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

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The Emergence of Russian Private Military Companies: A New Tool of Clandestine Warfare

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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Russian private security and military company (PMSC) industry has evolved to serve the needs of both business clients as well as governments. Thus far, the ties between the Kremlin and the Russian PMSC industry are ambiguous and seem to vary across the different companies. What seems clear though, is that the Kremlin is experimenting with the utility of these companies and that the use of PMSCs is on the rise. Private security and military companies are neither explicitly legal nor illegal in Russia, a status that may serve Russian authorities well in situations where attribution and attention is unwanted. While the exact shape and role of the Russian PMSC industry may not be carved out fully, Russia is now home to a small, but potent, PMSC industry that can be mobilized to inflict harm on the country's enemies.

KEYWORDS
Private military companies; Russia; hybrid warfare; military capability

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, private military and security companies (PMSCs) appeared in many parts of the world. The example set by the US in particular, including its extensive use of PMSCs in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, has been a source of inspiration for many other countries, including Russia. While some of the Russian PMSCs have received considerable media attention during the past couple of years, there is still little systematic study of the Russian PMSC industry and its capabilities.[1] Speculations also abound in terms of if and how these companies relate to Russian authorities and Russian foreign policy. This article directs attention to these questions and discusses some of the implications that Russian use of PMSCs may have for the security of Western countries. By way of introduction, the article first provides a brief description of the Russian PMSC industry.

The Early Russian PMSC Industry

In the years after the fall of the Soviet Union, surplus Russian military and state security personnel frequently established domestic security companies but some also got acquainted with the international PMSC industry. Former Russian soldiers served as body guards and carried out diverse types of protective work while Russian pilots and technicians were attractive to companies operating aircraft (Lock, 1999). The South African mercenary PMSC, Executive Outcomes for instance employed Russian Mi-17 and Mi-24 attack helicopters and Russian and Ukrainian pilots and technicians to operate

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them (Reno, 1997). A lot of surplus military transport planes and helicopters ended up on private hands in this period, some of which is still on the market.

The downsizing of the Soviet military not only demobilized individual troops, but also entire cadres and military units. According to one observer, some of the demobilized elite military formations maintained sufficient cohesion to reconstitute themselves as, in effect, readymade PMSCs (Axelrod, 2013). The company "Alpha Group" was created out of Group A (Alpha Group), one of two FSB special forces units. Alpha Group was later acquired by ArmorGroup sometime between 1999 and 2003.[2] Another early Russian PMSC that disappeared or mutated is RusCorp Group. In 2010 RusCorp described itself as an "international security holding company" headquartered in Moscow and with offices in Nigeria, Iraq, the United States, the UK and "other selected European countries". The company claimed to have wide experience from emergency and high-risk environments and to deliver services within "all aspects of security" (PrivateMilitary.org, 2010). As such, RusCorp appears to have been an armed private protection company, with what perhaps can be described as a rather "gun toting" image, not uncommon in the early 2000 s.

Parts of the early Russian PMSC industry also hail back to the organization of volunteers in foreign wars and thus have little to do with protective services. As an example, the St Petersburg based security company named Rubikon, supervised by Russian security services, was central in organizing volunteers to fight on the side of the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990 s (InformNapalm, 2015).

After 9/11, the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan presented huge business opportunities for PMSCs. Russian companies also rushed to the scene in order to cater to Russian corporations in particular. The so called "non-government educational center" Antiterror was established in 2003 with the assistance of the Russian Union of Paratroopers. Antiterror signed contracts for the protection of the oil and gas infrastructure of the companies Tatneft, Energoinzheniering and the Russian Engineering Company in the mid-2000 s (Konovalov & Valetskii, 2013). In 2010, the Russian oil company Lukoil established its own security company – Lukom-A – to protect investments in Iraq. According to Arkadii Babchenko, the Lukoil subsidiary was by law just a regular private security company, but in reality, it was a PMSC. The same author also claims that the next trigger for the PMSC business in Russia was Somali piracy (Popkov, 2016). Much like Western shippers, Russian ship-owners needed protection for their vessels in the Gulf of Aden. Russian security companies however quickly got the reputation for a "shoot first" approach designed to deter pirates from attacking Russian flagged ships in the first place. Thus, in terms of timing, the development of Russian PMSCs seems to largely follow international trends.

The Contemporary Russian PMSC Industry

According to the Russian experts Ivan Konovalov and Oleg Valetskii, earlier this decade there were between 10 and 20 PMSCs in Russia (2013). Accurate and up-to-date numbers are non-existent, largely due to the secretive nature of the industry, but also because of the difficulties involved in determining exactly which organizations qualify as a PMSC, and because they are not yet officially legal. The better-known companies are Moran Security, RSB-Group, Wagner, Mar, ENOT Corp., Patriot and Shchit.[3] Moran Security, the RSB-Group and Shchit in many ways resemble Western PMSCs; Wagner and Patriot are more government-hired mercenaries

than PMSCs; while Mar and ENOT are smaller, ideologized companies active mostly in the post-Soviet space. ENOT was disbanded in late 2018, and the leader arrested on charges of extortion (Polykhina, 2019). The ideological anchoring of some Russian PMSCs sets them apart from Western PMSCs, which except from declaring that they support their home countries' troops, usually insist on being apolitical actors. Another difference between Western PMSCs and their Russian cousins is that Western PMSCs are heavily involved with military support services and logistics, types of services that Russian PMSCs do not appear to focus on, or even offer, as of yet.

Wagner is undoubtedly both the largest and the most well known of the Russian PMSCs because of its role in Russia's war effort in Syria. However, several of these companies may yet become active both in a potential escalated conflict with the West and in conflict theaters in the developing world. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in terms of military hardware, none of these companies are likely to be able to fight on the level of regular military units unless they are armed as such by the Russian military itself.

Even though this article denotes these companies "private security and military companies", several of the Russian companies hardly fit a categorization as commercial actors.[4] In fact, it may even be a stretch to call Wagner a *private* company. Some of the Russian PMSCs are business ventures, selling their services to other commercial actors in a commercial and competitive market e.g. for piracy protection. Wagner however appears more of a mercenary outfit, understood to mean an outfit that also offer combat services as opposed to mere protective services.[5] Furthermore, their services seem to be exclusive to parts of the Russian security apparatus or to a handful of clients approved by that same apparatus. However, Russian PMSCs are not homogeneous. Some seem to be designed primarily to be proxy forces that can take commercial assignments for approved clients on the side. Others appear primarily to be commercial actors that act as proxies when they are called to do so. Compared to Western companies, most Russian companies seem however to be less weary of providing services close to the combat spectrum. In contrast, the large segment of the Western industry that competes for contracts for (Western) state clients and which operates on the open market will shy away from services that will associate them with combat as that will warrant the much dreaded mercenary association, which in the West has a clear delegitimizing effect. After several Blackwater "scandals" in particular, Western companies have also become very sensitive to bad publicity and many also find that operating in complex war zones is simply too risky. In addition, most Western companies also lack the cohesion and coordinated training necessary to operate in substitution of an army unit.

Like any other national "market for force", Russian PMSCs are shaped not only by supply and demand, but also by the cultural, historical, political and legal environment they exist within. The industry is affected by the national institutional environment, informal and formal regulations, national military culture, popular acceptance, historical propensity for using private actors to exercise force, relations to government structures and elites, and many other factors. In short, companies will be "socialized" by their home environment, even when acting internationally (Flohr, Rieth, Schwindenhammer, & Wolf, 2010). In the case of Russian PMSCs this so far has resulted in a crossbreed PMSC industry populated by some Western style companies, some mercenary outfits and some ideologically driven units which resemble armed militias. Common to them all is that they

exist at the mercy of the authorities and thus that they may need to prove their worth in order to continue to exist.

PMSCS AND THE STATE

The Russian state at present seems relatively ambivalent about the phenomenon of PMSCs. In fact, when a new proposal for the legalization of PMSC again was raised in Russian media at the beginning of 2018, Putin's spokesman Dmitrii Peskov simply stated that the Kremlin "has no position on this question" (Aptekar, 2018). Despite their undeniable existence, PMSCs are not yet explicitly regulated by Russian law.

These companies are furthermore also largely absent from Russian military theory, at least in terms of PMSCs being an instrument in the Russian military toolbox (Eklund and Elfving, 2017). In the latest 2014 version of the official Russian military doctrine, PMSCs are only mentioned in the context of foreign threats (Neelov, 2017). Likewise, in a major new Russian work on future war written by the military intellectuals Igor Popov and Musa Khamsatov, PMSCs are mostly described as a Western phenomenon. They are (as of yet) not prescribed any particular role in future Russian security politics (Popov and Khamzatov, 2017, pp. 256–259).

Russian Motives for Developing a PMSC Industry

The Russian debate on PMSCs suggests at least four main drivers for their development: profits, military emulation, the companies' potential as a non-attributional means of coercion and avoiding an Afghanistan-type loss aversion situation among the public.

In terms of profits, it is worth recalling that Russia is home to a large and lucrative domestic private security sector, which in 2011 was worth 7 billion USD annually (Galeotti, 2013). Russia and Russian decision makers are hence accustomed to not only the concept of privately supplied security, but also to the revenues that such a sector generates. The Deputy Head of the Duma (Russian parliament) Sub-Committee for Statebuilding and Legislation, Mikhail Emelianov, maintains that the private military industry is an internationally rapidly growing market dominated thus far by Western countries (the US and the UK in particular), and he argues that there is huge untapped potential for Russia. As Emelianov put it, "Our history is such that we always had to fight wars. Why not exploit this experience [for profit]?"(Kovalenko & Baltacheva, 2018). The dominance of Western companies within the private protection market in war zones troubles Russian decision makers. The fact that the country's PMSC industry is underdeveloped has led Russian companies to seek protective services from Western companies in war zones, which has caused Russian interests to miss out on business opportunities. Russian military observer Ivan Konovalov suggests that many developing nations' governments may welcome the emergence of PMSCs with geopolitical affiliations that differ from those of the West (Eremenko, 2014). This argument is supported by the recent experience of Russian PMSCs in several African countries, and possibly also in backing President Maduro in Venezuela.

A second motive could simply be to adopt what appears to be a useful foreign political instrument for the US and the UK in particular. Military emulation is a well-known international phenomenon. It would be fair to say that the radical reform of the Russian

armed forces initiated by Minister of Defense Anatolii Serdiukov in 2008 was, to a significant extent, an emulation of reforms that occurred in many Western countries after the end of the Cold War. Thus, it is not unnatural to see the development of Russian PMSCs essentially as a conscious attempt to imitate what may appear to be a smart innovation by the West. For example, an article in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) daily *Krasnaia Zvezda* (Red Star) from 2013 argued that PMSCs is a "phenomenon of our times" that the West has understood but in which Russia has lagged behind (Palchikov, 2013). There is, however, reason to doubt that the Russian political-economic model is producing a PMSC market similar to those that exist in many Western countries, given that there is currently a very strong tendency toward monopolies in many sectors of the Russian economy. In 2014, Oleg Krinitsin, the head of RSB-Group, expressed concern regarding the potential for a genuine neoliberal Russian PMSC market. His suspicion was that Russia was more likely to end up with some "clumsy monopoly structure" (Boiarskii, 2014). Such a model may serve the Kremlin's interests well.

Third, the possibility of using a certain level of force in pursuing your national interests without this force being attributed to you is clearly tempting. Russian voices in the PMSC debate are certain that Western countries already do this (Neelov, 2017), and President Putin himself has talked about PMSCs as "an instrument for the realization of national interests where the state itself does not have to be involved" (RIA Novosti, 2012). Furthermore, investigative Russian reporters suggest that some members of the Russian General Staff were sold on the idea during a presentation delivered to them by the founder of the South African company Executive Outcomes, Eben Barlow, on the side-lines of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in 2010. It was the non-attribution aspect in particular that apparently triggered the generals' interest (Malkova & Baev, 2019).

PMSCs also provides the opportunity to offer covert international assistance to allied regimes. Duma representative Gennadii Nosovko, who proposed one of the laws relating to the legalization of PMSCs, has even publicly indicated that Russian PMSCs could be made available to Putin's allied authoritarian leaders in other countries that face popular uprisings. According to him, "there would not have been this present situation in Ukraine if there in Russia had been relevant PMSCs for hire at the time of the crisis for the Yanukovych government. At a time where they [the Yanukovych government] could not be certain of the loyalty of their army, they could have signed a contract with a Russian PMSC" (Boiarskii, 2014).

A fourth motivation for developing Russian PMCs may be to avoid the well-known "body bag effect", also a motivating factor in the West. In short, PMSCs could provide Russian authorities with a convenient means of utilizing military force in operations where the general Russian public would be sensitive to casualties. Ever since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), there has been considerable skepticism in Russia about risking Russian lives in operations not directly connected to the defense of the country. A Levada Center opinion poll from October 2015 (the beginning of Russian operations in Syria) suggested that despite more than 50 per cent support for the Russian policy toward Syria overall, only 19 per cent were willing to support "boots on the ground" (Levada Center, 2015). Private military contractors are often ex-service personnel, but tend to garner less support than their public counterparts. One Russian observer suggests sympathy for losses suffered by Wagner personnel is low, largely due to a perception that "(…) these people are highly paid, and knew what they were getting into" (Pukhov, 2017).

The Bureaucratic Politics of Russian PMSCs

There have been a number of initiatives in the Duma designed to legalize PMSCs and regulate their activities. In 2009, the representative Andrei Lugovoi proposed an amendment to the law governing private security companies that would allow them to operate abroad. Similar attempts were made in 2012, 2014 and 2018, but none have succeeded so far.

Some of the domestic resistance to legalizing PMSCs is probably ideological and stems from concerns regarding the state monopoly on the (legitimate) use of violence. An arguably more important objection relates to worries regarding who is to control PMSCs. Rival agencies would vie for such control because of the potential political clout attached and because of the desire to manage any potential future financial resources available to PMSCs. It may be the case that as long as the control issue remains undecided, most of the domestic players in Russia prefer the current ambiguous existence of these companies to outright legalization.

Several Russian sources point to a conflict of interest between the FSB (domestic security service) and the GRU (military intelligence) on this issue. The prevalence of competition and rivalry between these two agencies is historically well known, and there being a dispute between them on the issue of PMSCs does not seem far-fetched, especially not since Wagner in particular seems closely aligned to the GRU. One Russian source claims that the GRU "has spent 15 years on spreading the, in principle false, myth that private military companies play a major role in contemporary wars", and points to what he sees as planted publications on this topic in Russian military journals such as *Zarubezhnoe Voennoe Obozrenie* (Foreign Military Review) (Tokarev, 2017). Other sources maintain that the skepticism toward PMSCs is also strong within the military, not only in the FSB, and that both the MOD and the FSB constitute obstacles to the adoption of a law on PMSCs (Neelov, 2017). However, even if the GRU may be a driving force behind the development of Russian PMSCs, this does not necessarily mean that the institution is in favor of legalization. There is every reason to think that the GRU sees the potential benefits of the "informally allowed to exist" status.

That said, it would probably be wrong to suggest, as some have done, that the FSB is entirely against the PMSC idea (Tokarev, 2017). If that was the case, PMSCs would most likely not have been able to exist, even in the shadowy way that they do today. The FSB currently enjoys enough political pull in the Kremlin to block this phenomenon completely if it so wanted. The Russian military observer Arkadii Babchenko is adamant that the FSB is currently in full control of the PMSCs (Popkov, 2016). Thus, it seems more likely that the FSB has chosen a strategy of allowing the limited development of PMSCs under strict FSB control, rather than trying to block such companies from emerging. Control here does not necessarily mean day-to-day monitoring and interference. It is more likely that the FSB, and ultimately the Kremlin, have made it clear that PMSCs exist at their mercy, will have to do whatever the political leadership tells them and, should they fail to comply, can be dissolved almost instantly. This latter point may also help to explain the apparent paradox of PMSC existence without legalization. If they, in the absence of legalization, continue to exist at the FSB's mercy, they are likely to be easier to oversee and direct.

It is also likely that there are mixed views on PMSCs within the armed forces. At a conference on PMSCs organized by the Academy of the General Staff in March 2016, former Chief of Defense General Iurii Baluevskii argued forcefully against legalization on the grounds that PMSCs have the potential to become uncontrollable (Falichev, 2016).

Another concern may be that the military is not comfortable working alongside presumably less professional and less capable PMSCs, or that a PMSC presence in the same theater would be more of a nuisance than a help to the military forces. In addition, the military may also be concerned that PMSCs could consume resources that otherwise could have been earmarked for the regular forces. Thus, if PMSCs are allowed to continue to exist in Russia, it is, for MOD image purposes, best for the armed forces if they remain non-legalized and thus less visible (Polovinko, 2017).

PMSCs in Russian Foreign Policy

Russian PMSCs have existed at least since the mid-2000s, but their role as a tool of foreign policy has developed more recently. There is now substantial empirical evidence to suggest that Russia over the past five years on several occasions has employed PMSCs in pursuit of national interests beyond its borders. Wagner's participation in the annexation of Crimea in 2014 may have been the first major example of this tactic. Since then, their employment by the Kremlin on the rebel side in Donbas, and on the side of Assad in Syria, are the most prominent examples. Furthermore, there are now firm indications that they have been active in Libya, on the side of President Bashar in Sudan and in support of the government in the Central African Republic, among other places (Marten, 2019).

Two aspects of the Russian use of PMSCs as a tool of foreign policy are particularly striking: the diversity of operations in which they have been engaged and the blurring of national and private interests in their employment. The full extent of Russian PMSC participation in the annexation of Crimea remains unclear. However, Russian sources suggest that at least Wagner took part in the preparations for the disputed Crimean referendum on leaving Ukraine (Dergachev & Zgirovskaia, 2016). In Donbas, the same company was nicknamed "the cleaners", a name that alludes to their role in getting rid of local rebel commanders not to the Kremlin's liking, and to their participation in disciplining anti-Kiev rebel groups that operated too freely. In particular, there have been several claims that Wagner was used to discipline the loosely organized Cossack groups that fought Ukrainian forces in the Luhansk area (Guliaiev, 2016; Korotkov, 2015).

The above-mentioned examples could arguably be grouped as special operations. However, a separatist source also claimed to the online Ukrainian newspaper *Strana* (The Country) that at least Wagner took part in regular high-intensity fighting during the battle of Debaltseve in February 2015 (Ivashkina & Skibitskaia, 2016). If that is the case, it is further evidence that Russian PMSCs can be used in more conventional military roles. This claim corresponds with how Wagner has been utilized in a high-intensity fighting role in Syria. As a former Wagner fighter told the Estonian TV channel ETV in July 2017, "Wagner is no ordinary private military company. It is a miniature army. We had it all, mortars, howitzers, tanks, infantry-fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers" (Zakharov, 2017). One commentator describes Wager at the peak of activity in Syria as a force consisting of four reconnaissance assault brigades (each made up of three companies of up to 100 men), an artillery squadron (three batteries of 100 men each), a tank company (twelve tanks), a diversionary-reconnaissance company (150 men), a combat engineering company (100 men), a communication company (100 men), and staff and support sub-units (Kuczynski, 2018). Whether or not this description is entirely accurate, it seems clear that Wagner has capabilities that are a far cry from those of Western PMSCs. That said, it is unlikely that Wagner itself owns or controls the weaponry and

equipment needed to perform in this way, rather it is likely scrambled from the Ministry of Defense. Still, in this case, there was both the permission and the ability to mobilize a potent unit of contractors to substitute or support conventional forces.

The second striking aspect of the Russian use of PMSCs is how it, as opposed to the use of regular military force, potentially blurs national and private interests. In June 2017, the online Russian newspaper *Fontanka* claimed to have seen documents proving that in December 2016 the Syrian government and the Russian private company Euro Polis signed a deal in which Euro Polis promised to liberate oil and gas fields from Islamic State. In return, Euro Polis was to receive 25 per cent of the future income from these fields. Euro Polis is owned by the well-known Russian businessman and suspected Wagner banker, Yevgenii Prigozhin (Korotkov, 2017; Murtazin, 2017), and the task of retaking the fields was to be carried out by Wagner. Russian regular forces in Syria could not have taken on such a commercial-military contract as this, but a PMSC could. In a somewhat similar situation in February 2018 in Deir Ezzor in Syria, an unidentified number of Wagner soldiers died in an attempt to force the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces away from oil wells they controlled. The 600-strong Wagner force involved in this incident operated in support of the Assad-backed militia "ISIS Hunters". However, anonymous Russian military sources have characterized the operation as essentially being a local fight over oil resources (Solopov et al., 2018). Two Russian commentators called this incident the first direct clash between Russian and US forces since the Vietnam War (Aptekar & Zhelezneva, 2018), while Russian military sources confirmed that this operation was initiated without the approval of the Russian command in Syria (Solopov et al., 2018).

This blurring of national and commercial interests may not be limited only to Syria. The above-mentioned separatist source *Strana* claims that in Donbas, Wagner was "integrated into the GRU, but also open for private customers on the side" (Ivashkina & Skibitskaia, 2016). This jumbling of interests may not represent a major problem if the national and commercial interests coincide, but serious confusion and potential conflict could erupt if they do not. Neither Wagner nor any other Russian PMSC would intentionally do something contrary to the will of Putin. However, when these companies sometimes are allowed to act according to their own agenda in the same theater of operations, their activities may easily create negative consequences for Russian strategic interests. It would be equivalent to having a military unit that over the course of the same engagement is sometimes within and sometimes outside the chain of command.

The Russian PMSC industry is opaque, diverse and somewhat immature, meaning it has probably yet to find its shape and role. What that shape and role will be depends on power brokers within the security apparatus and in the Kremlin, and the rivalries and power struggles between them. It may also depend on clientelistic dynamics and the balancing of private interests with the interests of other elites.

WHAT ROLE FOR RUSSIAN PMSCS IN A RUSSIAN-WESTERN CONFLICT?

When Russian PMSCs operate on behalf of the Russian government, they can do so either by command or on a contractual basis. The former is possible because the distinction between public and private enterprise is more blurred in Russia than in most Western countries. There is little rule of law to protect private enterprise from having to carry out the wishes of the political leadership, even if they do not want to. Thus, it is easier for the Russian government than for many other governments to order private companies to do

the government's bidding. Therefore, whether the PMSC in question is a "company" set up to primarily serve the Russian security apparatus and to operate in close conjunction with government agencies, such as Wagner, or a registered private security firm, such as RSB-Group, might prove unimportant if the state decides that it needs its help.

Despite the fact that Wagner, according to some sources, on occasion fought on the level of a battle group in Syria, this seems less likely in the event of a conflict with Western countries, and particularly unlikely in a potential conflict with NATO countries. In Syria, Wagner fought the relatively lightly armed Islamic State. In a Western context, they would be fighting regular and far more heavily armed forces. In such high-intensity scenarios, Russia would probably prefer to use its regular forces. Still, one cannot rule out the possibility that PMSCs in some instances would be used as force multipliers in situations where Russia found its troops stretched. Nevertheless, we argue that PMSCs, in the context of a conflict with one or more Western countries, would be valuable to Russia as an instrument that could be used in *preparing* or *shaping* the battlefield. In fact, there are numerous ways that civilian contractors operating covertly on enemy soil could be used to facilitate Russian military operations, to carry out acts of sabotage in order to slow down Western military action or limit the options available to mission planners, or simply to paralyze civilian societal functions. Importantly, PMSCs could be used covertly to sabotage an enemy irrespective of the level of open conflict.

In many ways, the most obvious potential implication of Russian PMSCs for Western security is that Russian authorities could use them in situations where they want a very limited use of force for a restricted aim of some kind. One example could be the forced release of a Russian fishing vessel seized by a Western coastguard. In the event that the operation should fail, or if some of the Russian operators are arrested, Russia could deny responsibility. It is of course highly likely that the government of the other country involved would understand, or at least strongly suspect, that the use of force could be attributed to Russian authorities. However, in terms of both legal responsibility and the international narrative, there would be a major difference between the use of PMSCs and regular forces.

In a somewhat different scenario, PMSCs could be used to provoke a confrontation with a Western country, orchestrating it so that a reaction from the West could be deemed as militarizing or escalating the situation. Using a maritime example again, Moran Security Group (in contrast with most Western maritime PMSCs) has its own small fleet of unmarked vessels that would fit such purposes.[6] The company also boasts that its core personnel are ex-navy officers. If such a ship was used to carry out acts that would warrant a Western country to deploy naval ships or in other ways respond using military means, that could very well produce the international crisis scenario that the Russian leadership had wanted.

As the example above illustrates, PMSCs do not necessarily have to use kinetic force in order to help Russian authorities achieve foreign policy goals. They could be used, for example, to instigate civil unrest, execute cyber-attacks, act as foreign agents or inflict significant economic losses. At least one of the Russian PMSCs, ENOT Corp., seems to have run military-type training camps for right-wing activists from foreign countries (Goble, 2017). If Russia wanted to put a foreign government under pressure, then training right-wing radicals in violent methods before sending them back to their home country could be one way of doing that. Meanwhile, RSB-Group has established its own dedicated

cyber warfare capacity. So far, most cyber operations emanating from Russia have been traced back to the FSB or the GRU. In order to avoid direct attribution to Russian government agencies in the future, the authorities could start outsourcing more of the cyber operations to competent PMSCs.

The PMSCs could also be useful agents abroad. Personnel associated with the GRU allegedly poisoned Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury in 2018; even though Russia denied responsibility for the attack, the UK and some of its Western allies claimed GRU agents carried it out and responded by expelling Russian diplomats. The risk of such retaliations could be lessened by using PMSC personnel without a direct affiliation to any government security agency.

Additionally, one may also imagine a situation where Russia wanted to harm a Western country economically in order to exert pressure on its government or as an act of revenge for perceived illegitimate actions against Russia. Here, Russia could, for example, target port infrastructure, oil and gas facilities or underwater sea cables. Using PMSCs for such missions could create a situation of formal deniability while still sending a clear message to the target country. The main takeaway here is that these are just some examples of non-kinetic activities that Russian PMSCs could potentially carry out on behalf of the Russian government. In other words, PMSCs are an adaptive and flexible tool that could be used in any number of ways and for many purposes.

Within the kinetic specter, PMSCs could be well suited to "preparing" the target country for a possible later arrival of regular Russian forces. The private companies' activities here could include, for example, acts of sabotage, assassination of key personnel, reconnaissance, intelligence collection and target identification. PMSCs could hence be very useful in the early stages of a conflict or in peacetime by gathering data useful to military operation planning processes. PMSC operators (possibly ex-special forces personnel), dressed as civilians would be able to carry out reconnaissance work that would provide detailed information on e.g. potential landing sites or other local conditions in foreign countries.

Many of these tasks would normally be the domain of Russian special forces, but the use of PMSCs would decrease the potential for attribution. Uncertainty and confusion over attribution could slow down the target country's decision making and complicate appeals for NATO guarantees and the invocation of Article 5. Other NATO countries would most likely be hesitant to retaliate against Russia and thus risk war if there was a chance that Russia was not to blame for the hostile acts. One should note here that Russian military thinking for a long time has entertained the idea that there is no longer a clear demarcation between peace and war. The line is blurred, and efforts to achieve strategic aims may move back and forth between states of civilian and military aggression.

