


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Resistance Resurgent: Resurrecting a Method of Irregular Warfare in Great Power Competition

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. has spent the last two decades, during its short time as the singular superpower, engaging relatively successfully in counterterrorism. However, we have now entered a new era of Great Power Competition (GPC) with adversaries; Russia and China. In the last decade, these nations have either caught up to the U.S. or have gained a slight edge in several types of warfare, while they challenge the international order created and dominated by the U.S. In particular, Russian threats loom over our NATO Baltic allies, while Chinese threats loom over the South China Sea and Taiwan. The U.S. has inadequate conventional deterrence forces in each of these theaters and likely could not respond to crisis in each area simultaneously. Concurrently, though not allied, Russia and China have increased cooperation. It will take many years for the U.S. to build adequate conventional forces to prevent each of these adversaries from asserting their will and taking and holding the sovereign territory of our allies or partners. Yet history reveals a type of warfare for which we and our allies and partners can prepare for immediately at little cost to add a layer of deterrence to assist in denying ultimate victory to our adversaries with scarce dedication of resources. It is a type of warfare that can asymmetrically impose costs on an occupier by forcing him to devote substantial resources to his own security while also making his political consolidation of the occupied territory very difficult if not impossible. Its methods range from violence led by an authorized organization fighting to reclaim sovereignty, to passive and peaceful activities by the general population. This method of warfare, which must be organized, trained and equipped immediately, is resistance.

KEYWORDS

Resistance; Great Power Competition; special operations forces

SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM

The U.S. has spent the last two decades engaging relatively successfully in counterterrorism, in at least the tactical and operational levels though probably not strategically, but unsuccessfully in counterinsurgency with its attendant quagmire of nation building. The counterinsurgency and nation building campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost us thousands of lives and trillions of dollars. Over the past few years, the realization has been dawning that such focus and expenditure of lives and treasure has placed the US in a difficult strategic position. Based on trends of the last decade in particular, it is clear that the U.S.' short time as the singular superpower is ending.

Russia and China both excel at information warfare, and have likely caught up to the U.S. in the realm of cyber warfare, while possessing the institutional authorities and focus to apply it offensively against opponents, with a high degree of efficiency and some deniability, while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict. Russia has deployed hypersonic missiles (Marcus, 2019) while the U.S. catches up (Stashwick, 2020), and it has also deployed semi-state private military company forces to Syria (Marten, 2019) and Libya (Harchaoui, 2021) gaining combat experience and regional leverage on NATO's southern flank, while continuing to de-stabilize Ukraine and threaten the Baltic states. China has outright defied and ignored international law regarding the law of the seas and unilaterally cut short its promises to Macau and Hong Kong. It has encroached upon the territory of its land and maritime neighbors, inexorably increased its military capabilities, and has made clear its unrelenting intention to re-integrate Taiwan into the People's Republic of China (PRC), while demonstrating through exercises an increasing capability to soon achieve that end.

We have quickly entered a new era of Great Power Competition (*National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2017), accompanied by changes to the character of war (Brown, 2019). Meanwhile, the U.S. treaty obligation to defend the easternmost NATO allies relies on a few tripwire troops through a rotational presence, very much unlike the massive U.S. presence in Europe during the Cold War. In the far East, its reaction to Chinese encroachments in the South China Sea (SCS) are limited to diplomatic protests and freedom of navigation exercises (Panda, 2020), while its policy toward Taiwan remains that of "strategic ambiguity" (Chen, 2021).

Though not allied and with significant differences between them, Russia and China have increased their cooperation. Their mutual views of the U.S. may be something along the line of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," which could bring about extremely expensive consequences for the U.S. in a crisis involving the U.S. and either of them. A large conventional force capable of deterring both Russia and China simultaneously cannot be built and deployed within the next few years. Neither can this be achieved with the addition of new allies and partners. Furthermore, both nations have already demonstrated substantial capabilities below the threshold of armed conflict, in cyberspace, the information environment, and even through economic extortion. Those capabilities can be countered to a large degree by increasing the facets of societal resilience, which is a critical and necessary component of a total or comprehensive defense and the ability to resist an adversary.

