating back into their surroundings, and the vertical and subterranean components of an urbanized environment that make it uniquely difficult to counter terrorist groups. However, as with past missions, while the opportunity for failure and chaos is present, so too is the opportunity for growth, excellence and triumph for SOF.

LITERATURE REVIEW

One of the most unique challenges for understanding SOF is the secretive nature of much of their work. While information is plentiful when their failure, success is often mired by secrecy and obscurity. However, despite this, their remains multiple volumes and works by past and contemporary thinkers to assess the challenges and opportunities for SOF units. For urban and megacity applications there exists some literature on how SOF can be used to counterterrorism, but unfortunately, this specific knowledge is limited. To understand the usage of small units and urban and megacity warfare, contemporary thinkers like CT expert David Kilcullen and British military expert Alice Hills offer their interpretations. Kilcullen notes that for military units the geographic and infrastructure complexity of the urban environment will "break up military forces." (Kilcullen, 2013). He explains that because the urban environment is so complex, it is virtually impossible for a large-mechanized military force to navigate and operate in a dense urban environment. Streets are too narrow or blocked for large military vehicle to operate, thereby creating a deadly bottleneck for military forces. This in turn results in the splintering of forces and making it difficult to manage and coordinate operations.

Alice Hills adds to this by noting that the urban environment "emphasizes intellectual and operational limitations of current military thought, decision-making and logistics, all of which are designed for (and work best) open areas." (Hills, 2004). Additionally, technical challenges of intelligence and information collection and usage become increasingly more complex in an urbanized environment (Hills, 2004). This means that the physical time and space difference between open and rural warfare is significantly compacted in an urbanized setting. For example, it may take minutes or hours for terror networks to reposition and execute in a rural or open setting, however, in the denseness of the urban environment, terrorist forces can reposition and reengage in a fraction of the time. This means that information that is merely minutes old, may already be incorrect or obsolete. CT and special operations expert Seth Jones mirrors this sentiment by arguing that "keys to success [in the urban environment] include constant communications among units, good intelligence (especially [Human Intelligence] HUMINT), the ability to transfer intelligence quickly and the willingness to operate at the small unit level." (Jones, 2007). Jones agrees with Kilcullen and Hills in that while urban operations can be executed by large armies, successfully rooting out enemy combatants is best done through the small unit and small footprint.

While Kilcullen, Hills and Jones focus largely on the size of the military force best needed for executing urban operations, they also touch on, in addition to other experts, the rise of the terror network in the urban environment. Kilcullen's seminal work, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla*, discusses the rise of the urban insurgency. While Kilcullen focuses much of his work on insurgencies, their are strong connections and similarities between insurgent groups and terrorist groups. However, for the purposes of this paper, their use of networked operations and structure is to be considered similar.

Similar to insurgencies, terror groups operate and hide in a population that is either favorable to their goals, or at least unwilling or unable to challenge their power. Terrorist groups can operate vastly different from insurgencies, depending on their objectives and their specific environment, however, there are some similarities, particularly in how they operate. Special operations and CT expert Seth Jones describe what he calls the types of networked terror groups:

Chain Network

People goods or information move along a line of separated contact, and where end-to-end communications must travel through intermediate notes.

Hub Network

A set of actors are tied to a central (although not hierarchical) node or actor.

All-Channel Network

A collaborative system where each group is connected to every other. (Jones, 2007)

Though this does not encompass all terror groups, as Jones notes, a growing number of terrorist groups are moving to one of these models. Jones uses the case of Israel's Operation Defensive Shield to discuss the implications for fighting a networked terrorist group in an urbanized environment.

Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perlinger's work *The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective*, echoes Jones' argument that terrorist networks are changing the dynamic of the terror network to evade detection and plan operations. While their work focuses on the use of social networking to explain terror groups, it has significant implications in how SOF will apply potential tactics and methods to counter terrorist networks.

One of the key challenges for SOF is not so much the execution of CT missions, as it relates to kicking down doors, but in how SOF operates to find and identify terrorists for apprehension or elimination. This is not to say that SOF can or should replace the intelligence community (IC) apparatus that is tasked with collecting information on terror networks. In fact, much of SOF's work and capabilities are complimentary rather than counter to what the IC can do. As will be discussed later in this chapter, many of the lessons learned and many of the recommendations for future SOF in the urban and megacity environment are intertwined with IC functions and are critical to successful execution of SOF execution of CT missions. Intelligence and CT experts like Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perlinger suggest that the increasing autonomy of terror cells means that a new networked intelligence effort should be utilized to counter terror networks. This is something that SOF has been attempting for years, most notable during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, but will grow in increasing important in the years ahead. Additionally, new ideas such as social network analysis (SNA) can be utilized to understand the changing dynamic of terror cells. SNA has traditionally been used to identify nodes and contacts within a terror cell, but in the context of this paper, SNA also has applications to mean analyzing internet social mediums to identify terror cells and networks.

CASE METHODS

To explain the use of SOF in an urbanized environment, this paper will utilize three specific case studies and their historical importance to explain their use in a megacity and urban environment. One study, using Black Hawk Down incident will look at small unit special operations in the urban environment and analyze lessons learned. The second study will look at Israel's use of small unit operations to counter terrorist networks in the West Bank, and identify lessons learned. The third and final case study will analyze the 2008 Mumbai terror attack and how it was executed by the terrorist group and how it was responded by Indian CT units and

identify lessons learned from the attack. Following a brief explanation of the cases and subsequent lessons learned, this paper will then relook at the particular challenges of the urban and megacity environment. Finally, this paper will analyze the lessons learned from the three case studies and offer analysis and interpretation on future best practices and implications for SOF usage in the megacity and urban environment to counter terror networks.

CASE STUDIES

Case Study One: Mogadishu

Background

The Battle of Mogadishu, often referred to as the Black Hawk Down incident, is one of the most studied and tragic memories for the SOF community. The Black Hawk Down incident began several years prior to the downing of two black hawk helicopter in October 1993, as a Somalian civil war between warring factions in the early 1990s (Snyder, 2001). The civil war pitted multiple clans and war-lords against each other, resulting in a humanitarian crisis that led to the death and starvation of thousands of Somali's. This led to a United Nations peace-keeping led mission to secure food supplies and humanitarian workers. However, the security situation deteriorated and the US was forced to deploy military personnel (Modern Urban Operations, 2016). On 8 August 1993 four US servicemen were killed in a remote-controlled roadside bomb. Their death led to the deployment of further troops, including that of Task Force (TF) Ranger, led by members of the Army's Ranger battalion, members of JSOC's Delta and SEAL Team Six operators, and the ISA. TF Ranger's mission culminated in a raid on 3 October 1993 when ISA sources reported that two of Aideed's top lieutenants would be at the Olympic Hotel, in the Bakara market, the heart of "Black Sea", as explained by members of TF Ranger (Smith, 2011). TF Ranger attempted to capture the top aides and in doing so, members of Aideed's clan had shot down two black hawk helicopters inside the city. The mission quickly changed from a snatch-and-grab to a rescue mission. This significantly changed the dynamics of the mission and approximately one hundred troops, fended off thousands of armed rebels in a heavily urbanized environment. The battle ended more than twelve hours after it started, resulting in the death of nineteen servicemen and the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia within the coming months.

Lesson's Learned

Despite the chaos and death that resulted from the Battle of Mogadishu, the underlying mission of capturing Aideed's top aides was actually a success. However, despite this, it is widely understood that there were some key deficiencies, as well as successes that can be applied to SOF units attempting to execute missions in a highly urbanized environment. Major General William Garrison, the commander of TF Ranger long argued that the element of surprise was lacking from the mission. He noted that "you can have all the grand theories of warfare that you want … but ultimately there are four options: up the middle, up the left, up the right or don't go." (Smith, 2011). In this case, he noted, they went "up the middle" which was in line with the six snatch missions executed previously. This meant that Aideed's men were aware of how TF Ranger executed their missions and knew how to

react. When executing missions, particularly CT missions by SOF it is critically important to maintain the element of surprise and momentum in order to knock an adversary off their feet and execute the missions with little death or damage.

One of the key deficiencies of the mission was the lack of airpower (Modern Urban Operations, 2016). While the use of airpower may vary in some CT operations and SOF missions, it is still a critical element of a successful mission execution. For CT missions, air superiority can take the form of overhead fire support if necessary, but for operators, one of the key aspects are predominantly intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), which in the case of Mogadishu was actually a success story.

Despite the chaos and death caused by the downing of the two helicopters, the Battle for Mogadishu actually shows success in the capabilities for SOF. One of the key components of success was the coordination between intelligence collection and execution by SOF members. The National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) was a joint unit headed by the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Office of Military Affairs and on the ground commanders and was instrumental in providing critical intelligence to commanders in Somalia prior to the mission (Smith, 2011). The joint venture between the CIA and JSOC's ISA led to key HUMINT sources that located some of Aideed's top aides. Additionally, the ISA used a variety of signals intelligence (SIGINT) methods via airborne assets to monitor communications and track second and third-tier members of Aideed's group (Smith, 2011). Despite the chaos, intelligence collection and its coordination and usage by SOF forces had played a significant role in tracking members of Aideed's clan and pin-pointing their significance to Aideed. In a highly urbanized environment, particularly one as void of control and stability as Mogadishu, close coordination of intelligence and the on-the-ground SOF units is critical to mission success.

Despite the success of the intelligence and during the battle, it became clear that close-quarter-combat and the application of force in a highly urbanized environment meant that situations changed rapidly and operators had to adjust quickly. The rapid change of environment led to chaos and confusion, even among members of a highly trained unit, who were unable to move or adjust or extricate themselves from dangerous situations. Because of this confusion and its subsequent failure to relay reliable and timely intelligence back to the operations center, meant that supporting fire and reinforcements were not able to relieve TF Ranger in a timely manner. In what would be called "the lost convoy", dozens of men meant to reinforce and subsequently extricate the downed pilots were hampered by constant roadblocks and confusing intertwined roads and critical hours were lost that arguably lead to further death (Runkle, 2013). The "lost convoy's" struggle was in large part due to this rapidly changing and deteriorating environment where accurate and timely intelligence and positioning was needed but not present. While not a megacity, the complexity and the decayed infrastructure of Mogadishu meant that rescue missions and attempts to reinforce were severely complicated and lives were lost because of it.

Case Study Two: Operation Defensive Shield

Background

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict had been raging since September 2000 following a series of suicide attacks by Palestinian terrorists following the withdrawal of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat from peace talks. Following a wave of Palestinian terror attacks, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had been conducting significant CT operations throughout the Palestinian controlled West

Bank and Gaza Strip. However, a particularly deadly terrorist attack during a Passover Seder on 27 March 2002, resonated among Israel and culminated in a tipping point for action (Jones, 2007). Five days later on 2 April, the IDF launched operation Defensive Shield. A massive incursion into the West Bank and particularly into the towns of Jenin, Tulkram, Nablus and Ramallah – cities that saw a significant number of terrorist cells operating and executing missions from. The largest of the action taking place in Jenin and Nablus (Jones, 2007). For more than three weeks the IDF, led by elite SOF units painstakingly moved their way through a maze of booby-traps, snipers and crumbling infrastructure to combat and apprehend terrorist members (Cantignani, 2007). By the end of Operation Defense Shield, fifty IDF soldiers had been killed, mostly in Jenin and Nablus, and scores of Palestinians, mostly terrorists had been killed as well (Mofaz, 2002). The mission, though costly, was a success in that it significantly reduced terror attacks during the same period a year later (Mofaz, 2002).

Lesson's Learned

One of the growing problems among terrorist groups is the disconnection between a centralized command structure and though this evolution has been trending for decades, it was most notable during Operation Defensive Shield. In the urban settings of Jenin and Nablus, there rose the concept of networked terrorists. These were terrorist cells that were part of a hub or all-central type terrorist cell (Jones, 2007). As mentioned previously, in the literature review, this means that cells were operating semi-autonomous too each other. This made countering them in the urban environment particularly difficult. Jenin, in particular, had approximately 15,000 residents in a 600 square yard area (Cantignani, 2007). The challenge is even greater when attempting to locate only a handful of terrorists without harming innocent civilians. One of the tactics utilized by the IDF and in particular their SOF units was the use of small unit intelligence collection and sharing small unit networks of intelligence, where information is shared and moved quickly among low-level commanders meant actionable information was utilized in short time frames, thereby allowing quick action to counter terrorist movements (Jones, 2007). This allows units to then "swarm" areas and focus on small target areas, thereby eliminating collateral damage and isolating the terrorist. Intelligence collection and distribution among small units can be done through a number of means. Units are not constrained by HUMINT factors, but because technology is breeding a new way of communicating, terrorist networks are increasingly using technology and commercial available means to communicate. To combat this, IDF SOF units employed specialized SIGINT capabilities in armored vehicles as well as ground troops and used complex SIGINT capabilities through aerial means (Cantignani, 2007).

Case Study Three: Mumbai

Background

On the evening of 26 November 2008, ten men landed on a beachhead in Mumbai India in the start of what would be a three day terror siege in Mumbai (CNN, 2015). By the time, the terror siege had ended three days later on the November 29, the terrorists had killed 164 people in a brazen attack that spaced several city miles, multiple hotels and a Jewish religious institution (CNN Library, 2015). Planning for the operation and real-time coordination had been operated out of Karachi by the terror group's mastermind, Sajob Mir, who

had been following via twitter and short wave radio the movements and execution of the attacks via a safe house in Karachi (Kilcullen, 2013). For three days, India's elite CT force the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) was unable to eliminate the attackers. The terrorists, members of the LeT and JuD terrorist groups, evaded CT forces through exploitation of local media and social media that was tracking the movements of CT forces, particularly notable when ATS forces attempted to storm the Nariman House, where one of the attack cells was located (Kelly & Rizvi, 2015). This gave the attackers a heads up on impending counterattacks and responses by the ATS. By the end of the siege, only one member of the terrorist cell was apprehended.

Lessons Learned

The explosive use of social media and even the usage of traditional media outlets is not something that is lost on terror groups that are looking to stay relevant and in power. Despite widespread usage of media by terror groups to recruit and raise funds, there is an emergence of their usage as a means to communicate and react during the execution of a terror attack. During the Mumbai attack, the attackers were in constant communication with their handlers via short wave radio and cell phones in Karachi. The team in Karachi was constantly monitoring social media, particularly Twitter accounts that were showing locations of CT units. This allowed the Karachi team to relay critical information to the attackers that allowed them to evade the ATS. Additionally, traditional media outlets were showing constant footage of the ATS, relaying critical information to the attackers on the location of ATS units. Members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, who executed the attack, understood that just as media can be used to inform the public, so too can it be used to relay information to the terrorists. In a highly urbanized environment – where evasion of authorities is necessary and the density of a population means there are likely to be multiple social media eyes tracking the movements of terrorists and counterterrorist forces – terrorist networks are keenly aware of the capabilities of media both social and traditional as it related to operations.

COUNTERING TERROR NETWORKS IN THE INCREASING MEGACITY AND URBAN ENVIRONMENT

As hypothesized, terrorist networks are beginning to move to an urbanized environment and with the increase in megacities, there is an increase in opportunity for terror groups to find a safe haven. One of the biggest challenges for conducting SOF operations in the megacity and urban environment is the density of the population. Unlike other environments, where SOF units have the ability to navigate with relative secrecy, the density of the population makes their movement highly visible. In these high density environment, units can be tracked via twitter, pictures posted and identities revealed. Their locations can be tracked via simple GPS coordination and can signal to terror groups to vacate the area or plan an attack against SOF units (Freedberg, 2015). This is particularly troublesome because as previously argued in this paper, many terror networks operate in areas that are highly segregated and separated from the population. This suggests that outsiders can be easily recognized. Additionally, the complexity and density of the urban environment, particularly that of megacities means that carrying out operations will become exponentially more difficult. During counterterrorism raids by Israeli

SOF into the West Bank, "the most difficult element of the operation was not the tactical part – it was navigating the streets and alleys and being able to maneuver in and out of the of the hostile environment and remain in the area for hours on end" (Katz, 2016).

It is argued by experts that one of the reasons that terror groups are moving to a megacity environment is that there is safety in a population that is sympathetic to their cause – or at least incapable or unwilling to counter the groups presence. Gaining intelligence and information about the terrorist groups and its operations become exponentially more difficult when dealing with a highly dense population (Kilcullen, 2013). Therefore, for SOF units attempting to infiltrate and gain information, there is an inherent caution in seeking information from local sources. This means that one of the key requisites is good intelligence from local sources. However, this requires a complex and nuanced approach.

As noted in the case studies, one of the biggest challenges is physically navigating the urban environment. In the high density of the megacity environment, many areas are poorly maintained and the physical infrastructure makes it difficult to physically traverse and offers many opportunities for terrorists to hide, escape and exploit to counter SOF units. This makes finding and apprehending terrorists exponentially more difficult.

Despite the challenges of the megacity environment, there are lessons learned and opportunities to be utilized from past experiences and past engagements with terror groups in an urban environment. All have complications, and intricacies, but smart application and usage, appropriate to the mission offer opportunities for success.

LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE SOF USAGE

While terrorist groups are adapting to meet the challenges around them, so too should SOF as they engage in CT operations. One of the key trademarks of the special operations community is its ability to adapt. While change is never easy, particularly in the defense enterprise, the SOF community prides itself at being above normal bureaucracies and capable of adapting. The three case studies and the lessons learned mentioned previously offer three important thoughts that can help SOF meet and rise above the challenges of future CT operations as they relate to the urban environment:

- Intelligence collection and usage needs to be a seamless transition from collector to operator.
- Terror networks are becoming more networked, therefore, SOF must utilize a networked approach to identify and apprehend terrorist.
- Terror networks are utilizing traditional and social mediums to plan, operate and execute missions. SOF should utilize these medium and exploit their capabilities to identify and apprehend terrorists.

"'Information and Intelligence' is the 'Fire and Maneuver' of the 21st Century." (Faint & Harris)

-Maj. General Michael Flynn

In the current war on terror, one of the most critical tools to countering terrorist networks is information. Without it, there are no operations planned and there is no terrorist caught. During

the Iraq surge and subsequent years following, the head of JSOC in the late 2000s and early 2010s, General Stanley McChrystal employed the concept of Find, Finish, Fix, Exploit, Analyze, otherwise known as F3EA. The concept of F3EA is a targeting methodology for exploiting information obtained from a target to feed further usage (Faint & Harris, 2018). Though not a new methodology, it gained significant traction during McChrystal's time. The success of the F3EA process led to significant success in dismantling terror cells and networks in Iraq (Shultz, 2017). However, F3EA can and should evolve and expand to meet future needs. One of the key components of F3EA is the coordination between SOF units and the three-letter intelligence collection agencies to provide actionable information to the SOF units (Shultz, 2017). However, in the megacity and urban environment, information and situations can change rapidly and intelligence may be obsolete in a matter of minutes.

Intelligence analysis has been a significant component of SOF's activities, but bringing specialized people and equipment down to the lower level units allows for exploitation of information and rapid usage of actionable information (Smith, 2011). During Israel's Operation Defensive Shield, it was theorized that giving small units the manpower and technology to analyze and exploit information in rapid fashion led to terrorist apprehension, but also saved lives in as much as it led defensive tactics (Jones, 2007). Israel had actually utilized what it called Field Intelligence Units, as early as 2000, but its success in a highly urbanized environment was not appreciated until Operation Defensive Shield (Cantignani, 2007).

One of the growing components of SOF is the usage of SIGINT and communications intelligence (COMINT). Although not a new concept, its importance is growing and as terror groups hide among the population it is growing increasingly important to utilize tools to pinpoint precise locations of terror cells.). The expansion of these platforms means that SOF units can receive, analyze and exploit information for rapid usage. This will pay significant dividends in the urban environment because it will allow rapid and actionable information flow of information among units, allowing the front line SOF units to have the best and most accurate information available, which can save lives and ensure a successful mission execution.