Additionally, PMSCs could be employed as smokescreens for regular Russian soldiers or special forces personnel in locations or contexts where deploying Russian soldiers would not sit well nationally or internationally. Simply put, regular Russian troops could be disguised as PMSCs. Russian-speaking personnel could thus be carrying out activities in locations under the cover of commercial agencies. This type of cover-up would be plausible in cases where Russia was providing unofficial state support for a regime or a militia, or where it for other reasons wanted to maintain a low profile or a light footprint. For example, given the close relationship between the GRU and Wagner,

it is not unthinkable that the same personnel may operate for both organizations in some cases; one should not rule out shoulder patches being swopped according to assignment or convenience. Such an approach may not be very farfetched; after all, a similar mode of operation designed to offer military assistance covertly was used in several countries during the cold war when Soviet soldiers and military instructors were sent to the Middle East as "tourists" (Sukhankin, 2018). Most PMSCs boasts their senior leadership hailing from various special forces units, the FSB or GRU, and that they employ former service personnel from the ranks of GRU and FSB. Many likely also remain in the reserves for such units (Jane's Intelligence Review, 2018). This confirms that the ties between some of the Russian PMSCs and divisions of the state security apparatus are close, but it also suggests that the dividing lines between them at times may be porous. The PMSC Shchit for example, seems largely to be a commercial outcrop of the 45th special forces regiment of the Airborne Forces (Korotkov, 2019).

Finally, PMSC activities in working against a foreign state may in principle also be initiated by the PMSC itself or by its owners or sponsors. There is reason to believe that not all hostile activity in support of Russian political goals, for example in cyber space, is directly ordered by Russian authorities. Some of it may be initiated bottom-up, and could be motivated by idealistic patriotism designed to earn goodwill from decision makers. One cannot rule out Russian PMSCs doing something similar, especially the more ideologically motivated among them. On the other hand, companies that strive for a position among international PMSCs are probably less likely to engage in such activities. Furthermore, any actor contemplating taking action on behalf of Russia without the explicit consent of Russian authorities would probably be relatively careful when deciding on the activities in which they should engage. They would know that they could easily end up putting the Russian government in an awkward position, and that this could backfire and leave them facing extremely negative consequences at home.

RUSSIAN PMSCS IN CONFLICTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

As already described, Russian PMSCs have started to have a presence in several conflict-ridden countries in the developing world, including South Sudan, Libya and the Central African Republic. In these war-torn countries, PMSC personnel have been reported to provide military training, but also to in more direct ways, meddle in internal power struggles. In Libya, there are reports that Wagner has been an active supporter of warlord Kahlifa Haftar, the self-declared field marshal of the "Libyan National Army" who aspires to overthrow the UN backed government in Tripoli. While the exact role of Wagner is not entirely clear, it seems to include military training, political "counseling" and information campaigns (see e.g. Weiss & Vaux, 2019). In some cases, Russian PMSCs thus have a proxy role in weak states, which in fact may affect who holds power in such states.

The presence and participation of Russian PMSC in violent conflicts may also have direct consequences for civilians in those conflicts, as well as for Western forces in the same theater. In the wake of the PMSC boom during the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, several instances of PMSC misbehavior were reported in the Western media. This triggered debates in both political and academic circles regarding what PMSC proliferation meant for the security of civilians in war zones. Such worries are also

warranted in the case of Russian PMSCs; in fact, Russian PMSCs may pose an even greater risk to civilians in conflict zones than Western PMSCs do. This hypothesis rests on two assumptions. First, Russian military culture is relatively more tolerant of collateral damage in terms of civilian life than the cultures prevalent in many other countries. Observers will point here to the two Chechen wars, and the bombings of Grozny in particular, as evidence of a military culture less concerned with collateral damage. Similar evidence of limited sensitivity to collateral damage can be observed in the Russian war effort in Syria since 2015, as illustrated by the aerial bombardment of population centers and the use of cluster munitions (Bostad, 2018). The second assumption is that Russian PMSCs may be less constrained by the risk of reputational damage than their Western counterparts. For example, Russian PMSCs have not experienced the same level of criticism related to violent conduct as the Western PMSCs did when they worked in Iraq. This means that not only are Russian PMSCs' personnel likely to be drawn from a military culture that has a comparatively higher acceptance of loss of civilian life, they are probably also less likely than PMSCs from other countries to face sanctions from their own government for causing such losses.[7]

Russian PMSCs may also cause harm due to their propensity to work for regimes that care little about human rights. They cater for many of the same clients as Western PMSCs do, in particular oil and gas companies operating in conflict zones and shipping companies hiring guards to protect against piracy, but after Donbas and Syria there might be an increasing tendency for Russian PMSCs to sign contracts with regimes in developing countries that have questionable human rights records. For example, the fact that Russian PMSCs are working for the governments of Sudan and the Central African Republic point in such a direction (Iakoreva, 2018). Both these countries were, according to Freedom House, among the 11 worst in the world in terms of political rights and civil liberties in 2018. As argued earlier in this article, the provision of violent force for the suppression of domestic rebellion in other countries has even been presented as a motive for the legalization of PMSCs by some Russian lawmakers. Thus, there is a danger that Russian PMSCs may become an additional source of repressive capacity for some of the world's most oppressive regimes.

Violent conflicts in developing countries may also lead Russian and Western PMSCs to be pitched against each other causing friction between Russia and the Western state home to the Western PMSC. Worse still, Western military forces could find themselves fighting Russian PMSCs acting as proxies for state or non-state adversaries of the West. This has already happened, in February 2018, when US warplanes bombed forces on the ground in Syria that included Russian Wagner fighters. The number of Wagner fighters killed remains a matter of controversy, but the episode created international headlines and provoked the fear that Russia would see this as an act of violence against the Russian state. Fortunately, that did not happen. According to former US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, the Russian forces in Syria used the established deconfliction line to convey to US commanders that Wagner in this case was acting outside of their control (Pawlyk, 2018). That, however, may not always be the case in the future. Thus, the danger is both that Western countries' adversaries in such conflicts may be militarily augmented by Russian PMSCs, and that the Russian authorities may come to see attacks on their PMSCs as more problematic than they did in the February 2018 example in Syria. Russian reaction to similar incidents in the future will probably depend on the ties that the

PMSC in question has to Russian authorities in general, and in the theater in question in particular.

Russian PMSCs might also be engaged to fight directly on behalf of the Kremlin in international conflicts. While that did not seem to be the case in the Wagner episode in February 2018, it was most probably true in the two fights for Palmyra in March 2016 and March 2017. Since these were both battles against Islamic State, US or other Western forces had no reason to attempt to prevent the Syrian and Russian offensives. However, it is not difficult to imagine a future situation where a Kremlin-backed Russian PMSC fights a local ally of Western forces. In such situations, Western countries would have to take into account that supporting its ally might result in an escalation into a conflict with Russia. Worst case, the antagonist of the Western ally may invite Russian PMSCs specifically for this purpose, and the expectation that the Kremlin will see attacks on Russian PMSCs as an affront to itself may embolden the antagonist to be more offensive than it otherwise would have been. Thus, the extent to which Russian PMSCs will act on behalf of the Russian government in future international conflicts is likely to be crucial in terms of the effect their development has on Western security.

Finally, we cannot disregard the possibility that an actor allied to a Western country will hire Russian PMSCs to boost its military capacity beyond what the Western partner can offer. For instance, Nigeria hired STTEP International to help combat Boko Haram in 2015; STTEP is a PMSC with links to the defunct Executive Outcomes, and it allegedly does not shy away from engaging in combat. Nigeria at the same time has recurrently received various forms of military training from Western countries, also with the aim of helping its forces confront Boko Haram (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). Thus, there is at least a theoretical possibility that Western forces at some point in the future may find themselves fighting alongside Russian PMSCs. This would probably not create many problems with regard to relations with the Kremlin, but if the Russian PMSCs were to show a disregard for human rights or civilian casualties, such fighting may become a dilemma and a significant source of embarrassment for the Western countries engaged in that particular conflict.

Some of the possible consequences for international security pointed out in this article may seem somewhat startling. After all, the Russian PMSC industry is still relatively limited, and Russia as an international actor is not militarily engaged in many countries around the world. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the nervousness created by the US bombing of Wagner in Syria in February 2018, things may change quickly. Six years after the little green men invaded Crimea, Western strategic thinking still does not seem to reflect the wide range of possibilities available to powers that tend not to worry much about international humanitarian law.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite Russian rhetoric on the need for a state monopoly on the use of force, and despite resistance in Russia to the legalization of PMSCs, the country already has a record of outsourcing violence to private entrepreneurs (Østensen & Bukkvoll, 2018). The Russian PMSC industry is not an entirely new manifestation of this inclination, rather it dates back to the 1990 s. The Russian PMSC industry is still relatively small and heterogeneous in

terms of professionalism and the services on offer. Compared to most Western PMSCs, Russian companies appear more rugged and more likely to take part in direct combat.

The still-lacking Russian legalization of PMSCs is somewhat puzzling given that as far back as 2012, President Putin spoke positively about the development of such companies. We find the answers to this puzzle in the strong ideological resentment toward PMSCs in some quarters of the Russian elite, and even more in state agency infighting over who will control PMSCs. Nevertheless, despite the absence of formal legality, Russian PMSCs are a reality, and there are few indications that they will disappear. If anything, they have lately become more active and more important, especially due to their role in the Donbas and Syrian wars and their increasing engagement in several African countries. Western countries should anticipate that Russian PMSCs may well continue to be a feature in violent conflicts where Russia is a party. However, Western countries should also anticipate PMSCs being used to carry out a wide array of actions within the hostile spectrum, in war and in peace, and in the gray zones between war and peace.

The modern use of commercial military and security companies in war zones can still be seen as a particularly Western, or even a US, phenomenon. Nonetheless, as with most other military innovations, it has come to be emulated in other regions of the world. It will, however, almost never be the case that military innovations are simply copied. When entering new political, economic and cultural realities, these groups will inevitably take local forms, and while the exact shape and role of the Russian PMSC industry is not yet carved out fully, Russia is now home to a small, but potent, PMSC industry that can be mobilized to inflict harm on Russia's enemies if called upon. Understanding the Russian conception of this "tool", and understanding what advantages these companies might offer in complementing any Russian use of force, is therefore an important part of understanding Russian strategic thinking.

NOTES

1. There is however an increasing number of studies on the subject of Russian PMSCs. These include among others Marten (2019); Spearin (2018); Sukhankin (2019); Østensen and Bukkvoll (2018).
2. ArmorGroup also had acquired well-known Defense Systems Limited (DSL) in 1997 and was itself acquired by G4 S Risk Management and morphed into that company in 2008 (Østensen, 2011).
3. There have also been reports of a company called Vega Strategic Services allegedly providing military training to the pro-Syrian government militia Liwa al-Quds (aka the Jerusalem Brigade); however, some sources have claimed the company's existence may be part of a counter-propaganda campaign carried out by media outlets close to the Kremlin. See Sukhankin (2019).
4. The issues of how to define these types of companies has been a constant matter of academic discussion since the early 2000 s. Making categorical distinctions between different companies that broadly speaking can be labeled PMSCs, has largely proven difficult under most circumstances because companies themselves are flexible and because most categories tend to merge into one another. Consequently, analyzing what companies of this sort *do* may be more fruitful than what they *are*.
5. This is not to suggest that there always is a clear demarcation line between combat and protective work when push comes to shove, but it also does not suggest that protective work cannot be separated from offensive soldiering.
6. In fact, a diplomatic issue arouse between Russia and Nigeria after nine crew members of the MV Myre Seadiver, one of Moran's vessels, were arrested on charges of gun-running in 2012.

The issue was solved after the Russian embassy stepped in and negotiated the crew members' release from prison. (Marten, 2019).

7. Importantly, Western PMSCs have also rarely been held to account for misbehavior in theaters. The case of four Blackwater operators in 2010 was the first widely publicized trial where PMSC personnel were convicted of murders committed in Iraq.

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War in the Falklands: Case Studies in British Special Operations

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ABSTRACT

This article explores the aspects of British special operations as conducted during the Falklands War in 1982 within the context of Spulak's theory of special operations. Specifically, it provides an evaluation of three engagements that were conducted by British special operations forces in order to confirm or refute the five characteristics of special operations as per this theory. While variances can be found and are described here, Spulak's theory of special operations can generally be seen as present in British special operations during this conflict.

KEYWORDS

Special operations; Falkland Islands; United Kingdom; Argentina

"Fortune favors the brave." – Terence

INTRODUCTION

The Falklands War (*La Guerra de las Malvinas o Conflicto del Atlántico Sur*) in 1982 between Great Britain and Argentina was one of the few armed conflicts in the late 20th Century that involved sustained, full spectrum military actions in a large and remote theater of operations. More particularly, this conflict was one of the few of that period that saw at least one of the belligerents integrate special operations with conventional operations in a deliberate and continuous manner. British special operations conducted during the Falklands War provide appropriate exemplars that can be evaluated in the context of modern military concepts.

This examination of British special operations in the Falklands War considers three engagements within the context of five characteristics of special operations forces, framed in Robert G. Spulak's Theory of Special Operations. As an assessment of how British special operations forces contributed to achieving strategic objectives in the Falklands War, this essay is presented in four parts. First, Spulak's theory of special operations is introduced as a framework for analysis. Then, an overview of the Falklands War provides context to the events of the war as part of the larger British political objectives in the Falklands. Within that milieu, British special operations during three battles of the Falklands campaign are examined within the framework of Spulak's characteristics of special operations forces. Finally, the strategic contributions of special operations in each battle of the Falklands War are presented.

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A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS: SPULAK'S THEORY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Robert Spulak presented his theory of special operations in 2007 as an extension of William McRaven's work, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice*, which was first published in 1995. In his treatise, McRaven emphasizes the generation of relatively superior combat power by special operations forces during direct action operations. Using this as a point of departure, Spulak focuses on the attributes of special operations forces that allow for the accomplishment of missions that would not be possible for conventional forces. Spulak poses that conventional forces cannot undertake certain missions without assuming unacceptable risks, which are primarily due to Clausewitzian friction. Accordingly, he presents that the need for special operations forces arises from the limitations of conventional forces, respective of those risks and considering the principles of war, and argues that special operations forces' inherent qualities allow them to overcome risk and obstacles that would preclude conventional forces from undertaking certain missions (Spulak, 2007, pp. 3–4).

Spulak presents three compelling reasons for defining a theory of special operations:

> *Conventional wisdom sees a growing role for special operations forces. A theory can help effectively fight the current war on terrorism and address the future challenges to our security.*
>
> *Special operations have always been discussed in terms of their potential and actual strategic impact, and a theory is needed for this strategic capability.*
>
> *A theory would be valuable to improve the institution of SOF by creating the ability to explain what institutional features (e.g., organization, doctrine, and use of technology) help or hinder the strategic uses of SOF.* (Spulak, 2007, p. 38).

Such a theory explains the application of special operations to strategic ends beyond the immediate *ad hoc* responses contemplated by military planners. Spulak's theory of special operations begins with an understanding of the limitations of conventional forces; the most prominent of which is Clausewitzian friction (defined in a subsequent section) (Spulak, 2007, pp. 3–4). Spulak posits that the unique ability of special operations forces is to overcome certain friction that conventional forces cannot, and this makes them effective at achieving the strategic goals. The main tenet of Spulak's theory is that special operations personnel perform strategically important tasks with the ability to "resolve economically politico-military problems at the operational or strategic level that are difficult or impossible to accomplish with conventional forces alone" (Spulak, 2007, p. 1). Spulak's conclusion is that special operations forces are most useful when they are being used for strategic ends; therefore, Spulak's theory offers military planners a guide on the use of special operations as a means to strategic ends. (Spulak, 2007, p. 3).

Spulak traces the origins of special operations forces and finds fundamental qualities of modern special operations forces: "Warriors", "Creativity," and "Flexibility" (Spulak, 2007, p. 14). These three qualities, in turn, associate with the ultimate sources of friction faced by special operations forces: constraints imposed by human physical and cognitive limits ("war is hell"); informational uncertainties and unforeseeable differences between perceived and actual reality ("you can't know what's out there"); and structural non-linearity of combat processes ("you can't predict what will happen") (Spulak, 2007, pp. 20–21). Spulak organizes special operations forces' contributions using the military principles of

war (objective, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity) along with nine core special operations tasks (direct action; counterterrorism; foreign internal defense; unconventional warfare; special reconnaissance; psychological operations; civil affairs operations; information operations; counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) (Spulak, 2007, pp. 31–38).

In the context of the previous qualities of special operations forces, Spulak identifies five predominant characteristics of special operations:

> *Relative superiority is the ability of small special operations units to gain a temporary decisive advantage, even over a larger or well-defended enemy force.*
>
> *Certain access – the ability to rapidly and securely transport, insert, and extract special operations forces, typically undetected, allowing operations in areas where or when conventional military operations are not possible.*
>
> *Unconventional operations – the ability to directly alter the way in which the tension between threatening and avoiding destruction is managed to conduct operations – for example, operating autonomously and independently, establishing and utilizing the capabilities of foreign military and paramilitary forces, sabotage, and subversion.*
>
> *Integrated operations – the ability to address transnational and asymmetric threats by integrating elements of national power and operating with other military forces and nonmilitary agencies.*
>
> *Strategic initiative – the ability to create and maintain initiative against an enemy at the strategic level by an orchestrated campaign of engaging carefully selected objectives unavailable to conventional forces.* (Spulak, 2007, p. 23).

Spulak posits that these characteristics are unique to special operations, are enduring, and describe the primary operational capabilities of special operations forces, and that any given force's ability to perform special operations unique missions rests on these characteristics. Spulak's theory of special operations provides a model that supports understanding the capabilities of special operations forces, enhances the planning of special operations missions, and can be used as a guide for understanding of institutional features that can influence planning for strategic uses. Different than McRaven's work, which focuses on describing direct action case studies, Spulak's theory provides an overall concept for understanding modern special operations (Spulak, 2007, pp. 4–5).

Spulak's effort is an excellent reference for evaluating British special operations during the Falklands War. It is particularly strong for framing the examination of how closely these forces aligned with the characteristics of special operations, and ultimately how these operations contributed to the achievement of British strategic objectives. This evaluation of British special operations forces' ability to overcome friction and be effective in recapturing the Falklands begins with a political and historical overview of Britain's strategic objectives during the Falklands War.

OVERVIEW OF THE FALKLANDS WAR

The political milieu and the sequence of events that sparked the initial hostilities provide the perspective to appreciate the strategic purpose of British special operations forces in the Falklands War. Understanding the Falklands War begins with how the Falklands came under British control in the first place.

In 1982, the Falkland Islands had been an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom for about one hundred and fifty years. An outlying pawn of European wars, the Falklands had been the focus of minor skirmishes between Spain, France and the United Kingdom since the 16th Century. The primary source of the long-lasting conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom can be found in the fact that Argentina's position is that Spain's claims to the Falklands became its own once is succeeded from that country; the British never recognized these claims and in fact have similarly substantial claims to the territory based on their own efforts to occupy and develop the islands over the four hundred years preceding the Falklands War.

The volatility of Argentina's internal politics during the 20th century was prime factor in the diminishment of it economic and military power over the course of that period. Prior to 1982, the Argentine military *junta* had assumed control of the Argentine national government seven times between 1930 and 1976. The year of the war marked the sixth year of Argentina's latest *junta*, which had originated when President Isabel Perón, widow of Juan Perón and custodian of the Perón legacy, had been ousted for failing to properly manage the country's economy. She was replaced by a succession of military leaders, culminating in General Leopoldo Galtieri, who assumed the presidency in December 1981. Unsuccessful in governance, Galtieri's regime faced criticism in the face of failing industrial output, declining wages, rising unemployment, and an inflation rate above 100 percent. While the wealthy, property-owning class was insulated from these factors, the majority of the population was subjected to a desperate situation. The *junta* established a sort of political stability, but at the cost of extreme repression of those opposing the regime, killing between 7,000 and 15,000 during the internal war in the 1970s (Middlebrook, 2014, p. 35). Following a significant diminishment of public support to his government, Galtieri directed the invasion of *Las Malvinas* as a way of deflecting attention from his domestic failures. For a while, this succeeded.

From the British perspective, the UK's declining interest in the Falklands was part of an overall decision to reduce overseas commitments worldwide (Privratsky, 2014, p. 2). Britain's strategic focus on countering the Soviet Union relegated the Falklands to being an expensive distraction for the British government. As such, the British military presence was reduced over time to a single platoon of Royal Marines in Stanley and *Her Majesty's Ship (HMS) Endurance*, which was a lightly armed ice patrol vessel (Hopple, 1984, p. 346). Given the austerity measures imposed at the time on the Royal Navy, the British scheduled *HMS Endurance* for retirement in 1982 without replacement. One additional factor that would soon have impact is the Falkland's geography. Its remoteness meant that the closest British military facilities were thousands of miles away in Belize and Ascension Island. These facilities were wholly insufficient, based on distance and capability, to support contingency operations. Thus, the closest substantial military support to the Falklands were the British Islands themselves at 8,000 miles distance and at least three weeks away by ship (Privratsky, 2014, p. 5).

THE WAR BEGINS

Years of suspicion and posturing culminated in 1982 with a small confrontation that quickly became a full spectrum war. With *HMS Endurance* in the final weeks of being stationed in Stanley, an incident occurred that took both Buenos Aires and London by

surprise. In March 1982, Constantino Davidoff, an Argentine scrap-metal merchant, began fulfilling a contract with a Scottish firm to demolish and salvage the whaling station at Leith Harbor on South Georgia Island, which is a British Overseas Territory located approximately 600 miles east of the Falklands. Although ostensibly motivated by his own private interests, Davidoff's commercial efforts were either co-opted or directed by the Argentinian government for its own political purposes.

The British embassy in Buenos Aires had issued Davidoff permission to begin work on South Georgia Island on the condition that he present his credentials to the head of the British Antarctic Survey at its main base at Grytviken, which is 20 miles south of Leith Harbor. Davidoff's work party of some forty workmen failed to comply with this requirement and instead landed at Leith Harbor on 19 March. Most of the Argentinians, who were actually members of the Argentine Navy's Tactical Diver's Group, changed into military uniforms and hoisted the Argentinian flag in the full view of the members of the British Antarctic Survey who were present. Argentinian actions on South Georgia Island quickly incurred an unexpected British response. Instead of acquiescing and entering into diplomacy, the UK dispatched *HMS Endurance* along with twenty-two Royal Marines to South Georgia Island with the purpose of evicting the Argentinians. Following a series of clashes, *HMS Endurance* withdrew and the Royal Marines surrendered to the numerically superior Argentinians (Hastings & Jenkins, 1997, pp. 68–69).

The British understood Davidoff's landing to be a deliberate provocation and an establishment of an Argentinian presence on South Georgia Island for the purpose of claiming sovereignty. With this warning, the UK thus began preparations for defense of the Falkland Islands with the limited military resources at hand. Undeterred with what it observed and unimpressed with British diplomatic threats, Argentina continued preparing for conflict, culminating with the invasion of the Falklands Islands on April 1st (Perkins, 1983, p. 65). After an initially robust defense, British military forces surrendered and relinquished complete control of the Falkland Islands to the Government of Argentina.

BRITISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS LEAD THE FIGHT

The Argentine invasion prompted an almost immediate British mobilization of forces, focused on a maritime task force cobbled together from naval and civil assets. By the end of April 1982, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher determined that the situation could not be resolved with negotiations and shifted focus to military options. Operation CORPORATE was initiated and the British began military operations in support of liberating the Falklands War (Bluth, 1987, p. 15).

British special operations forces were considered for use from the outset and tasked accordingly. The Ministry of Defense published initial guidance for the employment of special operations on 4 April 1982, designating the following tasks and qualities for strategic use of British Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Squadron (SBS) units: intelligence gathering, diversions, pathfinding, and direct action (note: the Special Boat Squadron was renamed Special Boat Service in 1987). The guidance specified that "adequate intelligence support" would be necessary to achieve these tasks (MOD, 1982, p. 8). British special operations forces were responsible for conducting two strategic tasks in support of the liberation of the Falklands. British special operations forces would conduct strategic intelligence missions in order to fill gaps in the theater intelligence picture, which

given all the factors was significant. Special operations forces would also perform direct action mission in order to neutralize strategic threats that could jeopardize the amphibious assault (Finlan, 2002, p. 322).

British special operations forces were essential to the success of Operation CORPORATE and were engaged throughout. From the first operations on South Georgia Island on 21 April until the negotiated Argentinian surrender at Stanley on 14 June 1982, SAS and SBS units were present at most decisive actions (Finlan, 2002, p. 324). Operation CORPORATE demonstrated British will and military efficiency, but at the cost to Britain of 255 dead and 777 wounded (Hastings & Jenkins, 1997, pp. 397–398). The contribution of British special operations forces played a very important part in the overall success of the operation, with some missions being more successful than others (Finlan, 2002, p. 327).

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CAPABILITIES IN CONTEXT

Three combat actions during Operation CORPORATE demonstrate the level of effectiveness of British special operations forces in support of overall campaign objectives:

- *Operation PARAQUET*
- *Operation PRELIM*
- *The Assault on Mount Kent.*

The next section contains an evaluation of these British special operations during each of these battles using Spulak's identified characteristics of special operations as a guide.

OPERATION PARAQUET

In April 1982, a choice presented itself to British leadership: recapture South Georgia Island or bypass the island and wait until the main Falklands operation was complete. Admiral Terence Lewin, the Chief of the Defense Staff, wanted an early success in order to gain political support for the conflict in the Falklands and boost confidence in the military's ability (Middlebrook, 2014, p. 103). Given these conditions, and as part of its overall strategy of escalating military engagement, the British government decided to send troops to South Georgia on 7 April 1982, only four days after the Argentinians had captured the island. On 7 April 1982, Admiral of the Fleet John Fieldhouse formed Combined Task Group (CTG) 317.9 under the command of naval Captain Brian Young of *HMS Antrim*, for the purpose of conducting Operation PARAQUET – the recapture of South Georgia Island. Composing the flotilla was *HMS Antrim* (a destroyer), *HMS Plymouth* (a frigate) and *Fleet Oiler Tidespring*, while the ground operation, led by Major Guy Sheridan, was to involve 150 Royal Marines of M Company, 42 Commando, Mountain Troop from D Squadron, 22 SAS, as well as elements of 2 SBS and 6 SBS on *HMS Plymouth* and *HMS Conqueror* (a submarine), respectively (Perkins, 1983, pp. 116–126). Collectively, the forces were known as Task Group 317.9. The plan to retake South Georgia had three parts. First, the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Group from D Squadron, 22 SAS, led by Major Cedric Delves, would land via helicopter on Fortuna Glacier. On the glacier, the SAS would assess the Argentine forces at Leith, Husvik, and Stromness. Second, the marines of 2 SBS would go by helicopter to Hound Bay and assess the approaches of Grytviken. Third, once the SAS and SBS teams had assessed the state of Argentine forces,

Royal marines would land five or six days later and the SAS would assault Grytviken during daylight hours (Rossiter, 2008, p. 192, 197–198). The Task Group included *HMS Antrim, HMS Plymouth*, and eventually *HMS Brilliant*, reached South Georgia on 21 April and began reconnaissance shortly thereafter (Thompson, 2007, p. 38).

The operation was designed to fit into the War Cabinet's strategy of escalating military engagement in order to convince the Argentinians that Britain was determined to regain control of the occupied islands (Middlebrook, 2014, p. 103). This first step in escalation served several initial purposes and functions: reconnaissance, terrain mapping, submarine patrol, combined aircraft and carrier support and cover, and setting up an observation post. The recapture of South Georgia was an opportunity to rehearse an amphibious assault and to gain intelligence on the Argentines because at that point, the Argentinian disposition was unknown (Van der Bijl, 2007, p. 47).