We are in a strategically defensive posture with extremely limited resources. The U.S. can learn from its failed nation building experiences and draw the lesson that we are not able to impose lasting, stable, prosperous, and friendly democracies through force. However, our long historic experience tells us that we can successfully assist free people who are determined to remain free and possess the national resilience and confidence to do so. Such assistance can make the calculations of our adversaries much more difficult. The ability to deter both Russia and China, without resort to nuclear weapons, would be much preferable. Yet, re-building that capability will take many years. In the meantime, we must devise ways to both deter those adversaries and to better assist our allies and partners in the short term. Focusing on both the Russian threat to NATO's eastern-most members (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), and China's threats to states on its periphery, there is work to be done immediately and at little cost to add a layer of deterrence (to deny ultimate victory to adversaries); Resistance.

A SHORT HISTORY

Recent Roots

In 2014, the U.S. Special Operations Command – Europe (SOCEUR) began a project to delve into the concept of resistance. It began with several allies and partners, focusing on the most vulnerable portions of the NATO frontier; the Baltic region. The reason for this project was the clear lack of adequate NATO conventional forces in the Baltic states to serve as deterrence to a potential Russian incursion.

The result of this project was the unclassified *Resistance Operating Concept* (ROC) (Fiala, 2020). It presented resistance as a nation's preplanned, authorized, and organized resistance to a foreign occupier, both nonviolent and violent. It was presented as part of a larger national strategy of Total Defense or Comprehensive Defense. Within the ROC, the definition of resistance is:

a nation's organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power.

Within the definition, we note that it is authorized and organized by the sovereign national government and is not an ad hoc call to arms or a *levée en masse* (mass levy) to fight foreign forces during an initial invasion. The purpose of an authorized and organized resistance is to deny the invader the ability to consolidate his victory and ultimately reestablish national sovereignty. Its methods are both violent and nonviolent. As an organization authorized by the lawful and legitimate government, it is responsible to that government, even if that government is in exile. The most significant implication is that it is an effort to be planned in peacetime in case of war. It is also important to note that neither NATO policy nor doctrine recognize this concept of resistance. However, that does not prevent its members, jointly or individually, from recognizing and preparing for such form of warfare.

As compared to the time and expense necessary to build and deploy aircraft carrier battle groups or wings of stealth fighters, the training and equipping of several hundred to several thousand individuals to engage in the tactics and techniques of resistance can be accomplished much more quickly and at barely any comparable cost. Its methods of sabotage, guerrilla style violence, and peaceful and passive popular protest (Bartkowski, 2015) provide various tools; some or all of which can be applied. These methods can be taught, trained and prepared in much less time than the creation of large conventional forces to deter on equal terms. This is not to say that such conventional forces ought not be created, but that an organized resistance capability can be built now, in a relatively short time, with comparatively little investment, and to great effect.

Deeper Roots: *Viva La Resistance*, and Inadvertent and Cold War Stay Behinds

When conceiving of such a resistance in the popular mind, most Americans probably think of the valiant French resistance (Gildea, 2015) to the Nazis in World War II. Yet, that episode of resistance had its complexities. There were many unrelated networks with different capabilities, different goals, and sometimes very different political objectives.

The communist networks in and around Paris were among the best organized and focused on bringing about a communist regime after the Nazis were removed. The threat of a takeover of Paris and possibly the nation by the communist resistance networks was a large part of why Charles de Gaulle stressed the necessity for the western allies to march into Paris. This disparity of objectives among resistance organizations was not unique to France. Poland also had resistance groups divided between western aligned and Soviet communist aligned organizations. Poland's western leaning Secret State (Utracka, 2019) was eviscerated by the German army during the battle of Warsaw in 1944. That western aligned resistance organization sought to capture the nation's capital to reestablish a sovereign Polish government and stave off incoming Soviet domination. After its practical destruction by the Germans, its remainder was eventually completely crushed by the Soviets when they took the city and consolidated their rule over Poland, assisted by the communist resistance networks.