"It Takes a Network to Defeat a Network"

- General Stanley McChrystal

One of the most pressing challenges in the GWOT is the coordination of information. It has long been a problem in the intelligence community that information is stovepiped, and information that can support the mission is lost during territorial fighting and unfortunately, this problem has not abated (Headley, 2008). For SOF units which are the forefront of CT operations, it is critical that information is shared seamlessly across of agencies and personnel working to defeat terror networks. General McChrystal may have been saying even more than he meant, when he suggested that to defeat a [terrorist] network, it takes a network." Similar to insurgent groups, terror groups operating in the megacity and urban environment need a network of recruits, financers, planners and foot-soldiers (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006). Additionally, because terror groups are beginning to operate as varying degrees of networks, different from past traditional models, countering them requires different tactics (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2006). SOF units employ units that specialize in human mapping. However, this is not done to the extent that it can be done, namely because of man-power and financial considerations. However, units that specialize in Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Human

Terrain Teams (HTT) are particular specializations that map human geography and provide on the ground situational awareness (Cline, 2006). These PSYOPS members and HTT's can add value by providing cultural frameworks to intelligence analysis that can help SOF units understand the human terrain and exploit valuable information that may have otherwise been missed (Ford, 2012). This is a similarly done in counterinsurgency warfare, where trust and reliable information from local population sources are a key component to winning. It is not by accident that many CT practices have similar roots and methods to that of counterinsurgency strategy. Both require units going into relatively hostile territory and using information gained from local sources to achieve mission success. SOF units like Israel's Ya'ma – a specialized SOF unit that is made of up native Arabic speakers and cultural experts of Arabic culture – offer an example of specialized operators to identify, collect and disseminate critical intelligence (Katz, 2016). The Ya'ma's were a critical component of Operation Defensive Shield and have subsequently been responsible for the arrest and elimination of countless Palestinian terrorists (Katz, 2016).

Part of the network approach is close coordination with three-letter intelligence agencies. While intelligence gathering and dissemination should be conducted at the small unit level, there is still critical importance in information and technologies that are specialized by other agencies. During the second Gulf War, there had been an explosive use in commercial cell phone usage among the Iraqi people (Naylor, 2015). This represented a critical means of information transfer, including among terrorist networks who were using cell phones more. Agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA) are highly specialized and have enormous resources to track SIGINT and COMINT. While JSOC and SOF units have similar capabilities and have had past successes using their own SIGINT/COMINT variants, they do not match the reach of agencies like the NSA. Placing NSA specialists and operators within SOF units can offer a critical bridge to capabilities and information that may not have been there before.

> Handler: Greetings! There are three Ministers and One Secretary of the Cabinet in your hotel …
>
> Terrorist: Oh! That is Good News! That is icing on the cake!
>
> Handler: Find those 3-5 and get whatever you want from India.
>
> - Communication from attackers at Mumbai Taj Mahal Hotel (Kelly & Rizvi, 2015)

One of the lessons learned from the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks that terror groups are beginning to communicate and utilize medium that are in common usage and publically available. Though terrorists are notorious for using innocuous capabilities for nefarious purposes, the rise of social media has offered a new opportunity for terror groups to exploit innocent items for mass terror and death. The explosive use of cell phones and social media platforms means that the globe is becoming increasingly connected and information is shared at micro-second speed. For the megacity this means that super concentrated populations have the ability to relay information to terrorist groups and allow for their evasion, escape or to pinpoint locations of SOF units to counter attack. The IC, which is increasingly using Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) and COMINT to identify terrorist networks. For SOF units operating in the megacity environment, using and exploiting SOCMINT and COMINT tools are critical for identifying and locating terrorists. During the terrorist attacks and siege of Sydney in 2014,

the lone terrorist Man Haron Moni was able to utilize twitter feeds to identify the location of CT units and evade capture (Archie, 2016). This allowed him to barricade and plan for the inevitable CT units entry into the café where he was hiding.

One way to counter this is to provide SOF units with the ability to analyze and exploit SOCMINT in real-time. London police during the 2012 Olympics utilized the social media platform, Flickr and the posts people uploaded to facially recognize hostile targets (Omand, 2012). In Iraq, social media posts by known suspects were able to identify nodes and potential hits of relevant connections to known terrorists, by connecting social media information (Ford, 2012). This lead to the arrest and exploitation of countless individuals, who were able to provide valuable information on terror networks. The use of real-time SOCMINT can offer enormous and valuable real-time intelligence for SOF units countering terror networks.

Conducting SOCMINT and COMINT by SOF units would seem like an undertaking too large for a small unit, however, in conjunction with the other recommendations of network coherence and intelligence streamlining, usage and analysis by small level SOF units in the planning phases allows valuable situational awareness to be provided to the operator. In the megacity environment, where the physical proximity of non-combatants to the terrorists, along with the physical complexity of the urban environment, makes an enormously valuable addition the operator's capabilities.

CONCLUSION

The use of Special Operations Forces should not be the primary tool for countering terrorists, particularly in the megacity environment. There are underlying problems of the megacity and urban environment and the complexity and differences between terrorist networks and their host environment make it far beyond the scope of what SOF can or should do. However, as the SOF community has grown to become the critical tool for countering terrorist networks it is imperative that SOF receives the resources and innovative capabilities to counter terrorist networks. The SOF community has had a history of trial by fire and has been engaged in multiple learning experiences that have refined their critical warfighting skills. While urban combat and countering terrorist networks are not a new experience for the SOF community, the evolving nature of terror networks means that SOF must evolve as well. As communities move to a more urbanized environment and as more megacities develop, once again SOF must evolve to meet challenges that may not have existed before.

While many of SOF's failures and trials are known to the public, their successes are kept secret. However, their successes come from lessons learned of past failures. Learning is a constant endeavor for SOF units and understanding past success and failures is critical for future success. For SOF units already over-utilized and under-resourced, using new tools and methods offers a force-multiplying capability and enables toe SOF operator to meet mission needs without being over-taxed. New tools and methods can become mission-critical functions by reducing manpower and shortening the time span between information collection and execution, which are critical to mission success. Since a significant amount of intelligence and work is needed prior to a mission's execution it is imperative that SOF units have the most reliable and accurate information to ensure missions success and the lowest cost possible – both in resources and destruction. For SOF units operating in the urban environment, utilizing these new tools is imperative.

While every megacity and every urban environment is vastly different, their remains some similarities – they are complex, nuanced and highly problematic. SOF units cannot count on a population that is receptive to their goals. Nor will they encounter an environment that is conducive to their normal tactics. Instead, SOF units need to understand the environment they are going into and understand the networks they are countering. However, if past adaptions and past utilization of lessons learned by SOF units is a guide, then SOF units will be able to counter the threat of the future terrorist network.

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Western and Eastern Ways of Special Warfare

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Special operations were supposedly a new way of irregular warfare that was officially formed during World War II. This pointed to a paradoxical argument that modern-day special operations are a product of Western modern military innovation but utilizing Eastern ways of "ungentlemanly" warfare. This thesis is superfluous as special operations had been well practised by both ancient Western empires such as the Greeks and Romans, and around the same time in the East, such as in China, and Japan. This paper propounds that special operations, or ways of warfare as a whole, have no cultural and geographic divide, but rather very similarly practiced by men from all over the world in attempts to win economically and efficiently.

Keywords: special operations, strategic culture, ways of warfare

INTRODUCTION

The mere mention of special operations today will conjure images of balaclava-clad commandos storming a building and killing a group of terrorists while rescuing hapless hostages. Special Operations (or known as Special Forces in the UK) were supposedly new combat units formed to conduct irregular warfare and commando raids during World War II (WWII). This was allegedly the first time in history whereby official special operations formations were organized in the standing armies of the major belligerents rather than ad-hoc add-ons (Gray, 2005, p. 249). Reiterating Gray's point, Harari (2007) in his study of special operations during the age of chivalry from 1100 to 1550, also concluded that historically, there were no similar permanent units assigned to conduct special operations except ad-hoc formations or regular troops assigned for specific dangerous special operations (pp. 34–37). During WWII, for example, the famous British Special Air Service (SAS) was formed to conduct small unit commando raids and irregular warfare behind enemy lines. Similarly, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) was formed in 1942 by Sir Winston Churchill to "set Europe ablaze". The main objectives of the SOE were to conduct sabotage and subversion in occupied Europe against Nazi Germany. The Americans had a similar organization, the Office for Strategic Services (OSS) that later became the basis for the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after WWII. Not to be outdone, all of the belligerent forces had also set up various special operations units during WWII ranging from the US Marines Corps' Raiders, the Soviets' Spetsnaz, the Japanese's "Nakano School" special operators to the Italian forefathers of today's US Navy SEALS, the *Decima MAS*.

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This pointed to a decidedly and paradoxical argument that modern-day special operations is a product of Western military innovation but using the Eastern way of "dirty" or "ungentlemanly" warfare. This has been somewhat compounded by the once popular comparison between the Western and Eastern (Oriental) ways of warfare. The Western way of warfare was popularly propounded by Victor Davis Hanson (1989) as originating from the Greek *Hoplite* tactics and their phalanx formation, direct military maneuvers, democratic principles and social freedom and cohesion that have continued to yield military successes for the Western powers for centuries. On the other hand, the Eastern way of warfare has been deemed as relying on indirect tactics, deception, ruses, and dirty tricks. Hence, special operations or special warfare was viewed during its early formations as a corruption of Western conventional warfare with Eastern ways of fighting. This thesis is superfluous as its best. Special operations had been well practised by both ancient Western empires such as the Greeks, in the Near East by the Assassins and the Zealots (and Sicariis), and in the Far East, for example in China and Japan, transcending geographic space and cultural divides.

This article propounds that special operations, or ways of warfare as a whole, has no cultural divide, but rather very similarly practiced by men from all over the world. Ideas of fighting, killing and ultimately winning a war has similar undertones – utilizing ways to win in an economic manner and in the least time possible. This article assesses the practice of special operations by the Greeks during the Peloponnesian War by Brasidas, the Assassins in the Near East, and the Chinese and Japanese in the Far East. It will demonstrate that special operations warfare has been widely practised by different civilizations in different geographic areas for millenniums and supports the thesis that special operations serve as important strategic instruments.

SO, WHAT ARE SPECIAL OPERATIONS?

There are numerous definitions of special operations. These definitions can be divided into two categories; one based on a rigid assumption that special operations are what a special operations unit does, and the second on a broader definition of what a special operation is and a *suggestion* of who should conduct it. Ohad Leslau (2010), an independent international affairs researcher, writing on Israeli Special Operations shares a similar view. He stated that there are two approaches to studying Special Operations. The first looks into "organization, equipment, selection and training of SOF [Special Operations Forces], to distinguish them from regular units" (p. 511). Whereas the second focuses on "the uniqueness of the SOF's operations and objectives" (p. 511).

One of the key definitions based on a Special Operations organization can be traced to one of the largest employers of Special Operations units – the U.S. military. The official definition of Special Operations is identified by the Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (JP 3–05) (2003) as:

> Special operations are operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. (I-1)

Other authors that define Special Operations in a similar vein are James D. Kiras (2006, p. 5), Robert Spulak. Jr. (2007, p. 1), and William McRaven (1995, p. 2).

Meanwhile, a useful definition based on special operations' unique capabilities as opposed to an organization was provided Edward N. Luttwak, Steven L. Canby and David L. Thomas' study on special operations, *A Systematic Review of "Commando" (Special) Operations 1939–1980* (1982) in which Special Operations was defined as " … self-contained acts of war mounted by self-sufficient forces operating within hostile territory" (p. 1). Similarly, Maurice Tugwell and David Charters (1984) also used a broader definition based on the uniqueness of Special Operations in another landmark study on the effectiveness of US special operations:

> Small scale, clandestine, covert or overt operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant political or military objectives in support of foreign policy. (p. 35)

The late M.R.D. Foot (1970), a prominent Special Operations Executive (SOE) historian and ex-SAS intelligence officer during World War II, managed to provide a useful working definition of Special Operations,

> They are unorthodox coups, that is, unexpected strokes of violence, usually mounted and executed outside the military establishment of the day, which exercises a startling effect on the enemy; preferably at the highest level. (p. 19)

Foot's definition concisely sums up special operations' most important ingredients for its operational success and survival, which are utilizing elements of surprise and unexpected acts of warfare. All of these modern definitions of special operations point to common themes - conducting commando raids, sabotage, subversion and the raising of resistance or rebellious militants in enemy areas, gathering intelligence, and conducting propaganda warfare - that are broadly similar with the practice of special operations by different civilizations ages ago which this article will highlight in the next sections.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DURING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

The Peloponnesian War which had lasted for almost thirty years from 431-404BC between the Greek city-states and their allies has spawned many studies regarding its political outcome, lessons for strategy, and tactics. Thucydides's classic treatise on the Peloponnesian War remains one of the greatest historical and strategic texts for the study of war, warfare and international relations. The Greeks, especially the Spartans were known as the pioneers of the so-called Western way of warfare in the use of *hoplites* and phalanx formation. Victor Davis Hanson even argued that the superior Western way of warfare which transcended millenniums and had ensured battlefield victories for the Western powers in the history of war has its origins in the Greeks' phalanx, and the Spartans were reputed to be one of the best practitioners of this formation.

Supporters of such thoughts may have ignored the practice of a key special operations task – subversion - which was widely employed by both the Spartans and Athenians during the Peloponnesian War. Subversion was used by all parties during the war to persuade factions in their respective rival states (and their allies) to revolt and create problems internally. This was hoped will result in their enemies diverting valuable military resources to quell the revolts. Brasidas, a Spartan general was one such practitioner of special operations and subversion.

Brasidas was known as one of the most gallant and successful Spartan generals. He was the son of Tellis, a Spartan diplomat. Brasidas was very active during the first decade of the Peloponnesian War (Rusch, 2011, p. 99). He won a few battles fighting conventionally at Megara, Thessaly, Macedon, and Acanthus. It was here at Acanthus that Brasidas appealed to the Acanthus people to rise in revolt and liberate themselves from Athens's domination (pp. 100–101). Brasidas later used subversion successfully in a few other Athenian colonies namely Amphipolis and Argilus to raise rebellions against the Athenians. Brasidas had also won over the Thracian tribes and other Greek cities on the Athos peninsula of Chalcidice to fight against the Athenians using subversion.

Brasidas was also known to have combined the utilization of aggressive conventional battles but yet still capable of using persuasion, betrayal, and diplomacy to commit colonized Athenian cities to rise in revolt. Brasidas's cunning combination of using special operations and conventional tactics predates what is popularly termed today as hybrid warfare. Nonetheless, as for most modern special operations leaders, Brasidas became too effective for Sparta – other military generals were jealous of his successes as he was the only Spartan general with success during that period of the war, and his unconventional ways of warfare.

Athens soon decided to counter the rebellions and recapture the rebel cities. Amphipolis was one of these cities, and Brasidas while defending the city, led an attack on the arriving Athenian forces but was killed. After Brasidas's death, the Spartans continued to use subversion in raising revolts within Athens's numerous colonies and allies (pp. 12, 22, 33,125 & 129).

Brasidas and the Spartan practice of special operations behind enemy lines in a modern context would be known as fifth column activities. For example, during WWII, the Germans were suspected to have conducted Fifth Column operations which had worried the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill so much and left a good impression on him that he would form the SOE to mirror the German's Fifth Columnists. The SOE was tasked to perform sabotage and subversion in Nazi-occupied Europe and later in Asia too.

SOE's long lineage can perhaps be plausibly traced back to the Peloponnesian war – the conduct of subversion by Brasidas against Athenians' interests – an economical way of fighting a war by influencing and using other subjects to fight against the Athenians, creating problems in their own backyard, and interdicting Athenian food supplies and trade lines. This forced the Athenians to divert important resources and time to quell these revolts. Plausibly, these special operations conducted by the Spartans had managed to weaken the Athenians and contributed to the ultimate defeat of Athens, yielding a handsome strategic utility.

The Spartans immortalized by the modern day perception of formidable *hoplite* conventional soldiers had been deliberately misrepresented. They were also at foremost a serious practitioner of special operations apt in the deployment of subversion. Perhaps some Western-centric military historians conveniently neglected this aspect to promote their views about the superiority of the Western way of warfare and could not accept that even the seeds of the Western way of warfare had also practiced "ungentlemanly warfare" commonly attributed to the Orientals.

THE NEAR EAST WITH THE ASSASSINS

The Persian sect of Islamic Shi'ite known as the Nizaris had practised a form coercive power using covert operations killing off enemy leaders or prominent figureheads to generate intended strategic and political utilities in the 1100s. The victims were usually high-ranking politicians and

military personnel. The Nizaris that practised these killings were named assassins as they were perceived, albeit wrongly, to be under the influence of hashish when conducting their missions (Lewis, 2003). The term assassination was in fact attributed to the Arabic word "hashish" and "hashshashin", literally translated as "those who smoke hashish" (White, 2007, p. 7). The Nizaris' practice of coercive power and using special operations to conduct assassinations provided some of the best ahistorical examples of such ways and means in pursuit of power.

The assassins' tactics involved the killing of their victims in broad daylight and deliberately in the presence of many people in order to highlight their daring terror attacks (Pape, 2006, pp. 12–13). The assassins themselves were prepared to die for their cause. This form of killing served as a way of warfare for the Nizaris. Instead of using large armies, single or a few assassins were used to kill or strike fear into the hearts of the potential victims, which were often enough to induce the payment of tribute or political concessions from their victims that were allowed to survive or the replacements of their victims. This is a truly economical way of conducting coercive diplomacy.

The Nizari assassins were very effective and managed to obtain political concessions from a host of Middle East Emperors and Kingdoms for their sect (pp. 34–35). For example, it was reputed that even Saladin, the famous Islamic warrior, was fearful of the Nizari assassins, even more so as there were two attempts carried out to assassinate him between 1174 and 1176. Although the attempts failed, Saladin had to take extra security precautions to safeguard himself and even had to sleep in a wooden tower. Saladin was reputed to have come to terms with the assassins and left them alone in their territories, and Saladin was never threatened again by the assassins (Lewis, 2003, pp. 113–115).

Marco Polo, the famous traveler, had also described his encounter with the Assassins when he visited Persia in 1273. Marco Polo mentioned that the Assassins had a mountain fortress in the valley of Alamut and seen the beautiful heavenly garden that had been elaborately built by the head of the Assassins known as the Old Man. Marco Polo observed how young men were given drinks that might have been laced with drugs and then when intoxicated led into the garden of paradise with rivers of honey, milk, wine, and beautiful ladies, almost similar to what heaven was perceived. After being allowed to "taste" paradise for a while these men were convinced that when they died for the Old Man, they would be sent to heaven (Lewis, 2003, pp. 6–8). This managed to influence the obedience and devoutness to duty by the Assassins to complete their mission and get themselves killed in the process, ironically, not dissimilar with contemporary suicide bombers obsession for martyrdom.

The Nizaris had demonstrated that rather than going on an all-out war with its foes, it managed to gain valuable political concessions through its way of conducting special killing operations against selected human targets – a cost-effective way of compelling both their enemies and allies to accede to the Nizaris' demands. The killings or the demonstration of a killing attempt was often used as a psychological measure to strike fear and demoralize the enemy into colluding with the Nizaris. The practice of using small scale units of highly trained special operatives in assassinations, however, ultimately led to its demise when it could not gather a large conventional military formation to defend against the mobile and agile invading Mongol hoards toward the end of the Nizaris' political realm. The Nizari sect was wiped out by the Mongols in the early 13th century (Gibb, 1973, p. 13 and p. 19).

THE FAR EAST: CHINESE CH'I FORCES, AND JAPANESE NINJAS

In ancient history, the Chinese were known to have practiced various forms of special operations in ancient history. The Chinese during the Warring States period had fought many wars until finally unified by the first Chinese Emperor Qing. With the vast experience of war, the Chinese had sought ways to overcome the enemy's strengths and attempt to cut losses by finding ways to fight economically. This produced tactics based on deception, trickery, and surprise as well as taking advantage of small units of men to infiltrate the enemy's camp either to kill enemy leaders, to destroy provisions, or to gather information.