On 21 April, Captain Young's ships approached the island in very bad weather. The ship's helicopters had taken off despite a snowstorm, bringing the SAS to the landing site on Fortuna Glacier (Hastings & Jenkins, 1997, pp. 159– 160). The SAS had planned to set up a reconnaissance position to overlook Argentinian positions at Leith by transiting over the ice of the Fortuna Glacier in order to avoid being compromised. The Royal Navy captain of *HMS Endurance*, Nick Barker, opposed this approach because of personal experience with the dangerous climatic conditions. The SAS covered less than half a mile in whiteout conditions in five hours before requesting to be withdrawn the next day. Three helicopters were sent to extract them and two crashed because of the weather, but the third managed to bring all personnel back to the ship. The loss of two helicopters represented an enormous logistical blow to the naval assault force but, more importantly, the first operation had ended in failure. The loss of the helicopters did not preclude other attempts to land British special operations forces around the Argentine positions on South Georgia. On 23 April, the British forces attempted to land an SAS Boat troop, but only three of the five Gemini inflatable boats were able to make it to the objective; the other two drifted out to sea and had to be retrieved by helicopter. The SBS attempt to provide reconnaissance had been foiled by ice puncturing their inflatable boats (Finlan, 2002, pp. 87–88).

On 25 April, the British picked up unidentified radar contacts close to the main Argentine base at Grytviken. Three British helicopters sighted an Argentine submarine heading out of Cumberland Bay, and attacked it with depth charges and torpedoes. The submarine turned back to Grytviken, but the Argentinians on shore had been thrown into disarray. The British were determined to use this to their advantage and a composite force of marines, SAS, and SBS was formed. This force landed by helicopter and approached Grytviken, launching an unwitting assault on a group of elephant seals they initially mistook for Argentine forces. Because of the Argentine disarray and the speed of their landing, the British were met with surprisingly little resistance. At 0515 local time, the garrison commander surrendered (Hastings & Jenkins, 1997, pp. 163–164).

After the capture of Grytviken, the garrison at Leith surrendered without resistance the next day. The British victory at South Georgia became complete when a helicopter picked up the signal from the three-man SAS patrol in a Gemini boat that had been swept away on 23 April, and rescued them. This final small miracle completed the capture of South Georgia with no British lives lost and only one Argentine wounded and one killed the following day in an accident (Hastings & Jenkins, 1997, p. 164).

The complexity of the plan, the unplanned inclusion of the SAS, as well as unclear and overlapping roles of (naval) Captain Young, Major Sheridan, and Major Delves nearly made Operation PARAQUET a British disaster. Simplicity was not the strong point of this operation and it could have had devastating strategic consequences for the rest of Operation CORPORATE. A failure at South Georgia Island would have undermined the political will behind the entire undertaking in the Falklands (Finlan, 2002, p. 327).

Special Operations Characteristics for Operation PARAQUET

This audacious action was intended from the beginning to be a rapid assault leading to swift victory. The British wanted to secure this early victory in order to bolster political support for retaking the Falklands. The decision to send troops was made within four days of the Argentinian invasion of South Georgia (Middlebrook, 2014, p. 103). Operation PARAQUET's inconsistent adherence to Spulak's characteristics of special operations presents opportunities for negative critical review, even with the operation's overall success.

British special operations forces demonstrated limited success in achieving *Certain Access*. Conceptually, using special operations forces was the best solution to gaining access to the island all without having to divert major forces from the primary operation. South Georgia Island is 800 miles from the Falklands, and while largely irrelevant to the recapture of the Falklands, the political decision to take South Georgia Island became part of the overall strategy based on the perceived requirement to build domestic support and provide a quick defeat of any kind to the Argentinians. A small, regular force seemed too risky, as any sort of setback would have had devastating consequences to public perception of military capability (Hastings & Jenkins, 1997, pp. 158– 159). The limited effectiveness of the infiltration techniques used by SAS and SBS forces, combined with a lack of unified command with conventional forces, led to a near-disaster that was overcome by luck and a lack of resistance by the Argentinians.

British special operations forces were relatively effective in applying the principle of *Unconventional Operations*, and their flexibility and innovation were instrumental to the overall success of Operation PARAQUET. One of the operational constraints imposed on the Commander Task Group was to minimize loss of life and damage to property. Naval gunfire could have reduced the two Argentinian bases without committing any troops to a landing, but this would have been contrary to the orders to minimize death and damage. A conventional assault landing would likely have led to high casualties on both sides. Given this, planners for the reoccupation of South Georgia Island considered several unconventional tactics and the use of special operations forces as the lead for some critical efforts. One option considered was to contact the Argentinian garrison by radio and demand its surrender before shots were fired. This option, however, was discounted because it squandered the surprise effect on the Argentinians. An ultimatum would have put the Argentinians on guard and would have invited an Argentine preemptive strike. (Perkins, 1983, pp. 121– 122). Regardless, the use of SBS and SAS, even with their limited effectiveness, capitalized on the combination of shock and lack of Argentinian will to fight and thus led the way to tactical success.

Operation PARAQUET was intended to be an *Integrated Operation* from the onset, but the potential positive effects from integration were limited by significant command and control challenges; predominately, continually changing task organizations and chains of

command. This is demonstrated in the example of Major Guy Sheridan, the Royal Marine officer whose regular assignment at the time was second-in-command of 42 Commando. Given his extensive mountaineering experience and current assignment, Major Sheridan was selected to be the Landing Force Commander for the force consisting of M Company of 42 Commando, a section of the Commando Reconnaissance Troop, a section of specialized assault troops (engineers, medics and logisticians), two naval gunfire observer parties; and an SBS section. Major Sheridan flew to Ascension Island and linked up with 2 SBS and the Mountain Troop of D Squadron, 22 SAS. Sheridan and M Company (with other elements) loaded onto the *HMS Antrim* on 10 April, then moved south as part of the Task Group under command of Captain Young (of course, a naval officer). To Sheridan's surprise, the whole of D Squadron had been transferred to Young's authority and was heading for South Georgia as part of a separate task; it's still not clear who gave this command. In addition to this confused situation, D Squadron's commander maintained private satellite communications with a direct line to the top, regularly bypassing the rest of the command team at the scene of the operation (Thompson, 2007, p. 38).

Problems from this command and control arrangement quickly appeared. After reaching South Georgia on 21 April, the Task Group employed D Squadron to conduct reconnaissance for Captain Young, not for Major Sheridan. Against the advice of Major Sheridan, D Squadron landed its reconnaissance patrols on the Fortuna Glacier, where they found themselves unprepared to deal with the extreme conditions there. Sheridan's special knowledge of hazardous conditions serving as a military mountaineer and arctic expert being ignored, the patrols made no headway across the glacier and had to be evacuated less than 12 hours after arriving (Thompson, 2007, p. 39). The captain of *HMS Endurance* remarked later of the operation, "in military terms the whole operation had become a monumental cockup" (Thompson, 2007, p. 39). In addition to the blurred lines of command on the ground, there was also a significant amount of "back-seat driving" by Fleet Headquarters at Northwood. Too many leaders of equal rank were involved in this operation and too little attention was paid to Major Sheridan, the officer on the ground with the most battle and mountain experience. Sheridan was junior in command to the three naval captains, and equal in rank to the SAS commander, and the lack of a clear, integrated chain of command led to near chaos (Thompson, 2007, pp. 39–40).

While execution was less than perfect, the use of the SAS as part of *Strategic Initiative* realized the strategic objective of a swift and bloodless victory to win public support for the remainder of the Falklands campaign. A conventional naval bombardment, even if backed by the threat of total destruction if the garrison failed to surrender, would have likely inflicted a much greater potential for loss of life at least for Argentinian forces, which was counter to the stated objectives of the British government. (Finlan, 2002, p. 88; Thompson, 2007, p. 41). British special operations provided a strategic solution that the conventional forces would have found near impossible to provide.

OPERATION PRELIM

In preparation for the invasion to secure San Carlos and subsequently the remainder of the Falklands, British special operations forces attacked Argentinian forces there as part of an operation named PRELIM. Elements of D Squadron, 22 SAS, led by Major Cedric Delves, raided the airstrip and facilities on Pebble Island in order to destroy the Pucara light attack

aircraft that the Argentinians had based there. Delves and his team found themselves with a lack of information about Argentinian capabilities, but it was clear that they needed to reduce the Argentinian air threat before the main landing. Land reconnaissance revealed that Pucaras and other small aircraft were based at Pebble Island; these posed a significant threat to British ships entering the northern Falkland Sound. In order to reduce that threat, the British planned a raid to be conducted by special operations forces, with actions on the objective overnight on 14 May 1982 (Freedman, 2007, pp. 434– 435).

The original objectives of the raid were to destroy Argentinian air capabilities as well as to eliminate the Argentinian garrison on the island. However, pre-mission assessments concluded that eliminating the garrison would be too difficult, so that part of the plan was dropped (Finlan, 2002, p. 323). This final plan was simpler than the original, with the entire raiding party arriving and departing by helicopter. Four troops of D Squadron were tasked to conduct the raid, to include augmentation by a naval gunfire forward observation team. The tasks in the plan were clear: Boat Troop would conduct pre-raid reconnaissance, Mountain Troop would attack the airfield, and the remaining forces would provide security and constitute a reserve (Hutchings, 2014, p. 11). Infiltrating by helicopter and then canoe on the night of 11 May, elements of Boat Troop established reconnaissance hide sites and began reporting back to headquarters; the Pucaras were present as the primary target, but the team also determined that Pebble Island was being used as a staging base for Argentinian C-130s from the mainland. A successful attack could also interrupt this supply chain (Fowler, 1992, p. 18).

Weather effects on the *Hermes* delayed the infiltration of the assault elements of D Squadron, leaving thirty minutes on the objective instead of planned ninety. Nevertheless, the raiders landed on Pebble Island on the night of 14 May and linked up with Boat Troop, after which the consolidated group established a secured position in the vicinity of the objective. Once prepared, the elements of Boat Troop split from the main body and attacked the Argentinian base's munitions and fuel dump, while the remainder of assault teams moved onto the airfield and began the deliberate destruction of the Pucaras and other aircraft that were present. A significant aspect of the SAS operators' well planned operations was the placement of explosive charges on the Pucaras; the raiders set their explosives in identical locations on each plane, thus preventing the Argentinians from using parts from one plane to repair another. In addition to the explosives, the assault element used grenade launchers and light antitank rockets to complete the destruction of the targeted aircraft. During the British assault, the Argentinian defenders were suppressed by mortar fire and by naval gunfire from *HMS Glamorgan* (Southby-Tailyour, 2014, pp. 160–161). With just a short time on the objective, the SAS successfully completed the raid and began moving back to the pickup location, having destroyed six Pucaras, four Mentors light attack aircraft, a Skyvan cargo plane, as well as all of the Argentinian ammunition and fuel stored at the airfield (Freedman, 2007, p. 435).

The destruction of the aircraft permanently removed key Argentinian assets from the battlefield and delivered a clear and decisive advantage to British forces. This enabled the main British task force to advance further into the decisive phase of Operation CORPORATE while forcing the Argentinians to revise their tactics (Finlan, 2002, p. 328).

Special Operations Characteristics for Operation PRELIM

Operation PRELIM is an excellent example of small special operations units' ability to gain *Relative Superiority* and use it to a decisive advantage. Given clear tasks, appropriate resources

and, of course, surprise, D Squadron was successful in destroying many Argentinian aircraft, even while significantly outnumbered on the objective. The only British casualties were a concussion to one soldier and a fratricide gunshot wound to another. Both injuries were treated quickly and the entire operation only ran 15 minutes behind schedule (Van der Bijl, 2007, p. 75). The swiftness of the raid was captured in the log for *HMS Glamorgan* for 15 May: *"0400 hrs Arrived on the gun-line … 0420 hrs Opened fire and 07:45 hrs Bombardment complete. Retired at 29 knots! 14 (sic) Aircraft destroyed ashore"* (Mackay & Cooksey, 2007, p. 71).

Operation PRELIM also provides an excellent example of special operations forces' ability to ensure *Certain Access* by demonstrating unconventional, low-visibility methods of insertion and extraction of special operations forces, all while being undetected prior to initiation of the raid. Under the cover of darkness, the SAS infiltrated to close proximity to the Argentinian controlled airfield, a great example of which was the element of D Squadron's Boat Troop that paddled ashore in 2-man canoes, then traversed difficult terrain in order to establish a covert observation post that set the conditions for the main effort. For the attack on the airfield, it was imperative for the main body of SAS to quickly cover the seven thousand meters to the airfield; the plan reflected this and provided guidance that speed was the most important factor in the movement to the objective (Van der Bijl, 2007, p. 74). In the end, this small and highly mobile force inserted undetected and destroyed Argentinian airpower on Pebble Island within a matter of hours with limited casualties.

While the SAS assaulted the aircraft on the runway, British naval gunfire delivered supporting fires and provided a classic example of *Integrated Operations* (Freedman, 2007, p. 435). *HMS Glamorgan's* coordinated movement placed its 4.5 inch Mark N6 guns at the right place and time to support the SAS's assault on the airfield, bombarding the western edge of the runway in an attempt to obstruct Argentinian counterattacks emanating from the main garrison (Van der Bijl, 2007, p. 75). Additionally, the raiding party along with the original 8-man reconnaissance team were picked up by four naval Sea Kings and flown back to *HMS Hermes*, rounding out the superb support by the British Navy to the SAS for this successful raid.

Finally, the raid on Pebble Island demonstrates effective use of special operations forces' capabilities as part of Britain's creation of *Strategic Initiative* during the Falklands War. In this case, the airfield on Pebble Island was specially selected to create several strategic effects, to include the successful demonstration of a strategic capability (the SAS), the lessening of Argentina's strategic mobility (use of the airfield for C-130 transit), and of course the removal of a particularly lethal Argentinean capability from the battlefield (the Pucara aircraft). This action is likely the best example of Spulak's theory out of the entire campaign. The Argentinian threat on Pebble Island needed to be neutralized and elements from British SAS were effectively used to do so (Mackay & Cooksey, 2007, pp. 37–38, 84).

ASSAULT ON MOUNT KENT

Encouraged by their success at Pebble Island, and after hard fought naval and air battles that saw significant ship and aircraft casualties, the British successfully landed at Ajax Bay and Port San Carlos and begin the land campaign with the objective of liberating Stanley. The terrain to be covered during that action was the northern half of East Falkland Island, which is characterized by a mountain range that runs east to west. Dominating that range

is Mount Kent, which at about 1500 feet in height overlooks the entire axis of advance toward Stanley. Being just twelve miles west of the town of Stanley, Mount Kent provides spectacular overwatch for the capital as well as for the entire northern part of East Falkland Island. For both sides, controlling this dominant terrain was identified as essential task, and was part of a larger objective to occupy the high ground from Long Island Mount through Mount Kent to Mount Challenger to prepare the battlespace for a nighttime assault on the Argentine Outer Defense Zone (Van der Bijl, 2007, p. 92). If it had been properly secured by the Argentinians, Mount Kent could have been the center of a deliberate defense that could have presented as significant challenge the British to reckon with. As it was, the hill was lightly defended, if guarded at all, and the British sought to take advantage of this opportunity (Adams, 1989, p. 190).

During reconnaissance that began on 25 May, D Squadron assessed that that Mount Kent was surprisingly undefended by the Argentinians. Even though the objective was 40 miles east of the nearest British forces, SAS Lieutenant Colonel Michael Rose, who had command over all British special operations forces, sought and gained approval to immediately seize Mount Kent with a minimal force (Middlebrook, 2014, pp. 277–279). The remainder of the squadron arrived on 27 May, just in time to repel Argentinian patrols from 602 Commando Company. Skirmishes continued as the situation continued to develop, as the British were not fully aware of the Argentinian disposition.

Royal Marine Commandos had attempted to land by helicopter in the afternoon on 30 May, but the operation to fly these British reinforcements to Mount Kent was canceled due to unsuitable weather. The next day, elements of K Company, 42 Commando, along with their overall commander (Royal Marine Lieutenant Colonel Nick Vaux) as well as Lieutenant Colonel Rose, landed by helicopter. The landing zone and surrounding terrain were complex and high, and as such provided advantage for the British in the subsequent battle. The British knew that the Argentinians did not have the area covered, and they would not likely desire to stage up in the high areas due to challenging climate and terrain conditions. The landing took place in the afternoon during waning daylight hours, with the British helicopter pilots flying contour with night vision goggles to cross the 40 miles across East Falkland from the nearest British positions. Because they were attacking into the unknown, it appeared that the Argentinians would be unprepared to respond (Hastings & Jenkins, 1997, pp. 332–333). It is not clear whether the Argentinians knew of the helicopter landing, but the British forces were not fired upon in any case during landing.

The objectives for the SAS during the assault on Mount Kent were multidimensional. The SAS was tasked with a variety of supporting attacks, to include:

- surveilling the approaches of Mount Kent
- conducting diversionary attacks that were designed to deceive the Argentinians as to where the main British conventional attack would come from
- conducting clandestine patrols to find a route through a minefield around the south of Mount Harriet
- sniping and coordinating naval artillery were to harass the defenders and deny them sleep
- attacking Argentina's artillery observation post on Mount Kent and the ground radar installation on Mount Longdon
- laser designating key targets including the Argentine bunker complex on Mount Harriet for bombing (McManners, 268).

Although the British had a diverse arsenal of firepower and were technologically advanced, the location, terrain and weather and known radar capabilities on the island did not always permit or require complex tactical moves (Hutchings, 2008). The terrain alone was a deterrent, as the mountains, snow and lack of roads made it impossible to execute maneuvers in any way other than on foot (Freedman, 2001; Valovcin, 1992). The use of special operations forces for dismounted patrols was a conventional task, yet a requirement within the conduct of their broader tasks due to the operating environment. The special operations teams were highly successful due to their level of training and expertise.

As the Argentinians began to respond and the fight began to develop, the last operational British Chinook helicopter brought in three 105 mm guns and 300 rounds of ammunition. On the way back to San Carlos, the helicopter inadvertently struck a lake, and although it managed to keep flying, it would be out for the remainder of the night. Thus, no more gun ammunition could be brought in and K Company would be alone until they could be reinforced (Hastings & Jenkins, 1997, pp. 333–334). Even so, this additional firepower turned the tide of the battle and allowed the British to repel subsequent attacks.

Special Operations Characteristics for the Assault on Mount Kent

The helicopter insertion on 31 May was successful in generating *Relative Superiority* and providing *Certain Access* for British SOF, despite white-out conditions the day before. As the helicopters landed, Max Hastings, a journalist who was along for landings, shouted to Lieutenant Colonel Rose that it seem impossible that the Argentinians would not respond with shells at the landing site. Rose aptly responded with, "Who dares wins," the motto of the British SAS. Certainly the landing troops under Vaux and Rose were prepared to be shelled, but the skilled flying by the helicopter pilots and the timing of the operation at dusk allowed them to be inserted successfully with no Argentine resistance. They were joined by K Company later that night, which seized the hill with an uncontested assault (Hastings & Jenkins, 1997, pp. 332–333).

This operation demonstrated an effective result in regards to *Integrated Operations*. The relatively close proximity of the insertions of Vaux, Rose and Delves allowed for excellent coordination and synchronized execution during the initial phases of the assault. This, combined with the fact that the British were not met with effective Argentinian fire, allowed for the cobbled together force of SAS, Commandos, Royal Artillery and Royal Air Force to adequately prepare the battlefield for K Company to seize Mount Kent before the Argentinians could generate enough force to respond (Middlebrook, 2014, p. 278). The communication difficulties, infighting, casualties and friendly fire incidents associated with the other phases, are not visible here. As stated above, marines landed with Lieutenant Colonels Vaux and Rose of the SAS and were met by Major Delves of D Squadron upon arrival. Rose, Vaux, and commando headquarters established a shelter a few hundred yards from the landing site. Captain Peter Babbington of K Company carried out a company night attack on the summit of Mount Kent, and was relieved to discover that it was largely unguarded, which made securing the summit relatively easy (Hastings & Jenkins, 1997, pp. 332–333).

Certainly, the British exhibited *Strategic Initiative* while securing Mount Kent. By acting with audacity and quicker than the Argentinians could respond, British special operations forces achieved the strategic goal of seizing the dominant terrain that enabled

success for the remainder of the campaign. The momentum gained by the British and lost by the Argentinians never shifted again during this conflict. Within a week of the seizure of Mount Kent, 3 Para held Mount Estancia and Mount Vernet (to the northeast of Mount Kent) and the SAS were firmly in place on the Murrell Heights (Hastings & Jenkins, 1997, p. 335). The position on the Murrell Heights was important because it was located just north of Stanley Harbor, putting the SAS in position for a final assault. On 4 June, 45 Commando Brigade arrived to the rear slopes of Mount Kent and the key fighting elements of 3 Commando Brigade were positions on the north axis of advance against Port Stanley. Thus, seizing Mount Kent and securing these key positions set the British up for a final assault on Port Stanley.

ASSESSING SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES STRATEGIC ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE FALKLANDS WAR

The strategic contributions of British special operations forces during the Falklands War clearly correlate to Spulak's theory of special operations, but they are not always direct or comprehensive. True to Spulak's imperative to gauge strategic impact, it is important to appreciate British special operations forces' strategic contributions as part of the critical examination of their efforts in this conflict while foiled against Spulak's characteristics of special operations. This assessment extrapolates associations between Spulak's theoretical principles and the military successes that the British enjoyed by employing special operations forces during the Falklands War.

When Admiral Lewin set out to clinch an early victory to increase political support for the cause and increase confidence in the British military, he achieved that effect with Operation PARAQUET. However, this success was almost in spite of adherence to some of Spulak's principles. British forces managed to retake South Georgia in a speedy 22 days after the Argentinians had captured it, but were barely able to generate *Relative Superiority* while doing so (Middlebrook, 2014, p. 113). And while the operation suffered only somewhat due to the misfortune of the stranded SAS men on the glacier, and the overall objective and thus the strategic effect was still achieved, this was no clear demonstration of *Certain Access*. Only the combat power generated by *Integrated Operations*, with well-executed naval, air and ground actions occurring in spite of all setbacks, destroyed Argentinian initiative and assets and secured the objective with no combat casualties (Hastings & Jenkins, 1997, p. 164). Understanding that the decision to recapture South Georgia before the main assault was considered to be an important demonstration of political will, PARAQUAT remains a mixed showing of Spulak's principles (Adams, 1989, p. 442).

At the other end of the spectrum, Operation PRELIM's coordinated attack on Pebble Island was so effective in producing overwhelming combat power that an effective response from the Argentinian garrison was non-existent. Indeed, British special operations forces' thirty minute long attack demonstrated all of Spulak's principles, resulting in the destruction of half of Argentina's ground attack aircraft in the Falkland Islands, as well as aerial surveillance and transport aircraft. The simplicity and elegance of the SAS team's execution using maximized effort to obtain the initiative. Major General Moore had this to say about the raid:

> *Pebble Island was successfully raided in the most atrocious weather and provided just the right political and military boost to morale. In my view this single operation is easily the best example of*

> *a successful "All Arms" special operation we are likely to see in a very long while. A short notice operation carried out with speed and dash-no dead, one injured and 11 aircraft written off in one hour. Total time from start to finish five days. Remarkable. But a word of caution is necessary here. Because it succeeded on this occasion, it may be tempting to expect such operations to be feasible in this, or shorter, time-scales at the drop of a hat. The time-scale will usually be longer and the assets needed to provide the necessary support are considerable.* (1983, p. 29).

This successful effort likely secured British advantage for the remainder of the campaign. This mission is the best example of adherence to Spulak's' theory of special operations, which translated into effective engagement of a key target, and positively impacted the entire campaign.

The assault on Mount Kent by British special operations forces was certainly *integrated*, but it was hardly *unconventional*. The overall goal was the control of the mountains that overlooked the approaches to Port Stanley and shaping the battlespace for the invasion by conventional forces. SAS were tasked with reconnaissance of all three mountainous peaks-along with the interlocking Two Sisters ridge that connected Harriet and Kent (Southby-Tailyour, 2014b). Although the work of displacing Argentinian forces would fall to conventional forces, the British would rely heavily on SAS units for reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and laser targeting targets for RAF Harrier strikes utilizing 1,000-pound GBU-16 Paveway II bombs (Van der Bijl, 2007). Was this necessarily a special operation? Spulak's criterial do not necessarily support this contention.

The SAS patrols and ambushes, and kept the area secure which aided the conventional forces in creating a new phase line in which to advance to Stanley which was only 10 miles away. This type of operation could have been handled by conventional forces; certainly, the British Parachute Regiment could have. Regardless, the preponderance of SAS engagements were against Argentinian special operations forces, and they decimated their Argentinians opponents even though the SAS did not have the numerical advantage. The British SAS were better trained and more seasoned combatants after having experiences in overseas warfare in previous British engagements (Dunn, 1993; Finlan, 2002b; Ward, 2007).

A MIXED ASSESSMENT

Modern special operations forces are designed, and perhaps more importantly, resourced to achieve strategic effects. It is not clear from this appraisal that British special operations forces' adhered to Spulak's characteristics of special operations and that this enabled British special operations forces to accomplish their strategic goals overall. The cases shown here, however, demonstrate that more often than not, the principles of Spulak's theory of special operations can be found in the experiences of British special operations forces in the Falklands War. Operation PRELIM adhered the best to Spulak's theory of special operations and was also the battle to most definitively achieve the strategic objective set out for the operation. Thus, although special operations forces are able to overcome friction that conventional forces cannot, they cannot overcome all friction. Additionally, although special operations forces may not have adhered to Spulak's characteristics, the overall objective of the mission could still be accomplished, albeit with more complication. One could say that adhering to the Spulak's characteristics of special operations may be necessary, but not sufficient to overcoming friction. Still, Britain's mission accomplishments in the Falklands War indicate that those cases that showed adherence to Spulak's principles were more likely to lead to a positive

strategic effect. Overall, the Falklands campaign was a success for the British, but not without significant sacrifice in men and materiel, and not necessarily due to adherence to Spulak's theory. While total adherence to Spulak's theory is would be unlikely even in the most successful missions, these measurements create a baseline and a vantage point for future special operations. Whether these numbers are very high or very low in comparison to other missions and conflicts, is outside the scope of this paper's research, and is an avenue for other scholars to pursue.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Several of the authors are employees of the US Government; the views presented are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Government, the Department of Defense or its components.

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The Population-Centric Turn in Special Operations: A Possible Way Ahead for SOF Informed by a Cross-Disciplinary Analysis of State-Building Interventions

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ABSTRACT

Post-Cold War liberal state-building interventions are characterized by a convergence of operational approaches rooted in counterinsurgency, state building and peace operations. A cross-disciplinary analysis of these operational approaches reveals a holistic framework consisting of initial, provisional, and durable control. Connecting this framework to the results found in case studies on liberal state-building interventions, it becomes clear that there are conceptual conflicts. Conceptual conflicts which have real-world consequences when it turns out that the requirements for initial, provisional, and durable control are difficult to reconcile in areas of operations. Such real-world consequences can be mitigated by having a thorough understanding of the societal context. Because the acquiring of understanding with regard to possible (near-future) intervention area's is often hazardous and requires a specific skillset, Special Operations Forces (SOF) might be the entity most suitable for these kinds of activities. For this to happen, SOF will have to reorient and reorganize itself. This entails that it will have to partially shed the baggage it has collected during the last three decades.

KEYWORDS

Liberal State-Building Interventions; Special Operations Forces; Understanding; Cultural Intelligence; Societal Context

INTRODUCTION

The better part of the twentieth century has been characterized by the struggle between three competing ideologies (*i.e.* fascism, communism, and liberalism). After the end of the Second World War, fascism disappeared as a global ideology and international political relations were dominated by the shadow boxing match that is known as the Cold War. This ended when it turned out that communism lacked the stamina to compete with liberalism, leading to Francis Fukuyama's famous proclamation that the Western world had reached the end of history (1992). Liberalism's triumph led to a "widely shared conviction that political and economic liberalism offered a key to solving a broad range of social, political and economic problems from under-development and famine, to disease, environmental degradation and violent conflict" (Paris, 2012, p. 30). Consequently, liberal optimism became entrenched in Western interventionist thinking and has played a fundamental role in international security in the 1990s as well as the first decades of the 21st century. The September 11 attacks of 2001 have hugely shaped the international security situation during this latter period as the conduct of Western states – both in domestic and international matters – has been profoundly influenced by the

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Global War on Terror (GWoT). It has been against this backdrop of liberalism and the GWoT that state-building interventionism evolved into its current form.