Sun Tzu's *Art of War*, written or collected after the end of the Warring States period about 2,500 years ago, was based on such lessons. Various other Chinese military treatises had also quoted the use of special operations. One such example is the Chinese military using special operations in their way of warfare 2,000 years ago in the Battle of Guan Du, which took place in 200 A.D between the kingdoms of Cao Cao and Yuan Shao. Yuan Shao's army was well stocked with provisions of rations whereby Cao Cao's army was less equipped to fight a protracted war. Therefore, Cao Cao decided to defeat Yuan Shao in a quick fight and found that the best option was to destroy the key to Yuan Shao's strength, the provisions – which he planned to do in a surprise and covert attack. The operation was successful as the few guards watching over the provisions were overwhelmed with ease and the food provisions quickly destroyed by fire. This operation caused the morale of Yuan Shao's army to plummet and raised widespread panic that resulted in a confused retreat of the army. Cao Cao subsequently attacked the retreating Yuan Shao army, destroying it and leading to Yuan Shao's collapse from power, and the consolidation of Cao Cao's power in Yuan Shao's kingdom (Sun Tzu, 1998, pp. 82–82). This is a fine example of the tactical use of Special Operations correctly identifying and striking at the decisive point, leading to the gaining of immense strategic utility for the overall campaign.

Ralph D. Sawyer in his book *The Tao of Spycraft* (1998), provided excellent and well researched historical examples of Chinese practice of special operations including assassinations, spycraft gathering intelligence, deception, and propaganda operations to demoralize the enemy. Sawyer also included a discussion on the use of special operations in the famous Chinese classic novel, loosely based on actual events during the reign of the Song Dynasty, *The Water Margin* (Shih Nai-an, 1992). The *Water Margin* tells of a tale of a group of rebels that took refuge in marshlands and conducted a campaign of insurgency against the emperor in the early 12th century. Special operations were used by the rebels against the Chinese forces, and the rebels managed to outsmart and defeat the emperor's forces numerous times. Notwithstanding its early successes, the rebels, however, were ultimately defeated by the Chinese forces. The marshland insurgents had predated the Americans' Francis Marion or "the Swamp Fox" by 600 years – a group of American militias in their war for independence from the British, had also similarly sought refuge in difficult to penetrate marshlands and from there, conducted an insurgency against the British in South Carolina. The Swamp Fox and his band of rebels had a more auspicious ending – they won.

Some of the military treatises and classical texts from China had also made its early influence with a number of its neighboring states namely Japan and the evolution of a band of special operators – the ninjas.

The ninjas or *shinobi* were a group of warriors in feudal Japan that was active from 1400 to 1600, which coincided with the continuous struggles and warfare among the different feudal warlords for close to 300 years. The ninjas were famous for their daring and surprise attacks which were heavily influenced by the Chinese military's practice of special operations (Man, 2012, pp. 7–8). The ninjas were highly trained to conduct sabotage, assassinations, gathering intelligence, secret infiltration, making breaches in enemy's fortifications, and guerrilla warfare. The ninjas' methods and tactics can be gleaned from the *Banshesūkai* (pp. 186–189). The ninjas' main difference with the other famous Japanese warrior traditions, the Samurai, was that rather than committing suicide in the face of defeat, the Ninjas sought to survive and escape to fight another day (p. 62). This instinctive survival trait had ensured that ninjas had to be proficient in secrecy, camouflage, and more importantly knowing when not to progress further in too risky ventures. This is another important hallmark of special operations which is knowing what kind of missions are worth the risks and not to be engaged as a can-do-all kind of unit. Special operators are a finite source and not super-soldiers which requires strategic understanding and careful deliberation in their usage.

The ninjas were frequently employed by the Japanese warlords during the Sengoku period (1400-1600s), often used to infiltrate enemy camps to gather information and to kill enemy leaders. More importantly, groups of ninjas were also used in what today can be termed as commando raids or direct action missions. They were used to storm extremely difficult-to-infiltrate fortifications in dark nights and gain entry by subduing the guards at the fortifications' gates. This surprise attack would enable the larger formation of conventional warriors to rush in and finish off the opposition and capture the fort (pp. 64–73).

The continuous feudal warfare in Japan ended by 1638 which resulted in the demise of the ninja tradition as its warriors went back to farming. The ninjas became an elusive group during this peaceful period. Legends about their prowess however flourished which gave rise to numerous mystic tales about the ninjas being able to fly, walk on water, and turn invisible! These fables continued to build on today, where ninjas were popularly portrayed as black-clad super-soldiers, depriving them the proper recognition as one of the most successful practitioners of special operations in history.

CONCLUSION

This study on the practice of special operations has clearly indicated that civilizations from different geographic areas and ages shared similarities in the practice of special operations. More importantly, these historical examples of special operations highlighted the political and strategic utility of special operations and its wide usage that transcends cultural bounds. Both Western and Eastern societies had utilized so-called "ungentlemanly warfare" for millenniums employing a combination of guile and deception to conduct assassinations; launching surprise ambushes and raids on enemy forces and camps; using small units to storm and gain entry into fortifications by deception, bribery and ruses; sabotaging enemy material; secretly infiltrating enemy positions to gather intelligence; and running subversion campaigns. This article clearly demonstrates that there is no such Western or Eastern divide in special operations warfare. Humans are born with the innate nature to fight wars in the most economical and efficient manner. Not surprisingly, humans from all cultures are naturally inclined to practice similar maxims in order to win wars economically and efficiently. Special operations warfare is one such form of warfare.

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Bytes, With, and Through: Establishment of Cyber Engagement Teams to Enable Collective Security

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Multiple documents from the White House, Congress, and from within the Department of Defense describe the imperative to work with allies and partners toward long-term advancement of the U.S. and partners' interests. These same documents also often stress the importance of the cyberspace as a warfighting domain and a U.S. and international interest. However, there is no clear strategy or methodology today that explicitly links the building of partner capacity within the cyber domain. This paper serves as a primer for discussion on how to bridge cyber operations and partner capacity by proposing a concept of Cyber Engagement Teams (CETs). CETs would seeks to expand on current Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Force Assistance (SFA) or other cooperation and engagement apparatuses. Taking advantage of similar successes and lessons learned over the many decades by those units engaging in FID, SFA, and other security cooperation mechanisms, the U.S. has an opportunity establish a cadre of functional cyber experts to complement the traditional and existing engagement models. These forward deployed CETs would work with and train U.S. allies in areas of network operations, cyber security, and even offensive cyber operations while at the same time providing a viable mechanism to hold the adversary's target networks and systems at risk. By working with indigenous forces, CETs would situate U.S. and friendly forces and capabilities in a better position to counter Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) threats, to hold adversary command and control (C2) networks at risk by working "by, with, and through" friendly nations, and would develop lasting relationships. CETs are a logical tool to contend with cyber adversaries through friendly engagement, collective security, and partnering.

Keywords: Cyber, asymmetric, Theater Security Cooperation, cyberspace operations, A2AD

Unlike the very exclusive nuclear club, being a member of the cyber club is open to all. Most, if not all, nation-states practice cyber warfare in some way, shape, or form. Other actors include Violent Extremist Organizations, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, organized crime outfits, hacktivist groups, and lone-wolf hackers. What is more, adversary cyber capabilities will only become more advanced as time goes by. Today, the distinctions and capabilities between actors are disappearing. One possible way to contend with the proliferation of cyber technologies and posture U.S. forces and capabilities to counter potential adversaries could be to forward-deploy Cyber

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Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/uops

Engagement Teams (CETs) in a similar construct to other forward-deployed engagement teams such as those found in Security Force Assistance or Foreign Internal Defense missions or units such as Joint Task Force Bravo headquartered in Honduras. Deploying cyber forces forward provides a tool for signaling American resolve and intent, even as cyber effects can seemingly come from anywhere at any time. When deployed, these CETs would work with and train our allies while at the same time providing a viable mechanism to hold the adversary's target networks and systems at risk. (For this concept paper, the term cyber will encompass similar enabling capabilities found in network operations, information operations, electromagnetic operations, and space operations.)

UNDERSTANDING THE CYBER THREAT, CYBER GEOGRAPHY, AND INTERDEPENDENCIES

One has to make certain assumptions about the world to consider the concept of CETs as a viable method to counter adversaries and to strengthen U.S. allies. Weak and failing states, rising nations, and non-state actors will pursue cyberspace operations as a cost-effective alternative to traditional and conventional military capabilities and because other options have been taken from them due to preponderance of U.S. military strength. North Korea provides a prime example of a failing state looking toward cyber capabilities as a cost-effective augment to traditional military capabilities. According to Rep. Mike Rogers, Chairman the House Select Committee on Intelligence, and former commander of Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea, General James Thurman (ret), North Korea continues to pursue cyber operations as an asymmetric and sophisticated threat in the face of technologically superior adversaries. (Chumley, 2014; U.S. Congress, 2012) Asymmetries aside, where one could argue that a cyber war is preferable to a conventional, kinetic war, recall that consistent with United States policy, the U.S. reserves the right to take military action to defend itself and its allies, partners, and interests in the event of hostile acts conducted through cyberspace.

Today's battlefield is increasingly complex and technologically internetworked. As a result, more and more operations are becoming interdependent relying on different warfighting functions and specific unit capabilities simultaneously. As an example, more and more these operations can be tied to non-DOD missions and partners to operate in the War on Terror. Cyber capabilities bridge these often seemingly disparate activities and allow commanders to take advantage of complexity, generate tempo, and deny the same to the adversary. At the same time, the interdependencies within cyberspace can complicate warfighters' ability to shape the environment and employ many capabilities.

Protection of "homeland" will include elements of space, the electromagnetic spectrum, and cyberspace. Former President Barack Obama's 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) called attention to the U.S. digital infrastructure. President Obama's International Strategy for Cyberspace stated that the same technologies that enable the U.S. to lead and build security also empower those who would disrupt and destroy (White House, 2011). The technologies that run the U.S. government and give the U.S. commercial and financial sectors such advantages could easily be disrupted causing harm to the U.S. (White House, 2010) In his 2017 NSS, President Donald Trump highlights several areas where the United States will focus its efforts in cyberspace. These "priority actions" include deterring and disrupting malicious cyber actors, improving information sharing and sensing, and deploying a layered defense approach. (White House, 2017) Throughout, the NSS points to working with allies and partners toward a more secure cyberspace environment. The NSS goes on to note that public safety and essential services relies on a vast national infrastructure enabled by cyberspace,

space, and the electromagnetic spectrum that adversaries will target. Most recently, the Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy outlines and identifies areas where the U.S. must adapt and excel in cyberspace. The document points out that rapid technological advancement and commercial technologies are changing the character of war and that the U.S.'s adversaries are exploiting these advances to their fullest capability to create asymmetries (Mattis, 2018). Further, the strategy highlights that the U.S.'s ability to shape and deter within the strategic environment in the early phases, as well as in potential conflict, are underpinned by its alliances and partnerships. These allies and partners provide the United States with accesses to both the physical and logical terrain where CETs can be most effective.

Assuredly, the Department of Defense (DOD) will continue to face threats and attacks from within cyberspace. Even though Cyberspace is a contested domain, there are no forward-deployed cyber forces in the same manner as forward-deployed air, sea, and ground forces. The threats originating from and attacking within cyberspace will target garrison and deployed facilities, as well as friendly military networks and civil infrastructure. Undoubtedly, anti-access actions will seek favorable effects through cyberspace beginning in phase zero. Furthermore, adversaries will likely target U.S. friendly nations and their commercial infrastructures that collaborate with the U.S. or those countries from where U.S. forces might operate from in the event of conflict. These friendly nations and their communication infrastructures, generally less technologically advanced than the U.S., become seams that adversaries will try to exploit and to spread through toward attacking the U.S. information capabilities. The Summary Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 2018 clearly recognizes the requirement to operate and defend "forward" by working "with U.S. allies and partners to strengthen cyber capacity, expand combined cyberspace operations, and increase bi-directional information sharing."

In a more traditional sense, forward-deployed CETs can take advantage of theater geometry in both a physical and logical sense. Professor Milan Vego, Ph.D., of the United States Naval War College describes theaters as consisting of natural and artificial terrain that can influence military operations at any level. To Vego, islands near each other are complementary and provide bases to establish control of the adjacent sea or ocean (Vego, 2000). In a similar fashion, CETs dispersed throughout a theater can act as "islands" by assisting friendly and partner nations in defending their networks and infrastructure. Further, Vego describes the importance of bases in his view that bases are the starting point for operations and campaigns. In the cyber domain, these bases, physical or virtual, serve as virtual garrisons, supply depots, airfields, and anchorages. Vego also states that optimally a theater would have a large and diverse number of bases in peacetime. In wartime, bases should be as close to potential enemy as possible to focus power and energy. With near limitless range, cyber operations can be mounted from anywhere; however, CETs operating from forward-deployed bases across the theater provides for additional depth for offensive, defensive, and the counter-offensive much as Vego describes.

What may been seen as a critical capability to one may be viewed as a critical vulnerability by another. The dichotomy is that the reliance on cyber systems means they are both a critical capability and a critical vulnerability simultaneously. The proliferation of cyber technologies along with Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) systems and weapons has combined to extend the reach and capabilities of adversaries. In cyber warfare, the tyranny of distance is generally negated and the line between capable and less capable adversaries is blurring. Technology continues to come down in cost and much of this technology is dual-use. Networked devices and cyber operations go hand in hand and can give adversaries an advantage that they would

not have had otherwise. The spread of commercial networks and information technology systems (as well as military weapons and command and control systems to a lesser degree) increases the gaps an adversary can target. Cellular technologies, in particular, increasingly provide more avenues of approach for attack and provide methods for information operations and intelligence collection (Porter Felt, Finifter, Chin, & Wagner, 2011).

Today, one cannot assume assured air and sea dominance as each increasingly relies upon cyber capabilities. Both commercial and military technologies track movements of aircraft and vessels via cyber-enabled systems. These systems use the Global Positioning System (GPS), satellite communications, radar, and the internet to fuse a common operational picture for governments and agencies to monitor, and when necessary, defend their territories. Adversaries might interrupt U.S. air and sea dominance if they gain access to or disrupt commercial systems that provide and interpret data or the networks that carry the data. As a result, American dependence on space and cyberspace provides adversaries with a "critical capability" that is targetable by both military and non-military actors. Adversaries will surely target terrestrial and celestial transmission systems such as undersea fiber optic cables, the electromagnetic spectrum, and satellite systems to degrade or deny information flow across the battlefield. What is more, adversaries in the Asia-Pacific region have demonstrated these capabilities and would no doubt use them against U.S. forces. Losing these links would make command and control of U.S. military and friendly forces difficult. Sensor and intelligence data would also suffer from a lack of data pathways. The U.S. must ensure that its C2 systems, and to much the same degree that of its allies and partners are shored up against threats from adversaries; CETs provide planners a viable option to counter threats in cyberspace and to strengthen U.S. and allies early within the domain.

Even with the recognition of the convergence of cyber technologies (network operations, information operations, electromagnetic operations, and space operations), the DOD must adapt its force structure and doctrine to permit full exploitation of these capabilities across all echelons and across all phases of operations. Adhering to multiple DOD and service-level strategies require additional engagement approaches, expanded forward basing options, and more distributed operations concepts. In principle, any engagements should include some level of cyber activities.

Cyber operations during Phase 0 and Phase I are extremely important and must continue to be viewed as an instrument of military, as well as political and informational, power when confronted by an adversary or when planning for an uncertain future. In much the same way as the DOD trains and partners with indigenous forces to strengthen their general military capabilities, and just as importantly, to signal to adversaries the close ties between the U.S. and a friendly nation, the DOD should leverage that same idea in cyberspace through Cyber Engagement Teams. CETs working continually "by, with, and through" our allies and partners would establish and maintain the necessary habitual relationship required for continued shaping and posturing of the environment, provide a level of deterrence, and may even prevent open conflict between adversaries (Magnuson, 2011).

CET RELATION TO SECURITY COOPERATION ENGAGEMENTS, FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE, AND SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

Presently, the U.S. is not engaging its partners and allies in cyberspace in the same manner as it does across the more traditional warfighting functions. CETs are another tool to contend with cyber adversaries through engagement, collective security, and partnering. The concept of CETs

proposes to expand on current Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Force Assistance (SFA) or other cooperation and engagement apparatuses. CETs consisting of a cadre of cyber officers and enlisted personnel would engage with partners in defensive cyber operations (DCO), offensive cyber operations (OCO), intelligence gathering, exploitation, and the operational fusion of these actions with security activities in either an indirect or direct support construct as outlined in JP 3–22, Foreign Internal Defense (Joint Chiefs, 2017). CET operations would contribute to the current activities undertaken by U.S. forces around the globe in the cyber arena by assisting host countries to defend effectively against external threats; contributing to coalition operations; or organizing, training, equipping, and advising other countries' security forces or supporting institutions. By working with indigenous forces, CETs situate U.S. and friendly forces in a better position to counter A2AD threats, hold adversary command, and control (C2) networks at risk by working "by, with, and through" friendly nations and developing lasting relationships. CETs would train partners by assisting them in becoming more capable of providing their own cyber security while at the same time these same CETs could provide U.S. forces, operating from local infrastructure, the ability to directly or indirectly influence unfriendly networks and cyber operations (Livingston, 2011). Put another way, CETs operating in an SFA or FID-like capacity would enhance military capabilities and proficiency of those partnered with via training, advising, and assisting host nation militaries to build military, or more specifically, cyberspace operations capability. (U.S. Senate, 2008)

The 2010 Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68 lists the DOD policy for conducting SFA. When looked at through cyber-lenses, establishing CETs to compliment traditional SOF and general purpose forces conducting SFA activities becomes clear. For example, the instruction states that:

> ***SFA shall encompass DoD efforts to support the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capacity and capability of the foreign security forces and supporting institutions of host countries, as well as international and regional security organizations. SFA can occur across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict as well as during all phases of military operations. These efforts shall be conducted with, through, and by foreign security forces.***

and

> ***SFA activities shall be conducted primarily to assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability. However, the Department of Defense may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to defend effectively against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another country's security forces or supporting institutions.*** (U.S. DOD, 2010)

Neither of these to policy statements prohibits cyber operations, training, and capacity building of foreign security forces or partners. In fact, given the broad terms of the language, one can certainly read into the spirit of the policy that the DOD *should* be conducting engagements across the range of military operations and across ministerial and department level institutions with its foreign partners and allies and CETs can easily be a construct by which to arrive at the stated policy.

Furthermore, and with permission of the host governments, CETs in friendly countries essentially establish a "beachhead" for counter-A2AD operations by gaining access to additional maneuver space with local infrastructure. CETs position DOD forces physically and virtually through engagement opportunities in the cyber domain. What is more, these CETs can influence

the environment during Phases 0 and I by setting the initial conditions, across all warfighting domains, for Phase II and beyond operations. The CETs can provide Indications and Warning (I&W) as well as employ organic, and where applicable, host-nation cyber capabilities to seize the initiative when the time is right. The aim is to provide security cooperation engagement mechanisms with an available pool of highly trained and qualified personnel to draw from to train indigenous forces on cyber defense, exploitation, and offense to generate tempo, buy time, or to render adversary networks and systems to a more manageable threat level. These same personnel, along with traditional conventional forces, or FID/SFA engagement teams and their tailored capabilities would be the first line of defense (coordinated cyber-defense and response, electromagnetic protect operations, information environment domination) or the jump-off point for offensive operations (offensive cyber operations, electromagnetic attack, focused information warfare activities). Whether defensive or offensive, the idea is to pit the U.S.'s cyberspace capabilities against an adversary's at the soonest and to ensure friendly nation-state partners have an ability to do the same.

Employing a CET construct has multiple purposes. First, CETs challenge adversary cyber operations through U.S. and partners exchanging best practices and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in the digital domain. Second, CETs send a signal to adversaries that the U.S. and her allies recognize cyberspace as a warfighting domain and that they are prepared to defend it and, at the same time, provide a credible threat to adversary infrastructure and networks (hold at risk). To be successful, CETs must perform several key tasks:

- Cultivate a cadre of U.S. cyberspace professionals with intimate knowledge of friendly and adversary infrastructure and networks to assist in defense-in-depth activities and to plan for or to conduct offensive and exploitative operations.
- Enable access to denied areas, permit friendly freedom of movement and maneuver in and through cyberspace from forward-deployed locations.
- Develop strong military-to-military relationships in cyberspace similar to that in other domains such as land, air, and naval as well as the "human domain" to enable integrated operations.
- Participate in bilateral and multinational cyberspace training exercises and forums.
- Assist allies in defense of national infrastructure.
- Share releasable cyberspace intelligence to broaden the depth of knowledge concerning cyberspace adversaries.
- Support information sharing and communication to mitigate adversary messaging.

There are, of course, some requirements that the DOD needs to have in-place to employ and deploy CETs. At a minimum, CETs require the following:

- Trained Foreign Area Officers (to include linguists), Regional Area Officers, and military advisors capable of repeat performance in a region or country to foster positive relationships along with trained and readily identifiable cyber forces within the DOD.
- Deployable technologies to hold adversary A2AD systems at risk. These systems might include ground-based pods to effect/control the electromagnetic spectrum; devices capable of transmitting code into adversary C2 networks and weapon systems capable of stand-off distances; devices capable of confusing adversary position, navigation, and timing (PNT).

- To hold adversary A2AD systems at risk, teams require an ability to deploy rapidly across the theater where there may be little or no existing communications infrastructure. Teams will require satellite communications capability bandwidths in excess of current man-portable radio systems; reliable power sources; and ruggedized/weatherized systems.
- Intelligence sharing agreements and broader cyber operational policies between the U.S. and partners. To be successful and to establish trust between the U.S. and partner nations, even a rudimentary exchange of intelligence, as well as cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures will go a long way to foster conviction and build solid relationships.
- An ability to operate from either military or commercial telecommunications networks.
- Capability to reach back into DOD and interagency communities of interest and to communicate, even at a basic level, with host nation forces.
- Ability to perform a wide variety of cyberspace operations (cyber intelligence, defense, exploitation, offense, information warfare, electromagnetic support, space support, etc.) in small, tailorable packages with the ability to call for augmentation as required.

INVESTMENT HORIZON FOR CETS

The time horizon to adapt this concept to something achievable is likely beyond 5 years. Firstly, the DOD does not have the requisite inventory of trained cyber operators within U.S. Cyber Command's Cyber Mission Forces teams. (U.S. Cyber Command, 2016) Adding forces for CETs in addition to the already understaffed Cyber Mission Forces would require several years' investment for recruitment and training before they could be used to augment SC engagements, FID, and SFA operations. Additionally, low-levels of trust exist between nations when it comes to cyberspace operations. This could be in part due to the relative ease in which a nation can enter the ever-militarized cyber domain and the vulnerabilities associated with these technologies. Thus, sharing information on TTPs for offense or defense, even at a rudimentary level, can allow nations to develop signatures to discern the wheat from the chaff in cyberspace, e.g. no side would want to tip their hat as to how they do business. Therefore, it is necessary to begin the trust dialog early and engage often to build the relationships necessary for cyberspace cooperation.

Phase I, 3-year plan (Build the force): During this phase, the DOD must review comprehensive linkages between all US government engagements with partner nations that are purposeful and quid-pro-quo in nature. This plan may require adopting new supporting DOD and Department of State policies to enable the concept. It will certainly be necessary to review, align, and conduct the required Title 10 (possibly Title 50 and Title 18) responsibilities to develop and train personnel capable of performing engagements in austere environments. Equipping the cyber personnel for austere environments should take less time as most capabilities and enabling hardware are commercial. However, the concept will likely require some government-furnished special software and hardware for security and special application purposes. The DOD should engage new partners that may possess terrain, capabilities, or political advantage to U.S. interests during this first 5 years. Where necessary, the DOD should negotiate for continual presence and access on at least yearlong, rotational engagements.

Phase II, 2–4 year plan (Survey and experiment): Note that experimentation begins at the 3-year mark during the build phase. During this phase, DOD would need to develop methods of testing the

cyber force concept in existing engagement activities. This would require leveraging the relationships built during Phase I to discern the exact nature of the DOD and partner-nation requirements as well as to provide time to custom tailor packages for future engagements with partner nations. This is the opportune time to exercise concepts associated with staffing and organizational relationships; forward deploy personnel to validate skillsets, equipment, and training; and to work directly with partner-nations to better understand what the DOD can provide and where the DOD will need intergovernment support. This is the best phase to codify doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership & education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) requirements.

Phase III, 3–5 year plan (Implement and improve): Overlapping with the Experiment phase, this phase would be the steady-state of operations, but in all likelihood would be more associated with an initial operations capability (IOC) since by this time the concept should be more fully developed. It would allow the DOD to continue to build U.S. accesses, improve partner capacity through the above-mentioned framework, to refine where and how cyber forces aggregate within FID, SFA, TSC operations, refine crisis response activities, and develop partner-nation capabilities while solidifying relationships in the event of a crisis.

CET STRUCTURING

The size and make-up a Cyber Engagement Team would vary based upon the required training or mission within a host country. More specifically, the teams are scalable based upon mission analysis, friendly nation partner capabilities, and levels of trust between the U.S. and the host. At a minimum, skillsets necessary to draw from would include network defenders, cyber operations planners, and intelligence specialists. Other skills required might include electromagnetic spectrum managers, offensive cyber operators, information operations personnel, space systems planners, etc. An experienced, senior company-grade officer should lead most Cyber Engagement Teams while an E8 or E9 can lead the smaller engagements. Cyber Engagement Teams should have at least one member familiar with or experience working within the interagency, e.g. NSA, CYBERCOM, DIA, CIA, FBI, DHS, etc.

The DOD has a limited number of trained and available personnel to support cyber operations, but the number is growing. Keeping scalability in mind would allow planners to surge operations as required. Further, competing requirements will dictate which missions take priority over others for funding and training; budgets are not likely to see funding levels on par with that of the first decade of the twenty-first century. For CETs to be successful, the CET cadre will require basic and advanced training in network operations, intelligence, exploitation, electromagnetic warfare, electromagnetic spectrum management, offensive cyber operations, information warfare, and space systems capabilities. While these personnel already exist within the U.S. Armed Forces in many Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) and ranks to some degree today, the hurdles will be right-sizing the required number of service members, identifying and managing personnel, and making them available for tasking to Cyber Engagement Teams. Without a dedicated cadre of service members to form the nexus of the CET construct, the DOD may require a shift in how it currently assigns forces to augment existing engagement apparatuses.

Cyber Engagement Team personnel should be a special duty assignment and have longer prescribed tour lengths, if not constructed as a separate and distinct job function similar to today's special operations forces. Tour should be five to 7 years to gain proficiency in the technologies



FIGURE 1. Conceptual cyber engagement team organizational structure.

necessary and to build personal relationships with friendly forces. Additionally, Cyber Engagement Team members will require a U.S. Secret clearance at the minimum. Specialized billets will require TS/SCI access. A Conceptual Cyber Engagement Team might require personnel and be organized as follows in Figure 1:

OPPORTUNITIES & RISKS

The following are some opportunities that are possible because of Cyber Engagement Teams:

- Cooperation with friendly nations allows Cyber Engagement Teams to understand friendly capabilities and weaknesses to protect shared infrastructure interests.
- Cyber intelligence sharing between U.S. and friendly nations may assist in Indications and Warning (I&W), Attack Sense, and Warning (AS&W).
- Cooperative engagements for cyber defense allows Cyber Engagement Teams to assist friendly nations in securing their networks. Cooperation may allow U.S. to emplace sensors on friendly networks for intelligence aggregation purposes.

- Cyber Engagement Teams develop and cultivate friendly cyber operators with habitual relationships that U.S. could leverage in time of crisis.
- Cyber Engagement Teams can identify and develop strong points and controlled terrain (virtual and physical) in a given theater similar to control of coastlines, chokepoints and sea lines of communication (SLOCs).
- Cyber Engagement Teams promote deterrence through presence.
- Cyber Engagement Teams enable multinational defense.
- Cyber Engagement Teams enable integration of cyberspace operations into broader collective security plans and operations.

There are few risks that are inherent with the Cyber Engagement Team concept due to the limited fiscal and personnel assets available. Most risks are service-related and include, but are not limited to:

Risk: To date, the U.S. has not signaled its cyber capabilities, openly, to most partners or potential adversaries. Exposing friendly nations to even unclassified defensive practices and commercially available exploitation and offensive systems could potentially limit the U.S.'s ability to maneuver in required networks should the need arise. Additionally, given the relative low-cost nature of some defenses and offenses, capabilities can easily proliferate to potential adversaries. **Mitigation**: By limiting engagement practices to industry standards and practices with commercially available hardware and software, the DOD keeps specific U.S. capabilities close hold. Further, commercially available tools have associated signatures and remediation techniques from which the U.S. is largely immune.

Risk: Force structuring and balance between competing priorities could limit available personnel for either Cyber Engagement Teams or conventional forces. **Mitigation**: Since the Armed Forces will likely not increase in the near term, analysis and force structuring at the service and department level can make appropriate trade-offs where necessary. Another option may be to create scalable rotational forces for cyber-specific missions, perhaps located within the Theater Special Operations Command and by leveraging DOD interagency partnerships.

Risk: Classification issues and secure facility requirements may prohibit deploying and training with host nations limiting operations. **Mitigation**: Proper adherence to security procedures will allow for SECRET and above operations in friendly foreign nations. Use of SIPRNET and Trojan Spirit during bilateral and multinational exercises validates mitigation.

Risk: Costs to develop, main, train, deploy, and equip could be prohibitive as budgets shrink. **Mitigation**: Understanding the changing character of warfare and the implications of cyber technologies on today's battlefield will assist the DOD in programming and defending budget requests.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To take advantage of similar successes and lessons learned over the many decades by those units engaging in FID, SFA, and other security cooperation mechanisms the DOD should establish Cyber Engagement Teams to complement existing engagement models. Expanding on the existing FID, SFA, and TSC missions, the Cyber Engagement Team concept provides the DoD with options though Phases 0-I by building relationships, establishing presence in foreign countries, learning the capabilities and limitations of partner nations as well as training indigenous forces, and sets the

stage for Phase II operations. The DOD should expand upon the current engagement teams with dedicated cyber forces that are manned, trained, and equipped to ultimately position the DOD with favorable conditions throughout the cyberspace domain.

Early integration is key. DOD Planners should integrate CETs into existing and emergent engagement mechanisms per the policy and directives that exist. The result of early integration of CETs into U.S. plans would be that the U.S. maintains access to the global commons and other sovereign territories including waters, airspace, and cyberspace. Forward-deployed CETs provide a capability for planning and signaling purposes in an uncertain world. It is essential that CETs or a like construct are incorporated at the earliest in all activities of engagement mechanisms in the same manner as other warfighting functions; cyber operations support and are complimentary to all levels of war and warfighting functions. The ability to rapidly establish control of cyberspace, or at the very least establish a foothold, cannot be stressed enough. Recent history has proven that cyber operations are the norm in modern conflict.

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Dare to Know: The Problem of Overcoming Information Asymmetry for Special Operations Forces in Military Assistance Operations

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Research on military assistance shows that its effects depend on overcoming the information advantage of the receiving state. This paper examines when donor states are willing to overcome the information asymmetry, given the risk involved for special operations forces. The paper builds on a study of Danish military assistance in Cameroon. The findings show that preventive military assistance by special operations forces is not driven by vital national interests, which reduces the risk-taking of the donor state and its efficiency. However, being part of international networks of special operations forces and participating in multinational efforts is important for small states.

Keywords: military assistance, special operations forces, small states, risk, national interests

Policymakers laud military assistance (MA) as an effective tool for preventing the spread of radical, violent militants in volatile regions such as West Africa. In theory, working by, with, and through local security forces, militias, or local self-defense units offers a discreet, low-cost, low-risk alternative to military engagements before a threat has grown to a size uncontrollable by the local state. Such an alternative is attractive to Western powers after the meager outcomes of the drawn-out and costly large-scale engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq (Krieg, 2016; Larsdotter, 2015; Mumford, 2013; Robinson, 2016; Ucko & Egnell, 2014). The United States and, to a smaller extent France, have deployed small economy-of-force special operations forces (SOF) teams to train and, if circumstances demand it, advise and assist local units to improve their military effectiveness against terrorists and insurgents. SOFs are especially relevant in areas characterized by neither war nor peace, because they can operate in areas with higher personal risk than comparable, conventional training teams and are able to operate in smaller groups far from supporting forces (Lohaus, 2017). Increasingly, small states send SOF teams to participate in U.S. regional initiatives particularly in Africa.[1] Apparently, a reorientation in military strategy is on the way among small states.

However, Western powers are often frustrated when high-quality training does not translate into a more effective local military response to insurgent or terrorist threats. Even more problematic, at times Western trained units are engaged in activities ulterior to the goal of the Western powers, such as internal repression or coups. In fact, recent research on MA

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conducted by the United States finds that small footprint MA, in most cases, only slightly improves the recipient state's military effectiveness (Biddle, 2017; Biddle, Macdonald, & Baker, 2018; Byman, 2006; Johnson, 2014; Ladwig, 2016, 2017; Paul et al., 2015; Watts, Baxter, Dunigan, & Rizzi, 2013). Most often, the perspective and interests of local receiving governments differ from those of the Western powers. Preventive MA is meant to counter a nascent threat that the local government might not yet consider a threat to their survival, in which case Western MA might be a way to gather material benefits rather than improving combat efficiency (Byman, 2006). In other cases, the local government faces other threats to its survival from other insurgencies, protest movements, or fears that a coup might happen. Besides, states vulnerable to insurgencies or extremist networks are often the ones that use elite forces for purposes of political suppression or coup-proofing (Byman, 2006; Ladwig, 2017). Under such circumstances, the governments will spread out its military resources and coup-proof with detrimental effects on information sharing, delegation of authority, and unity of efforts necessary to counter insurgencies or terrorist groups (Byman, 2016b; Powell, 2014). In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam, the US special forces trained minority groups loosely controlled by the local states, which led to effective combat units, but they were units whom the decision-makers from the majority groups mistrusted. To improve the efficiency of SOF-provided MA, the Western powers need to limit the negative effects of differences in interests.

When Western powers seek to incentivize recipients to turn MA into a more efficient military effort against a common threat, they face a problem of information asymmetry. To punish or reward changes in e.g. organization, command structure, deployment, or war fighting the donor state needs detailed knowledge of how the trained units fit into the broader strategy of the recipient state and how the unit operates outside the training facilities. Current research emphasizes the general problem of donors not being able to surveil every military unit or to be present in every part of the recipient state (Biddle et al., 2018, p. 8). This is a challenge to small scale SOF-provided MA that is a broad category of activities ranging from short-term train-and-equip programs to comprehensive, long-term engagements involving advising and assisting in combat operations. The closer the trainers get to area of operations, the more exposed they become to the risk inherent in combat. Another kind of risk is the potential political fallout from attempts to monitor the local governments' ulterior use of trained units. In short, the problem of overcoming the information asymmetry is not simply one of practicalities, but one we should consider a calculation of the risk of monitoring against the perceived benefits of reducing the asymmetry. This is especially the case for small powers that possess few SOF units and intelligence resources compared to the United States and that constantly need to prioritize between ongoing and potential deployments.

The purpose of this paper is thus to examine under what circumstances small states are likely to overcome the information asymmetry and increase the effectiveness of their MA. More specifically, we concern ourselves with the smaller, empirical puzzle of why European SOFs from states such as Denmark are involved in training elite units in West Africa without mitigating the effects of information asymmetry to increase the effectiveness of the training? Denmark is among the most risk-taking and globally oriented European states. In Afghanistan Denmark had the highest casualty rate within the ISAF coalition and exposed its combat troops to risk until the general withdrawal of the combat mission in 2014 (Jakobsen & Ringsmose, 2015). Within the last 10 years Danish SOFs have been deployed in Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, in Northern Mali, in Iraq and possibly Syria. Therefore, we would expect Danish decision-makers to be risk-taking, even if a military mission involves relatively

few national interests. If they are not, we need to develop our understanding of what drives the engagement to gain a more nuanced view of the relation between interests and risk-taking.

This paper argues that existing literature on overcoming information asymmetry between donor states and receivers of military training needs to include the driver behind the donor state's engagement and the risk involved in mitigating the asymmetry. Most likely, the previous omission reflects the literature's almost exclusive focus on the United States, who engages in MA in numerous states. The broad commitment of the United States hides the underlying interests that become apparent when studying small states that need to prioritize and weigh benefit, cost, and risk in each of their limited engagements. Many small state SOF MA missions do not reflect vital national interests, but rather an attempt to engage in global SOF networks and develop the ability to conduct MA. This paper proposes three possible drivers for providing MA that result in different risk profiles and, most likely, different outcomes. First, a *bureaucratic* driver to maintain international networks and gain experience means that small state donors are unwilling to accept risk in training engagements or those involved in mitigating the information asymmetry by advising and assisting the recipient units when they are deployed. Second, a *stability/alliance* driver to maintain alliances and promote stability results in higher willingness to accept risk when providing training, but not in increased acceptance of risks associated with gathering information. Third, a *vital national interest* driver means that MA in areas considered a vital national interest is likely to involve high degrees of risk in training and in gathering information about the local forces.

Bringing interests and risk-taking to the fore of our attention when studying SOF-provided MA also benefits the debate in the United States. Even when conducting low-level, so-called preventive MA in order to keep the level of violence manageable, the risk is always present, as was made visible by the deaths of four U.S. servicemen in Niger in October 2017. Even though the United States has developed greater acceptance of losses to its SOF units over the last two decades, the ensuing debate in the United States shows how SOF MA missions outside war zones can generate disagreement about purpose and risk (Burke & Borger, 2017). Evaluating and choosing risks is likely to be nuanced considerations made by the Western trainers and their military bureaucracy. The risk of violence may vary across regions within the receiving state, which makes the choice of training sites and the freedom of movement of the Western SOF units important. A nuanced understanding of the risk assessment of the donor state involved in MA can help us explain where and how MA is conducted. In the case of the European states' contribution to MA in West Africa, the possibility of partaking in a U.S.-led training and exercise initiative fits the lack of vital national interests or even direct political attention to the engagement. MA has been conducted in an almost risk-free area, and selecting and vetting local partner units has been done within the framework established by the United States. In comparison, European states have been willing to put SOFs at risk in Afghanistan and Iraq when providing MA to local forces, where alliance and stability interests drove the engagement.

The paper is structured into five parts. First, a theory section that expands on the principal-agent theory commonly applied to MA by introducing donor interests and levels of risk in obtaining information. Second, a section on the research design. Third, a section that examines the drivers behind MA provided by Denmark. Fourth, an analysis of the levels of risk in training and gathering information on the use of the local elite forces, as well as of the outcome of MA in terms of improvement in the recipient state's ability to conduct counter-insurgency

and anti-terror operations. Fifth, a discussion of the theoretical and policy implications of the findings of the paper.

EXPANDING ON THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PERSPECTIVE: THE WILLINGNESS OF THE DONOR STATE TO TAKE RISKS

In order to unpack the relationship between risk taking and MA, this section first draws on theories of principal-agent relations. Second, it nuances our understanding of the involved risks by distinguishing between the risk of conducting training and the risk of monitoring local units. Third, the section adds to the PA-literature on MA by introducing three different drivers behind MA-missions that each results in a different risk-profile. Fourth, the section discusses the implications of looking at donor motives for PA-analyzes of MA.