The new interventionism has distinguished itself from colonial and Cold War counter-insurgency and peace operations by combining traditional tactics with liberal state building aimed at transforming political order. Furthermore, the overarching setting of the GWoT has triggered an influx of counterterrorist activities, which has been instrumental to the increased role of Special Operation Forces (SOF). The persistence of this blended approach is exemplified by recent developments in the Sahel region which have shown a commanding presence of SOF in connection with robust peace operations (Charbonneau, 2017). Albeit that peace operations and SOF are not new to each other (*e.g.* Somalia and Bosnia in the 1990s), the intensity currently witnessed in the Sahel is considered reminiscent of the SOF role during the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, it might be argued that the much discussed convergence of counterinsurgency and peace-operations tactics in war amongst the people has extended beyond the level of soft power and moved into the realm of hard power (Brocades Zaalberg, 2014). The increasing use of SOF, therefore, is not only explained by being the go-to force for discriminate counterterrorism operations, but also by the fact that SOF traditionally have specialized in conducting unconventional warfare in which going native among the population and training local forces are key to success. In addition to these specialized capabilities, SOF personnel is furthermore deemed more apt for operating in a political sensitive environment because of their level of education and training as well as their relatively senior age (in comparison to regular troops). Combined with the fact that SOF can generally be deployed with a much smaller logistical footprint than conventional forces, the often heard political wish to deploy SOF is easily explained (Cohen, 2016, p. 75).

While dominating the reality of Western interventionism, the fusion of concepts and increased use of SOF have not been matched by a similar movement within the scholarly community. As a result, many a claim has been made that the scholarly spheres writing about interventionism fail to connect and suffer from academic myopia. Following this, the point can be put forth that too little is known about possible conceptual conflicts between the different operational approaches used in state-building interventionism (Kitzen, 2016, p. 374; Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2014, p. 369). Furthermore, it is argued that such myopia might result in a lack of collective learning regarding state-building interventions' most pertinent issues. This article attempts to identify such conceptual conflicts and pertinent issues by adopting a holistic perspective informed by a cross-disciplinary analysis of state-building interventions aimed at transforming the political order. Our analysis will firstly explore the conceptual dimension of state-building interventions concluding with a framework based upon the establishment of political control. Subsequently, this framework will be used to assess two tactical approaches currently being applied in state-building interventions (*i.e.* co-option and counterterrorism). Thirdly, the pertinent issue of strategy in state-building interventions will be discussed. Following this, a possible way ahead for SOF aimed at addressing the challenges identified in the previous sections will be proposed. The suggested approach encompasses a population-centric turn in special operations which serves to augment their strategic function and mitigate operational challenges as identified in this article.

THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO STATE-BUILDING INTERVENTIONS

The rationale underlying state-building interventions stems from the Westphalian system and its concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty in this context promises two things: "a country's territory remains inviolate, and populations within a country's borders pledge their allegiance to it. Essentially, it is the territorial contract among states that guarantees the sanctity of the social contracts within them" (Simons, McGraw, & Lauchengco, 2011, Chapter 3). This results in the view that the Westphalian nation-state system that underpins our international society, provides worldwide security by obliging states to administer their space and people by exercising control (Spruyt, 1996, p. 193). As such, states are expected to tame the violence within their territory by transferring coercion to institutions of the state (Giustozzi, 2011, p. 228; United Nations Security Council, 1999). Depending on the degree of their inability, states that are unable to tame this violence are considered failed or fragile states (Willems, 2015, p. 15). The ungoverned spaces, or security gaps, that exist because of these failures are considered a breeding ground for forces that deal in private violence and thus threaten international security (Frith & Glenn, 2015, p. 1787; Patrick, 2006). It is furthermore argued that because statehood is earned and every state has the responsibility to protect its citizens, failing to do so, and thereby being unable to close the security gap, provides a ground for intervention. This even supersedes the principle of nonintervention stemming from national sovereignty (Chandler, 2004; Frith & Glenn, 2015, p. 1792; Helman & Ratner, 1992, p. 8). In sum, it can be stated that it is "[t]he goal of the international community […] to rehabilitate and expand the capacity of states to control their own territories and suppress violent actors who might inhabit otherwise ungoverned spaces" (Lake, 2016, p. 59). Since liberalism promises the successful addressing of political, social, and economic problems feeding a security gap, striving toward a liberal (political) order seems the logical course of action in achieving durable domestic control and thereby enhancing international security.

Over the past 25 years delivering economic, social, and political liberalism in conflict-torn foreign countries has manifested itself in the form of state building. The general idea for this approach was to distil a blueprint from consolidated Western states and recreate the herein found institutions in countries with a security gap. These institutions would guarantee the universal values of democracy, rule of law, and free market which seemingly offered a panacea for addressing the causes of conflict (Jüde, 2018, p. 4; Marshall, 2010, p. 245; Metz, 2014, p. 33; Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004, p. 23). State building, therefore, should be regarded as an exogenous approach aimed at transforming the political order in the target country. State-building efforts themselves have been embedded in either counterinsurgency or peace operations in order to establish an underpinning for durable results. Traditionally, state building is more closely related to the former than to the latter. In order to understand the current state of affairs, we will first explore the historical evolution of both counterinsurgency and peace operations.

Counterinsurgency is often contrasted with conventional military campaigns and major combat operations by arguing that it is more political in nature (Ucko, 2014b, p. 73). The reason for this can be found in the notion that counterinsurgency takes place amongst the people (Smith, 2006). As a result, the political repercussions of military force are evident at all levels of warfare (*i.e.* strategic, operational, tactical). In other words, the nonmilitary

effects of military actions undertaken by the military actor, are felt at the tactical and operational level. This is however equally true for the political repercussions of nonmilitary power. Consequentially, military force as found within counterinsurgency is more closely linked to the other political instruments of power as presented by the DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy) acronym (Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2014, p. 363). Counterinsurgency, thus, is by nature arguably more political than conventional military force through its connectedness to other domains of statecraft.

History is rife with examples of what David Kilcullen has labeled 'small-c counterinsurgency', the generic countering of insurrection by incumbent power holders (2014, p. 129). Moreover, this form of counterinsurgency has been instrumental in the creation of ancient, as well as, modern states (Jüde, 2018, p. 6). It is concluded, therefore, that "[g]eneric, small-c counterinsurgency, […] or counter-insurrection, seems to be an enduring human social institution that has been part of virtually every government in history and perhaps even partly defines what we mean by the word [state]". Furthermore, small-c counterinsurgency "does not seem to be exclusively associated with any specific content, doctrine or set of core techniques […] and may involve a very wide variety of methods" (Kilcullen, 2014, p. 130). This contrasts with so-called "big-c counterinsurgency" created under the guidance of RAND in the second part of the 20th century (Kilcullen, 2014, p. 133). This form, which is also known as "classical COIN" specifically seeks to fight revolutionary insurgencies through an approach based on collective experiences of Western states during the wars of decolonization and proxy-wars that took place directly after the Second World War or during the Cold War respectively (Beckett, 2014, p. 23).

As such, COIN prescribes a political solution which emphasizes the construction of a viable state capable of durably winning the hearts and minds of the population. Destruction of insurgent forces is subordinate to this political fight. While this approach became the dominant paradigm within the counterinsurgency community from the 1960s until the early 2000's, it held scarcely any influence as after Vietnam the US – and NATO in its wake – moved away from counterinsurgency (Long, 2006, p. 20). Instead, Western military thinking and practice focused on conventional warfighting concepts such as AirLand Battle, and the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (Brocades Zaalberg, 2017, p. 74; Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2014, p. 1; Ucko, 2009, Chapters 2–3). Despite a small resurgence of COIN in the 1980s, it was not until the escalating situation in Iraq and Afghanistan demanded a new approach that the next fundamental iteration of counterinsurgency came to be (Ucko, 2014b, p. 73).

Since the newly emerged approached was rooted in classical counterinsurgency, it was dubbed neo-classical COIN (Metz, 2014, p. 33; Paul, Clarke, Grill, & Dunigan, 2016, p. 1022). The revamped classical ideas were, among others, codified in the well-known Army/Marine Corps Field Manual FM 3–24 Counterinsurgency and spearheaded by David Petraeus (Ucko, 2009, Chapters 4–6). However, on the ground it turned out that context and doctrine were not always congruent with each other. As a result, bottom-up tactics tailored to specific local requirements became the norm (Mackay, Tatham, & Rowland, 2011, p. 60). Reality furthermore deviated from doctrine in the form of ever present politically-imposed constraints in time and resources (Kilcullen, 2014, p. 142). Consequentially, intervening troops caught up in a conflict with insurgents typically adopt a hybrid form of counterinsurgency which mixes traditional (neo-)classical COIN tactics with counterterrorism and reconciliation efforts (Kilcullen, 2014, p. 143). This approach offers an accelerated path for obtaining effect within

a limited amount of time and with limited resources as it seeks to establish initial control through the creation of rudimentary political order. Durable results should be achieved through a follow-on approach focusing on local forces and the deployment of predominantly nonmilitary tools of statecraft. It should also be mentioned that all aforementioned counter-insurgency concepts, regardless their differences, accept that conflicts cannot be resolved by traditional military power alone as there is a broad consensus on the importance of the political process in achieving the control fundamental to a consolidated state (Friis, 2010, p. 51). While this primacy of a political solution has been on the forefront during almost every counterinsurgency campaign, it mostly has failed to materialized as the principal task for the intervening force.

Peace operations have been intrinsically linked with the post-World War II rise of the United Nations (UN) and are stated to contain the following elements: (1) conflict prevention and peacemaking, (2) peacekeeping, and (3) peacebuilding (Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000, p. 2). Conflict prevention and peacemaking refer to interventions with varying degrees of intensity. Where conflict prevention is generally more low profile, peacemaking can also be robust and very visible, possibly combining military intervention with economic sanctions (Frith & Glenn, 2015, p. 1794). The UN activities in Korea and Congo during the 1950s and 1960s are an early example of such a robust attempt to make peace. The intensity of these operations, however, stands out as an exception compared to UN operations ever since.[1] Recently, however, UN peace-making, or peace-enforcing, has again adopted a more robust stance, particularly in the Sahel and Congo. This has resulted in the UN effort there closely resembling modern counterinsurgency tactics as observed in Iraq and Afghanistan (Charbonneau, 2017; Karlsrud, 2017, p. 1225; Tull, 2018). The second element of peace-operations, peace-keeping, bore the brunt of UN operations up until the end of the Cold War. Although there were exceptions, such operations were generally considered to be both simple and uneventful (Marten, 2004, p. 25). UN peacekeepers mostly carried out traditional military tasks such as guard duties and checkpoints in order to provide reassurance after a ceasefire had been agreed (Marten, 2004, p. 26). It should be noticed that such peacekeeping typically took place – often literally – between states and on barren pieces of land. At this point, a very clear distinction can be made between peace operations during and after the Cold War (Willems, 2015, p. 10). The latter are often not about monitoring negotiated ceasefires between sovereign states or clearly defined domestic parties, but take place in surroundings characterized by the absence of a Weberian monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Weber & Worm, 2002, p. 397). Consequently, peacekeepers are no longer separated from the people but find themselves among the local population and therefore, just like in counterinsurgency, military force is converging with other instruments of power (Kilcullen, 2014, p. 145; Simpson, 2012, p. 231; Smith, 2006, p. 371). These instruments, thus, increasingly interact whereas peace operations have traditionally considered them to be distinctive spheres within a conflict. John Karlsrud argues that this could result in a downward spiral because of the negative impact that robust military force might have on the other instruments of power available to a peace-operations interventionist (2017, p. 1225).

Due to the fact that peace operations have been taking place amongst the people, it has now become common practice for the UN to pursue the transformation of political order in conflict areas (Paris & Sisk, 2010, p. 4). As a result, peacebuilding has developed into an

integral part of peace operations (Paris & Sisk, 2010, p. 4). This has led to initiatives such as Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) that seek to enhance a fragile state's provisional control over society (Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000, p. 5). Since top-down state building has often turned out problematic (on which we will elaborate below), these initiatives have increasingly gained in local character and thereby adopted a so-called hybrid turn merging local and international perspectives (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016).

The historical analysis of counterinsurgency and peace operations has revealed that whereas state building is historically rooted in the former, it has recently also emerged in the latter. Originally, post-Cold War state building relied on top-down transformation through institutionalization in order to establish a Western-style centralized liberal state which is able to provide durable control (Baker & Scheye, 2007, p. 506; Donnely, 2005, p. 32; Tilly, 1992, p. 192). While insights from the field have triggered adjustments of campaign goals in order to build a rudimentary or hybrid political order, building a centralized modern state often remains the preferred solution. This has not been without criticism as there is a huge difference in the way in which Western consolidated states have emerged and the path envisioned to recreate such states in war-torn areas (Goodhand & Sedra, 2013, p. 4).

Historically, state formation has evolved along two routes. The first one is the well-known "war made the state" (Tilly, 1992, p. 27). This pathway is based on the accumulation of violence and the processes needed for consolidating this violence in a monopoly on force (Devetak, 2005, p. 173; Giustozzi, 2011, p. 227; Kaplan, 2018, p. 233; Migdal, 1988, p. 22). The second and more recent one is the notion that self-interested cooperation between power holders drove state formation (Spruyt, 1996, p. 185). Either way, the formation itself and the creation of institutions that uphold (liberal) values took a lot of time, often drew blood, and was predominantly of an endogenous nature (Fukuyama, 2014, p. 313). By employing a top-down approach, intervening parties neglected these historical insights and especially the notion that rules mostly follow local norms. A notion which dictates that international rules, recognition and support cannot make a state (Baker & Scheye, 2007, p. 517; Giustozzi, 2011, p. 229; Shirky, 2009, p. 306).

The abovementioned problems are further augmented by the fact that societal organization in war-torn countries typically is characterized by a fragmented distribution of social control permeated by personal ties (Migdal, 1988, p. 263). So-called web-like societies are notoriously difficult to transform through a top-down approach because Western-style strong-state institutions do not resonate with the population – for which loyalty to groups and other people is far more important than institutions (Giustozzi, 2011, p. 231; Simpson, 2012, Chapter 3). Building consolidated centralized states in web-like societies where state institutions hold significantly less value than in Western countries, therefore, is often considered short-sighted and even highly unlikely (Migdal, 1988, p. 271; Hagmann & Péclard, 2010, p. 541; see also Jardine, 2004). Thus, a hybrid form of political order which is more in line with the local political reality, seems to be the most feasible way of achieving control.

Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond argue that "[h]ybrid peace can be seen as a framework in which power circulates between its constituent actors, who are involved in a range of discussions of how conflict can be resolved or transformed at its related local, elite and state, regional and international levels" (2016, p. 229). A hybrid approach – as

recently observed in the field during counterinsurgency and peace operations –, therefore, reaches out beyond the strict Weberian notion of a state and seeks to involve all relevant power holders including, among others, informal actors and security providers, commercial organizations, and NGOs (Baker & Scheye, 2007, p. 516). The resulting political order evolves around a centralized component that accommodates formal as well as informal powers and works fundamentally different from the impersonal bureaucracy most intervening states have domestically (Logan, 2009, p. 121). This also affects the organization of force which is not necessarily monopolized, but often dispersed among various actors (Baker & Scheye, 2007, p. 512; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, p. 227; Willems, 2015, pp. 29–33). While from a Western perspective such a situation might seem undesirable, it actually helps to foster trust and support for the new state entity as local power-holders are allowed to secure and protect their vested interests. A hybrid approach that holds the middle between centralized and dispersed control, thereby, offers seemingly the best step forward in countries characterized by "social relations of stateness" (Painter, 2006, p. 752). Consequently, state building should focus less on the institutions of the state itself, but more on the way these entities can contribute to a hybrid political order capable of establishing and maintaining provisional control (Baker & Scheye, 2007, p. 525). Ideally, this approach will follow an emancipatory route toward a sustainable balance between local and state elements (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, p. 229). It has to be mentioned, however, that contention in local society will not always allow for establishing such a positive result. Therefore, state building along this path might also lead to a so-called negative hybrid order that is characterized by persistence of social tensions.

To conclude our conceptual exploration, it is important to stress that state-building interventions are all about establishing and consolidating control over a target society. Whereas traditionally this process has been a top-down undertaking aimed at constructing a Western-style liberal state in a war-torn country, recent counterinsurgency campaigns and peacebuilding efforts have spawned the insight that a more localized, hybrid approach might be necessary. This leads us to the following holistic conceptual framework for understanding modern state-building interventions. First, *initial* control is obtained through a combination of tactics tailored to local circumstances. Typically, these tactics are part of a counterinsurgency campaign, but they might be also be principal ingredients of peacebuilding (as practiced after the Cold War). These efforts aim to establish a hybrid political order that resonates with local society and therefore is capable of exerting *provisional* control. Ultimately, however, it is all about consolidating this into *durable* control by alleviating societal tensions in order to bolster a positive hybrid political order – which also provides the exit for the intervening party. We will now use this holistic framework of initial, provisional, and durable control for assessing co-option and counterterrorism, two tactical approaches that have fulfilled a predominant role in modern state-building interventions.

THE REALITY OF OBTAINING CONTROL IN STATE-BUILDING INTERVENTIONS

Historical as well as recent experiences have demonstrated that external interventions can establish short-term stability by co-opting local power-holders as this not only allows for exploiting the local pattern of legitimate authority – so-called cultural legitimization – but also serves to mobilize people and resources from within the target society (Kitzen, 2016,

pp. 525–548). As such, co-option provides an underpinning for fostering hybrid political orders capable of exerting provisional control. Building a hybrid political order requires the intervening party to understand the local context in order to include – and where necessary reconcile – all relevant actors (Willems, 2015, p. 158; see also Baker & Scheye, 2007, p. 516; Friis, 2010, p. 51). Furthermore, interventionist state builders should be prepared to creatively search for new forms of cooperation and support among the populace, and rethink classical mechanisms and arrangements of security interventions. Thus, building hybrid political orders not only requires thinking beyond top-down Western-style state building, but also the flexibility to pragmatically adapt the operational approach for realizing the end state. Most important, however, are the first mentioned facets of getting the context right and identifying the relevant (f)actors for creating a balanced order (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, p. 232). This allows for an inclusive approach in which legitimate local power-holders are co-opted and brought to cooperate in the local political marketplace in order to establish an underpinning for long-term stability. It can be argued, therefore, that "[p]referably such information should be available before the onset of a mission as it allows for a campaign design that is tailored to local circumstances. However, in reality planners are working with an incomplete picture. Therefore, counterinsurgents should develop an awareness of the unique features of the target society as soon as possible in order to adjust their co-option strategy and make the right selection of co-optees: societal context is king" (Kitzen, 2016, p. 544; see also Mackay et al., 2011, p. 96).

Although constructing a hybrid order according the aforementioned approach suffices for achieving initial and provisional control, it is crucial to consolidate this in a more durable result. Therefore, the hybrid should be transformed from a purely heterogenous order – that in the long run might even prove "antithetic to statemaking" – into a more standardized entity capable of overcoming the inherent fragility caused by rule plurality (Balthasar, 2018, p. 4, 10; see also Rawls, 2005, p. 576). In other words, for the interventionis to achieve strategic success through establishing durable control, some form of centralization and aligned relinquishing of local powers is necessary. It is important, therefore, that selection of potential co-optees on the basis of a thorough understanding of the societal landscape not only focuses on finding agents instrumental in exerting initial and provisional control, but also vets their willingness to participate in centralization.

While the quintessential role of a thorough understanding of the local context for co-opting local power-holders is evident, it is an equally important tenet for adopting an appropriate counterterrorism approach. As mentioned afore, modern counterinsurgency campaigns are characterized by a combination of traditional tactics, reconciliation efforts, and counterterrorism. The former two elements focus predominantly on fighting the insurgency indirectly by securing the population, reaching out to all involved societal segments and working toward a political solution – in all of which co-option plays an essential role. The latter element, however, typically encompasses a dynamic targeting campaign designed to fight the insurgency directly with kinetic means. During the height of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, the go-to units for these often high-risk actions were almost exclusively SOF as deploying superiorly trained and equipped badged special operations personnel (so-called badged operators) was considered a measure to mitigate the inherent risks (McChrystal, 2014; Naylor, 2015). As described by William McRaven, there are six principles for successfully deploying SOF in kinetic missions; simplicity,

security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose (McRaven, 1996, p. 11). Security, as a principle of special operations, is aimed at making sure the enemy is unaware of your intentions thereby being able to generate surprise. The other principles are aimed at exploiting this element of surprise. Obfuscating intentions with the aim of being unpredictable, is thus deemed paramount in directly defeating an opponent through kinetic means. But how does this all relate to the state-building effort and why is it paramount for SOF to conduct counterterrorism operations with a thorough knowledge of the local societal landscape?

As already discussed, transforming the political order in war-torn countries through interventions is a precarious undertaking. Trust and predictability are key to foster the conditions for this transformation. This should not be a problem when there is a clear distinction between bad guys and good guys, yet in the reality of state-building interventions amongst the people, this dichotomous presentation is an illusion. Norms in such web-like societies are dictated at the local level where people pursue personal interests in order to maximize their strategies of survival. As a consequence, personal links with local power-holders thrive widely and supersede the value attributed to a rather abstract system of governance brought forward by central state institutions. Moreover, in times of violent contention local power-holders and their clients align with different parties as serves their interest best. An often-heard example illustrates how an Afghan family hedges by having one son in the Taliban and the other in the Afghan National Army in order to maximize their chances (Simpson, 2012, Chapter 3). In such an environment the paradigm of a traditional polarized war, in which the result is definitive and wherein the stakeholders are contained within the warring parties is simply not applicable (Simpson, 2012). This non-linear character forces interventionists into a delicate balancing act in order to position themselves in relation to a multitude of (local) stakeholders (Burchill & Linklater, 2005, p. 35; Dimitriu & de Graaf, 2014). When we project this on for instance a geographically compressed urban area, the tremendous challenges become immediately clear; within only a couple of square kilometers intervening troops will typically engage in social "smile-and-wave" patrolling and engage with key leaders during daytime, while at night unpredictable helicopters raids – performed according McRaven's principles – will take place in order to kill or capture insurgent leaders. It is evident that this precarious and potentially volatile mix simultaneously seeks to build trust and instigate confusion within the local population and therefore might be counterproductive. The enemy-centric counterterrorism approach might therefore have a negative impact on the other tactics that are instrumental in transforming the political order (see also Kitzen, 2012, p. 729). Even worse, this might result in a downward spiral away from the desired strategic end state (*Annex B to AJP-3.5*). Yet, counterterrorism is pivotal for eliminating irreconcilable extremists and therefore such operations are essential in achieving initial control as well as creating the conditions for the emergence of a sustainable political order. The question, thus, is how to address this counterterrorism paradox and design a target campaign that both facilitates effective state-building and mitigates potential negative spill-over.

Tackling the counterterrorism paradox urges for a different approach toward targeting. Instead of purely focusing on destruction for negating future enemy behavior, the effects of such destructive actions on other stakeholders should also been taken into account (Friis, 2010, p. 55; Mackay et al., 2011, pp. 3, 59, 117; Osinga, 2017, p. 2). In other words, interventionists increasingly have to consider the second and third order effects of their

counterterrorism actions (Lamb, 2014, p. 13). Careful management of these effects will prevent communication of conflicting messages and thereby forestall the confusion that will adversely affect state-building. This can only be implemented when the interventionists have obtained a thorough understanding of the local societal context (Mackay et al., 2011). Therefore, sufficient knowledge of the human terrain is not only paramount for co-opting local power-holders, but also for staging an effective targeting campaign aimed at eliminating irreconcilable extremists.

While it seems obvious that a better understanding of local societal dynamics enhances counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics, this point has been often overlooked in recent state-building interventions. Moreover, it is ill-understood how these effective tactical exploits exactly contribute to the desired strategic end state of such interventions. In this regard our analytical framework for understanding modern state building provides a lens for scrutinizing this relationship. Thus far we have revealed that top-down state building has failed to provide both initial and durable control. On the other side, bottom-up co-option and hybrid political orders have successfully enabled initial and provisional control. Yet, if we want to establish durable control, enhanced centralization of the political order is essential for alleviating societal tensions. This can only be achieved by co-opting local power-holders that are not only willing to provide initial control, but also support the emancipatory route in the direction of the positive hybrid order necessary for durable control. Identification and selection of such co-optees during the initial and provisional control phases, therefore, is key. Counterterrorism is of vital support to this process of political transformation – especially during the initial phase – as this will deal with irreconcilable agents. Yet, managing second and third order effects of targeting is crucial for preventing confusion and empowering trust building efforts working toward durable control. Consequently, a thorough understanding of the societal context which informs the choices made in both the co-option and counterterrorism approach bolsters the path from initial (via provisional) to durable control. By doing so, these tactical exploits contribute to the strategic end state and thereby become an integral part of the strategic function. This brings us to the strategic dimension of modern state-building interventions; what do interventionists actually want to achieve and how are they formulating an appropriate approach for obtaining the desired end state?

THE STRATEGIC FUNCTION IN STATE-BUILDING INTERVENTIONS: THE FILTER OF FEASIBILITY

While strategy lacks a universal definition, Western military thought still leans heavily on Carl Von Clausewitz who argued that strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of war. Gray has expanded upon this by telling us that "military strategy is the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purpose of policy as decided by politics" (Gray, 2015, p. 20). In other words, the political process creates policy which dictates the end state. It is the role of strategy to make certain that operational and tactical means are employed in a way that ensures their effective contribution toward this end state. Furthermore, the end state itself should provide the operational and tactical level with a "why" to which they can align their activities thereby having a positive influence on the effectiveness of the "how".

If we project this notion of strategy on modern state-building interventions, it immediately becomes clear that there is a huge mismatch between the local context and the success interventionists wish to achieve with their operational approach (Simpson, 2012, p. 233). This, ultimately, boils down to two fundamental questions with regard to strategy formulation; what is the desired end state and how to achieve this in a feasible manner? Regarding the first question, interventionists will have to determine what they want to achieve through their intervention. Do they want to emulate Western consolidated states with its democracy, rule of law, and free markets or go for a less utopian approach (Marshall, 2010, p. 241)? Often, however, no choice is made. Consequently, interventions typically lack the end state defining strategic level objectives that supposedly guide the operational approach (Amersfoort, 2016; Mackay et al., 2011, p. 25). Therefore, it becomes impossible to provide lower levels with a clear intent. This strategic unclarity is further augmented by constraints on the available time frame which typically is far less than the amount of time deemed necessary for a campaign – end date trumps end state. This all inevitably results in the operational level starting to induce its own version of strategy within the given constraints (Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2014, p. 14; Simpson, 2012, p. 228; Ucko, 2014b, p. 72). Yet, as a consequence of the lack in strategic guidance, the operational and tactical levels will often focus on executing operations, when the principal matter ought to be the appropriateness of operations. Phrased more succinctly, the "how" starts to dictate the "what/why" as we see a "tacticization of strategy" (Cohen, 2016, p. 137). This is very much contradictory to the core challenge of strategy which is to "control action so that it has the political effect desired" (Gray, 2015, p. 1). Considering that (counter)insurgencies are ultimately won at the political level, an operational approach unguided by a proper strategy might create an unwinnable and indefinite conflict (Meiser & Nath, 2018; Porch, 2013, p. 320). Thusly, this undesired direction essentially means leaving true liberal intentions behind by forgetting that war, the approach, is ultimately about creating peace, the success (Simpson, 2012, p. 236).