Recent literature on cooperation between Western powers and local governments on MA and counterinsurgency has adopted the principal-agent rational choice perspective (Biddle et al., 2018, Hazelton, 2018; Ladwig, 2017). Considering the relationship as one between a principal (the Western power) and an agent (the local government) puts light on the most critical aspects of strategic cooperation, namely the lack of common interests, and offers strategies for overcoming this misalignment of interests (Laffont & Martimort, 2002). The principal's challenge of getting the client to act according to the principal's wishes arises from two problems. First, the client would prefer to shrink from the task defined by the principal – or in the case of MA from the risk of the task – as long as it goes against the interest of the client. Second, the principal suffers from information asymmetry as the principal cannot surveil every action of the client – a supervisor cannot sit in the car of every sales representative to monitor his salesmanship (Stiglitz, 1989). To overcome the problem of misaligned interests and information asymmetry, the principal must control the incentives of the agent. The principal can exert inducement, such as arms deliveries or payment for efficient military operations or put in place punishment, such as withdrawal of the MA-mission if the agent fails to behave as required. However, in the area of military operations and civil-military relations, the problem of detecting lacking or contradictory efforts remains a hindrance to reward or punish the agent's behavior. In particular, the donor state needs to take two kinds of risk: the risk of training and the risk of monitoring.

To include the risk involved in MA in the theoretical framework we distinguish between the risk associated with conducting training and the risk of monitoring the combat effectiveness of the local units. The recent example of the EU border assistance program in Libya illustrates why we need to make this distinction. Training took place in EU member states and onboard European ships to reduce the risk to EU trainers. However, EU trainers were not allowed to assist the newly-trained units or monitor their improvements in Libya (Loschi, Raineri, & Strazzari, 2018, pp. 6–9). Monitoring trained units in advise and assist missions is a way for SOFs to limit the information asymmetry. By watching and interacting with units planning and carrying out missions in high-risk areas, SOFs can build an informed picture of what tasks the local elite forces normally perform. Reducing the risk of conducting training is, therefore, likely to be much easier than lowering the risk of advise and assist missions in the most dangerous parts of the recipient state. The perception of risks involved in training and monitoring local units goes into the decision-making process, which weights the perceived national interests against the perceived risk and cost involved.

In contrast, this paper takes the risk involved in monitoring the local state as its starting point and considers the mitigation of information asymmetry less of a practical obstacle and more of an analytical question of why donor states choose a certain risk profile in MA missions. MA missions are essentially missions of choice, which means that the donor state has to decide where and how to provide MA in order to make the greatest improvement of its own security. Some threats are more easily associated with a certain geographical area, such as the Russian intervention in states formerly part of the Soviet Union, and some donor states might prioritize certain areas for historic reasons, such as France and its former African colonies (Chivvis, 2016, p. 172ff). However, in relation to other threats, such as the one stemming from Al Qaeda, geography becomes a less defining feature, and the argument that MA in, say, Somalia or Mali reduces the terrorist threat in the donor state is not self-explanatory. Therefore, other political priorities, such as signaling political commitment to NATO and especially the United States, become important. This was arguably the case in Afghanistan, where many European states used SOF-provided MA as a bargaining chip to gain favors at home from the United States (Matlary & Petersson, 2013, pp. 6–7). Finally, in some cases the choice of a local partner is not discussed at the political level, but made by bureaucratic agencies who have an interest in fostering international cooperation by participating in multinational missions and exercises. Besides the great powers of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, small Western states rely on international cooperation for access to knowledge, materiel, and logistics. Therefore, we need to nuance our concept of national interests in order to understand the different drivers of SOF-provided MA.

When key decision-makers perceive an MA mission as one of a vital national interest, they accept great risks on behalf of the involved personnel. Vital national interest is understood as addressing direct threats to the security of the donor state or its population. After 9/11 MA missions to build the Afghan security forces had strong political support among decision-makers in the United States, and military planners could take a great risk when deploying trainers in Southern Afghanistan and operating with local units. Members of the government or even the head of state are most likely involved in or even initiate MA missions, if they perceive MA to be a way to counter the strategic threat. Having stout political support, military planners are free to plan missions that entail great risk to the personnel involved. On the other hand, strong political interest in the mission also puts a premium on the observable output of the MA mission. Therefore, planners must consider ways to monitor the local forces with a view to measuring the output and outcome of MA. Measuring only observable output, such as the number of soldiers trained, is a poor substitute for an assessment of the MA's contribution to improving the efficiency of the local forces on the battlefield (Blanken & Lepore, 2015, pp. 7–8). We would expect a vital national interest in the outcome of the local conflict to result in high-risk acceptance when monitoring local units and either improved efficiency of the local force or the donor state's knowledge of its failure.

In most cases, MA missions are not strongly tied to vital national interests, but driven by other strategic interests such as keeping a close relationship to allies or ensuring stability and economic interests, for example access to oil or anti-piracy, which we in short term the alliance/stability driver.[2] Even when economic interests are at stake, simply demonstrating resolve and commitment might be the primary objective to galvanize an international coalition such as the one in East Africa increasing the local capacity to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. In fact, when less than a vital national interest is at stake, many small states rationally contribute to coalition conflict management or conflict prevention. The rationale is to gain prestige among great powers, which can be converted

into influence, access, or even material benefits to further their vital national interests (Jakobsen, Ringsmose, & Saxi, 2018). The focus on secondary effects of military engagements is driven by elites made up of politicians and civil servants who share the vision of focusing on "forces for status" rather than "forces for good", meaning that the outcome of the efforts of the expeditionary forces in the actual theater was of secondary importance (Grænger, 2015). In principle, when providing MA based on alliance/stability interests *where* to engage is not settled a priori, as alliance considerations might take the donor states to unexpected regions with little intrinsic strategic value to them. On the other hand, the driver behind the engagement is likely to determine *how* to engage in MA in terms of risk aversion. If the purpose is to demonstrate a commitment to allies, the donor state might be willing to provide training in places that expose trainers to physical danger in order to demonstrate whole-hearted commitment. However, improving the local capacity or monitoring the outcome of the MA effort would be a lesser concern, because the primary purpose is not to change the outcome of the conflict in the receiving state. Therefore, we expect little risk-taking in terms of monitoring local units in the most dangerous areas.

Finally, MA missions might be driven by bureaucratic interests among the military or the civil servants in ministries involved in foreign and defense policies. They are likely to share an understanding of the direction of the foreign policy, grand strategy, or even theater strategy, as long as politicians have supported the policy for some time (Kitchen, 2010, p. 141ff). MA missions intended to prevent instability and conflict are likely to be open-ended engagements, as the fundamental character of the receiving state only changes slowly, if at all. Under such circumstances civil servants and bureaucrats within the military are likely to make the decisions of where and how to provide MA. However, if decisions are made below the political level and not as part of an engagement based on vital or alliance/stability security interests, we would expect them to involve few risks. If the purpose is to continue long-term commitments, take part in international military cooperation, or acquire new tactical skills, the decision-makers are unlikely to accept risks as part of the training or as part of the monitoring of the local units. Any fall-outs in terms of casualties, hostage taking, or partaking in war crimes are likely to generate a highly negative reaction from the political level and the population, because neither perceives the engagement as vital to the state's security. Table 1 summarizes the three possible drivers behind MA engagements.

TABLE 1
Three Drivers of Small State Donor MA and Their Expected Risk Profiles and Outcomes

Drivers behind MA	*Expected willingness to accept risks when conducting training*	*Expected willingness to accept risks when gathering information about the recipient's unit*	*Expected outcome*
Vital national interest-driven	High	High	Improved military efficiency of the local unit or donor knowledge of failure
Alliance- & stability-driven	Medium	Low	Improved military efficiency depends on external factors
Bureaucracy-driven	Low	Low	Improved military efficiency depends on external factors

We now have a more nuanced theoretical understanding of the circumstances under which donor states are likely to overcome information asymmetry and, thereby, increase the chances that MA improves the efficiency of the local units. Also, we are better able to explain the outcomes of multinational MA missions, because we can account for the variety of drivers behind each of the contributing states' engagement. Especially, this theoretical addition explains the meager outcomes of multinational MA, when few donor states are primarily concerned about improving the efficiency of the local units.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To demonstrate the claimed relation between interests, risk aversion, and outcome, we must consider how to measure the variables. Moreover, we need to consider the relevant empirical object and method for examining the provision of MA. One of the main observable differences between vital interest-, alliance and stability-, and bureaucracy-driven MA missions is the decision-making process. First, key political decision-makers are likely to initiate and be involved in decisions concerning vital national interests, whereas alliance and stability interests are more likely to be defined by civil servants and the political levels together, as the interests involved might not be as easily definable or might compete with other interests for attention. Obviously, bureaucracy-driven decisions are primarily made among civil servants and the military bureaucracy with only nominal political involvement. Second, the way decision-makers perceive the cost and benefit of the mission also provides an indication of the involved interests. Vital national interests are likely to be involved, if the donor state is willing to tolerate high costs, economically or even in casualties, and/or the donor state considers the mission to be of high value. Third, the way political and administrative levels interact to assess cost and benefit and determine the national interests involved provides an indication of the perceptions of the decision-makers.

Using the concept of risk entails that we can calculate the chance of negative outcomes of the activity, and decision-makers are able to consider that risk during the planning process (Knight, 1921, pp. 22–48). Each instance of ambush or green-on-blue shootings are obviously unpredictable, but over time, decision-makers are able to identify the frequency of such incidents in a state or region within that state. In accordance with the theoretical contribution, two elements are important to operationalize. First, an examination must look into the perceived risk of providing the training, which is rather straightforward understood as the perceived risk of taking casualties due to insider attacks or attacks on the training facility. Training facilities are often used continuously over years, and even though the risk of attacks might suddenly increase, the decision-makers can make a fairly accurate prediction of the risk associated with deploying trainers to those facilities. Second, an examination must consider the perceived risk of monitoring local units, which is a little more complicated to calculate. Advising and assisting in addition to training is mostly relevant in combat areas, though the perceived risk varies among combat areas. Moreover, the donor state might use intelligence resources to monitor the local units or the government to detect misuse of the trained units, which we cannot track due to the covert nature of such activities. However, the decision-makers must take into consideration the risk to intelligence personnel as well as the potential of political crises if the partner state reveals the surveillance. Even though uncertainty plays

a larger role in areas with enemy contact and with the enemy seeking to achieve surprise, previous activities provide a strong basis for calculating the risk (Blanken, 2012, p. 285).

In measuring military efficiency, this paper uses a subset of the conceptual work on military effectiveness made by Stanley and Brooks (ed.). They define military effectiveness as the ability to create military power from a state's basic resources in wealth, technology, population, size, and human capital, which can be measured on four dimensions of integration of military activities, responsiveness to constraints, human skills, and quality of the materiel (Stanley & Brooks, 2007, p. 9ff). We concern ourselves with the integration of trained special or elite forces into the military strategy to target the common threat to the receiving and donor states and the improvement in the tactical skills of the trained units. Because of this selective use of the concept, the term efficiency seems more appropriate than effectiveness, as the ability to win battles also depends on material and domestic constraints. Moreover, we cannot realistically measure lasting outcomes of the training in such a short time frame. Therefore, the most observable indicator is the initiatives taken by the local states in relation to the training to ensure that the participating units improve their tactical skills.

This paper is based on a single-case study of Danish MA in Cameroon in 2016–2017. The purpose of the case is to illustrate the connection between the donor state's interests and risk aversion. Until now, Denmark has generally been among the most risk-taking European states in international missions. Based on this prior behavior, finding risk-averse behavior in the Danish case when the MA-engagement is driven by alliance/stability concerns or bureaucracy would raise the probability that other small states would be risk-averse in such engagements (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 96–99). Empirically, the following analysis is based on data generated in connection with observational fieldwork done in Cameroon in March 2017, which included access to actors involved in the decision-making process as well as to documents. Unless a reference is made to a source, the information in this analysis was obtained from the fieldwork or conversations with decision-makers.

A BUREAUCRACY-DRIVEN, LOW-RISK DANISH PARTICIPATION IN WEST AFRICA

Since 2015 Denmark has contributed to two U.S.-led regional exercises in West Africa. Both exercises are yearly, month-long exercises with the dual purpose of providing MA to the African participants as well as improving regional cooperation. Flintlock takes place in the Sahel region south of Sahara as well as in a number of West African states. Since 2015 the Danish Jaeger Corps has provided trainers for the exercise that focuses on improving land warfare SOF skills and light infantry tactics. Since 2016 trainers from the Danish Frogman Corps have contributed to the maritime exercise Obangame Express, which focuses on maritime SOF operations. More specifically, the Danish trainers have trained operators from the Cameroonian Presidential Guard, *Brigade Intervention Rapid* (B.I.R), the Cameroonian *Compagnie des Palmeurs et Nageurs de Combat* (COPALCO), and the Nigerian Special Boat Service (SBS). In addition, since 2017 the Frogman Corps has expanded its MA program in Cameroon through the provision of a combat swimmer and boarding program for COPALCO that has taken place periodically during the year. The Frogman Corps and the Danish Special Operations Command (SOCOM) developed this program as a contribution to a broader training initiative by the U.S. Marine Corps (Henningsen, 2017). The Danish engagements in Cameroon

and Nigeria are largely unconnected to other Danish international operations, such as Mali or Iraq, which begs the question of how the engagement came about, what the decision-makers perceived as the cost and benefit of participating, as well as how the bureaucratic and policy levels interacted.

Two explanations of the Danish engagement are possible, namely that either bureaucratic or alliance/stability interests were the drivers. Nothing suggests that the Danish engagement was vital national interest-driven. There was no political pressure from the Minister of Defense or the Danish Parliament. Moreover, the so-called Taksøe Report commissioned by Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the Danish Prime Minister, identified West Africa as a region with limited strategic value to Denmark (Taksøe, 2016). One likely driver was the policy level of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where civil servants took considerable interest in initiatives aimed at carrying out the policy prescriptions in the two strategic publications "Denmark's Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World" and "Strategy for the Danish Measures Against Piracy and Armed Robbery". A second likely driver was the Danish SOCOM, newly established in 2014, which was eager to increase the utility of the Danish SOFs by using them for new purposes, such as preventive engagement to increase stability in fragile states. Conversations with actors involved in the decision-making process support the argument that SOCOM took the initiative and acted as a policy entrepreneur that successfully gained support among the higher authorities through consultations.

A look at the perceived value and cost of conducting episodic MA in West Africa supports the argument that the Danish engagement was bureaucracy-driven. The success of SOCOM rested on the advantageous cost-benefit calculus of the initiative. In economic terms, the cost of the project was minimal, as operating within the established training setup of the United States Africa Command reduced the cost. Bureaucratically, the low-cost option was important for gaining support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Most Danish stabilization initiatives in fragile states have to be financed by the so-called Peace and Stabilization Fund, which has a fixed yearly budget. The low cost of the project meant that the civil servants in the steering committee had few concerns about providing funding. Moreover, SOCOM decided to finance part of the Danish participation through the budget of the Jaeger Corps, which may have reduced resistance to the project further.

The benefits of participation were threefold. Tactically, the Danish SOFs became familiar with providing MA in a more independent role, because the two corps were involved in identifying their partner units and responsible for logistics. Operationally, SOCOM expanded its knowledge of West Africa supplementing the experience gained from the deployment of the Jaeger Corps to the UN mission in Mali in 2016. More importantly, SOCOM advanced its access to the global network of SOF units, which the United States Special Operations Command has been promoting to foster cooperation not only between the United States and its partners, but also among the partners. The Danish SOCOM and its Dutch and Belgian counterparts are in the process of establishing a tri-lateral Special Operations Component Command, and Danish participation in Flintlock and Obangame Express together with Dutch trainers furthered the cooperation at the tactical and operational levels. At the strategic level the yearly engagement in West Africa provided the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with activities that brought to life what was intended in the above mentioned strategic publication on anti-piracy and stabilization of fragile states. All in all, the very low cost and the benefits of fostering

cooperation as well as trying out new tactical and operational concepts made the engagement possible, even with few apparent political interests.

Another key to why Danish MA in West Africa was feasible, despite the lack of political pressure, is the legal distinction between international missions, on the one hand, and mundane training, exercises, or exchange programs, on the other. The former requires parliamentary approval, while civil servants and the military bureaucracy have considerable latitude to plan and finance the latter, as long as the overall budget can cover the cost. Legal differences aside, the decision-making process in relation to MA in West Africa also reflects the new character of MA taking place outside conflict zones where Danish combat troops are involved. Obviously, international missions that include Danish combat troops receive much more political attention than international deployments in regions with low levels of risk. Instead, the military bureaucracy in the command structure interacted with the policy level at the Ministry of Defense as well as in the steering committee that administered the Peace and Stabilization Fund. The fact that MA in West Africa received relatively little attention at the political level, in spite of the initiative breaking new ground in terms of mission type and regional focus, is most likely a reflection of its bureaucracy-driven character.

The initiative to use Danish SOFs as trainers in West Africa as a means in the Danish anti-piracy and stabilization strategies came from the military bureaucracy, but found support from civil servants with the authority to approve and finance the initiative. The advantage of this arrangement was the flexibility and speed of the decision-making process as well as the opportunity to experiment with a new mission type in an established setup provided by U.S. Africa Command. However, when we consider the initiative in the light of our theoretical model, we would expect the Danish risk-taking to be low in terms of the risk to Danish trainers and the willingness to get in-depth knowledge of the operational use of the local units. Moreover, we would expect the low risk-taking to result in very little improvement in the military efficiency of the local units, even though this is difficult to measure in such a short time frame.

How Willing Was Denmark to Accept Risk?

In 2016 and 2017 the Danish trainers were stationed in Cameroon and mostly trained Cameroonian units. To understand the risk involved in expanding Danish knowledge of the local force in order to improve the efficiency of MA, we need to examine the level of risk in the training areas as well as in the areas in which the Cameroonian units operated. Threats and risks were unevenly distributed in Cameroon. In the North the inaccessible terrain allowed Boko Haram to operate in the border region between Nigeria and Cameroon. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project database, in the period 2014–2017 the Cameroonian security forces clashed at least 178 times with Boko Haram in the North resulting in at least 1,193 casualties (Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, & Karlsen, 2010). In contrast, the southern regions of Cameroon, where the largest and wealthiest part of the population lived, saw comparatively little violence. Still, President Paul Biya oppressed and intimidated the English-speaking tribes in the southernmost parts of Cameroon, which escalated in 2016 and 2017, when leaders were arrested, access to the Internet was cut, and oppression by the security forces in the affected areas increased (International Crisis Group, 2017). Finally, piracy was mostly unrelated to the political conflicts in Cameroon, as criminals from Cameroon or Nigeria robbed or hijacked commercial vessels in the Gulf of Guinea (Vervaeke, 2017). The Danish training – as well as

most activities in relation to the two exercises – took place in the southern regions and, thus, involved fewer risks than training in the northern regions. In sum, the distribution of risk in Cameroon was highly uneven, as in most states in Central and West Africa, and the training took place in low-risk regions.

Being situated far from the high-risk areas and with no advise and assist role, Danish as well as other Western SOF trainers had to rely on their own adaptive skills to tailor-make the training. During the exercises the Jaeger Corps conducted training in subjects relevant to SOFs, but also in light infantry tactics in general, such as combat patrols, jungle training, close quarter combat, marksmanship, and medical aid. During Obangame Express the Frogman Corps taught the same general purpose subjects, but added elements relevant to maritime operations, such as boarding and over-the-beach insertion of patrols. However, in both Flintlock and Obangame Express the training culminated in week-long exercises for local units only based on scenarios with an opponent broadly simulating Boko Haram, with the addition of a coastal threat. Despite the added realism at the end of the two exercises, the training generally focused on increasing the tactical proficiency of the individual soldiers, rather than the unit, and only to a limited extent on problems encountered by local forces in relation to piracy or Boko Haram. Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for this was the local focus on highly demanding, but rarely used tactical skills such as fast-roping from helicopters. Also, the African states did not specify the number of soldiers in the exercises, their proficiency, or operational experience. Without local inputs as to the actual tactical deficiencies or problems encountered during missions, the Danish trainers were left with little knowledge for developing tailor-made training. Without an advise and assist role, the Danish operators had to rely on their general SOF skills of being adaptive and able to relate to the local soldiers, but they had little chance of relating their observations to the threat environment in which the local soldiers operated when deployed in Northern Cameroon or Nigeria. In the case of COPALCO, which the Frogman Corps trained three times a year, the training was based on an identified need for basic combat swimming skills and boarding. No doubt that training is relevant for a unit operating in the maritime element, but the Danish trainers were unable to relate that specific training to the unit's general tactical behavior or needs, because no advise and assist role existed.