The aforementioned reveals that the second question of how to obtain the strategic goal in modern state-building interventions is inherently connected to the lack of clarity with regard to the desired end state. Moreover, designing a feasible operational approach is further complicated by the fact that typically interventionists know too little about the society they wish to change (Cohen, 2016, p. 49). Unfamiliarity with the relevant societal concepts, actors, and dynamics leads to an inability to formulate a proposition and distinguish variables to test the resulting hypothesis. A less than adequate understanding of the local societal landscape, therefore, not only has evident repercussions for the ability to make informed choices with regard to the operational approach, but also hampers the ability to evaluate this approach by measuring its effects. As such, a strategy and subsequent operational approach insufficiently grounded in the local context is ultimately antithetic toward the concept of effect-based operations.

Countering this strategic conundrum, Emile Simpson argues that "liberal powers need to move on from thinking about military activity (and its civilian operational equivalent) as a one-way, unquestioning execution of policy, to incorporate it as part of a two-way dialogue; the aim of such an evolution is to produce sound strategy through continuous reconciliation of what is desired and what is possible" (2012, pp. 237, 243). In other words, looking at policy through a context infused filter of feasibility allows interventionists to set realistic goals and design an appropriate strategy. A strategy that is able to effectively

inform the operational approach and subsequent tactics. As a side effect, the operational and tactical objectives that follow from the thusly formulated strategic end state also provide the to-be-won-population with the crucial incentive to start building up interests in the new political order thereby creating the soil for the state institutions to grow from (Lake, 2016, p. 26). Contrary to the situation typically found in modern state-building interventions, such a strategic approach paints an actual picture of a future different from the status quo. A future that is not just described in concepts such as democracy, rule of law, and free markets, but in prosaic implications that resonate with the local population. A future so tangible that it convinces the population to invest in it. The importance of this paradigm is, as David Ucko argues, nearly universally agreed upon by both scholars and military personnel (2014a, p. 165).

UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIETAL CONTEXT BY GAINING CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE

The insights provided thus far have extensively revealed the permeating importance of understanding the societal context for state-building interventions. It bolsters the strategic function of such interventions by acting as filter of feasibility which provides an insight toward the limits of how the operational approach may contribute to the desired strategic end state. Furthermore, a thorough understanding helps to mitigate the conceptual conflicts associated with co-option and counterterrorism tactics. Making the wrong co-option choices early in the process can increase societal tensions and thus have detrimental effects for establishing durable control in the long run. Equally important, the quintessential role of understanding for overcoming the counterterrorism paradox can hardly be overestimated. The insight this understanding provides toward the second and third order effects of such operations is critical in determining the appropriateness in relation to state-building efforts and thus toward the strategic end state. Taking all this into consideration, it can be concluded that obtaining a profound understanding of the societal context should be a priority for all state-building interventionists.

UK Joint Doctrine Publication – Understanding, explains that "intelligence is knowing a tomato is a fruit, understanding is not putting it in a fruit salad" (Ministry of Defence, 2010, pp. 2–1). Although this quote is both succinct and appealing, it does leave us with a fundamental follow-up question. What is a fruit salad? The answer to that question is grounded in culture. A concept which can be defined as the shared warping or sensemaking of the world (Holmes, 2015, p. 208; Spencer, 2014, p. 2). In aiming to understand the societal context, one is essentially building up an image of concepts and propositions that constitute this shared warping of the world. And if one is to understand the societal context in an area of intervention, it is therefore critical to become aware of the concepts and propositions locals use in making sense of the world. Constructing this repertoire of concepts and propositions is alternatively known as acquiring cultural intelligence. Beyond its evident descriptive quality, cultural intelligence can also assist in achieving objectives (Friis, 2010, p. 55). Arguing in this direction, Haldun Yalçinkaya and Yusuf Özer explain cultural intelligence and its value as being "the output derived from evaluating, interpreting, analyzing, and processing the raw information regarding culture. The skill of conquering the hearts and minds in an operation environment would be obtained through cultural intelligence. Cultural intelligence is an important force multiplier to

reveal the visible and invisible sides of cultures existing in the area of operation and to support the decision process. We also argue that having cultural intelligence, and thus obtaining cultural awareness, turns perceptions of local people, as well as of troops, from fear and uncertainty to trust and confidence" (2017, p. 455). In other words, cultural intelligence is instrumental in obtaining a profound understanding and subsequently designing an appropriate plan.

Looking back at the quote in the beginning of this section and taking the above on cultural intelligence into consideration, one could argue that true understanding thus also deals with the concept of a fruit salad. A concept which might vary for different locales. After all, there are a lot parts in the world where the combination of melon, peach, and tomato constitutes a fruit salad. Substitute the local concept of a fruit salad for the local concept of security or governance and the relevance of cultural intelligence is immediately evident with regard to interventions. Acquisition of cultural intelligence is, however, very much dependent on actual interaction with the people. The difficulty herein lies in the fact that the societies of interest are often in areas that are considered dangerous and therefore off limits to many. Yet, from the point of view of special operations this presents a unique niche that might be exploited to firmly enhance state-building efforts.

THE POPULATION-CENTRIC TURN IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Generic SOF doctrine describes three main SOF tasks: Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, and Military Assistance (*Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5(B)*, n.d., pp. 2–1). Simplified, Direct Action is mostly associated with kinetic offensive operations, Military Assistance is aimed at the training of other units, and Special Reconnaissance is the gathering of information. Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance are enemy-centric whilst Military Assistance is proxy-centric. During Special Reconnaissance there might be engagements with the population but those are predominantly aimed at acquiring intelligence on the opposing forces. However, taking our findings in consideration, a strong argument can be made for a variation on Special Reconnaissance that is primarily population-centric and aimed at acquiring an understanding of the local societal context in possible near-future intervention areas (Spencer, 2014, pp. 68, 122; Thomson, 2018, p. 17). This emphasis on the gaining of understanding pre-conflict is important because it prevents being taken by surprise and generates time (Bouwmeester, 2017, p. 130; Lamb, 2014, p. 10; Osinga, 2007, p. 37) As such, the pursuance of understanding ought to be considered a shaping operation that may have a profound impact on the outcome of the conflict. Regardless of whether the conflict itself is fought below or above the threshold of armed activities (Ducheine, van Haaster, & van Harskamp, 2017, p. 168).

Conceptually, so-called pre-conflict population-centric Special Reconnaissance (PC2 Special Reconnaissance) could play a fundamental part in the orientation phase of the strategic planning process. John Boyd famously emphasized the importance of such an orientation phase by arguing that: "[o]rientation shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act. […] Orientation shapes the character of present observation-orientation-decision-action loops – while these present loops shape the character of future orientation" (Osinga, 2007, p. 193). And just as the pre-conflict understanding generated by population-centric Special Reconnaissance provides input for state-building

intervention strategy, it also supports the formation of a positive hybrid order by assisting in the selection of proper co-optees at the local level. The latter is especially relevant if you consider that quick wins with regard to security and stability during interventions in war-torn areas are generally won at the local level and often by non- or semi-state actors (Baker & Scheye, 2007, p. 512). Finally, there is the positive effect PC2 Special Reconnaissance might have on counterterrorism operations during the beginning of an intervention. Understanding of the local society might provide insight toward the appropriate level of operational prudence with regard to such efforts. Operational prudence based upon the principle that trust arrives walking and departs riding.

Obviously, such conclusions have value beyond the pre-conflict phase and are equally applicable during subsequent phases of an intervention. However, the evident value in itself says little about the applicability of the PC2 Special Reconnaissance concept. The organizational repercussions of the concept are simply too extreme for that. As discussed afore, achieving an understanding of the societal context is arguably contingent on acquiring cultural intelligence. With regard to this, Emily Spencer states that "[c]ultural intelligence is understanding the beliefs, values, and attitudes that drive behaviours and acting in a way to further your interests" (2014, p. 6). Following this line of thought, the concept is thus associated with fields such as psychology, anthropology, and sociology. Population-centric Special Reconnaissance therefore aims to combine the broadly defined ability of SOF personnel to survive, with the effects that are usually generated by the aforementioned social sciences. By going in this direction, SOF essentially becomes the human domain sensor designated for the harshest of conditions.

In aspiring this, it seems probable that some hard choices will have to be made. Designating a operator to population-centric Special Reconnaissance will most likely entail an enormous investment in social science related skills (Nesic & David, 2019). Considering these are academic fields, this potentially has far reaching consequences for the necessary cognitive abilities of the operator and consequently for the selection phase of the SOF unit. Either with regard to personnel that moves into population-centric Special Reconnaissance, or arguably for the SOF unit as a whole (Berg-Knutsen & Roberts, 2015, p. 38). In all probability this will furthermore entail partially leaving behind elements of the SOF skills honed during the last two decades (Toomse, 2015a, p. 52). Notwithstanding the critical and broadly defined survival skills, it will most likely result in an increased focus on education compared to training. The argument here is that training prepares for contingencies that can be thought of beforehand whilst education is aimed at improving judgment. War amongst the people means operating in an environment populated by humans, which are known for irrational and therefore unpredictable behavior. Such an operational environment limits the use of training thereby inversely emphasizing the need for judgment and thus education (Spencer, 2014).

Regardless of the cognitive abilities necessary for advanced education, there is also the issue of motivation. As a consequence of both Hollywood depictions and media campaigns aimed at recruiting operators, there is an undeniable image of SOF being primarily about kinetic Direct Action. Adding to this, the GWoT and the specific US SOF role therein, has resulted in a distorted (public) perception of SOF in general. As a result, SOF and counterterrorism have become entangled even though they are conceptually and practically only partially connected (Resteigne, 2018, p. 152). The ambition for operators to play a part within population-centric Special Reconnaissance, is therefore by no means

a given. On top of this, the people that are deemed more suitable for these kinds of operations would be the older operators with more life experience as this helps them in the interaction with the target audience and provides them with enhanced judgment (Berg-Knutsen & Roberts, 2015, p. 40). However, many experienced SOF operators typically choose to transfer to domestic governmental security units in order to spend more time with their family. Alternatively, they decide to seek employment in the private security sector thereby significantly increasing their financial gains (Spearin, 2014). Human resource management, therefore, should be aimed at creating the conditions that incentivize operators to stay within SOF and pursue a career in PC2 Special Reconnaissance. Lastly, and because of the nature of PC2 Special Reconnaissance, activities will most likely be low key and undertaken by small parties or individuals. Because of this, there will be no continuous chain of command that links the tactical exploits to the strategic level. As a result, the operators themselves will have to look after the integrity of that link and should therefore be strategically aware.

In sum, the operator most suitable for pre-conflict population-centric Special Reconnaissance within a state-building context would, regardless of personal motivation, need to have sufficient tactical skills to be able to survive, possess the cognitive ability crucial for the successful application of social science related skills, have the life experience constitutive of both enhanced judgment and the ability to relate to people, and the capacity to align the tactical activities with the strategic end state in order to effectively contribute to the strategic function. Meeting these requirements, however, is not the sole challenge. Especially in smaller militaries, the scarce availability of operators is an additional problem. Whereas larger militaries might diversify their SOF for specific roles, smaller militaries have a much more limited capacity for hedging (Resteigne, 2018; Toomse, 2015b, p. 63). As a consequence, operators in smaller militaries are already over encumbered with regard to the SOF skills that need to be kept on par. The amount of plates that they are supposed to keep spinning will increase greatly with a task such as population-centric Special Reconnaissance. A way to mitigate this problem might be the use of SOF support forces where possible. This essentially entails the accurate determination of the exact skills which differentiate operators and thereby legitimizes the use of such scarce commodity when truly necessary. In the case of population-centric Special Reconnaissance this means that the unique added value of each operator should be distinguished to allow the organization to fully exploit these particular skills.

Obviously, this all is very much dependent on the context of a specific operation and as such, one size will not fill all. However, from a planning perspective it will be necessary to create a SOF support organization capable of providing the most needed skills related to population-centric Special Reconnaissance. Within this context, one can think of capabilities such as strategic analysis and linguistic support. Additionally, population-centric operations will benefit from behavioral scientists' input. Alternatively, it may be prudent to connect the SOF organization to entities within the government that (partially) already have these kinds of capabilities thereby negating the necessity to create another unit that might ultimately be under resourced. Such a connection to for example the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intelligence services, and police organizations, might also do justice to the DIME nature of the operational environment for PC2 Special Reconnaissance.

All this entails a fundamental reorientation of the SOF units and the organizations that support them within the countries that have relatively few operators. A reorientation away

from the GWoT infused, almost dogmatic and very dominant kinetic Direct Action mentality which is, for most of the smaller Western militaries, not grounded in realistic prospects (Resteigne, 2018, p. 154). Similar to conventional forces and their preference for major combat operations, SOF also has a tendency to focus on the war it wants to fight (Kitzen, 2011). Yet, by doing so SOF allows tactics to dictate the operational approach. This limits SOF's capacity to contribute to the interests of the state and essentially disqualifies these forces from exerting the strategic function their doctrine prescribes (*AJP-3.5*, n.d., pp. 1–1). Perhaps pre-conflict population-centric Special Reconnaissance is a way to turn this around.

CONCLUSION

This article first has sought to provide a holistic scholarly perspective on state-building interventions in order to understand the reality observed on the ground. Therefore, we have constructed a cross-disciplinary conceptual framework focusing on initial, provisional, and durable control. Consequently, this framework has been used to assess the currently dominant tactical approaches of co-option and counterterrorism. This analysis has been further augmented by a critical exploration of the pertinent matter of strategy in state-building interventions. The combined findings all pointed at the pivotal importance of a thorough understanding of the local societal context in state-building interventions. Such an understanding allows for the selection of appropriate co-optees instrumental in fostering the transition from initial to durable control. Furthermore, thorough knowledge of the local context allows for the management of second and third order effects of targeting operations and is thereby crucial for overcoming the counterterrorism paradox. Thusly, a proper understanding not only enables the successful employment of tactics for establishing initial control, but also for transferring this into provisional and ultimately durable control. Furthermore, a profound knowledge of the local context also functions as a filter of feasibility which informs the designing of a strategy in which the desired is reconciled with the possible. As such, understanding is also critical for the strategic function of state-building interventions.

By expanding upon all these insights, we, consequently, have identified a way in which SOF could bolster state-building interventions. Cultural intelligence is quintessential and therefore pre-conflict population-centric Special Reconnaissance should be added to the SOF mission set. Yet, this does not come without consequences since it encompasses a move away from the currently dominant Direct Action paradigm. A paradigm which was created through the US foreign policy infused GWoT and was copied by other Westen countries without enough consideration of their own strategic context. Especially for special operations units within smaller militaries this move away from Direct Action will lead to a fundamental reorientation of their tasks as well as a different appreciation of the skills of their operators. Such a reorientation might be necessary, but most probably it will not readily correspond with the war SOF units want to be fighting.

NOTE

1. The United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea, which is the only UN cemetery of its kind, is testament to the intensity of this particular conflict.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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OSS Operations in Occupied Yugoslavia: Enduring Principles

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ABSTRACT

This case study describes the unconventional warfare techniques used by Allied special operations forces during their campaign against Axis occupiers of Yugoslavia from 1943 to 1945. The Yugoslavia campaign was destined to be among the first in a series of twentieth-century unconventional warfare efforts, culminating in the campaign conducted by the United States and United Kingdom covert and special operators. This region of the Balkans was extremely active with occupying German, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and various client government militaries pitted against largely unconventional forces to include Soviet backed partisans under Tito and loyalist Chetniks backed by Allied Forces. The planning considerations, preparation, and precise military actions conducted during this conflict continue to reemerge in contemporary discussions on special operations theory. The experiences of the past continue to enable successes in the evolution of modern special operations forces that began with the formation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS and employment of special operations forces in Yugoslavia during World War II.

KEYWORDS

Yugoslavia; partisan Warfare; strategic Intelligence; unconventional Warfare

From September 1943 to January 1944, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was the clandestine operations branch of the US military, conducted a partisan supply operation to Yugoslavia that provides an example of the value of unconventional warfare in defeating an occupying force. During this five-month period, the OSS delivered supplies by air from Cairo, Egypt, and Bari, Italy to partisan forces under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito within occupied Yugoslavia during World War II (WWII). The cost of the operation to the OSS was approximately 35,000 USD yet yielded results of significant greater magnitude and saved countless Allied lives (Office of Strategic Services, 1944).

The return on investment for this operation and the strategic impact that it had upon the war was a critical aspect of the unconventional warfare campaign that was then underway. Using this money, the OSS estimated that the partisans were able to raise and arm a guerilla force of at least 30,000 that forced the German Wehrmacht to divert four combat divisions from their winter offensive against the Russians for the sole purpose of interdicting and defending against Yugoslav partisan operations. This operation is estimated to have caused the Wehrmacht to react with a force normally deployed to attack three American divisions and would have costed the United States approximately 171,000,000 USD and an untold number of casualties. Simultaneously, the US and UK were also building a level of trust and respect with the partisans as well as Tito himself that went beyond the military and into the political realm (Office of Strategic Services, 1944).

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It is impossible to discuss the OSS, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or even United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) without first mentioning General William J. Donovan who was the father of the OSS, which later became the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and finally the CIA. It was through his efforts an effective agency was formed. Prior to WWII, the US Intelligence Community was a disjointed collection of agencies that rarely collaborated and only provided information to their respective organizations. A community with this sort of structure was sure to fail in a time of war. With that challenge, President Roosevelt made several attempts to centralize the intelligence collection operations of the United States. After several years of frustration, he appointed Donovan as the Coordinator of Information (COI) on July 11, 1941. The Office of the Coordinator of Information

> … constituted the nation's first peacetime, non-departmental intelligence organization. President Roosevelt authorized it to collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon national security: to correlate such information and data, and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine; and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the Government (Central Intelligence Agency, COI Came First section).

By 1941, Donovan was already a legend in many circles. He had instant credibility with the military, having earned the Congressional Medal of Honor in World War I when as a battalion commander he valiantly charged German lines. A law graduate of Columbia University, he was a deputy assistant to the Attorney General in the Coolidge Administration (Central Intelligence Agency, COI Came First section). Most importantly, he had the passion and vision, and the necessary dislike of bureaucracy that allowed him to quickly create a flexible and effective organization that was to be essential to Allied victory in the war.

Donovan did not originally set out to create an organization that conducted clandestine operations; this mission set fell to the OSS when other organizations were found to be lacking. While Donovan was a legend, his new organization was not warmly received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the intelligence agencies within the War Department that were jealous of the amount of resources given to Donovan and feared losing the power they had accumulated.

During the buildup of the COI in 1941, Donovan inherited several organizations and missions that were shed by their parent organizations. One of these was espionage, as the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the War Departments' Military Intelligence Division (G2) were uncomfortable with the mission during peacetime. Donovan accepted these mission sets from ONI and G2 and successfully managed to gain access to the Presidential unvouchered funds. The ability to spend these funds as well as the authority granted to the OSS to engage in espionage directly facilitated the later creation of the CIA's Directorate of Operations (Central Intelligence Agency, COI Came First section).

Shortly after America's entry into the war and with a growing budget and staff, the President moved control of the COI from the White House to the newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff. Donovan supported this realignment as it provided him with military support and resources. Initially, the move resulted in a reduction in staff, as half of his permanent staff was sent to the Office of War Information to manage the Foreign Information Service (FIS). This changed on June 13, 1942, when the COI became the

Office of Strategic Services (Central Intelligence Agency, what was OSS). The new name reflected Donovan's belief in the value of strategic intelligence in defeating the Axis powers.

As the OSS grew and matured under Donovan's leadership, the organization developed two directorates that would play key roles in supporting partisan activities in Yugoslavia during WWII: Strategic Services and Intelligence Services. Specifically, Strategic Services and its subordinate branch cell Special Operations would eventually lead to the evolution of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the United States, as well as the creation of the CIA's authority to combine intelligence and clandestine operations within the same organization (Smith, 1972). The Special Operations branch, working closely with the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) was responsible for the special operations that supported partisan operations in Yugoslavia during WWII.

This research seeks to describe themes and patterns discovered during a case study of unconventional operations in German-occupied Yugoslavia during WWII. In the case study factors that contributed to the success of strategic operations conducted by Allied nations are identified and shown as relevant in today's special operations. They are major considerations in the CIA and Special Operations Force's organizational architecture. They are considerations for training, preparation, and execution of operations, and currently laced in Special Operations doctrine. Based on the findings, recommendations for planners of subsequent and future unconventional warfare campaigns are made.

As an exemplar, the Allied unconventional warfare campaign in Yugoslavia during WWII provides a model for future unconventional warfare campaigns. To gain a deeper understanding of this successful campaign, this study asks, what covert actions and special operations activities were instrumental in facilitating the strategic success of the Allied unconventional warfare campaign in German-occupied Yugoslavia during World War II?

CHARACTERISTICS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

An examination of OSS special operations in German-occupied Yugoslavia during WWII reveals themes that are comparable to modern types of special operations, specifically unconventional warfare. The Yugoslav case presents factors that contributed to the success of strategic operations conducted by Allied nations and demonstrates how these operations formed the architecture for the CIA and are currently used in military Special Operations doctrine. Additionally, a model emerges with a framework that can be evaluated for operational design purposes by planners of future unconventional warfare campaigns.

While the OSS' North Africa Campaign was where Allied special operations forces conducted their initial activities against Axis powers, it was the Yugoslavia campaign that first embodied the factors that have since been identified as characterizing special operations and include:

- the careful selection process and mission-specific training for special operations personnel
- the requirement for regionally, culturally and linguistically proficient special operations personnel
- the requirement to gain access to a denied area occupied by hostile forces

- the need to communicate over very long distances to a remote support base
- the requirement to operate in high-risk, austere, harsh environments without extensive support
- the necessity to address the ambiguous local situation, develop solutions, and working closely with indigenous authorities in order to solve the strategic problem
- has readily identifiable phases that constitute the characteristics of US unconventional warfare campaigns: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, employment, and transition (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, pp. I-5–I-8).

The planning documents, reports, assessments, and materials generated by planners and those conducting operations in theater explicitly reflect the characteristics of contemporary special operations as defined today. The deliberate planning and forward-thinking approach to complex operations remains a constant in unconventional and irregular forms of conflict at present and in the foreseeable future.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Hybrid warfare, and by extension unconventional warfare (UW), is not a new concept. The United States Department of Defense defines UW as "Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area" (United States Department of Defense, 2007, p. 14). The term irregular warfare (IW) is often used, incorrectly, as a synonym for UW. IW is:

> A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will" (United States Department of Defense, 2007, p. 6).

UW is thus one tool of many used to wage IW.

Applying these definitions to history, this form of warfare is not a new concept. In the American Revolutionary War, George Washington's army normally conducted conventional type battles but in the South Carolina campaign, his forces employed some UW tactics. The tactics employed by the North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong blended conventional and unconventional warfare in support of an effective IW struggle (Hoffman, 2009). In addition, the 2014 invasion and occupation of Crimea by Russia saw a combination of conventional attacks, unconventional warfare from Russian Spetsnaz, as well as a powerful information warfare campaign designed to destabilize the Ukrainian government, mitigate world outrage, and bolster support for the campaign within Russia (Maigre, 2015). Hybrid warfare is used because it works and its success has been validated over centuries. As the current research will show, it was a significant factor in partisan activity within Yugoslavia during World War II.

Occupied Yugoslavia – An Optimal Unconventional Battleground

War came again to Yugoslavia in April 1941 when the country found itself occupied and divided between the Italian and German armies, as well as collaborating forces, in the

occupied areas of the Balkans. The Italians had recently moved forces into Greece from Albania, and Hitler feared that the Allies would look to Yugoslavia as a base of operations to launch counterattacks into Greece. Should this happen, Hitler's forces would be separated from his Italian allies and his armies would face another front. The Allies and Axis had both been pushing for Yugoslavia to pledge loyalty to one side, but the country was divided. The Serbian leaders who controlled the government favored the Allies while the King and his supporters feared the Germans and attempted to stay neutral for as long as possible (Bookbinder, 2005).

Distrust grew when Hitler learned of Yugoslav overtures to the Allies and the Yugoslav government learned of a German plan to overthrow the Yugoslav government (Bookbinder, 2005). Hitler became increasingly worried about losing Yugoslavia to the Allied forces and presented the Yugoslav government with an ultimatum; either pledge loyalty to Germany or risk a German invasion. On March 25, 1941, the Yugoslav government agreed to join the Axis. However, the next day, the Yugoslav army, who supported the Allies, overthrew the government and seized control, resulting in an invasion by Germany (Bookbinder, 2005).

Although it was the Wehrmacht (the regular Army) and not the SS which initially served in a supporting role conducted the invasion, the campaign into Yugoslavia was particularly brutal. Poorly trained and ill-equipped, the Yugoslav army fell to the vastly superior German forces within 10 days. What followed was an occupation that at war's end resulted in 1.75 million dead or 11 percent of the population and pitted Yugoslav ethnic groups against one another (Shepherd, 2012).

The devastation inflicted upon Yugoslavia can be traced to two root causes, memories of German losses to Serbia in World War I, and Hitler's campaign of ethnic cleansing against Jews. The hatred toward Serbia is well illustrated by an order given to the Wehrmacht soldiers by Lieutenant General Franz Boehme, the Commanding General in Serbia. He told his men:

> Your objective is to be achieved in a land where, in 1914, streams of German blood flowed because of the treachery of the Serbs, men and women. You are the avengers of those dead. A deterring example must be established for all of Serbia, one that will have the heaviest impact on the entire population. Anyone who carries out his duty in a lenient manner will be called to account, regardless of rank or position, and tried by a military court (Shepherd, 2012, p. i).

With these orders began a reign of terror waged against military and governmental objectives, but also specifically targeted civilian populations. The Wehrmacht soon filled the prisoner of war camps they established with male Serbian Jews and requested permission to move prisoners to Romania or Germany, but the request was denied. The Wehrmacht felt that they were left with only two options, release the prisoners or kill them. They chose the latter and began shooting all of the male Jewish prisoners. This quickly escalated to include Serbian Jewish women and children who were either starved to death or shot. The German forces in Yugoslavia soon received mobile gas vans in which prisoners were put into and then driven through towns as the occupants were poisoned to death. Thirty-five thousand Serbian Jews met their fate this way and it quickly spread a climate of fear across the Balkans (Bookbinder, 2005).

The fear fueled an insurgency that grew more resolute in response to the ongoing German atrocities. Orders went out from German commanders to troops that they

should incarcerate every male between the ages of 15 to 50. They were also to consider anyone approaching them from the direction of partisan-controlled territory as the enemy and should arrest them, and that lack of absolute proof that an individual is not a partisan member should not prevent a German soldier from executing the individual if they suspected that they were (Shepherd, 2009). The landscape was ripe for an insurgency that allowed the Allies, specifically the OSS, to support partisan activities.

Resistance forces were divided between two separate armies; one under the control of General Draza Mihailovich, a Chetnik and a regular army officer who refused the order to surrender to the Germans and Josip Broz Tito, a Croat and dedicated communist (Ford, 1992). It was Tito's forces that the allies eventually provided the majority of support to and his forces that are normally associated with the term partisans. And while both leaders would engage Axis forces, they had vastly different views of what a postwar Yugoslavia would look like.

The partisans totaled about 300,000 from a total population of 16 million (Rogers, 1957). OSS support of the partisans began in 1943 and consisted of 40 officers and enlisted men that operated 15 different cells based with partisan army corps or division headquarters (Donovan, 1945). While small in number, the impact of these unconventional warriors was strategic in nature. The OSS provided the partisans with military and medical supplies, engaged in psychological warfare against the occupying forces, and helped return allied forces to friendly territory. In a memorandum to Joint Chiefs of Staff written in March 1945, Donovan stated that the OSS was responsible for returning to safety over 800 American and British airmen shot down over Yugoslavia. This small force constructed several emergency landing strips for aircraft that were bringing in supplies and returning with evacuated airmen and OSS officers working with partisan forces routinely directed bombing attacks in support of partisan activities. Special demolitions were infiltrated into Yugoslavia, and the OSS officers provided the partisans with the training on how to effectively use them (Donovan, 1945). It was an extremely effective operation and is a clear blueprint for current US Special Operations doctrine, which embeds small numbers of specially trained forces with much larger forces and provides them with equipment, training, and specialized or unique skills.

ASSESSING A CAMPAIGN

Much debate exists as to whether or not an actual theory for Special Operations exists. Harry Yarger, a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University states "The lack of such theory is odd given the public's fascination with special operators, the U.S. Congress' legislative support, policy maker's penchant for their use, and the number of popular movies and books" seen in recent years (Yarger, 2013, p. 1). He presents a number of principles that provide the reader with a rather detailed list of necessary considerations in viewing special operations forces and their employment and reviews some of the criteria that have come out of USSOCOM in recent years. He ultimately declares that this piece contains nothing new in terms of the theory and he recognizes the absence of an overarching theory and promotes academic study of the field (Yarger, 2013).

A number of studies providing insight into the types of operations, circumstances, and unique environments of these operations can be seen in contemporary works. McRaven

(1996) provides detailed case studies on historical special operations missions beginning in World War II and ending in 1976 with the Israeli Raid on Entebbe and provides analysis on the elements that contribute to the success of special operations. The framework and principles presented appear to be reminiscent of the planning considerations presented in most military officer development courses over the last 30 years. While it provides an effective checklist for planning and assessing special operations activities and is popular, it falls short of establishing an actual theory for the study of special operations. Spulak (2007) widens analysis and expands the discussion to include various characteristics, capabilities, strategic impact, and doctrinal elements in publication since the formation of USSOCOM in 1987. He argues the need for special operations theory and suggests it can be:

> … stated concisely: special operations are missions to accomplish strategic objectives where the use of conventional forces would create unacceptable risks due to Clausewitzian friction. Overcoming these risks requires special operations forces that directly address the ultimate sources of friction through qualities that are the result of the distribution of the attributes of SOF personnel (Spulak, 2007, p. 41).

Though frequently referenced it has not been recognized as the authoritative theory on special operations.

Standing in contrast to most works on SOF Theory, Marsh, Kenny, and Joslin (2015) argue that there is " … a strong case for scientific rigor and theorizing the study of special operations" but that the field is better served by not limiting the study by developing " … single, overarching metatheory of special operations" that would inhibit wider observation and fail to recognize the various phenomena that are present in each case (Marsh et al., 2015, p. 90). Instead, they propose a wider view of the field of research possibilities applied to individual phenomena. It is with this particular view that historical documents were reviewed in order to identify unconventional warfare activities that lead to success during the OSS Yugoslavian Campaign and compare them to contemporary.

CURRENT STUDY

The material studied was primarily from the "Wild Bill" Donovan World War II collection at the National Archives in College Park Maryland. The archive materials consisted of staff papers, correspondence, area studies, mission reports, and asset profiles. To identify the emerging themes a wide range of initial materials was examined. Early analysis identified categories that were general but provided some context and helped to identify the importance of the various types of activities deemed important to success in theater. Initial impressions were that most material focused on the need for a US presence in the Yugoslav region, potential training requirements, and considerations of how those activities might best serve US interests. Much of the information is not attributed to individuals but rather staff sections responsible for activities in the theater of operations. These exchanges were written in direct language with frank assessments and no concern for attribution. As analysis progressed, new themes and relationships were identified. The initial review of content is discussed below and followed by themes that emerged in analysis.

The preliminary examination of documents provided a wide array of themes that included discussions on the geographic area, political undertones, various operations and support initiatives, and considerations force preparation. Many documents discussed the lack of US situational awareness in Yugoslav region. There were several documents expressing concern that all information was coming to US planners second hand and that it was potentially misleading, delayed, or even edited to benefit other Allied nations. Both British and Soviet Liaisons were on the ground shaping the environment and connecting to either the remanence of former government forces under Mihailovich and an assortment of emerging partisan and resistance factions with varied political agendas (Ceresole, 1945).

Though the initial argument to establish a liaison presence in Yugoslavia was for the purpose of unfiltered situational awareness, there were also concerns about Allied postwar positioning, conflicting political ideologies (Office of Strategic Services, 1945a) and the need to prepare for an invasion by expeditionary forces (Booth, 1945). This descriptive higher-level examination shaped the first impression. It clearly revealed a focus on identifying the long-term strategic requirements, strategic intelligence, methods of communication, and the importance of understanding, adapting and operating within the local population.

STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

The salient properties contained within the body of data continued to reference the various capabilities and attributes of the force needed to satisfy strategic requirements. Continued reviews of the material identified reoccurring dimensions and formed relationships to mission requirements and unique force capabilities. Gradually the characteristics and variations in data were identified and it became possible to map relationships between identified requirements. These remained largely consistent and were present in documents involving the initial formation of forces, training, operations, and debriefings.

Themes or categories identified in the previous step could take two very different paths. One could consider phases or factors in the initiative. These would include planning, recruitment, training, and operations. In an initial memo from the Cairo Desk, Lieutenant Colonel Wallar Booth identified and submitted a proposed outline for study to this effect (Booth, 1945). The other is to seek a more abstract view of the data to conceptualize on what requirements were most significant to the success of OSS operations in Yugoslavia. In identifying the requirements most significant to OSS success, the major storyline or core category has been named and encompasses the related subcategories that serve to support the storyline. These include a focus on strategic intelligence, communication, cultural knowledge, and preparation for operations within the Yugoslav environment.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

Reference to strategic intelligence requirements goes far beyond simple situational awareness and alleviating political concerns. Supporting themes within the body of data reference support for sabotage, targeting by Allied air forces, and preparation for large-scale invasion by conventional ground forces. It recognizes the importance of large intelligence networks that include the local population and partisan forces working within

the area. Early training and persistent intelligence requirements focus on the collection of intelligence, securing documents, and processing prisoners of war with a significant focus on who, when, what, and where (Booth, 1945). It highlights the significant importance and details and the use of illustrations in gathering intelligence and establishing large networks are shown as essential; they are useful in observing road networks, trains, and to reach a point of intelligence saturation (Booth, 1945). Support for invasion by conventional forces included local area assessment that identified not only enemy strength but the disposition of local manpower available to fight in support of allied effort (Office of Strategic Services, 1945b).

Operators and local assets were also included in plans to receive, maneuver with, and pass conventional forces on to other intelligence operatives as the battle moves beyond their geographic knowledge (Booth, 1945). Some thought was given to determining the status of the indigenous population's political leanings and their willingness to support US interests beyond conflict with Axis forces (Office of Strategic Services, 1945a).

COMMUNICATIONS

Significant focus was placed on communications training for both infiltrating operatives and indigenous assets. The ability of operatives to broadcast intelligence reports reoccurs as an important theme. Even where it is not specifically named in content, the importance of dependable communications methods is readily apparent in the data. In addition to training proposals, planning documents, and operations reports, it is laced in numerous routine exchanges. Reports generated in May 1945 provide some insights into the methods, patterns, complexities, and networks. These are highlighted in a collection of debriefings on Operations Sophie, Pittsburgh, Marina, Partridge, and Graves.

Discussion of communication training plans recognized the accomplishments of other similar missions in Western Europe. The successes of Jedburgh, Essex, and other field operations were considerations in training development (Booth, 1945). It was recognized that operations must master all methods of wire and radio methods. They should also be proficient in surveillance methods. These would include the use of electronics, imagery, and microfilm in communication (Booth, 1945).

Networks and signal plans for deep operations were established in a way that a centralized hub terminated and captured the entire body of reports. Though initially focused on intelligence collection and directing sabotage operation, attention to more conventional maneuver, logistics, and personnel recovery activities is frequently present in the material. Consideration for future requirements is reflected in building the communications network. The system is designed to transition from rear to forward echelons to accommodate the movement and transition of assets to maneuvering conventional forces. It was recognized that operations are dependent on the cooperation of all service branches and is a combined effort. "Intelligence, special operations, counter-espionage, and psychological warfare" are seen as connected efforts that rely on effective communications efforts (Booth, 1945).

The dispersion and isolation of cells operating in the region require the need for effective communications methods for infiltration of added resources, resupply, and personnel recovery. Tight communication windows required precise and timely exchanges. Security concerns in reports outlined a number of challenges to making successful communications. Proximity to German installations, monitoring, and mobile detection finding equipment were constant

concerns. Dependability and the cumbersome nature of communications gear also served to narrow the broadcast window. Often equipment was exchanged for other allied operating systems and makeshift antenna methods were developed to enhance capabilities (Nowell, 1944).

While skilled operators in more permissive environments might hit all scheduled windows, others were shown to miss up to 30 consecutive days of contacts. This made directing operations and scheduling supply drops unpredictable. Still, positive contacts led to a wide variety of successful quick infiltrations by air or submarine, resupply operations, and personnel recovery missions which saved hundreds of downed American Air Force personnel (Joyce, 1944).

CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE

Cultural Knowledge and preparation for the operating environment is presented as a major focus within staff papers. The need for individuals capable of blending into the local population was extremely important. Language capability, knowledge of the area of operation, and the ability to establish relationships and networks is a common subject in the collection. Additionally, it was noted that a special type of candidate was required for OSS operation whose characteristics included " … integrity, intelligence, courage and good physical condition" (Booth, 1945). The desired profile was reliable and experienced operators that understood how to conduct successful communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and sabotage missions. It was understood that recruitment abroad was required to identify the personnel necessary to round out teams and assessment and recruitment of the indigenous population was an ongoing effort.

A number of reports profiled the recruitment and capabilities of partisan fighters. On occasion, it was an extension of intelligence assessments that might prove useful in post-war Yugoslavia. In other write-ups, it appeared more of an evaluation for recruitment or retention. The reports provided such details as age, place of birth, unique skills, and any military experience the individual might have. Added information occasionally referenced marital status, political leanings, fighting ability, personal dispositions. Notes on religious preference were sometimes included.

Nothing was left unnoticed. Continued assessments of the requisite skills needed by the US and partisan forces were explicitly outlined and serve to support and confirm the themes identified in our research. Specific recommendations for training include intelligence, communications, and an ability to not only operate but thrive in the environment. Training evolved to meet emerging requirements and executed in conditions that are similar to the area of operations or when required in Yugoslavia. Reviews of the numerous OSS reports reinforced the importance of the subcategories identified above. When using these categories to review the mission reports on operations Geisha, Flotsam, Fungus, Altmark, Relator, and Redwood, one sees that the operational details are easily organized into parallel groups (Nowell, 1944).

LESSONS THAT ENDURE

This research explored the factors that contributed to the success of the unconventional warfare campaign conducted by the OSS and evaluated those observed factors while examining modern special operations, to include modern SOF doctrine. This section

analyzes those observations and presents refined themes as a framework for future unconventional warriors to consider when designing operational concepts. Given the nascent character of special operations during WWII, the OSS had limited doctrinal guidance for managing the unique missions that it was expected to conduct. As it was, the overall imperative to defeat the Germans, and specifically to conduct a successful economy of force operation in the Balkans, required the OSS as well as its allied partners to set the conditions in the Balkans by managing operations of every mission effectively regardless of the separate agenda of the resistance unit involved, the characteristics of the operational area, or the composition of OSS unit that conducted it. The goal in Yugoslavia was to effectively pester and distract the German war machine and set the conditions for eventual Allied victory in the Yugoslav theater of operations and thus support overall Allied victory against the Germans.

The greater part of existing academic examination looks at OSS history, to include its beginnings, operations, and leadership. There has been a much more limited academic consideration of the organization in the context of operational doctrine. In the context of the OSS' campaign in Yugoslavia, these operations clearly reflect unconventional warfare as outlined in US DOD Joint Publication 3–05 which describes operations that enables a resistance movement or insurgency "to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. II–8).

While unconventional warfare has emerged as a core activity of special operations forces (particularly US forces), WWII presented the first significant opportunity for the design and execution of an unconventional warfare campaign at the theater level. Unconventional warfare has continued to evolve since WWII, with many state and non-state actors using these techniques to pursue different and corresponding state and non-state purposes. This proliferation of techniques beyond the conventional warfare practices of the twentieth century has become what is termed "4th Generation Warfare," which is characterized by conflicts somewhere on the continuum between peace and full conflict/total war. This innovation in warfare was identified and discussed in 1989, when Lind, et al. evaluated the future of warfare in the context of identified trends, such as the use of mission orders, a reduction of the use of centralized logistics, an emphasis on maneuver, and fourth as " … the goal of collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him" (Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton, & Wilson, 1989, p. 23). The OSS experience in Yugoslavia provides examples that demonstrate all these trends. Additionally, the OSS operational records provide a unique and timely opportunity to examine unconventional warfare techniques, as the security classification of more modern conflicts (such as in Afghanistan) currently precludes access to that information.

The ongoing conflicts and "frozen conflicts" in South Ossetia, the Donbass, Kosovo, and Nagorno-Karabakh are examples of the ambiguous operating environment where either nation-states or non-state actors have employed these techniques. While these cases are examples of where fourth generation warfare techniques were used during a preliminary, unconventional warfare phase prior to limited conventional conflict, the potential exists that experienced forces could use fourth generation warfare techniques to achieve their goals while managing the conflict at a level just below what would normally devolve into open warfare. The OSS experience in Yugoslavia provides pertinent examples, though sometimes rudimentary, of

how effective an unconventional warfare campaign can be, as well as the challenges to success that are likely to be in place in future conflict situations.

Joint Publication 3–05 provides an outline of requirements for Special Operations Forces. It closely parallels the same requirements identified in the study of the OSS in Yugoslavia. It is as if the considerations were lifted from the classified documents and placed into today's guiding documents. JP 3–05 states that "SOF partners design, plan, and oversee execution of special operations in support of national strategic objectives" (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. III–18). In order to accomplish the objective, Special Operations Forces must consider " … strategic, physical, and political and/or diplomatic risk; operational techniques; modes of employment; and dependence on intelligence and indigenous assets" (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. I–1). All of this requires a high level of planning and intelligence with detailed knowledge of the area of operations, the culture, people, and languages used. This combined with demanding training and rehearsals are critical to mission success (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. I–2). Added definition and requirements for the ideal personnel suggest a demanding evaluation process where more experienced candidates are selected for advanced specialized training and " … regional, cultural, and linguistic specialties" (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. I–5). Great emphasis is placed on planning and the need for a " … robust communications architecture" (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. I–14). This remains an important element for successful operations. It serves as the intelligence and logistical life-line for both SOF operators and the supported indigenous forces.

A more clearly defined process of addressing the strategic problem exists in today's joint doctrine. Under the Joint Operating Concept (JOC) for Irregular Warfare (IW) joint force commanders (JFC) must conduct strategic planning that clearly translates "national strategic guidance and direction into a strategic concept for achieving a set of military and non-military conditions necessary to achieve strategic success" before an IW campaign can be designed (United States Department of Defense, 2007, p. 26). Considerations for establishing military conditions include ways in which the application of a wider selection of instruments of power can be brought to bear and the initiation of a successful campaign can be conducted. It may include major combat operations (MCO), indirectly using IW, or some hybrid of the two (United States Department of Defense, 2007).

Elements within the scripted vignette provide essential lines of operation as part of successful Irregular warfare campaign to bolster or erode a government's power base. The detailed example provides essential elements that are largely in-line with the study's findings. The vignette details the focus of these efforts which show that a high level of importance is placed upon the use of Special Operations forces in concert with indigenous peoples, the necessity of training host nation forces in intelligence and communication, a focus on actionable intelligence provided to the supported population, all of which is tailored to meet a strategic end (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007).

CONCLUSIONS

Considering the evolutions and revolutions occurring United States' Military capabilities since WWII, it seems that identifying commonality between covert actions and special operations activities in the former Yugoslav Republic during the second World War and

SOF operations today, might be difficult. Still, when looking at the thematic development of key elements that facilitated the strategic success of the Allied unconventional warfare campaign in German-occupied Yugoslavia during WWII, there is an obvious similarity to important considerations in today's SOF operations. Many of the OSS operations executed in a time of full-scale military operations were conducted in the same manner as they would be in today's less defined and graduated scale of conflict. This is displayed in contemporary Joint Publication's and Operating Concepts where significant importance is placed upon strategic considerations, the importance of strategic intelligence, communication, and cultural knowledge or considerations.

Within the framework of US special operations doctrine, successful unconventional warfare campaigns demonstrate the need to establish relationships early in the effort when at some point, a national decision is made to take action and begin an unconventional warfare campaign. There is a need to establish and maintain relationships with whatever organization is to be supported. While relationships are always important, so much of the soft power that must be generated by the unconventional warfare force relies on relationships to be effective.

These relationships include countering friendly, enemy, and neutral competitors, who will be in place in the area of operations as well as the area of influence. Actors on the battlefield, to include any friendly, enemy and neutral players, will pursue their own agenda at the expense of the overall friendly effort. An internal assessment of American intelligence capabilities in 1943 indicated that both the British and the Russians were much more capable of understanding the situation on the ground in guerilla-controlled Yugoslavia because of their in-place liaisons forward with the resistance. The Americans relied on secondary information and their ability to act and respond suffered accordingly. While the impact was in the realm of public affairs in regards to the British, the comparatively more effective Russians were well on their way to ideological victory (Ceresole, 1943).

Moreover, opponents' political and ideological efforts, to include those of current allies who may become opponents in the future, must be identified early and countered. The OSS' entry into the Yugoslav campaign was after both the British and Soviets had initiated operations and moved unconventional forces into the sanctuaries held by the partisan resistance. This created a situation where it found itself behind in the effort to provide information to counter communist doctrine being provided by forward-deployed Soviet political officers who were embedded with partisan forces. In fact, the OSS was never able to successfully counter the move toward communism and the Soviet bloc, and the end of the war found the victorious communist partisans within the grasp of the Soviets; at least for a while (Nowell, 1944).

The OSS found that the relationship with the partisans was fluid and required constant and consistent management. Partisans were typically focused on the end-state of a communist country after a victory over the Germans. However, the OSS learned the hard way that relationships must extend beyond the tactical imperative and focus on the overall objectives: the resistance must be coached and occasionally led with the end state in mind. Thus, OSS leaders, who would find themselves dealing with a tactical dilemma, would on occasion take expedient measures to satisfy an immediate goal rather than postpone an immediate success in deference to an operational or strategic win.

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The First U.S. Joint Special Operation, Circa 1805

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ABSTRACT
The United States Ship *USS Philadelphia's* three hundred and seven United States (U.S.) Crewmen and Officers were captured by a foreign power off the coast of North Africa in 1803. The recovery of the frigate and the rescue of the U.S. Crewmen and Officers is perhaps the first joint special operation conducted by the United States of America.

KEYWORDS
Hostage rescue and recovery; joint operations; special operations; unconventional warfare

The *USS Philadelphia* was ordered to patrol the Mediterranean Straits and conduct a blockade near the port of Tripoli due to the Bashaw of Tripoli demanding tribute for safe passage of American merchant ships and cargo. According to (Francis, 2007) the *USS Philadelphia*, a frigate 130 feet in length, weighing 1,240 tons and drawing 20 feet, ran aground on an uncharted reef on October 31, 1803, while under orders to protect the passage of American merchant ships in the Mediterranean. As explained by (Toll, 2006, p. 190) the grounded frigate was within sight of the fortified city-state of Tripoli. Being aground on the Kaliusa Reef, negated the frigates' ability to conduct naval movement and maneuver, hours later the *USS Philadelphia* was overcome by nine Tripolitan corsair vessels sailed by the plundering pirates of Tripoli. Three hundred and seven U.S. Crewmen and Officers were taken for ransom by Yusuf Karamanli the Tripolitan Bashaw (a positon akin to governor under the Ottoman Empire). The *USS Philadelphia* was salvaged from the reef, refitted, and reflagged for use as Tripolitan ship to defend the inner harbor of Tripoli.

INCIDENT BEGETS MILITARY RESPONSE – FIRST JOINT SPECIAL OPERATION

The unfortunate event of the *USS Philadelphia* prompted the third President of the United States Thomas Jefferson, into executive action with his Cabinet. President Jefferson along with the Secretary of State James Madison formulated a specialized military resolution involving the following: Henry Dearborn the Secretary of War, Robert Smith the newly appointed Secretary of the Navy, and William Eaton former Army Captain and U.S. Diplomat to the American Consul in Tunis.

The *USS Philadelphia* incident begets a military response. According to (Toll, 2006, p. 262) the decision to rescue and recover the U.S. Crewmen and Officers held for ransom, was critical to President Jefferson's American expression of expeditionary military application, signaling to the world, a willingness to protect American national interests of commerce and trade abroad. The recovery and rescue account for the first United States of

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America – joint special operation conducted in foreign lands since the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1789.

The North Coast of Africa during the period of 1793 to 1815 had four city-states under Ottoman hegemony. The four city-states were Tangier, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. The region was known for piracy and referred to as the Barbary or Pirate Coast. American trade relied on shipping, and sea commerce involved sailing through the strategic gates of Gibraltar to transit along the Coasts of Spain and North Africa leading to numerous Mediterranean Ports of trade. The United States was still forming; the expansion of merchant shipping was vital to private wealth, ultimately lending to new American growth, influence, and prosperity.

The United States of America at the time was newly formed nation, establishing internal and external authority. In 1801, The U.S. Capital building housing the Senate Chamber and House of Representatives was under construction when the House confirmed Thomas Jefferson as President. The White House was unfinished, and President Jefferson arrived at the Chamber for his inaugural address on March 4, 1801, from the Conrad & McMunn boardinghouse, it would be weeks before he moved into the White House. Thomas Jefferson's inaugural speech was a prelude of events to come; "a rising nation, spread over a wide and fruitful land, traversing all the seas with the rich productions of their industry, engaged in commerce with nations who feel power and forget the right, advancing rapidly to the destinies beyond the reach of mortal eye" (Toll, 2006, p. 150).

President Jefferson displayed frugality and balance, in a letter to his Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin " … we shall have revenue enough to improve our country in peace and defend it in war … " (Nester, 2013, p. 17).

America was forming, instigated in a Declaration of Independence July 4, 1776, established by a War of Independence, the surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, Virginia, on October 19, 1781, and the signing of the Treaty of Paris September 24, 1783, as documented by (Stewart, 2009, pp. 102–107).

The United States had achieved independence; the need for continued armed forces was in debate. The articles of the U.S. Constitution had begun to codify internal government affairs, placing the Secretary of War under the executive power of the president, and establishing the Department of War with the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy (Stewart, 2009, p. 113). American force size and strength fluctuated, the transition from a militia based continental army, to provisional, and finally a congressionally authorized U.S. Regular Army, a Navy Department (inspired by the Quasi-War with France) and establishment of the United States Marine Corps being of land and sea (Stewart, 2009, pp. 121–122). Jefferson hoped a U.S. application of diplomacy based in the Golden Rule; "to cultivate the peace and friendship of every nation", would avert war (Nester, 2013, p. 22). However, President Jefferson understood the "actual habits of our countrymen attach them to commerce" and "wars then must sometimes be our lot" (Nester, 2013, p. 20).

DIPLOMACY, ECONOMICS, & MILITARY – FIRST JOINT SPECIAL OPERATION

Nine days following the inauguration, President Jefferson received a diplomatic message from the U.S. Consul to Tripoli, the Bashaw Yusuf Karamanli threatened to attack

U.S. merchant ships with Tripolitan corsairs unless the United States distributed cash and gifts of tribute in six months (Toll, 2006, pp. 164–165). According to (Kilmeade & Yaeger, 2015, pp. 27–29) the Barbary power of Tripoli had been violating a Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the United States and Tripoli, ratified by U.S. Congress in 1797, through repeated breaches of contract, including acts of piracy, and increasing the agreed amount of tribute guaranteeing safe passage of U.S. ships in the region for trade and commerce. The demands of tribute expected to be paid by Americans to the city-state of Tripoli frustrated diplomacy. The Tripolitan demand for naval stores, accompanied by the fearlessness to request delivery of two U.S. built 36 gun frigates made the nation muse; "millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute" (Nester, 2013, p. 50). The U.S. Navy delivered the American built frigate *Crescent* to the Barbary Bashaw of Algiers, and it started one-upmanship demands from the other city-states (Toll, 2006, pp. 166–167). Tripoli and Tunis soon after demanded their U.S. made frigates, of which would have been used for the furtherance of state-sponsored piracy. In 1800, the *USS George Washington* sailed from America to Algiers to deliver the annual tribute to the Bashaw, and in turn, the Bashaw ordered the *USS George Washington* to deliver Algerian diplomats, livestock, cargo, and slaves as payment to the Ottoman hegemony in Constantinople. The commandeering of the *USS George Washington* was a turning point in U.S. Barbary Coast diplomatic relations, especially after the Bashaw stated to the Captain of the *USS George Washington* William Bainbridge, "you pay me tribute, by that you become my slaves" (Toll, 2006, p. 168).

On May 11, 1801, Bashaw of Tripoli Yusuf Karamanli declared war against the United States, and according to (Kilmeade & Yaeger, 2015, p. 54) the declaration was followed up with the cutting down of the American flag pole at U.S. Consulate in Tripoli, three days later. Communications were reliant on shipping and sea travel, decentralized decisions from U.S. appointed Secretaries, Counsels, and Military Officers were necessary and expected because dispatches from the Mediterranean to Washington D.C. required three months (Toll, 2006, p. 170). President Jefferson was not informed of the declaration of war for weeks because communications relied upon Atlantic transit. However, insights and knowledge gained from President Jefferson's previous diplomatic appointments in Paris made him well aware of the prevaricating behavior of the Bashaw, including unreasonable requests for tribute exhausting diplomacy. Thomas Jefferson when in Paris in 1786 had been aware of the Barbary state-sponsored antics of piracy, and supported naval action through his understanding of the need for navigation of the seas to carry forth American agricultural exports to foreign markets; "to preserve an equality of right … in the transportation of commodities … and in other uses of the seas" (Toll, 2006, p. 164).

The United States of America was being extorted for tribute, naval stores, weapons, munitions, and shipping vessels by the Bashaw of Tripoli and the other Barbary Coast city-states. American merchant vessels were being captured, reflagged, and placed into the Tripolitan navy. The Barbary pirates would take the cargo, imprison the crew for ransom, or even sell captives into slavery. The city-state rulers of Tangier, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli had an unappeasable desire for tribute called for by their Ottoman suzerain.

The United States addressed the Barbary piracy and extortion through diplomatic negotiations and a military U.S. Naval show of force in the Mediterranean. In 1802, President Jefferson and Secretary of Treasury Albert Gallatin deliberated the cost of constructing ships of tribute with U.S. taxes and sending them with naval stores to the

Barbary city-states sponsoring piracy, versus building the United States Armed Forces. The Treasury Secretary Gallatin had asked President Thomas Jefferson to contemplate a "mere matter of calculation whether the purchase of peace is not cheaper than the expense of war" (Toll, 2006, p. 174).

FORMING NOVEL PLANS – FIRST JOINT SPECIAL OPERATION

In 1802, President Jefferson was authorized by the Senate "An Act for the protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United States, against Tripolitan Corsairs" (Kilmeade & Yaeger, 2015, p. 93). The ensuing conventional U.S. Naval presence in the Mediterranean, including the attempted blockade and bombardment of Tripoli were not effective in dissuading the Bashaw Yusuf Karamanli from capturing U.S. merchant vessels. President Jefferson and Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith appointed Commodore Edward Preble as commander of the *USS Constitution* and the Navy Squadron in the Mediterranean in 1803. The President intended to increase pressure on Tripoli through more aggressive conventional naval action, authorized by Congress to "subdue, seize and make prize of all vessels, goods, and effects, belonging to the Bashaw of Tripoli, or his subjects" (Toll, 2006, p. 171).