We might argue that the relatively risk-adverse training in Cameroon was simply an outlier that does not reflect the Danish risk-taking when deploying SOFs. In 2016–2017 Danish SOF units were deployed in some of the most dangerous mission areas in the world. The Jaeger Corps conducted special reconnaissance in Northern Mali as part of the United Nation Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA), which had become one of the deadliest UN missions. Moreover, the Jaeger Corps and the Frogman Corps conducted MA in Iraq, training, advising, and assisting the al-Furat Sunni militia in Western Iraq, and even got the approval of the Danish Parliament to operate in Eastern Syria, even though the actual operational pattern of the Danish SOFs remains classified (Klarskov, 2017). The examples show that the Danish politicians remain willing to accept risk when deploying SOFs, even in the MA role as in Iraq. However, we argue that the difference lies in what drove the two deployments. In the case of Mali, Denmark might not have had vital national interests in the mission, still, Denmark put considerable efforts into making the UN-appointed General Michael Lollesgaard force commander of MINUSMA by promising to make a considerable contribution to the 10,000-strong force (Brøndum, 2015). The deployment of the Jaeger Corps was, thus, driven by alliance/stability interests, as Denmark needed to make the deployment to

maintain its international credibility in the UN system as well as among other European states contributing significantly to the operation, including Sweden and the Netherlands. In the case of Iraq, the Islamic State represented a direct threat to Denmark through its extensive use of terror in Europe, including Denmark, and it contributed to the huge inflow of refugees that became a politically sensitive topic in the political debate. Danish politicians publicly expressed their concern about the Islamic State, its possible expansion, as well as its connection to terrorism in Europe, and little debate ensued about broadening the mission area to Syria (Folketinget, 2016). All in all, Denmark took more risks in other theaters, but Cameroon is not so much an outlier as an example of a deployment driven by bureaucratic rather than vital national interests or alliance/stability interests.

Unwillingness to advise and assist in more risky regions was most apparent in relation to BIR. BIR was a large unit of 7,000 men operating across Cameroon in at least three different missions. From the perspective of President Biya, its most important mission was to act as the presidential guard suppressing political opponents and protecting the President against coups (International Crisis Group, 2014). BIR had allowed the President to survive the factional politics and maintain power since 1982, despite his limited power base. Denmark did not have an embassy in Cameroon, and full understanding of the political use of BIR would most likely have had to come from Western partners. Since 2013 the second mission of BIR was to confront the growing threat from Boko Haram. Gaining knowledge about the operational and strategic conditions of the BIR units in Northern Cameroon would either have necessitated a deployment of Danish observers in Northern Cameroon or a substantial intelligence effort to gather information. Moreover, Cameroon's problem in the fight against Boko Haram has primarily been to integrate the efforts of BIR and the regular forces and to follow military action by civilian initiatives in the impoverished provinces in Northern Cameroon (Powell, 2015; Tull, 2015). The third mission of BIR was to act as the main coastguard. It remains unclear, though, to what extent the coastguard units actually pursued pirates in the Gulf of Guinea or were limited to countering the widespread smuggling between Cameroon and its neighboring states. These examples of the very different tasks of BIR illustrate the difficulty for the Danish armed forces, intelligence, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to figure out the political and strategic contexts in which local forces operate as well as the considerable degree of risk willingness and efforts included.

However, when evaluating the Danish risk willingness, several caveats must be discussed. First, obviously, the nature and extent of the Danish intelligence initiatives are classified and might have mitigated some of the information asymmetries between Danish trainers and planners and local forces. Second, being part of initiatives taken by the United States, all local units had been vetted according to the Leahy legislation. This legislation mandates that only units without any known gross violations of human rights can be trained by U.S. forces. However, vetting in accordance with the Leahy legislation leaves out considerations of the political use of units and whether the units actually perform missions to the extent they claim (McNerney, Blank, Wasser, Boback, & Stephenson, 2017). A final counter-argument against the proposition that Denmark is not willing to run a risk to improve the military outcome of the MA is the step up of the training of COPALCO with several training sessions outside the scope of the regional exercises. Moreover, several sources within the military bureaucracy and at the policy level expressed willingness to train the Nigerian SBS in Nigeria in the future if the strategic effects of the MA were higher. If the training was to take place near the Niger Delta and the low-level insurgency in the region, Danish trainers would be subject to increased risk in

the training areas. Nevertheless, the engagement remains limited in time and scope, and even an engagement in Nigeria could be managed with a relatively low-risk profile, if the engagement used existing frameworks for cooperation, such as those established by the United Kingdom and the United States (Lunn & Harari, 2017, p. 10).

Our theoretical assumption was that a bureaucracy-driven MA mission would focus on reducing the risks involved in training and put little effort into overcoming the information asymmetry between the donor state and the local state. In general, the Danish engagement in Cameroon supports the theoretical assumption, albeit the Danish planners benefited from being part of a U.S.-led setup to overcome the information asymmetry. Moreover, we should primarily consider the Danish case an illustration of the importance of the involved interests of the donor state. The Danish case is unique in the sense that the engagement was in an initial phase and also served the purpose of getting experience with MA as a preventive and stabilizing tool. Before we consider the Danish case in the larger picture of the motives driving Western MA, we will briefly look at the improvement in the local military efficiency as a result of the Danish training efforts.

MORE EFFICIENT ANTI-PIRACY OR COUNTER-INSURGENCY?

Theoretically, we would assume that the Danish training efforts had little effect on the efficiency of the Cameroonian and Nigerian forces having taken few risks to reduce the information asymmetry. But measurement problems are abundant when trying to disaggregate the overall improvements in the units into the particular effort of one donor state when the same units have trained with other donor states as well as with, for example, trainers from the United States military throughout the year. Therefore, we turn to the more feasible question raised earlier concerning the efforts made by local units or the higher-ranking military bureaucracy to ensure maximum yield of the received training. Considerable variation existed among the three units. BIR did not submit whole units to improve their ability to cooperate, and Danish trainers estimated that the BIR soldiers were relatively inexperienced, which indicates that BIR considered international MA as an alternative, cheap way to improve the basic skill level of its inexperienced soldiers. COPALCO soldiers trained as a unit and most likely improved their skills during the exercise. The only drawback was the lack of sufficient training equipment for the unit, which indicates that they might not be sufficiently supported by the armed forces. However, the Nigerian SBS unit took the most whole-hearted approach to improving its soldiers' skills. Only seasoned, noncommissioned officers participated, and they were responsible for conducting similar training of other SBS soldiers in Nigeria once the exercises ended. Moreover, Flotilla Admiral Michaels, the commander of the unit, stayed with the participants for several days of the exercises.

No data exist for assessing the way the units were integrated into the overall military strategy in Cameroon or Nigeria. Danish authorities might have access to intelligence on the role played by the three units, but the Danish SOF units were deployed in a way that did not allow them to monitor how the units were integrated. However, this should not be considered a critique of the efforts of the individual operators or the planning of the Danish military bureaucracy. Rather it illustrates the difficulties of providing efficient MA as a preventive tool, because strong political support for risk-taking behavior is unlikely to be manifest when the threat is still not directly linked to the donor state.

DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This article has argued that the PA perspective on SOF-provided MA benefits from taking into account the drivers behind the donor states' engagement in order to understand the risk-taking and, consequently, the efficiency of SOF-provided MA. Generally, since 2001 small Western states have provided MA in states in which they have no vital national interests. Most of the MA missions have been conducted in support of a U.S. military mission or as part of U.S.-led preventive initiatives. As a result, the small states have generally exhibited a lower degree of risk-taking than their American counterpart. We have argued that alliance/stability or bureaucratic interests in access to an international SOF network, experience with preventive MA, or gaining goodwill drove many of the small states' engagements, as illustrated by the Danish participation in exercises Flintlock and Obangame Express. The result is either MA conducted in low-risk training areas and with little monitoring of the local units or MA conducted in high-risk training areas, but with little care for improvements in the military efficiency of the local unit. It appears that a dilemma exists when providing preventive stabilization. On the one hand, low-profile, small-scale, long-term missions in potentially unstable states offer smart ways of avoiding larger, more damaging conflicts, as long as the training efforts are supplemented by strict conditionality and monitoring of the receiving state. On the other hand, the discrete nature of SOF-provided MA and the lack of visible threats make it unlikely that political decision-makers perceive the missions as a vital national interest, which in turn makes high-risk monitoring of local units vulnerable to casualties or hostage taking. Although this dilemma might never be solved, it deserves attention when discussing the potential of SOF-provided MA.

However, this might be a specific European observation; it might be specific to certain states; or it might even be an outdated conclusion. Almost two decades into the war on terror most Western states have routinely deployed SOF units and accepted the associated risk. In the case of the United States, you might argue that SOF deployment has become so permanent that SOF units stand outside the debate about "boots on the ground" and casualties, and decision-makers and the United States' public consider them a highly professional force with a known and accepted risk associated with the job. The counter-argument has merits in the cases of the United States and France, who also permanently deploy her SOF units in harm's way. However, the limited SOF resources of the other small states spur internal debates about interests, risks, and strategic utility that are likely to lead to risk-averse behavior in some missions. One way for decision-makers within the United States to leverage this difference is to take into consideration the small states' areas of interest. What stands out from the previously mentioned deaths of four U.S. servicemen in Niger is perhaps not so much the public debate afterward, but the fact that since 1994 the United States has deployed thousands of SOFs, drone operators, trainers from the regular forces, and intelligence personnel in Africa with only five casualties (Lewis & Bavier, 2017). One explanation is that the United States has partnered with risk-taking allies such as France and Ethiopia, both of which have accepted casualties and proved risk-taking when monitoring local states in Somalia and the Sahel region. In this light, when asking for contributions to SOF MA missions the United States might take into consideration the national interests of its smaller allies to ensure the highest achievable risk-taking among them. One example might be the connection between instability in the Sahel region and North Africa and the flow of migrants to Europe. Traditionally risk-averse states, such as

Germany and Italy, are now training a regional quick-reaction force in the Sahel because of the political ramifications of the large inflow of migrants. Vital national or alliance/stability interests are a necessary condition for effective SOF-provided MA.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

NOTES

1. European SOF units have participated in activities that serve the dual purpose of military assistance and exercises in regional cooperation, such as Flintlock in the Sahel region, Obangame Express in coastal states along the Atlantic Ocean, and Cutlass Express in East Africa.
2. This paper builds on the work of neoclassical realism that considers national interests to be the political and bureaucratic decision-makers' perception of the international distribution of power (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016). Moreover, the theory assigns weight to the work done in foreign policy and security bureaucracy to interpret the security interests of the state, which shape the choices of the political decision-makers (Kitchen, 2010). Arguably, risk-taking also depends on strategic culture, and large and some capable powers such as Germany and Japan are highly risk-averse for historic reasons. However, we consider strategic culture imbued in the way decision-makers and bureaucrats perceive their national interests (Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 66ff).

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Special Operations Forces' Role in Political Warfare

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Great-power competition is once again the primary threat to the security of the United States. This is reminiscent of the political warfare between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, in which both sides sought to use political warfare to counter the other's influence and expand their own. US embassies around the world were on the front lines of this irregular warfare struggle. Today's modern operational environment is far more complex, with sub-state and non-governmental groups being just as influential as government organizations. US country teams with the responsibility to understand the political warfare challenges against the US lack the capacity to engage all the relevant groups. Special Operations Forces (SOF), as political warfare experts, must act as an extension of the US country teams. SOF teams using the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) model can extend a US country team's influence far beyond the host nation's capital. The twentieth century has many examples of small teams, with local understanding and strong local partnerships designing and implementing tactical political warfare activities which had a strategic effect. This article will examine some of these examples to demonstrate the role that modern US SOF teams can play to support US country teams.

Keywords: political warfare, SOF, country teams, DIME

INTRODUCTION

Great power competition is not new as the maneuvering of nation-states to gain an advantage for themselves at the expense of their adversaries is as old as the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia (as cited in Kissinger, 2014, pp. 6–7). But the recent reemergence of nations that actively seek to disrupt the rules-based global order as a way to advance their authoritarian and malign activities has become the most prevalent security challenge in the United States ("Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy"). This is reminiscent of the post–World War II "cold war" in which the Soviet Union (USSR) and the US employed a variety of tools to counter the other's influence and disrupt its alliances while avoiding major armed combat. Conflict of this type was termed "political warfare" by Ambassador George Kennan in 1946 during his posting at the US Embassy in Moscow. Ambassador Keenan observed that the USSR sought to expand its own power and limit US influence but had neither the resources nor the will to engage in a new world war. Instead, the USSR employed propaganda, subversion, military posturing, shows of force, and diplomatic and economic coercion to expand its own influence (Kennan, 1948).

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In today's operational environment (OE), the reemergence of great power competition is more complex with the addition of other state actors as well as nonstate and substate actors and organizations that have their own power and influence (Joint Operational Environment 2035, 2016). Modern technology and global conductivity allow even relatively small groups the ability to have a global impact (Friedman, 2000, pp. 6, 128). Thus, tactical actions with local organizations at the substate level can be just as important as nation-to-nation engagements. The DIME model (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) formerly used to describe the menu of state to state tools must now be used to describe the tools to engage organizations at the sub-state level as well.

In this context, many US Country Teams—the collection of US Government (USG) agencies within a US Embassy responsible for US foreign policy—are often unable to extend their engagement beyond a host nation's capital. The role of understanding and defending against political warfare at the substate level is left void. This is the role that Special Operations Forces (SOF) must play, as experts in political warfare, to extend the US Country Team's reach beyond the national capital and below national-level organizations (Madden et al., 2016).

SOF are organized and trained to build local partnerships, understand both the US Interagency and the local environment, and how to work in politically sensitive areas with little external support. Moreover, they know how to plan, synchronize, and execute tactical actions that have a strategic effect and are thus tailor-made to be the action arm of US Country Teams to conduct political warfare (Department of the Army, ADRP 3-05, 2012, p. 9). This is not a new concept, as SOF forces have a long history of supporting US Country Teams, from support to Colombia's counterinsurgency to Indonesia's counter-terrorism efforts but in this new OE, the integration of SOF and USG agencies must take on a more central role (Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, 2018).

This article will examine four historical examples, using the DIME model, in which organizations seeking to shape the operational environment built local partnerships and conduct tactical activities that had a strategic impact (Gray, 2015). Although these examples are not SOF specific, they are intended to demonstrate the strategic impact that small teams with local partners can have to shape a political warfare environment.

GREAT POWER COMPETITION

"For centuries, the struggle among great powers for influence, wealth, security, status, and honor had been the main source of conflict and war (Kagan, 2008, loc. 114)." This competition shifted to a bipolar conflict between the two superpowers that briefly subsided with the conclusion of the cold war. Today, a "new configuration of powers is reshaping the international order (Kagan, 2008, loc. 126)." Great powers seek to disrupt the international order to distract and disrupt the US and its allies in order to empower their own authoritarian and nefarious activities (Joint Operational Environment 2035, 2016).

According to the US National Defense Strategy, "The central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long term strategic competition. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with the authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions ("Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy," p. 2)." These revisionist powers seek to distract and disrupt

US activities and weaken US alliances in order to create more freedom of movement and legitimacy for their authoritarian model.

This competition is and will continue to be a type of irregular warfare, as most states and nonstate organizations seek to avoid military clashes with the US (Jones, 2018, pp. 1–15). However, competition between great powers does not mean the competition actions are only at the national level; instead, great power surrogates and allies utilizing modern technology can be extremely effective at the local level … Great power adversaries can work through these surrogates and substate organizations either directly or indirectly to create instability and weaken international alliances Stability in Multi-Domain Battle, 2018). Seth Jones, a political scientist with the Rand Corporation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes,

> The future of conflict means that the United States needs to prepare to compete with these states not primarily with divisions, aircraft carriers and strategic bombers—but by, with, and through state and non-state proxies, cyber tools, and overt and covert information campaigns. At the moment, however, the United States is ill-prepared for irregular competition. (Jones, 2018, p. 4)

Other experts agree that the future competition and conflict that will confront the US is a complex mixture of state and nonstate actors (Lamb & Gregg, 2016). A recent US Army War College publication agrees:

> In this volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment, where gray zone warfare is increasingly the norm, the U.S. Government must become better at defeating its adversaries using superior non-kinetic tactics … . The U.S. Government no longer has the luxury to work in stovepipes: it is imperative that it works more collectively. (Troeder, 2019, p. 22)

POLITICAL WARFARE AND SOF

The 1958 book *The Ugly American* (Lederer & Burdick, 1958) describes communist political warfare in the fictitious country of Sarkan. Some tactics included rebranding rice donated by the US to instead give the credit to the Soviet Union, and the engineering of sexual misconduct accusations against a US businessman working on a development program, resulting in the loss of USG influence The lessons of that book reflect the sophistication of the Soviet political warfare machine, its skill in using local surrogates, and the lack of US understanding of those same tools.

This observation was shared by Ambassador George Kennan when he first articulated the concept of political warfare while assigned to the US Embassy in Moscow just after World War II. He observed that the Soviet Union wanted to expand its influence and control but lacked the resources and capability to fight a new world war. Instead, it relied on tactics to weaken the US and its allies short of war. According to Kennan:

> Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in the time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP)[1], and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states. (Kennan, 1948)

Political Warfare in Italy

One of the first political warfare challenges the US faced was in Italy during its 1948 parliamentary elections. The postwar centrist government, the Christian Democrats (DC), was challenged by a communist coalition, the Popular Democratic Front (FDP). The Soviet Union was funding the FDP election and working to subvert the legitimacy of the pro-US government (Mistry, 2014, loc. 3074). The USG believed that Italian stability was central to European stability, and a shift of Italy to the Soviet bloc would spell disaster for the Marshal Plan (Mistry, 2014, loc. 1641). To counter Soviet political warfare activities, the US Country Team funded books, articles, and campaign activities to support the DC and to undermine the popularity of the FDP (Mistry, 2014, loc. 390–3096, 3124–3191). It also enlisted the Catholic Church to call for parishioners to support the DC and reject communism, and built partnerships with labor groups and businesses to build support of the DC (Mistry, 2014, loc. 2362). The US Country Team was successful, and the DC party won a majority in both houses of the Italian parliament, keeping Italy within the Marshal Plan. In the end the US Country Team was successful due to a better understanding of location conductions and a persistent presence of advisers who were able to build and maintain local partnerships (Mistry, 2014, loc. 4798–4799).

Today, political warfare remains the method used by US adversaries seeking to distract and disrupt the US and its allies. US Country Teams are responsible for implementing US foreign policy, including understanding and defending against political warfare. Diplomacy and engagement are essential; however, the complexity of today's operational environment and the sheer number of organizations that require engagement make this task beyond the capabilities of most US country teams (Haas, 2017, pp. 287–288). This is a role for SOF teams: to act as an extension of US Country Teams to engage local actors in support of US foreign policy. SOF are trained and equipped to build local partnerships, understand the local context and culture, and to operate effectively in austere and politically sensitive environments.

SOF teams working with local partners conducting tactical activities can have a strategic impact and shape the operational environment. Just as the US Country Team was successful in Italy—using local understanding and building local networks—SOF teams can and do the exact same thing. We will examine four cases in which small teams working with local partners did just that.