U.S. Navy Captain Edward Preble led the naval blockade from passive to what he believed "necessary to our National and Naval Character in the Eastern World, we humble that Regency and bring the Bashaw to our terms" (Waterhouse, Smith, & Long, 2006, p. 15). The aggressive actions of Commodore Preble's Naval Squadron, including blockades, bombardment, and capture of pirate vessels, were beginning to take effect until the unfortunate event of the *USS Philadelphia* running aground October 31, 1803.

The U.S. Navy frigates carried firepower (36 or 44 guns) aboard and were far superior to the Tripolitan corsairs (much of which were pirated and refitted ketch rigged merchant vessels). The Barbary Coast contains channels and shoals on approach to critical ports, as did the harbor-centric city-state of Tripoli. The U.S. Frigates required water 20 feet deep when fully gunned and loaded, this presented an advantage in the open sea, but a disadvantage in coastal areas. The Barbary Coast pirates had detailed local knowledge of the coastal soundings, and when the *USS Philadelphia* gave chase on October 31, 1803, it is likely the pirates purposely sailed through a known channel to escape capture. The grounding incident of the *USS Philadelphia* provided the Tripolitan Bashaw Yusuf Karamanli with diplomatic negotiating leverage of strategic value against the United States. Yusuf Karamanli held three hundred and seven U.S. Crewmen and Officers hostage, and favorable winds with a rising tide eventually permitted the Bashaw to salvage the shipwrecked *USS Philadelphia* from the reef. Following capture the *USS Philadelphia* was refitted and reflagged as a Tripolitan ship, and strategically stationed with recovered cannon in the harbor of Tripoli, (Nester, 2013, p. 53). The U.S. Navy 44 gun *USS Philadelphia* was a costly strategic loss for the United States of America. The *USS Philadelphia* was one of six frigates operating in the United States Navy and represented a third of the U.S. Conventional Naval Force strength in the Mediterranean (Toll, 2006, p. 188).

The loss of *USS Philadelphia* during the Tripolitan War required a novel plan to recover the U.S. Frigate. Acting in crisis response under decentralized naval command, Commodore Edward Preble massed his Naval Squadron outside the port of Tripoli. The

Secretary of Navy Robert Smith requested two more frigates, and increased naval bombardments on the inner harbor of Tripoli. The increased naval bombardments were intended to neutralize the Tripolitan refitting of the *USS Philadelphia*, nevertheless at the same time endangered the American captives held within the city-state. Diplomacy was applied in combination with the U.S. military naval action. Per (Nester, 2013, p. 53), the Tripolitan Bashaw Yusuf Karamanli had demanded three million dollars in ransom for the release of the U.S. Crewmen and Officers, additionally Karamanli was steadfast on retaining the captured U.S. Navy Frigate. The American Naval Squadron had captured the Tripolitan *Mastico* with sixty crew members. However, the Bashaw rejected a prisoner exchange. Preble was a determined Naval Squadron Commodore, and had admitted the loss of the *USS Philadelphia* "distressed me beyond description, and very much deranges my plans of operations for the present" (Toll, 2006, p. 199).

UNIQUE MODES OF EMPLOYMENT – FIRST JOINT SPECIAL OPERATION

In 1804, the U.S. Regular Army and U.S. Navy were very conventional in design, with four U.S. Regiments in the Army and six active Navy Frigates (three allocated to the Tripolitan War), and another six at dry dock in the Washington D.C. Navy Yard. During the American War of Independence, the militia and continental army used irregular tactics, and the continental navy used small galleys as gunboats to navigate the shoals. The Tripolitan War created a need for specialized equipment and tactics. According to (Smelser, 1968, p. 61), the requirement for small gunboats was necessary, to operate in the coastal shoals and give chase to the Barbary Coast pirates with support from conventional frigates offshore.

The plan to recover-destroy *USS Philadelphia* gained momentum because conventional naval bombardment had not influenced the Bashaw to change his behavior, and diplomatic negotiations had stalemated. In contemporary Special Operations, " … hostage rescue and recovery operations are sensitive crisis response missions in response to terrorist threats and incidents; offensive operations in support of hostage rescue and recovery can include the recapture of U.S. facilities, installations, and sensitive material overseas" (Department of Defense [DoD] JP 3–05, 2014, p. II-12). Commodore Preble, Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, and (William Bainbridge held hostage in Tripoli), planned an operation in time of crisis, to destroy the *USS Philadelphia* because the situation was assessed as too risky to support recovery. William Bainbridge, former Commander of the *USS Philadelphia*, was able to clandestinely provide intelligence reporting (through consulate letters using lemon juice) about the captured ship and the status of Tripolitan forces within the fortified harbor. Bainbridge suggested a small group of men rehearsed in sabotage, infiltrate at night and place specially constructed incendiary charges in critical locations to ensure destruction of the captured frigate. Lieutenant Decatur volunteered to hand-select a small group for the dangerous, high risk, yet rewarding mission. Lieutenant Stephen Decatur was athletic and carried an elusive quality and intensity that set him apart from others; as noted by (Toll, 2006, pp. 205–206). Commodore Preble had judged Decatur as worthy of the special mission to destroy the *USS Philadelphia*, knowing an operation of such great importance would accelerate career promotion in the U.S. Navy.

The special operation to recover-destroy the *USS Philadelphia* required unique modes of employment; using nonstandard equipment. According to (Toll, 2006, p. 206), the

Tripolitan captured *Mastico* ketch (renamed *USS Intrepid*) was used as a ruse to penetrate the hostile environment. The plan called for low-visibility infiltration by the method of the native-rigged vessel blending in by sailing alone at night into the harbor as a typical Maltese merchant ship. "In 1804, Marines went into action as raiders" (Hicks, 1961, p. 8). U.S. Marine raiders were included in the time-sensitive plan, and per (DoD JP 3–05, 2014, p. I-1) operated disguised in native clothing to blend-in on approach. The operation utilized an indigenous translator to hail ship-to-ship, maintaining low-visibility until alongside, and then through surprise gain tactical advantage without alerting Tripolitan forces. All of this was planned to reduce the tactical high risk associated with the crisis response mission, and reap the operational reward. The small specially selected U.S. Officers, Crewman, and Marines infiltrated the Tripolitan inner harbor under the guise of flying English colors on the evening of February 16, 1804. The U.S. Marine Corps served as infantry on landing expeditions, and at sea protected ships; the Marines had "a reputation for being bold" and "were invaluable during boarding actions" (Kilmeade & Yaeger, 2015, p. 60). The captured *USS Philadelphia* was successfully destroyed, in a politically sensitive and hostile environment of which surprised the Tripolitans. The reconnaissance of the harbor enabled detailed planning and flexibility to adjust the operation from recovery to destruction based on intelligence gathered. The result was a U.S. direct action, short-duration raid employing specialized military capabilities to conduct independent sabotage (DoD JP 3-05, 2014, p. II-5). The destruction of the *USS Philadelphia* encouraged the U.S. Navy Officers and Crewmen still being held hostage in Tripoli, and signaled American determination.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS – FIRST JOINT SPECIAL OPERATION

The Bashaw was baffled by the American persistence, and Commodore Preble never forgot his concern for "the unfortunate Country Men," held for ransom (Toll, 2006, p. 227). The special operation tactic met the intent by denying the Bashaw of Tripoli, a 44 gun frigate, to be used for protection of his harbor. The destruction of the USS Philadelphia had a strategic impact of which shaped diplomatic and military environments for future hostage rescue and recovery.

> Special operations forces capabilities include being able to quickly task-organize and deploy using a lower profile or footprint than conventional forces; gaining access to hostile and denied areas; rapidly surveying, assessing, and reporting local situations; working closely with regional military and civilian authorities and populations; organizing people to help solve local problems; and providing tailored or unconventional responses to ambiguous situations. (JSOU, 2015, p. 1–2)

President Jefferson and his cabinet favored increased trade and commerce, boosting the economic instrument of power in the Mediterranean, taking advantage of being at peace with Europe while France and England continued to be at war. President Jefferson applied a national strategy utilizing diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of power to advance and defend U.S. interests as prescribed per contemporary (DoD JP 3–0, 2017, p. I-1). Information and communications took months' time to cross the Atlantic Ocean. President Jefferson was informed of the loss of the USS Philadelphia and her U.S. Navy Officers and Crewmen on March 19, 1804; a month after Commodore Preble, through

decentralized authority, implemented sensitive crisis response, and destroyed the frigate under the nose of Yusuf Karamanli, placing military pressure on Tripolitans by way of a small-scale special operation, achieving operational and strategic effect.

Unaware of the successful destruction of the USS Philadelphia, President Jefferson increased application of naval force in the Mediterranean; because ongoing military and diplomatic actions had not yet convinced the Bashaw of Tripoli to release the three hundred and seven U.S. Crewmen and Officers. The *USS Philadelphia* incident moved President Jefferson to address Congress and request an increase for the U.S. Navy. In turn, U.S. Congress promptly provided the Commander in Chief "An Act Further to protect the commerce and seamen of the U.S. against the Barbary Powers" (Story, 1828, p. 941). The Secretary of the Navy sent four frigates and a logistical storeship as a relief squadron for Commodore Preble. Samuel Barron would become the next U.S. Naval Squadron Commodore in the Tripolitan War, 1804 through 1805 as Commander of the *USS President*, the flagship of the Squadron (Zacks, 2005, index).

Commodore Preble stood-down the conventional naval campaign against Tripoli from the deck of his flagship the *USS Constitution* on September 5, 1804. The intensified blockade and bombardment had exhausted resources and the squadron set course for resupply and linkup with the Barron's replacement fleet while the *USS Argus* and *USS Vixen* remained on blockade for a relief in place (Toll, 2006, p. 249). The arriving Commodore Samuel Barron was pre-informed of the ground force plan by the Secretary of the Navy. William Eaton while in transit aboard the *USS President*, used political savvy to garner Barron's support for the developing ground offensive involving a coalition with the former Bashaw Sidi Hamet Karamanli, elder brother of Yusuf through a shared common understanding of the threat. In Tripoli the threat, Yusuf Karamanli had endured Preble's intense naval summer campaign and the incoming Commodore Barron was informed "you will, it is believed, find Mr. Eaton extremely useful to you" (Kilmeade & Yaeger, 2015, pp. 157–168).

A new strategy was working, and new ways of thinking were coming together. The destruction of the *USS Philadelphia* unnerved Yusuf Karamanli, and Preble's naval campaign reduced his inner harbor defenses. Commodore Preble's handover concluded with impressive naval military pressure, of which compelled Yusuf to engage in diplomatic negotiations for peace; however, he was insistent upon unreasonable amounts of ransom for the U.S. Officers and Crewmen (Toll, 2006, p. 227).

OPERATING THROUGH AND WITH INDIGENOUS FORCES – FIRST JOINT SPECIAL OPERATION

> I engaged to take the management of an enterprise on the coast of Barbary, which had for its object the recovery of our captives in Tripoli, and imposing terms of peace on the Regency, by bringing a rival and an army in the enemy's rear, the President and his cabinet council had formed sanguine hopes of its success. William Eaton (Prentiss, 1813, p. 265)

Former U.S. Army Captain and former American diplomatic consul to Tunis, William Eaton proposed a unique plan to President Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison. It involved operations and activities conducted to enable a resistance movement by Sidi Hamet Karamanli, the rightful heir of Tripoli, to overthrow the illegitimate occupying power of his younger brother Bashaw Yusuf Karamanli. The plan Eaton

proposed called for operating through and with indigenous opposition forces to attack the denied Tripolitan area by land in conjunction with naval support by sea, to "put pressure on a hostile government" and resolve international crises without overt, large-scale conventional force" (DoD JP 3–05, 2014, p. II-8).

The newly forming plan relied upon effective coordination of capabilities and expertise from the U.S. Naval Squadron maritime forces, and U.S. land forces consisting of a re-appointed Army Officer William Eaton, a Marine detachment, and the indigenous opposition forces, equating to joint warfare and operating as part of a multinational coalition per (DoD JP 1, 2017, p. II-8). The plan was the first time the U.S. employed a joint force composed of elements from two U.S. Constitutionally acknowledged military departments operating in unified action on foreign seas and on foreign soil with a single co-operation commander Commodore Barron; who in contemporary terms could be referred to as the joint force commander per (DoD JP 1, 2017, p. IV-18).

The Naval Commodore ordered the U.S. Navy Squadron on September 15, 1804, to proceed to Alexandria Egypt with General Eaton, and use convoying procedures in and around Malta as deception. Insert General Eaton and the Marines at Cairo Egypt near Alexandria to locate Sidi Hamet Karamanli the rival elder brother, being the legitimate inheritor of Tripoli (Prentiss, 1813, pp. 367–368). Commodore Barron had ordered Master Commandant Isaac Hull to provide U.S. Naval support to General Eaton, the Marine detachment, and the indigenous opposition forces, with intent to reestablish Sidi Hamet Karamanli as Bashaw of Tripoli. The U.S. land forces commanded by Army General Eaton, consisted of Marine Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon, U.S. Midshipmen George Washington Mann, and a detachment of seven Marines. The land forces were ordered to travel overland from Alexandria Egypt, to locate Sidi Hamet Karamanli and assemble indigenous opposition forces; then move overland to the second largest Tripolitan city-state of Derne with intent to overthrow Yusuf Karamanli forcing the release of the U.S. Crewmen and Officers captured from the *USS Philadelphia* and held hostage for ransom (Prentiss, 1813, pp. 369–373).

General Eaton held a degree from Dartmouth and was brilliant at language with adept cultural abilities. According to (Nester, 2013, p. 54) William Eaton was a veteran of the War of Independence and served under General Anthony Wayne in the Northwest Campaign. Eaton had mastered; Greek, Latin, French, Arabic, and several Native American tribal languages. Eaton had a reputation as a marksman, swordsman, and sometimes brash yet charismatic military leader. William Eaton had been acting in a role similar to a contemporary Foreign Area Officer, or a Special Operations Liaison Officer when appointed as a U.S. Consul; and then selected as the ground forces component commander for the rescue operation (DoD JP 3–05, 2014, p. III-20). William Eaton was operating under Commodore Barron with executive authorities granted through James Madison the Secretary of State, and Tobias Lear the U.S. Barbary Chief Consul to the region (Kilmeade & Yaeger, 2015, p. 157). The executive confidence placed in William Eaton was attributed to his language, cultural, military, and diplomatic abilities all of which were deemed necessary to pull off the high risk ground offensive and follow-on rescue, by operating through or with indigenous resistance forces.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE – FIRST JOINT SPECIAL OPERATION

William Eaton devised the plan and donned his Army uniform for the operation. He wrote to Secretary of State James Madison, "to attack the usurper by land, while

operations are going by sea" (Prentiss, 1813, p. 208). Eaton had presented the plan to James Madison years ahead of the operation because as former U.S. Consul to Tunis he had observed, naval operations and negotiations produced little effect, other than contempt (Prentiss, 1813, pp. 208 & 263). Eaton's preparation began with an assessment of Sidi Hamet Karamanli and ended with approval from Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. The Secretary of State had initial apprehension toward meddling in domestic affairs of sovereigns. However, Yusuf Karamanli had breached a treaty with the United States. James Madison answered Eaton, "it cannot be unfair to turn to our advantage the enmity and pretensions of others against a common foe" (Toll, 2006, p. 229). The plan to overthrow the illegitimate government of Tripoli with indigenous resistance forces, and attack the enemy's rear to create security issues; associated the 1805 mission with the present-day description of Unconventional Warfare (UW).

> Unconventional warfare consists of operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. The U.S. Government conducted UW to create security issues behind enemy lines and erode enemy power and their will to fight, and in support of insurgencies attempting to overthrow adversarial regimes. (DoD JP 3-05, 2014, p. II-8)

Unconventional warfare operations rely on synchronization of special operations forces and conventional forces operating in unified action with one or more interagency and multinational partners utilizing a resistance movement to influence or foster a change in the illegitimate governing authority (DoD JP 3-05, 2014, p. II-8). The seven phases of unconventional warfare doctrinally consist of; preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, employment, and transition (Garland, 2019). The 1805 Joint Special Operation was no different. The ground forces commander, a frocked U.S. Army General, William Eaton, was an executive agent on "America's first covert military operation overseas" (Zacks, 2005, p. 10).

PREPARATION THROUGH BUILDUP – FIRST JOINT SPECIAL OPERATION

The special operation planned by William Eaton necessitated detailed collaboration and coordination between the ground forces and Commodore Barron's naval forces to integrate the capabilities of the joint force per (DoD JP 3-05, 2014, p. I-9). The integration, planning, and execution were in accord with contemporary unconventional warfare; it had involved U.S. Armed Forces working with U.S. Government agencies in the first three phases; preparation, initial contact, and infiltration. The armed force's role typically increases in the next three; organization, buildup, and employment (United States Special Operations Command [USSOCOM], 2007, p. 88). At the end of the operation during the transition phase, the armed forces were required to coordinate with government and diplomatic agencies to re-balance the military and diplomatic instruments of national power.

The preparation phase had concluded with approval granted. On November 10, 1804, the orders were issued to begin initial contact. The *USS Argus* commanded by Captain Isaac Hull infiltrated William Eaton to Alexandria Egypt. The U.S. Government and

Commodore Barron had approved the furnishing of supplies, ammunition, and funds (Zacks, 2005, p. 120).

William Eaton conducted the initial contact in Egypt, and he had to bring Sidi Hamet Karamanli out of hiding because there had been a death warrant, placed by his younger brother Yusuf Karamanli, who also held Hamet's wife and children hostage in Derne. William Eaton was able to find assistance from British and Egyptian diplomats' in Cairo, resultant from his past work as a consulate. Eaton located Sidi Hamet, and within eighteen days an agreement was reached on February 23, 1805, to begin organization, buildup, and employment of Sidi Hamet Karamanli's resistance forces (Nester, 2013, p. 55).

William Eaton was allocated 20,000 dollars, and a U.S. Marine detachment (Nester, 2013, p. 55). Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon, the Marine leader was from Fauquier, County Virginia and had been assigned as a Marine to the Tripolitan War in the Mediterranean beginning in 1802. Lieutenant O'Bannon served on the following ships during the Tripolitan War; the *USS Adams, USS President, USS Constitution*, and the *USS Argus*. While serving on the *USS Argus*, he was selected to participate in the operation to move overland with intent to overthrow Yusuf Karamanli by operating through or with indigenous resistance forces on an expedition against Derne (Marine Corps University [MCU], 2009). Lieutenant O'Bannon's U.S. Marine detachment included a Navy Midshipmen, a Marine Noncommissioned Officer (NCO), and six Marine privates (Prentiss, 1813, pp. 278 & 303).

The organization and buildup of Sidi Hamet's opposition forces included recruitment of eighty Greek and three hundred Arab mercenaries equating to a force size of four hundred and ninety, including the Eaton and the Marine detachment. Sidi Hamet Karamanli was from Derne, and his wife and children were being held there by Tripolitans loyal to his rival brother Yusuf Karamanli. According to (Nester, 2013, p. 55) Sidi Hamet was able to add another ninety Tripolitan opposition cavalry, bringing the total size of the caravan to nearly five hundred. Employment required a 520-mile march across the desert from Alexandria Egypt to the Tripolitan citadel at Derne. The caravan movement commenced on March 6, 1805 (Kilmeade & Yaeger, 2015, p. 181). The march was demanding; there were one hundred and ninety camels, ninety cavalry Tripolitans, and the diverse mercenary forces bartered for additional pay. Eaton and O'Bannon rode Barbary horses according to (Zacks, 2005, p. 175). The "polyglot Army" and caravan marched 20 miles daily, and on March 14, 1805, they reached the frontier between Egypt and the Tripolitan State and camped on a ridge in preparation for another phase of infiltration (Toll, 2006, p. 260). On the march the caravan was able to recruit several hundred mounted Bedouins, increasing the indigenous force strength to seven hundred, of which demonstrated readiness to conquer Yusuf Karamanli's Tripolitan forces at Derne (Kilmeade & Yaeger, 2015, pp. 182–183).

EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSITION – FIRST JOINT SPECIAL OPERATION

Employment included a linkup with the U.S. Naval Squadron consisting of the *USS Argus, USS Nautilus*, and the *USS Hornet*, commanded by Commandant Isaac Hull (Toll, 2006, p. 261). The ground forces and caravan faced deprivation during the desert expedition and the *USS Argus*, and *USS Hornet* resupplied the caravan from April 8 through April 23, 1805, at Bomba Beach (Zacks, 2005, p. 223). On April 25, 1805, the indigenous caravan

made camp on a ridge overlooking Derne, and General Eaton planned the direct action assault on the citadel, amongst rumors of the despot Yusuf Karamanli being made aware of the plans. A probable compromise, caused Eaton to send out a messenger on April 26, 1805, in an attempt to gain control of Derne through peaceful handover to the legitimate successor Sidi Hamet Karamanli. The Governor of Derne had ten times the force strength in comparison to Eaton and Sidi Hamet, thus declined surrender (Nester, 2013, p. 55). The Governor of Derne Mustifa, sent a reply to Eaton, "my head or yours" (Zacks, 2005, p. 228).

The pre-coordinated direct action assault on Derne commenced with naval bombardment at thirteen thirty hours on 27 April 1805, followed by field cannon and musket fires from the high ground held by Eaton and Sidi Hamet's assault force. Hamet's indigenous forces assaulted the rear of the Derne Citadel from the West, and the Marines led by Eaton on horseback from the Southeast. General William Eaton and the Marine detachment were, "bolstered by sixty Marines" from the U.S. Naval Squadron during the resupply of arms and field cannon (Nester, 2013, p. 55). Per (JSOU, 2015, p. 1–2) small-unit proficiency in specialized skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation, overwhelmed the adversaries at the Citadel of Derne. Eaton's unique plan operating by, with, and through seven hundred indigenous resistance forces took the citadel at Derne in two and a half hours, the Marines raised the American Flag for the first time on foreign soil across the Atlantic Ocean (Nester, 2013, p. 55). The direct action assault on Derne with indigenous forces was exemplary Unconventional Warfare, and the first joint special operation conducted by the United States armed forces on foreign land since the ratification of the U.S. Constitution.

Following employment and the assault on Derne, the transition phase involved sharing an engagement with U.S. Government diplomatic efforts. The military success and seizure of Derne set the conditions for the diplomatic leverage against Yusuf Karamanli. William Eaton wanted to continue military action and proceed to Tripoli. However, the U.S. Government counsel to the region, Tobias Lear, was in charge of the diplomatic instrument of power, and the U.S. Navy Commandant Isaac Hull held the military power offshore of Derne in the form of a Naval Squadron. On May 20, 1805, Tripolitan forces loyal to Yusuf were massing on the same high ground overlooking the citadel and planning a counterattack (Zacks, 2005, p. 239). On May 31, 1805, the *USS Hornet* messaged Eaton of ending U.S. support for Sidi Hamet, nevertheless Eaton held steadfast in Derne. The end state of the *USS Philadelphia* hostage rescue and recovery was achieved June 3, 1805, with a new diplomatic treaty eliminating any further U.S. annual tribute to the Barbary city-state of Tripoli. The transition phase of unconventional warfare involves U.S. Government departments, other nations' forces, and sensitive diplomacy. William Eaton, the detachment of Marines, and Sidi Hamet Karamanli were ordered to withdraw from Derne. On the evening of 12 June, 1805, William Eaton arranged a phased low-visibility night exfiltration to the *USS Constellation* (Toll, 2006, pp. 261–262). Eaton had met Sidi Hamet Karamanli years ago in Tunis on consulate duty, and just shared an expedition across the desert, and close combat with the man. Sidi Hamet was considered a loyal ally to the United States; therefore, William Eaton negotiated for Sidi Hamet's' safe extraction from Derne. Eaton returned to the United States as a hero and the State of Massachusetts granted him one thousand acres of land in the territory of Maine. The U.S. Government diplomatic efforts liberated Sidi Hamet's wife and children from Derne, and

the U.S. Government granted Sidi Hamet a 200.00 dollar monthly pension until his end years residing across the Tripolitan frontier in Egypt as an exile (Kilmeade & Yaeger, 2015, pp. 196–201).

DIPLOMATIC POSITION OF STRENGTH – FIRST JOINT SPECIAL OPERATION

General Eaton, Lieutenant O'Bannon, a detachment of Marines, a Midshipmen, and the resistance force of Sidi Hamet Karamanli had "shocked Yusuf into making peace" whereas the application of conventional U.S. Navy blockade and bombardment had not been able to influence a behavior change in the Tripolitan Bashaw (Smelser, 1968, p. 60). From a diplomatic position of strength gained by ways of a military special operation, Tobias Lear, the lead U.S. Diplomat to the Barbary city-states, had negotiated the release of the U.S. Officers and Crewmen. The U.S. Government did pay a small ransom fee of sixty thousand dollars, of which frustrated Eaton, for he was against the payout of any ransom and believed the "honor of the United States forbids the payment of a single penny to the Barbary pirates in public or in private" (Zacks, 2005, p. 119). William Eaton was in disagreement with the settlement and had the intent to take advantage of military momentum following the fall of Derne. Eaton intended direct action against Benghazi, followed by U.S. Naval transport from Benghazi across the Gulf of Sidra to Tripoli (Toll, 2006, p. 260). Eaton wrote in his journal; "through these instruments, I firmly believe, the enemy may be taken from his sofa at the same instant that our fellow citizens are rescued from chains" (Prentiss, 1813, p. 271). Tobias Lear wielding the U.S. diplomatic instrument of power ended the military operation and transition phase. The prudent choice was best for the United States at the time, because it is debatable whether or not Eaton, O'Bannon, the detachment of Marines, and resistance force would have been successful; "further penetration of Tripoli would only have provoked the massacre of Philadelphia's languishing crew, and have ended in Eaton's on destruction" (Smelser, 1968, p. 60).

CONCLUSION

A portion of the Naval and Marine tactics executed on the operation to destroy *USS Philadelphia* and recover the U.S. Crewmen and Officers involved conventional military forces engaged in traditional warfare. Traditional warfare is reserved as a struggle for domination between Westphalian nation-states for reasons of national interest, and Tripolitan city-state had formally declared war against the U.S. The U.S. Naval focus on maneuver and firepower to achieve operational objectives against the Tripolitan city-state as the center of gravity, align well with the characteristics of traditional warfare (DoD JP 1, 2017, p. I-5). Standard military functions were utilized for naval sea transport and naval bombardments in support of the ground force offensive. However, there were several distinct differences. The ground offensive may be characterized as irregular warfare, because of the "non-Westphalian context" associated with William Eaton's ability to gain support from Sidi Hamet Karamanli, a non-state actor, to conduct a "violent struggle for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population" of Derne (DoD JP 1, 2017, p. I-6). The form of irregular warfare conducted by William Eaton was unconventional warfare with Sidi Hamet Karamanli's resistance forces employed against the conventional occupying power of Tripolitan forces at the Derne Citadel. According to (DoD JP 1, 2017,

p. I-6) "military operations alone rarely resolve irregular warfare conflicts" and "the U.S. will always wage irregular warfare from the perspective of a nation-state" using a "whole-of-nation approach where the military instrument of power sets conditions for victory" (DoD JP 1, 2017, p. I-6). "American agent William Eaton conceived a plan to restore a friendly ruler to the Tripolitan throne and end the difficulties" … for the first time in history the American flag flew over a fortress of the old world, and a peace treaty soon ensued" (Hicks, 1961, p. 8).

William Eaton was able to apply years of Barbary cultural understanding, language abilities, and established relationships from his time as the U.S. consulate to Tunis. President Jefferson and James Madison approved William Eaton's tailored plan based on his previous experience and personal relationships. President Jefferson's Cabinet provided clear national and theater strategic objectives, combined with Eaton and the Marines competent tactical planning and execution are examples of special operations factors of success. The expeditionary employment of Eaton's small select force, employed at a great distance from the supporting operational base in Gibraltar or Malta, is a characteristic of a special operation (JSOU, 2015, p. 1–1). The operator-level planning and detailed intelligence coupled with the sophisticated means of insertion and support used to penetrate Tripolitan controlled terrain, and successfully return via naval extraction from hostile, and politically sensitive areas (Tripoli-harbor and Derne) – all reinforce characteristics of a special operation. The U.S. Naval Squadron presence in the Mediterranean during the Tripolitan War enabled the low-visibility raid to destroy the *USS Philadelphia* and the follow-on unconventional warfare action in Derne. The support provided by the conventional U.S. Navy Squadron is a testament to the special operations forces (SOF) truth; "most special operations require non-SOF support" (JSOU, 2015, p. 1–1).

The first United States of America joint special operations were sensitive crisis response. The destruction of the captured *USS Philadelphia* and follow-on rescue of the U.S. Officers and Crewmen involved the contemporary characterization of joint warfare, direct action, unconventional warfare, covert action, low-visibility operations, and extensive interagency coordination (DoD JP 3–05, 2014, p. I-5). The operations of 1804 and 1805 set the precedence for the United States power projection abroad through posture, presence, and developing partners. The Commander in Chief Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of State James Madison, the Secretary of War for Henry Dearborn, and the Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith proved to the world the democratic experiment was sovereign and would not acquiesce liberties to foreign adversaries.

The U.S. Navy officer Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, selected by Commodore Preble to conduct the low-visibility raid on the USS Philadelphia, was a testament to leadership development during the Tripolitan War, exhibited by performance during the War of 1812. The Marine action capturing the Citadel of Derne in 1805 is remembered in the Colors of the Corps, inscribed with "To the Shores of Tripoli" and in the Marine Corps hymn, "We will fight our country's battles on the land as on the sea" (MCU, 2006). William Eaton orchestrated the buildup of an indigenous army and traversed across 520 miles of desert to lead a joint special operation on the Citadel of Derne, he was wounded and exhibited "extraordinary feat of leadership and endurance; "William Eaton must rank among America's greatest special operations officers" (Nester, 2013, pp. 54–56).

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BOOK REVIEW

Review of: After the Wars: International Lessons from the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, edited by John A. Gentry and William M. Nolte, Bethesda, MD, National Intelligence University, 2018, $37.00 (paperback), ISBN: 978-1-932946-12-3

After the Wars contains a treasure trove of lessons from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and should be high on the reading list of anyone concerned with the changing character of warfare in the twentieth century. This volume is not unique in that it documents the perceptions and lessons drawn from two of the longest conflicts in American history, but that it does so from the point-of-view of a wide variety of non-U.S. actors: from adversaries like Russia and Iran, to friends like Japan and Germany, to actors like international nongovernmental organizations and insurgent groups. For American readers in the military and intelligence communities, this volume is an opportunity to escape from the echo chamber of American foreign policy discourse. Editors John Gentry and William Nolte have left no stone unturned to find individuals uniquely qualified to comment on how foreign actors have viewed America's participation in these two wars. The result is a volume rich in precision, detail, and insight. As Maureen Baginski notes in the foreword, it is indeed a thought-provoking journey (vii).

The one possible weakness in *After the Wars* is that it does not go far enough in answering a looming question, namely, what the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan mean for the future of warfare. Granted, the primary purpose of the volume, so ably executed, was to assess "how foreign actors see lessons of these wars in ways important *to those actors*" (3, emphasis in original), but the volume also aimed to "analyze how those lessons will affect [foreign actors'] future foreign and security policies and actions" (3). Forecasting the world of warfare that awaits American forces in the future is an imperative corollary of this effort, since the analysis of foreign actors' policies and actions necessarily involves anticipating what the battlefield will look like. The failure to tackle this future warfare question head on in *After the Wars*, even in a qualified or preliminary fashion, is a missed opportunity to influence the thinking and outlook of military and intelligence professionals dedicated to preserving America's national security. After all, how we perceive the future and how we prepare for it dictate whether we will actually learn the lessons and avoid the failures of the past.

Given this, one purpose of this review is to anticipate what the international lessons of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan contained in this volume mean for the future of warfare, and thus how this volume can genuinely contribute to helping America avoid the strategic missteps of the past. The main takeaway is that American military forces and intelligence professionals should prepare for a more ambiguous battlespace where the use and exploitation of information is much more prevalent.

After the Wars collects lessons from three main categories of actors: allies and friends of the U.S. (Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan); adversaries and enemies of the U.S. (Russia, Iran, China, AQI, the Taliban, and ISIL); and those in between (Turkey, Pakistan, and international NGOs). Gentry and Nolte do not use these categories to organize the volume, although this review does, in order to demonstrate how the volume contributes to our understanding of the future of warfare.

The lessons of America's allies and friends focus on the realization that they should do more to shape international security. Peter Viggo Jakobsen observes how Italy, France, Germany, and the UK have begun to shed their dependence on the American security umbrella in favor of more active involvement on the ground in Europe's security periphery. Patrick Keller finds that Germany's definition of "defense" now includes "security" (44–45). "Political

communication," he writes, "is … one of the few areas where an undisputed lesson can be drawn from [Germany's] Afghanistan experience" (38). Michael W. David notes that Japan has learned the public relations value of deployments as opposed to money. Japan's security commitments and willingness to be involved have increased in part, but not totally, because of its participation in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the case of these friends and allies of America, this newfound assertiveness and willingness to deploy does not represent a repudiation of American leadership in global affairs, but a recognition that a dependence on American military power is neither healthy nor wise in the long term.

In the case of America's adversaries and enemies, however, lessons focus on the opportunities that American failures in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided. Russia, according to Stephen Blank, learned that America does not know how to end its wars, and so is vulnerable to the information warfare concepts that Russia has developed as a result both of its experience in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine, and of America's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thomas E. Dowling observes that Iran, on the heels of U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, finds itself in the strongest strategic position it has known since the Islamic Revolution. Introducing UAVs and cyber capabilities into its concepts of denial and defensive attrition will only improve Iran's position in the inevitable conflict with the United States. Lawrence E. Cline notes that insurgent organizations like AQI, the Taliban, and ISIL have adapted their organizational structures, tactics, and strategies to reflect the importance of information operations, which they see as an American weakness. David Lai, for his part, finds that America's use of information age technology was an "eye-opening experience for the Chinese" (145), but that America also squandered its soft power and set inappropriate precedents for international behavior in its "drive for global hegemony" (134), which resulted in the terrorism that we see today (140). Like Iranians, Russians and insurgents, the Chinese seem eager to exploit the weaknesses laid bare by America's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, although they too are wary of confronting American precision firepower head-on, in favor of a more indirect reliance on denial and information warfare.

The lessons of those actors who are neither adversarial nor friendly toward the United States, or whose interests dictate that they vary between these extremes, focus on the uncertain realities created in Iraq and Afghanistan. K.A. Beyoghlow finds that the increasing electoral activity of Turkey's public and events like the failed July 2016 coup have contributed to "a serious mismatch between its strategy and its domestic and regional policies" (117). This uncertainty necessarily strains Turkish-American relations; the two cannot really do without each other, but they also appear to be strange bedfellows for the time being. Stephen Tankel points to the delicate "double game" that Pakistan is playing, doing just enough to appease American counterterrorism requests, without undermining Pakistan's relationships with Laskhar e-Tayyiba, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Haqqani Network, relationships cultivated painstakingly over the course of decades. "[N]o realistic inducements or threats of coercion," Tankel writes, "are likely to change the Pakistani military's strategic calculus regarding support for militant groups" (131). Pauline H. Baker identifies three major trends affecting international nongovernmental organizations as a result of American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan: worsening security, "shrinking humanitarian space" (171), and a changing funding landscape, with only one quarter of NGO funding coming from governments. These trends have resulted in varying levels of cooperation between NGOs and military forces on the ground, creating less certainty for military planners and humanitarians alike. This, along with Pakistan's "double game" and the ebb and flow in alignment between Turkish and American strategic objectives in the Middle East, suggest that those actors who are neither friends nor enemies will contribute a substantial level of uncertainty to the battlefield of the future.

Taken together, the lessons from these three categories of actors suggest that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were watershed moments in the history of warfare, not because of some dramatic change in tactics or battlefield technology, but because the information age has demonstrated the limits of American power. The unipolar moment, in other words, is over.

America's friends and allies will likely be more assertive in defining and defending their own interests in an increasingly uncertain global security environment. By the same token, America's adversaries and enemies will likely continue to probe and press the limits of American interests and resolve, and will use uncertainty and information ambiguity to their advantage. Those actors in the third category, between enemy and friend, will likely hedge in the face of this uncertainty, be it to test America's willingness to impose norms of behavior on foreign actors, or to appease America and her interests when the situation dictates.

In sum, future warfare augurs a much greater number of actors, with a much more diverse set of interests, in a battlespace in which precision firepower is nowhere near as decisive as it once was. Even if *After the Wars* does not address this future issue head-on, the clear-eyed assessments of international lessons from the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide a sobering reflection on the limits of American hard power.

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BOOK REVIEW

Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post-Cold War Relationship, by David P. Oakley, Lexington, Kentucky, The University Press of Kentucky, 2019, 264 pp., English, $50.00 (hardback), ISBN 978-0-8131-7670-3

What is the most effective relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense? Army LTC David Oakley, an assistant professor at National Defense University's College of International Security Affairs, concludes that a close working relationship is good but that desires resident (mainly) in DoD that CIA work for, and report to, military commanders exclusively are ill-advised. CIA needs to maintain its independence and continue to also perform its primary, longstanding, and important mission – providing intelligence support to senior civilian decision-makers.

Oakley recounts the history of efforts by Executive Branch civilian officials, Congress persons, and military commanders to push the CIA to supply the military's growing intelligence needs, mainly in the post-Cold War period but also in the aftermath of two intelligence-deficient events in 1983 – the Granada invasion and the marine barracks bombing in Beirut. Defense officials, including many uniformed officers and some senior civilians such as Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, have wanted the CIA to perform a military-like "supporting" role. That is, the CIA would work for military commanders exclusively. CIA and other civilian officials countered that the CIA should support military operations and planning efforts in the national interest but do so in a more co-equal way – in partnership. Oakley, an artillery officer and now strategist who served in Iraq as a military liaison to the U.S. embassy, and who also is a former CIA operations officer, presents a balanced set of arguments for each case before firmly supporting the latter view.

Subordinating Intelligence recounts in sometimes painful detail how DoD elements repeatedly have tried to gain CIA support for planning and operational purposes, often by influencing the review commissions that regularly examine U.S. intelligence. The result is a history of Defense parochialism as well as a history of the CIA-DoD relationship. Oakley makes clear in his brief summary assessment that the narrowly military and short-term focus of many commanders is a good reason to keep CIA independent.

The primary CIA capability at issue over the decades has been human intelligence (HUMINT) collection. Intelligence analysis was little discussed. Defense advocates wanted the CIA to make a larger effort to support ongoing operations with HUMINT collection and to develop human assets in peacetime who might be useful for commanders should an operation occur. Oakley knows from personal experience what many in DoD seem not to appreciate – that developing human intelligence assets is a time-consuming and costly process and that forecasting where U.S. military missions actually will occur, years in advance, is difficult at best. Historically, the CIA has focused its limited resources on recruiting access to strategically important information unavailable from other sources – not what tactically focused military commanders want or need.

Strikingly, even as he recounts how DoD has tried to grab control of CIA's HUMINT assets, Oakley little discusses Defense intelligence agencies' roles in supporting the military. He reports that Defense tactical HUMINT collection, despite some apparent improvement in recent years, has been chronically weak. Yet DoD has shaped public perceptions that a lack of intelligence support to deployed troops is solely the CIA's fault. Oakley mentions but does not dwell on another prominent example of how Defense has blamed the CIA for its own shortcomings – the erroneous bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. While

CIA analysts clearly erred, no responsibility is assigned to military intelligence or the personnel who planned and executed the mission.

While the CIA resisted DoD encroachment to some extent, the agency has moved remarkably in recent decades to support the military. Indeed, Oakley notes that many intelligence personnel and outside observers lament the "militarization" of the CIA, arguing that an excessive focus on the tactical aspects of counterterrorism has damaged the CIA's abilities to perform its traditional strategic collection and analytic roles. This argument goes beyond what Oakley calls the IC's "Lucy and the football" focus on terrorism. Mark Lowenthal among others has used another analogy – five-year-old children's tendency in soccer games to chase the ball and fail to play position – to describe the IC's tendency to focus on immediate priorities at the expense of long-term intelligence needs. The militarization of intelligence may also be partly responsible for another alleged failing often blamed on a residual "Cold War mentality" – a lack of imagination and flexibility in addressing complex intelligence challenges globally.

There are some errors, quirks, and limited perspectives in the book. For example, Representative William Nichols of Goldwater-Nichols Act fame appears as a senator. While generally respectful of senior officials, Oakley dismisses several people he does not like as "ideologues." At times a longer perspective would be helpful. The effort by Defense personnel to control, weaken, or destroy the CIA long precedes the period covered in this book. The Army, Navy, State Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation tried to prevent CIA's creation in 1947, setting the tone for later, chronic bureaucratic squabbling between the CIA and other agencies, including DoD, which influenced the period Oakley discusses. And, although extensively sourced, the book has big holes in the coverage of field cooperation, which undoubtedly spring largely from security concerns.

But the weaknesses are minor compared to the book's value as a solidly grounded, focused study of the intelligence relationship between Defense and the CIA. *Subordinating Intelligence* helps explain why there is considerable cooperation at the tactical level combined with organizational cultural differences, suspicions, and dislikes that keep the macro-level relationship tense. The book should help observers (and participants) understand the causes of what surely will be new characteristics of the relationship as both CIA and DoD shift somewhat from the counterterrorism emphasis of recent years to a renewed focus on "peer competitors."

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BOOK REVIEW

Success in the Shadows, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and the Global War on Terror, 2002-2015, by Barry M. Stentiford, Fort Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2018, 107 pp., $13,95, paperback, incl. pictures, maps, notes. ISBN: 978-1-940804-35-4

The Global War on Terror (GWoT) is typically associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have been the focus of media reporting since 2001. Yet, there have been numerous other combat zones in which US and coalition forces fought terrorist groups and local insurgencies. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), as such, has been a truly worldwide endeavor. As a consequence of the lack of public attention these underreported – and from an academic point also understudied – conflicts are often considered "sideshows". Their strategic significance as well as the efforts undertaken, however, urges for a reassessment of this appreciation. This especially applies to the southern Philippines, which between 2002 and 2015 was repeatedly dubbed "the second front" in the GWoT. During that period US Special Operation Forces (SOF) deployed to the "ungoverned space" of southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, the traditional heartland of the *Moros*, the Philippine Muslim minority, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P). The SOF operators successfully bolstered the Philippine government's ability to deliver security and essential services to the poverty-stricken local population. This greatly enhanced governmental legitimacy and the resulting increase in control led to the marginalization of *Al-Qaeda*-linked extremist terrorist organizations such as the *Abu Sayyaf Group* (ASG) and *Jemaah Islamiya* (JI). Even more important, the Philippine state also succeeded in concluding settlements with more moderate Moro insurgents which provided a political solution for the long term. In addition to these tangible results, the operational experiences in the field brought forward conceptual innovations such as the "*Basilan Model*" for conducting counterinsurgency operations through host nation forces predominantly. With the enduring of fighting on the "main front' of the GWoT, the need to scrutinize this "*Success in the Shadows*" has become a matter of urgency. Barry M. Stentiford's appropriately titled analysis of OEF-P, therefore, is an essential contribution to the field that bridges a hiatus in scholarly work by providing a detailed analysis of this very much understudied conflict.

One of the key insights from almost two decades of the GWoT is the pivotal importance of a thorough understanding of local conflict dynamics. Stentiford's work adheres to this principle as it first sets out to sketch the background of the unrest in the southern Philippines. A historical analysis that covers the Spanish colonial era, US rule, as well as modern times, explains that the lack of governmental legitimacy in the region had been a "problem long in the making". The issue at stake is the historical failure of various consecutive powers to reach out to the Moros and establish a durable connection between the central government in Manila and these peoples. The predominant Muslim populace in the south was typically ruled or ignored as served the government's interest best. By the late twentieth century this had resulted in a policy of negligence that not only materialized in a staggering poverty rate, but also in a decline of governmental control. The southern Philippines, therefore, proved fertile soil to insurgencies seeking autonomy for the Moros and, even worse, attracted far more radical groups like ASG and JI. These latter organizations soon developed links with *Al-Qaeda* which started to exploit the ungoverned space for training and planning of terrorist operations. The (temporarily) presence of infamous terrorist leaders such as Ramzi Yousef (one of the chief planners of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing) and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (the

mastermind of the 9/11 attacks) confirmed the importance of this sanctuary as a regional hub in the worldwide terrorist network. Thereby the situation in the southern Philippines had become of strategic concern to the US.

Whereas the first US troops deployed on the request of the Philippine government in early 2001, the 9/11 attacks acted as a catalyst for stepping up the combined counterterrorist effort. The Philippine military's Southern Command and the US Pacific Command (PACOM) conducted a combined assessment of the situation which led to a plan to track and eliminate Al-Qaeda linked terrorist groups. Thus, the operations in the region became part of the wider strategy against Islamic extremist groups and thereby the opening of the second front in the GWoT had become a fact. OEF-P kicked off with the deployment of US SOF advisers to train, advise, and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). While a base camp was established on Mindanao island, initial focus was on the island of Basilan, the main ASG stronghold. The US Special Forces (SF) soldiers did not engage in combat, but instead focused on bolstering their Philippine partners capabilities for doing so. Furthermore, they conducted Civil-Military Operations (CMO) and Information Operations (IO) in order to enhance the Philippine government's legitimacy and discredit ASG and JI. These activities all proved rather successful as the security situation as well as overall stability had increased by 2002. This success soon resulted in the first suggestions that the "Basilan model" of counterinsurgency offered a potential template for application in Afghanistan (and later also in Iraq). The strengthening of the position of the government and its forces also triggered a settlement between Manila with one of the key Moro insurgent groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Yet, the fight against terrorism was far from over as hardcore extremists from ASG and JI responded to the actions on Basilan by regrouping on Mindanao and other islands of the Sulu Archipelago, such as Jolo and Tawi-Tawi. In response Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) was established to definitely mop up the sanctuary for foreign jihadists in the region. US SOF retained their role as advisers and facilitators of humanitarian assistance, with the AFP taking upon them the combat role. These efforts culminated in the 2006–2007 Operation Ultimatum that successfully cleared Jolo from terrorist influence. The effectiveness of Philippine units was such that they managed in killing high value targets such as ASG leader Khadaffy Janjalani, and simultaneously launched an impressive CMO effort that improved the perception of the Philippine government. The first six years of OEF-P, thus, had brought considerable success. AFP forces and JSOTF-P had established a firm foothold in the region and governmental legitimacy was on the rise. Time had come to consolidate this success and transform it into a durable result.

A permanent solution to the region's security concerns always had been a matter of strengthening the connection between the local population and the government in Manila. The combined Philippine-US effort therefore mainly focused on CMO which also involved other partners such as for instance the US Agency for International Development (USAID). This not only (re-)established the Philippine government's authority over the region, but also provided fertile spoil for definite political agreements and reconciliation with moderate Moro insurgent groups such as the MILF and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). With regard to the extremist terrorist groups close cooperation with US SOF advisers greatly advanced the AFP capability for capturing or killing extremists. This, however, was not without risk for US operators as their weakened position forced the terrorists to adopt more and more indirect methods like the use of Improved Explosive Devices (IEDs) – which resulted in several casualties. Despite such threats US forces in general maintained an open posture toward locals and managed to develop good relationships, which greatly enhanced their influence. Camps were often located close to or even inside villages and sometimes the fences proved rather porous as local people happily came in to visit the Americans. JSOTF-P thereby contributed effectively to the strengthening of Manila's authority in the southern Philippines while simultaneously diminishing support for extremists.

The overall results of OEF-P are even more impressive considering the relatively small size, with a cap of 600 after the initial part of the mission. When the mission formally ended in February 2015 JSOTF-P consisted of as little as 400 soldiers. OEF-P offers an excellent demonstration of what a small force of advisors might achieve by, with, and through a dedicated and motivated partner force. In order to guarantee the preservation of security and stability in the southern Philippines beyond OEF-P, the latter stage of the mission had also included the improvement of Philippine National Police (PNP) capabilities. All by all the US SOF presence had been of pivotal importance for addressing the problem of the ungoverned space in the southern Philippines; a considerable part of the Moro peoples had come to accept Manila's legitimacy, and nefarious terrorist groups such as JI and ASG had almost completely vanished. Since then it has been up to the Philippine government to expand upon this underpinning and truly reestablish itself in the region while accommodating the Moros as a fully accepted group within Philippine society.

To conclude, Stentiford's work offers an excellent and insightful overview of OEF-P. Moreover, the highly detailed information about various posts and even locals betrays that the author has been deployed to the southern Philippines himself – which is also mentioned in the author's biography. While this offers a solid advantage with regard to describing the mission, this might also explain the somewhat lacking critical edge. A more critical stance seems justified as only two years after OEF-P's end the Islamic State (IS) had established itself in the very same region. In 2017 the situation had deteriorated so much that US forces found themselves redeploying for the still enduring Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines.[1] The conflict in the Philippines, thus, not only offers insights on the "Success in the Shadows", but also on the way (not) to preserve such a success. Furthermore, adopting a small footprint of advisory teams working according the "Basilan model" might shed new light on a rather indirect strategic approach for countering violent extremist organizations.[2] Yet, it should not be forgotten that thus far the conflict has drawn scarce attention by the general public and scholars alike. Learning lessons begins with capturing the actual experiences on the ground, and that is exactly what "Success in the Shadows" does. Stentiford's work, therefore, takes a crucial first step to actually learn from the experiences of US SOF deployed during OEF-P.

Notes

1. See for instance, Edwin Amadar, Bobby Tuttle, "The Rise of ISIS in the Philippines and the Battle of Marawi", *CTX Journal* 9:2 (Spring 2019), 31–38.
2. Rick Breekveldt, Martijn Kitzen, "Coercion and Non-State Actors, Lessons from the Philippines", *CTX Journal* 9:1 (Winter 2019), 13–28.

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BOOK REVIEW

1070A Covert Action: Reagan, the CIA, and Cold War Struggle in Poland, by Seth G. Jones, New York, W.W. Norton & company, 2018, 418 pp., $17.79, hardback, ISBN: 978 0 393 24700 8

What should be expected of a covert action (CA) book, the infamous "third option" usually carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)? As a scholar on the topic, I expect at least the following to be answered: how does the CA nest within the National Security Strategy? what type (i.e., propaganda, political activity, economic activity, sabotage, coup, or paramilitary) of CA was selected?; was there a lethal finding?; what other instruments of national power were exerted in conjunction with the CA?; what was the CA cost?; were foreign partners involved?; what were the ethical considerations?; what was the risk the operation could be exposed?; and would public opinion support the CA if exposed? Seth Jones in this fantastic work answers all of these questions, and more, using interview and declassified documents to place CIA support to Solidarity, codenamed QRHELPFUL, within a larger Cold War framework while also emphasizing the personalities that made this CA one of the most successful programs ever run.

Part I focuses mainly on the principal actors in QRHELPFUL: Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, Polish Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski, and CIA Director Bill Casey. The importance of starting with these personalities cannot go unmentioned. Each of them, by force of their personality, shaped the Solidarity movement in ways that others could not. With his everyman personality, deep ties to the Catholic Church, and ability to organize fellow workers, Walesa was the man the aggrieved Poles had been waiting for to stand up to the state. The state, in the form of the Polish United Worker's Party (UWP) and headed by Jaruzelski, was the antithesis of Walesa. The UWP and Jaruzelski were a military caste separated from the people and the Catholic Church, and subservient to a foreign power, the Soviet Union. Finally, there was Casey the OSS veteran, a man who did not just want to contain Communism but rather roll back Communism across the world. In this drive to rollback Communism, Casey found a willing partner in President Regan and the perfect opportunity in Poland from 1981 to 1989.

Part II lays the structural foundation of the situation in Poland that allowed the CIA to exploit the seams between the Polish people and the UWP, while also demonstrating the strategic value of moving Poland out of the Soviet sphere of influence. Despite the presence of a police state in Poland, the seam between the people and the UWP was not ready for exploitation until the state overreached by cracking down on the worker's movement and imprisoning Walesa. With the introduction of Martial Law, Reagan decided to help Solidarity. As Jones takes care to explain, Reagan saw the world in Manichean terms. As such, you were either good, like the U.S., or evil, like the Soviet Union. To Reagan, Solidarity reminded him of the American revolutionaries, the good guys, as they fought against the evil forces of tyranny, in this case embodied by the UWP and the Soviet Union. Using the existing plumbing that the CIA had set up in Western Europe and feeding into Poland, the U.S. was able to smuggle money, copying machines, paper, video equipment, and much else to Solidarity to challenge the Jaruzelski regime.

Part III details the turning of the tide with Solidarity, supported by the CIA, successfully challenging the Jaruzelski regime and eventually earning free elections in Poland. It is important to note, as Jones does, that Solidarity was a peaceful movement to challenge the Jaruzelski regime. Therefore, unlike in Afghanistan where the CIA was providing stinger

missiles, this was not a lethal finding. Rather, it was propaganda and political activity to an organic resistance movement in Poland. Another important distinction is that the CIA is most successful when cultivating real resistance movements that are based on legitimate grievances as opposed to creating a resistance movement out of whole cloth. In supporting this legitimate movement over eight years, the U.S. government spent a paltry 20 USD million dollars, including 105,000 USD for Solidarity to run, and win, in the elections against the UWP.

The value in this work culminates in the final chapter where Jones assesses the CA. In his evaluation, he answers many of the questions posed at the beginning of this review. This particular CA fit within NSDD-32 and NSDD-54. This distinction is of importance since the most successful CAs are the ones that fall within a particular policy objective. Oftentimes when CAs fail, it is because President views them as a silver bullet, hoping to appear that they are just doing something, rather than taking a step back and pondering what is the objective they want the CA to achieve. Regarding the type of CA, as stated it as a mix of political activity and propaganda. The reason these tools were chosen is they provide more plausible deniability and are less likely to lead to violence than ones further up the CA ladder. In the context of the Cold War, the U.S. did not want violence to break out in Poland since this would most likely cause the Soviet Union to intervene. In that case, the U.S. would not militarily intervene to save Poland since the value of an intervention would not justify the cost. Jones also does a great job showing that this CA was not conducted in isolation. Rather, the Treasury and State Department had roles to play in bringing their tools to bear in Poland to compliment the CIA's efforts. As far as other partners involved in this CA, the author writes at length on the importance of state actors to include The Vatican, who played a huge role in supporting Solidarity, the United Kingdom, and possibly unwittingly, the French. In addition, he does mention the role of non-state actors in supporting Solidarity to include worker's unions, such the AFL-CIO, and George Soros.

Overall, this book is of immense importance today with uprisings around the world wherein people yearn to be free from authoritarian rule. The CIA would do well to revisit QRHELPFUL to review the lessons learned and apply them in the appropriate context today. However, it is essential that before embarking on any CA, the U.S., like in Poland, must place the CA within a larger policy framework to optimize the chances of a successful outcome.

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