SMALL TEAMS, LOCAL PARTNERS, AND STRATEGIC EFFECTS: FOUR EXAMPLES

a) Diplomatic. The Siliwangi Division, Central Java, 1960s

"The Struggle for the de facto Authority of the Republic Must Become a Struggle for the de facto Village Administration." —General Abdul Nasution, Indonesian Armed Forces

The East Indies existed as a colony of the Netherlands from about 1615 to 1942 when Dutch colonial forces were defeated by the Japanese Imperial Army (Owen, 2005). Upon the Japanese defeat at the end of World War II, the Dutch Army returned to its former colony to attempt to regain control. What followed was a four-year fight for independence, with the new nation of Indonesia gaining its freedom from the Netherlands in December 1949. During the struggle, a well-organized secular guerrilla movement was formed to resist the Dutch, and an equally well-organized Islamic guerilla movement was also formed to fight the Dutch (Horikoshi, 1975). Upon independence, the

new national Government of Indonesia (GoI) was formed mostly from the secular guerilla movement, while the Islamic guerilla movement maintained several enclaves throughout the country, effectively becoming a state within a state (Kartosuwiryo, 2009). This movement became Darul Islam or "abode of God," and it was built on a network of sympathetic villages, mosques, and social organizations. They created their own civil administration, and the guerrilla fighters became their armed forces. The new GoI and its armed forces spent the next ten years attempting to use force to subdue and integrate Darul Islam into the state of Indonesia, and they were mostly unsuccessful (Nurwasis, 2009). Then in 1959, the GoI Armed Forces tried a new strategy (Parker, 1963). They employed a diplomatic approach to individual villages, engaging mayors almost as if they were independent states (which in a way they were). The military unit responsible for implementing this strategy was the Siliwangi Division, and they established the Siliwangi Institute to lead development assistance to these communities. The Siliwangi Division also assigned an individual or small team of non- commissioned officers to each village to maintain persistent engagement with the mayor and coordinate the development projects (Kilcullen, 2000, pp. 28–78).

Through this diplomatic engagement and the series of civic action projects, the Siliwangi Division gradually won over individual mayors and their communities, and Darul Islam began to lose influence (Nurwasis, 2009). As the relationship between the Siliwangi Division and the communities grew stronger, Darul Islam lost its freedom of movement and access to the population (Penders & Ulf, 1985). By 1962, Darul Islam leadership surrendered to the GOI, and their former area of control was integrated into the state of Indonesia (Soebardi, 1983).

Just as the Siliwangi Division did in 1959, today SOF teams in support of US Country Teams engage local governments to facilitate humanitarian assistance and development programs.

b) Information. Lenin and the Communist Party Vanguards
"In Order to Take Power Every Means Must be Used." —V.I. Lenin

Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better known by his alias Lenin, was a central character in the communist revolution that culminated in the overthrow of Czarist Russia and the creation of the Soviet Union in 1924, with Lenin as its first leader (Sebestyen, 2017, chapter 37). As Czarist Russia entered the 20th century, Lenin correctly assessed that popular discontent with Czar Nicholas's policies and the Russian government's lack of ability to address the population's social and economic needs made the situation ripe for revolution; however, general discontent was not enough to bring about the revolution (Lenin, 1966, loc. 114, 868). According to Lenin, "Sometimes history needs a push."

Lenin developed an Information Operations (IO) campaign that used small, specialized teams called Vanguards—small teams of dedicated and ideological reliable communists who would form the corps of workers' committees in individual factories. Vanguards were used to engage the workers at certain factories and enlist soldiers in certain military units. Lenin assessed that the manufacturing sector and the military were two essential pillars of the Czar's strength but also very vulnerable due to unrest caused by poor conditions and low pay. Using his Vanguard teams, Lenin tailored propaganda specifically for these units using newspapers, books, posters, and personal messages delivered by the Vanguards (LeBlanc, 1993, loc. 4324). Lenin also helped create and manage a nationwide newspaper called *Pravda* (meaning "truth" in Russian). He incorporated themes into *Pravda* based on the feedback of his Vanguard teams. He was able to convince factory workers to slow production and soldiers

to stay in the barracks during protests, weakening the czar's power significantly (Sebestyen, 2017, chapter 27).

Using the Vanguard to mobilize workers, Lenin was able to employ strikes, work slowdowns, protests, and riots to pressure the czar's government, combined with tailored messages to undermine the czar's legitimacy. The Vanguard teams also gave Lenin reliable information about the mood of the workers and the factory managers, allowing him to further tailor IO messages and actions (Lenin, 1966, loc. 1958, 1975). Under pressure, the czar stepped down in February 1917 and transitioned power to an interim government. Lenin continued the pressure and forced the interim government to collapse by October, clearing the way for the Communist Party under Lenin to take power. The comprehensive IO campaign allowed Lenin to degrade the czar's economic base and his legitimacy, thus leading to enough political pressure to drive the Czar out and cripple the interim government (Sebestyen, 2017, pp. 139–140, 179).

SOF teams work with local organizations to understand the local context and design specific messaging to support the broader US Country Teams' information campaigns.

c) Military. Major General Lansdale and the Philippines Military

"My Pleas to US Officials to Lend me a Submarine for a Couple of Days Seemed Only to Arouse Their Suspicion that I Had Gone Insane." Major General Edward Lansdale

MG Lansdale was a US Air Force officer and operative for the Office of Strategic Services, and later the Central Intelligence Agency. Lansdale served as a "counter-insurgency expert" and adviser to the Government of the Philippines (GoP) from 1951 to 1954 (Boot, 2018).

At the end of World War II, the GoP was struggling to reestablish itself after three years of Japanese Army occupation, so its ability to govern, especially in rural areas, was severely limited. This allowed a communist insurgent group, originally formed to fight the Japanese occupation, to re-create itself and challenge the central government in Manila (Kerkviet, 1977, pp. 210–248). By 1950 this group, known as the Hukbalahap or Huks, had 10,000 to 15,000 armed guerillas with more than 100,000 active supporters and had enough strength to occupy large towns and threaten Manila (Boot, 2018, pp. 400–405). The GoP and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) appeared unable to halt the Huks' progress and appealed to the USG for assistance. Lansdale was assigned to support the GoP with the mission "to undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage political-psychological warfare (Boot, 2018, p. 216)." Lansdale renewed a relationship with Ramon Magsaysay, the GoP's newly appointed Ministry of Defense. Magsaysay was a former noncommunist guerilla and US ally during World War II. The Magsaysay/Lansdale friendship led to significant success in the GoP/US struggle to defeat the Huks. Lansdale advised Magsaysay to take political and social actions designed to address the roots of instability, factors that the Huks were using to fuel their movement. The relationship between the AFP and the people was one of these factors (Boot, 2018, p. xlv). Lansdale and Magsaysay developed Civil Affairs (CA) sections for each army battalion, which were designed to act as counterparts to the Huks' political commissars (Boot, 2018, p. 127). The CA teams were tasked to help the AFP build relationships with the population, and also to ensure that all AFP military action had a political impact (Boot, 2018, p. 150). The CA teams helped to give the AFP legitimacy with the population, thus improving the AFP's access to critical areas while isolating the Huks (Boot, 2018, pp. 127–150).

The combination of a more professional AFP and a more effective civil government augmented by a series of political warfare tactics was successful in significantly diminishing

the Huks' support (Kerkviet, 1977, pp. 237–243). By 1954, the Huk movement was fragmented, and Luis Taruc, isolated and starving, surrendered to the AFP (Boot, 2013, pp. 414–419).

Today SOF teams are experts at working with partner nation security forces to help build more professional forces, which respect human rights, and have a positive relationship with the civilian population.

d) Economics—Revered Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (MLK) and Local Churches

"Freedom is Never Voluntarily Given by the Oppressor; It Must Be Demanded by the Oppressed." —Rev. King

MLK was a Baptist minister and a key leader in the US civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. The civil rights movement was focused on challenging a set of segregationist laws in the American south known as "Jim Crow" (Rieder, 2013). Blacks in the South had relatively little political power, so MLK designed a campaign to leverage their economic power to pressure the Jim Crow system.

Starting with the Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott of 1955, in which MLK and others organized a boycott of public buses to force the city government to adopt fair seating policies, MLK organized and led a series of nonviolent activities designed to challenge segregationist laws and increase the national visibility of the civil rights struggle. MLK helped create the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which leveraged black churches to organize economic pressure using protests, sit-ins, and civil disobedience (Garrow, 2015).

MLK understood that a lack of political power meant that blacks would have to use their economic power. He saw that "economic power was more basic that political power" (Garrow, 2015, p. 42). He and the SCLC, working with local black churches, helped organize economic boycotts and protests that had a negative economic impact on white businesses (McAdams, 1982, p. 129). MLK understood that white business support for segregation would "buckle under economic pressure of a boycott" (Garrow, 2015, p. 263).

Economic pressure also helped MLK and the SCLC to achieve a key goal of political warfare— to fragment opposition coalitions. White business owners would not continue to fully support segregationist politicians if it meant a loss of business (Garrow, 2015, p. 85). Boycotts by black customers sometimes mean the difference between profit and loss for white businesses, providing a strong motivation for these businesses to cease supporting segregationist politicians and reach an accommodation with the civil rights movement (Garrow, 2015, pp. 226–227).

MLK's coordinated use of economic pressure in coordination with other political and civil activities was a masterful use of political warfare. MLK's actions led to successful antidiscrimination laws, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.

SOF teams working with members of the US Country Teams help the embassy understand local economic conditions and the appropriate support of USG economic programs.

CONCLUSION

These examples clearly demonstrate that small teams with local partnerships can leverage the DIME power to create a strategic impact. Today, the combination of Special Forces, Civil

Affairs, and Psychological Operations teams can have a substantial impact on the operational environment. SOF teams can act as an extension of the US Country Teams, assessing the political warfare environment and executing appropriate programs and projects. SOF teams can design and execute political warfare campaigns consistent with US values, which counter adversaries' malignant influence and protect US allies and partners.

To successfully integrate SOF into US Country Teams, both the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the USG IA should incorporate this collaboration into their doctrine and training. USSOCOM should maintain its focus on regional cultural and language expertise and should expand its training on political warfare and the functions of USG IA operations and functions. USSOCOM should also increase the number of SOF personnel integrated into US Country Teams to facilitate joint planning.

To be successful in understanding, defending against, and implementing political warfare, US Country Teams need the capability to understand the local context, build local networks, and engage local leaders. In today's political warfare environment, leaders and groups beyond the host nation's capital are extremely important, but the number and variety of groups are beyond the capability of US Country Teams. This is the role that SOF can and must fill, with their understanding of political warfare, USG interagency, and local context; and their ability to build local partnerships enables them to plan and execute tactical activities that have a strategic effect.

NOTE

1. The European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshal Plan, was over $13 billion (approximately $110 billion in 2016 dollars) of development assistance provided by the United Stated to allied countries to assist in reconstruction after World War II.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the United States Government, Department of Defense, of the United States Southern Command.

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REVIEW ESSAY

Khan, Sulmaan Wasif. *Haunted by Chaos: China's Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. 336 pp.

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> *"Empires arise from chaos and empires collapse back into chaos. This we have known since time began." (Luo Guanzhong, 2017. p. 1.)*

Sulmaan Wasif Khan opens *Haunted by Chaos: China's Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping* with the assertion that China's grand strategy has yet to be studied properly (Khan, 2018, p. 1). This is a bold claim considering the range of recent studies on China, including such notable works as Graham Allison's *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?* or Howard French's *Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China's Push for Global Power*. Allison, for example, explains the impact of a rising China by positing that the Thucydidean metaphor—that of a rising power instilling fear in the dominant one and setting the two on a collision course—"provides the best lens available for illuminating relations between China and the U.S. today" (Graham, 2017, p. viii). French explains China's strategic motivations by highlighting an innate sense of superiority that he traces back to ancient China's belief in its universal authority (French, 2017, p. 7). For Khan, an assistant professor at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, these explanations tell only part of the story and "Xi's China is not just a rising power inspiring fear in an established one; nor one whose sole ultimate purpose is the revival of past glory" (Khan, 2018, p. 218). In *Haunted by Chaos*, Khan offers another perspective on China's strategic behavior. Rather than rising power and growing self-confidence, it is instead China's profound sense of insecurity that best explains its grand strategy.

The paradoxical idea of insecurity arising from power is certainly not a new one. Christopher Coker, for example, has succinctly observed that "the more security you have, the more insecure you feel" (Coker, 2010, p. 165). Nevertheless, Khan's work is thought-provoking because he uses these ideas to challenge conventional thinking on China. Khan's analysis is shaped by his experience as a student at Yale's acclaimed course on grand strategy, and he admits that his former Yale professors are unlikely to agree with all of his conclusions (Khan, 2018, p. 301). Whether one agrees with him or not, Khan succeeds admirably in pushing the reader to think more broadly regarding China's grand strategy, and how that strategy might develop over the years ahead.

Khan does an admirable job tying together key events from China's recent history, from the Long March to the Korean War, and the Tiananmen Square massacre to current tensions in the South China Sea. Khan's analysis explains how these events demonstrate the complementary components of a consistent grand strategy. Or at least the same approach to grand strategy, for as Khan observes, this is not a book about the detailed and proscriptive products of staff colleges and intellectual elites. China's grand strategy emerges not as a meticulous plan, but as a practical result of a shared sense of China's long-term interests and a realistic assessment of the capabilities needed to achieve them.

Organized into five chapters bracketed by an introduction and a conclusion, Khan outlines themes that drive China's leadership and continue to influence China's goals for the twenty-first century. Khan devotes two chapters to Mao: one on his efforts to reunify China, and another on his efforts to preserve the new China through a balance of power. Deng Xiaoping gets one chapter, focusing on his promotion of core beliefs. The assertiveness of Xi Jinping gets its own chapter. In between, Khan places Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao in a single combined chapter united in what he describes as a period of relative dullness and stolidity.

Throughout all these regimes, Khan argues that China's strategy over the last five decades reflects China's sense of itself as a "brittle entity" that must be protected. China's major policy and strategy focus has been on preserving state power and cohesion, for one of the lessons of Chinese history for its leaders is that unity is "not something to be taken for granted" (Khan, 2018, p. 9).

Khan tells us that one of Mao Zedong's most beloved books was *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, which takes place during the chaos that ensued as the Han dynasty collapsed. Mao's experiences after the collapse of the Qing dynasty seemed to him like a repeat of those earlier times, reinforcing fears of a vulnerable China weakened by its disunity. Khan explains that Chinese policy and strategy thus evolved to become essentially defensive because it "is a country uncertain of how durable its power and integrity will prove; it will do all it can to make certain of them" (Khan, 2018, p. 218). Despite variations in China's strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, there is a commonality of purpose arising from this sense of vulnerability that gives China's grand strategy a remarkable consistency.

Khan identifies persistent aspects of Chinese grand strategy over successive regimes that exemplify this consistency. These include China's eminently practical approach to balancing its use of the instruments of national power. China's approach to diplomacy has been to "maintain as close a relationship with every country as it could get" (Khan, 2018, p. 66). In this regard "smaller powers mattered; they could help as one sought to cope with the larger ones" (Khan, 2018, p. 19). There is also an element of flexibility in China's exercise of power. Mao was able to separate specific disagreements from the larger relationship, always keeping his focus on the major goal rather than letting himself be distracted by lesser ones (Khan, 2018, p. 90). Underlying it all is Mao's sense of the practical, and that this "pragmatism was what drove grand strategy" (Khan, 2018, p. 77). As Khan puts it, "in diplomacy, as in all else, Mao would do whatever worked" (Khan, 2018, p. 38).

Mao's successor Deng Xiaoping's strategic thinking was also marked by practicality but with added emphasis on core beliefs. Political unity did not mean a uniform social economic system, and "one could do things differently in different parts of the empire" (Khan, 2018, p. 129). Another "core belief that emerged early on was that in the primacy of the party" (Khan, 2018, p. 128). Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao continue a conservative grand strategy that was "stolid, not prone to adventure" (Khan, 2018, p. 171). There is a practical flexibility still in the domestic sphere

alongside continued recognition that ideology is important for ensuring a united and socially stable people (Khan, 2018, p. 174). On the international level, China's leaders strove to avoid making China appear as a threat by championing a peaceful resolution of disputes, and not allowing short-term issues to distract them from their overall strategic objectives.

With that as background, Khan brings us up to the present and the grand strategy of Xi Jinping. Khan's assessment of Xi Jinping's China is that it is more powerful but also more insecure (Khan, 2018, p. 7). The grand strategy of Xi Jinping is mired in this paradox of increased power bringing greater insecurity. Despite its efforts to avoid appearing as a threat, "because it is a massive country, that defensive policy can look suspiciously aggressive" (Khan, 2018, p. 218). Xi is more assertive and less constrained than his predecessors, and the "assertive vigor that Xi brings to his task has undermined Chinese national security significantly" (Khan, 2018, p. 212). A more successful, powerful, and assertive China alarms it's smaller neighbors, fueling unfriendliness and undermining the very security China worked to achieve.

Khan's former teacher, John Lewis Gaddis, defined grand strategy as "the alignment of potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities" (Gaddis, 2018, p. 21). Gaddis also noted the importance of proportionality to grand strategy. (Gaddis, 2018, p. 312). Khan has successfully used these ideas to illuminate China's strategic thinking. Khan concludes by noting that Xi's China must now grapple with new problems that arose with success such as environmental strain, growing income inequality, and corruption, for "success came with the seeds of failure" (Khan, 2018, p. 243). The question Khan leaves us with is whether China's longstanding approach to grand strategy will remain valid in the face of these new challenges.

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REVIEW ESSAY

12 More Books Every Green Beret Should Read: An Annotated Bibliography

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In 2018, three Special Forces personnel published an annotated biography called "12 Books Every Green Beret Should Read". The authors' purpose was to provide new members of Special Forces a concise reading list that would expand their knowledge of unconventional warfare. This version focuses on the development of mid-career officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers with multiple years of operational experience. Like the original work, the idea of this recent version is that mid-career green berets would read one book per month over a year-long period to better prepare themselves for planning and executing challenging UW operations.

KEYWORDS: Special forces, unconventional warfare, resistance, insurgency, counterinsurgency

In the Spring 2018 issue of *Special Operations Journal*, we published an annotated bibliography called "12 Books Every Green Beret Should Read". The authors' purpose for the article was to provide new members of U.S. Army Special Forces a concise reading list that would expand their knowledge of unconventional warfare (UW). The article focused on the history and theory pillars of military art and science and assumed that the new members had gained a solid foundation of UW doctrine while attending the Special Forces qualification course. This second annotated bibliography focuses on the development of mid-career officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned

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officers with multiple years of operational experience. Like the original work, the idea of this recent version is that mid-career green berets would read one book per month over a year-long period to better prepare themselves for planning and executing challenging UW operations.

Agan, Summer D. and All. (2019). *Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies: The Science of Resistance*. Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command. Resistance underpins every asymmetric conflict throughout history. It is the tool used by all actors when fighting over 'the relevant population' in Irregular Warfare. *The Science of Resistance* describes and categorizes the factors and conditions of resistance across the entire Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) spectrum. Through the application of seven relevant sciences, this book provides the most accurate picture of what a resistance looks like, why it occurs, how it can mobilize, effective strategies, and how it achieves its goals. Understanding "what right looks like" is a fundamental requirement of any Irregular Warfare planner when conducting UW, Counterinsurgency, Foreign Internal Defense, Counterterrorism, or Stability Operations.

Asprey, Robert. (1994). *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, Two Thousand Years of the Guerrilla at War from Ancient Persia to the Present*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. Robert Asprey is a former Marine Corps officer, Fulbright scholar, and accomplished military historian. His tome is a survey of guerrilla warfare that begins with the Scythian defeat of Darius and ends with the victorious Mujahidin in Afghanistan in 1989. In reference to the U.S. experience in Vietnam, he cautions "The pages that follow emphasize the cost to any country when its civil and military leaders fail to consider yesterday while dealing with today." (p. xiii) Asprey further underscores the importance of historical study in his assertion, "For a number of reasons guerrilla warfare has evolved into an ideal instrument for the realization of social-political-economic aspirations of underprivileged peoples." (p. x) In his review of this work, General James Gavin wrote, "The author handles the overall subject of guerrilla warfare in the most comprehensive manner I have read … I think that the book is superb and its pages should be dog-eared in every military man's library." (back cover) At over 1200 pages, it is doubtful that any serving SF soldier could read it from cover to cover, however, one may choose to use it as a regional reference to study the past conflicts in a specific area.

Bell, J. Boyer. (1971). *The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice*. New York: Alfred A. Knoft Publishers. J. Boyer Bell was a research associate at Harvard's Center for International Affairs when he published this book, which he based on extensive fieldwork and numerous interviews with current and former guerrilla fighters and commanders. Bell challenges the widely accepted argument, at least during the time of his research, that guerrilla warfare was an effective and prominent tool for political change. In the first section of the book, he examines guerrilla warfare and how various actors, including Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, Ho, Giap, Che Guevarra, and Regis Debray have integrated it into their revolutionary theories. In the second section, the author looks at the practice of guerrilla warfare and how these actors have employed their concepts on the battlefield. In sum, he concludes, "The theory is simple, elegant, sure – and without a revolutionary theory there is no revolutionary practice – but those who mistake the Myth for objective reality may find the practice of revolution leads not to victory but to fantasy, and often an early grave." (p. 60) Bell divides the final section into three case studies, including the wars of liberation in South Africa, the Palestine Fedayeen, and Che Guevarra in Bolivia. Each of the case studies provides the UW

practitioner with valuable insight into successful and not so successful methods of employing guerrilla forces.

Crandall, Russell. (2014). ***America's Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare from 1776 to the War on Terror.*** **Cambridge: Cambridge University Press**. Russell Crandall is a professor of international politics and American foreign policy at Davidson College, North Carolina. He has served in various high-level policy jobs within the U.S. government and has published multiple books on Latin America. This most recent book covers a vast swath of history with a focus on irregular warfare. Crandall reviews the major theorists and theories of insurgency and counter-insurgency. His most salient point is that while "dirty" wars are challenging to study, the U.S. will face this type of warfare in the future, and military personnel and government officials must understand it. He provides convincing evidence that the U.S. and other western democracies will engage in dirty wars in the short and long-term. Accepting this point, political and military leaders, as well as special operations practitioners must understand the history and theory of irregular warfare. This understanding, combined with a deep practitioner's experience, and knowledge of current events, can provide a framework for success in the next dirty war.

Gurr, Ted Robert. (1970). ***Why Men Rebel.*** **Princeton: Princeton University Press**. Ted Robert Gurr is Distinguished University Professor Emeritus and founding director of the Minorities at Risk Project at the University of Maryland. As one of the foremost experts in social movement theory, his book stands as one of the most useful even though it was published almost fifty years ago. His theory of relative deprivation helps to explain the underlying causes of political violence and is flexible enough to be applied across all regions of the world. Gurr provides a social scientific method of measuring the intensity of relative deprivation and determining when a social group will resort to violence to meet its needs. In a chapter on coercive balance, Gurr explains the tension between an oppressive regime and the population and describes a framework that could be used to evaluate and predict the probability that a dissident group would rebel. Also of note, he offers a process to assess the loyalty of government security forces and the hypothesis "The likelihood of conspiracy varies inversely with the loyalty of coercive forces to the regime." (p. 253) A comprehension of these ideas will provide the UW practitioner with a powerful analytic tool to understand and then manipulate a potential resistance movement.

Hazen, Jennifer. (2013). ***What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime.*** **Ithaca: Cornell University Press**. Jennifer Hazen is an Adjunct Associate Research Professor with the Department of Public Policy at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. She has extensive practitioner experience gained while holding positions at U.S. Africa Command, the United Nations, and with the Small Arms Survey in Geneva. In her groundbreaking book, Hazen looks beyond the political and military analysis of civil wars and examines the economics, resource management, and supply networks that support insurgent groups. Her research is underpinned by extensive fieldwork in Western Africa directly observing seven insurgent groups involved in three civil wars while interviewing insurgents as well as government counterinsurgency forces personnel. She argues, " … a rebel group's options for continuing a war depend on the group's access to resources, and as this access changes, so too do the available options." (p.50) Most importantly, Hazen provides military analysts and planners a framework for examining support mechanisms and determining if resource access is increasing, constant, or decreasing, which leads to an understanding of the rebel group's available options for continuing war. The author applies this framework across the seven case studies to

provide an in-depth look at expected outcomes in each respective conflict. While some political scientists have criticized Hazen for not giving military factors due credit, her book fits nicely within this military focused reading list and offers a valuable alternative perspective into how civil war participants acquire and expend resources to sustain their movement.

Irwin, Will. (2005). ***The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944*****. New York: Public Affairs**. Will Irwin is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer, military historian, and Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. In this work, he focuses on six Jedburgh teams and their respective contributions to the fight in the European Theater during World War II. The majority of the personnel came from the British Special Operations Executive, the U.S. Office of Strategic Service, and the Free French Forces. However, there were others from Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and South Africa. The Jedburgh teams were composed of three personnel, a team leader, usually a captain, and assistant team leader, usually a lieutenant, and a radio operator, usually a sergeant. There was at least one French serviceman on each team. At a personal level, Irwin traces the lives of a few of the team members from their initial training in their respective countries, to advanced training at Milton Hall in England, through infiltration and the execution of operations weaving in his detailed research into an easy to read narrative. While historians continue to debate the impact of the Jedburgh teams, and other SOF elements, in the outcome Operation Overlord and the World War II in general, Irwin provides demonstrative evidence that the impact was significant. In studying the exploits of these teams, the UW practitioner will learn how UW operations can be used to support major combat operations.

Cragg, Dan and Michael Lanning. (1992). ***Inside the VC and NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnam's Armed Forces*****. New York: Ballentine Books**. Lanning and Cragg both served numerous tours in U.S. Army ground combat units during the Vietnam War. While writing the book, they incorporate this experience with extensive primary research on the Viet Cong (VC) and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). They acknowledge the pitfalls with conducting this type of historical research and state that they attempted to set aside biases and write the book from the enemy's point of view. Their work provides the UW practitioner with an intimate tactical level view of how the North fought the war. They provided an excellent example of how to conduct an area study and gain an in-depth understanding of one's enemy on the battlefield. Probably most important is a chapter on how the NVA recruited soldiers and the VC recruited fighters, auxiliary and underground personnel; and once in the ranks, how they trained as well as maintained morale and motivation to deal with harsh living conditions and to face certain death in combat. Lanning and Cragg delve deep into the logistics aspect of irregular warfare with chapters on infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh trail, equipment d supplies, and logistics. The depth, breadth, and originality of this work make this an indispensable resource for UW practitioners and enablers of UW planning and operations.

Luttwak, Edward. (1968). ***Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook*****. Cambridge: Harvard University Press**. As a young scholar, Luttwak wrote, "This is a handbook. It is therefore not concerned with the theoretical analysis of the *coup d'état*, but rather with the formulation of the techniques which can be employed to seize power within a state." (p. 12) Before he published this book, the topic confounded political scientists because of the very nature of the *coup*, when the unpredictability of a small group of well-placed individuals strike out at a government, does not lend itself to simple characterization. However, Luttwak was able to develop a methodology for examining *coup* events and identify commonalities and patterns associated with this method of regime change. His chapters evaluate when a *coup* may be successfully employed as well as

strategy, planning, and execution. At the tactical level, he identifies the military units and commanders that must support the effort to ensure success, as well as the required security measures, sequencing, and timing of events. The author examines numerous case studies to illustrate his arguments and provides real-world examples of this phenomena. It is important to note that nationalists, populists, and radicals have used this technique much more effectively than other methods of regime change. This work should serve as a point of departure for in-depth study of the *coup d'état*, or anyone considering this as a technique to use in a UW campaign.

Orwell, George. (1945). *Animal Farm*. London: Secker and Warburg. Fiction, when well written and steeped in history, can present a great resource for understanding resistance, rebellion, and insurgency. George Orwell's "Animal Farm" as one of the top science fiction novels of the 20th century is just such a book. The allegory is an accurate and very controversial depiction of Stalin, Trotsky, and Lenin in the years following the Bolshevik Revolution. The author drew upon personal experience from the Spanish Civil War and a staunch stance against fascism, social injustice, and totalitarianism. The agendas and machinations by the two main characters, Napoleon representing Stalin, and Snowball as Trotsky, provide an entertaining story as they navigate rebellion on the Manor Farm in England. As in Stalin's real life, Napoleon achieved control over information and internal power structures. And, in the end, he won.

Peters, Ralph. (2000). *The Book of War: Sun-Tzu's "The Art of War" & Karl von Clausewitz's "On War."* New York: Random House. Ralph Peters is a retired military officer, author, and national security strategist who shows in the introduction to this book the prominence of Sun-Tzu's *The Art of War* and Karl von Clausewitz's *On War* for military thinkers. He compares and contrasts the two authors and provides strong justification as to why one should dedicate the time to studying these works. He writes, "Distant in time, space, and culture, Karl von Clausewitz and Sun-Tzu offer dueling visions, with the Prussian appalled by fantasies of bloodless war and the Chinese crying that bloodless victory is the acme of generalship, and with Clausewitz anxious to increase military effectiveness, while Sun-Tzu pleads, cleverly for military restraint." (p. vii) These two competing views offer the UW campaign planner a theoretical basis for considering courses of action. While taken on face value, it may seem that Sun-Tzu offers more to Special Forces personnel, Clausewitz does have a chapter on irregular warfare. Moreover, it is essential for UW planners to understand the Clausewitzian trinity when debating operational approaches in planning sessions with strategists from the general purpose forces. Of these two timeless military classics, Peters provides the following encouragement: "Each must be read. No cram notes will do, all summaries badly serve their genius. Clausewitz appears difficult, only to yield a hard, thrilling clarity; while Sun-Tzu, a quick swallow, takes a lifetime to digest. One text is long, the other appealingly short. Both are inexhaustible." (p. viii)

Taber, Robert. (1965). *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare*. New York: Brassey's Inc. The title and prose lead the reader to understand the actual power an entity such as a flea can have on its host/carrier from the contentious rash, scratching, and irritation to the mass casualty producing the bubonic plague. The flea like a revolutionist can create a small issue for an established institution or can radically shift the balance of power in a region. Understanding this power, one can interpret Taber's book in the framework of the seven phases of UW. His writing flows through the phases, using excellent examples that help the reader appreciate the philosophical thoughts of resisting by incorporating a tried example for each. War of the Flea, first published over forty years ago, still resonates and should be a required reading for policymakers, diplomats, and soldiers

that will find themselves thinking about how to deal with a problem, understanding the root of the problem; and influencing the crux of the problem to initiate a solution. It is evident that Tabor's travels and a firsthand view of Castro's and Guevara's revolution in Cuba established his belief and support for those that utilize this tool for regime change. Moreover, Taber's most significant contribution is how well this work is relevant today for the student that wants to understand revolution and its power as a policy tool.

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BOOK REVIEW

Craig Robert Gralley. *Hall of Mirrors: Virginia Hall: America's Greatest Spy of World War II*. 1st edition. Pisgah Forest, NC: Chrysalis Books, LLC, 2019, 225 pp., $19.95 ISBN: 9781733541534.

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The *Hall of Mirrors* takes the reader on a journey that enlightens the reader of the nexus between unconventional warfare, intelligence operations, and psychological operations during World War 2, simultaneous to illuminating Virginia Hall's contributions and the individual struggles and rewards she experiences throughout the war and her lifetime. This book is a relatable story for special operations, intelligence, and diplomatic personnel as it dives into the silver linings of conflict and war.

A daring and bold Virginia travels with the Special Operations Executive and then the Office of Strategic Services, which take her throughout France, into Spain, into London, and back into France. Virginia, a new agent of espionage, assesses, recruits, and develops the Heckler spy network to gain valuable intelligence on German operations, while feeding the information to the allies for intricately planned information and unconventional warfare. Virginia's multiple identities introduce the reader to an array of informants, saboteurs, and government personnel with roles as doctors, ladies of the night, reporters, priests, and allied agents, which place full faith and trust in Virginia's abilities and intent. Hall's agents in Haute Loire, Madame Guerin, Dr. Roussef, Suzanne Bertillon, the Labouriers, and Madame Catin continue to speak to Virginia in her memories and drive her desire to return to France. Virginia's dedication to the allied mission encourages her confidence to traverse in and out of the German preoccupied zones, amidst the threat of Klaus Barbie's prioritized capture of "La dame qui boite."

The author, Craig Gralley, illuminates Virginia Hall's contributions in a complex and energizing way; he details the humanizing yet relatable details of the people who fought for freedom and the agent who led them toward the liberation of France. Virginia is intricately developed by Gralley within this novel as to shed understanding of Virginia's difficult but rewarding "metamorphosis" in which she juggles her roles as patriot, diplomat, adventurer, spy, woman, friend, and lover. Virginia gains and loses those she loves and those she fights for, yet her dedication and focus remain steadfast.

The author writes the book as if Virginia is in the present tense of the war, but is recounting, in first-person, her memories of her first assignments, spy operations, familial and friendly encounters, and describes a backdrop of which both historians and naturalists alike can appreciate the detail. Gralley additionally inserts descriptions from her family and former reports to describe her personality, wits, habits, and desires, of which are also subtly woven throughout the book's narrative.

The book also reveals the individual ups and downs of Virginia, as an agent, an amputee, and as devout confidante to family and friends. The author succinctly captures the wide array of cognitive biases that work for and against Virginia Hall, a shift from previous books about Virginia that focused mainly on historical events and landscape. She struggles with herself: her physical differences, identity as a woman, her loss of loved ones, her longing for home, and her desire to return to the conflict.

The book concludes with an epilogue describing Virginia's heroic transition at the end of the war into further service at the Central Intelligence Agency as she again discovers another life awaiting her. Gralley makes the underlying theme of this book clear: Virginia Hall's wit and grit drove her to overcome her obstacles and to become WW2's most successful agent for the allies. *Hall of Mirrors*, by extension, is a story to further motivate dedicated patriots, regardless of physical qualities, gender, and personal histories.

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BOOK REVIEW

Steven B. Wagner. *Statecraft by Stealth: Secret Intelligence and British Rule in Palestine*. Cornell University Press, 2019, 336 pp., $39.95 (hardcover), ISBN:1501736477

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Steven Wagner's, *Statecraft by Stealth: Secret Intelligence and the British Rule in Palestine*, is an excellent book that looks at the role played by British Intelligence in Palestine from the latter years of World War One to the early days of World War Two. According to Wagner, British "secret intelligence—in both informational and institutional forms—was central to the story of British rule in Palestine: to the machinery of the colonial state in Palestine, and to the policy that governed it." Blending a chronological and thematic approach, Wagner explains the role of British intelligence and the evolution of its policy toward the Arab and Jewish populations. An informative and enjoyable read, Wagner grabs your attention in the introduction with the story of Joseph Davidescu, a British intelligence officer whose close relationship and eventual fallout with Zionists encapsulate British/Zionist relations during this period, and never loses it.

Wagner eloquently lays out the external factors that influenced the evolution of Britain's Palestine policy during this period. A conspiratorial fueled fear of a pan-Islamic/Bolshevik connection, coupled with a belief that Zionism could assist in countering pan-Islamism, resulted in a close partnership between Zionist and British intelligence. This partnership strengthened Zionist's intelligence capability and eventually led to a growing British dependence on them to support their policy and maintain power in Palestine, while also creating contradictions. First, a belief that "an Arab conspiracy" in the Ottoman Army could help defeat the Ottoman empire resulted in British intelligence developing a partnership with Arab allies. Second, British support for selective self-determination as an expedient in World War I placed Britain in an uncomfortable position between their promises to Zionists and their earlier self-determination stance.

Changing strategic conditions and national interests made it difficult for Great Britain to maintain these inconsistencies. With tension increasing in Europe, Great Britain's priorities and foci were changing. In May 1939, Great Britain's White Paper policy put limits on Jewish immigration and land acquisition in Palestine. According to Wagner, the White Paper was a British move to strengthen its relationship with Saudi Arabia in hope that Ibn Saud could help

turn the region pro-British. Although Britain's new policy resonated with Saud, it was not appreciated by either the Zionist who did not like the limits it placed on them or the Palestinians who "would rebel against Britain's failure to fulfill the White Paper's goals." Interestingly, the Zionist intelligence capability that Great Britain assisted in developing over the previous decades became essential for Yishuv survival and the "emergence of Israel." In this regard, Wagner credits Great Britain with helping build an effective Israeli intelligence apparatus.

Although Wagner does a great job laying out the influence of British intelligence in governing Palestine and the evolution of British policy, the book's contribution to intelligence studies is much greater. Wagner provides an understanding of British intelligence operations throughout its empire and explains the differences and similarities between British intelligence operations in the empire and elsewhere. He also contributes to the important and ongoing discussion on "what is intelligence?" As discussed by Mark Stout and Michael Warner in their fantastic and thought-provoking article, "Intelligence is as Intelligence Does," is intelligence the collection of information to inform decision-making or is it any of the myriad of activities intelligence agencies are tasked to carry out? In his book, Wagner defines intelligence as both. First, as "information relevant to security, communal relations, and administration, obtained from open or secret sources, and normally kept secret from other competitors." Second, as "institutions: those bodies responsible for stealing secrets, keeping them, and deploying them as an arm of policy, through anything from covert action to propaganda, disinformation and deception, and clandestine diplomacy." Although Wagner's information definition seems a little broad and could be interpreted as almost any information that informs policy, his writing is thought-provoking and forces the reader to wrestle with what is intelligence.

Statecraft by Stealth is well-researched, exceptionally written, and an important contribution to intelligence studies. Anyone interested in the role intelligence plays in statecraft or wants to wrestle with how to define intelligence should pick-up this book. They will not be disappointed!

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BOOK REVIEW

Krivdo, Michael, and Robert Toguchi. *The Competitive Advantage: Special Operations Forces in Large-Scale Combat Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2019, 275 pp., $18.95 (paper). ISBN: 9781099805257.

Reviewed by Chad Tobin

Ever changing, the rapidly evolving operational environment demands that the military adapt its approach to prepare for tomorrow's fight. After nearly two decades of dedication to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the US Army is shifting its focus to prepare for large-scale combat operations against peer and near-peer adversaries. To succeed in the Future Operating Environment (FOE), it will be critical that commanders leverage the benefits of Special Operations Forces – Conventional Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence (SOF-CF I3) and integrate ARSOF' four pillars of capabilities: indigenous approaches, developing understanding and wielding influence, precision targeting, and crisis response.

Organizing case studies from the exploits of T.E. Lawrence in 1916 to TF Viking in 2003, Concepts Division Chief Robert Toguchi and Deputy Command Historian Michael Krivdo to the US Army Special Operations Command expertly illustrate the advantages of synchronization and unity of effort of SOF and CF. Their book, *The Competitive Advantage: Special Operations Forces in Large-Scale Combat Operations* provides context for the implementation of SOF-CF I3 to achieve effects otherwise unattainable by either force operating unilaterally. This anthology, in which Krivdo, Toguchi, and other authors contribute, provides examples of how SOF-CF I3 achieved desired outcomes for the Joint Force Commander. Proper integration of SOF and CF capabilities achieves unity of effort and creates multiple dilemmas for the enemy. Additionally, the evolving hybrid threat anticipated in the FOE will require the Army to compete and defeat adversaries via the conduct of operations across multiple domains. As a part of the Joint Force, the Army "will militarily compete, penetrate, dis-integrate, and exploit our adversaries in the future" by conducting Multi-Domain Operations. Krivdo and Toguchi emphasize the relevance of historical SOF-CF application as it will apply to leaders and decision makers in the future operating environment. Recognizing the necessity of its application in the FOE, the USASOC Commanding General has made the improvement of SOF-CF I3 one of his priorities in the USASOC Campaign Plan 2035.

As the conduct of limited contingency operations in Afghanistan continues within an evolving global operating environment, military professionals need to prepare for the next conflict. The book's collection of case studies provides a logical bridge from historical SOF-CF synergy as it shaped the environment and set conditions for Joint Force successes to how Joint and multi-national forces must compliment and depend on each other's combat power and capabilities in tomorrow's fight. Commanders' knowledge of historical application of ARSOF capabilities, in concert with conventional forces, will allow them to capitalize on lessons learned and avoid previous pitfalls leading to failure.