Yet, resistance activities during WWII were not limited to Europe. In the Far East, there were resistance organizations focused on fighting the Japanese occupiers. In particular, and of great relevance to the US, were the anti-Japanese resistance activities in the Philippine Islands. During the Japanese invasion, some American service members escaped Japanese internment and fled into the hinterlands. Among them were leaders who helped organize active guerrilla resistance to the Japanese. Probably the most significant of these leaders was Russell W. Volckmann. He joined the formative Filipino resistance forces on the island of Luzon, assisted their organization and training, and by 1943 was leading a division sized force of five regiments. This force conducted hit and run attacks against the Japanese and assisted the return of American forces. In WWII, we had no pre-war defensive treaty with France, but the Philippines were U.S. territory.

After the war, the lines between the American dominated free west and Soviet dominated communist east hardened into the Iron Curtain. Within the NATO states, many members developed the concept of "stay behinds" (Ganser, 2005). These were small resistance organizations that were literally intended to stay behind in case of Soviet invasion and to fight the occupiers through methods of guerrilla warfare while gathering and sending out information of intelligence value. Several NATO member states developed such organizations. In fact, the 1st Battalion of the U.S. Army's 10th Special Forces Group ("The Originals") was headquartered in Bad Tölz, Bavaria, from the 1950s, specifically to help develop such a capability.

The Shattered Gladius

In 1990, as the Soviet Union was disintegrating, the Prime Minister of Italy confirmed the existence of a secret organization named Gladio, and run by Italian intelligence services (Nuti, 2007). This network was established with the assistance of the U.S., to conduct stay behind operations in case of Warsaw Pact invasion. Despite previous rumors and suspicions, confirmation of its existence had been secret until that day.

Soon after this revelation, other NATO states, and even neutral Sweden and Switzerland (Pedrick, 1990), also admitted to maintaining similar organizations. Acrimonious internal political accusations soon befell the government of Italy, as well as other governments within NATO. In Italy, there existed credible accusations of criminality and connections to suspected right-wing anti-communist terrorist incidents involving bombings and other

attacks over the previous twenty years (Pedrick, 1990). Some stay-behind organizations seemed to have recruited not just patriots but also some virulent ideologically anti-communist actors willing to harm fellow citizens who were communist. These suspicions, partially evidenced at least in Italy, led to the ignominious dissolution of the Cold War stay-behind organizations.

Yet, not all these organizations had the same problems as the Italian organization. Others, especially the Swiss network (Stringer, 2017), were well managed and well run. The problems, where they emerged, stemmed from a lack of adequate legal and policy frameworks, and oversight. These issues likely arose from a desire to maintain secrecy and thus the potential effectiveness of such organizations. Another unfortunate possibility, especially for the Italian group, is that some officials did not mind and perhaps encouraged some members of these organizations to act against internal “enemies” (Ganser, 2005) who favored the ideology that was threatening from the other side of the Iron Curtain.

THE BURNING FUSES

The Wrestling Bear; Russian Revanchism

Over the past 15 years, Russia has become increasingly aggressive along its periphery amongst former Soviet Republics. In 2008, Russia seized the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Cohen & Hamilton, 2011). In 2014, Russia seized Crimea (Salem, Walker, & Harding, 2014) from Ukraine and continues to support separatist militant violence in Eastern Ukraine. Much of its justification for each of these actions was based on alleged discrimination against Russian minority populations. As it did in Crimea and eastern Ukraine (Coalson, 2014), Russia has also alleged discrimination against ethnic Russian minorities in each of the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Coalson, 2014).

In the past several years, Russia has also asserted itself for improved strategic positioning. Several years ago it sent its forces along with private military companies to NATO’s southern flank in Libya and Syria. Most recently, it now has troops in Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan as part of a peace settlement stemming from the recent Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict (Osborn, Hovhannisyan, & Bagirova, 2020). Russia also continues to increase its political, economic and military influence in Belarus, likely seeking some form of integration under Russia (Barros, 2020). The greatest significance of this last move is that Belarus borders Lithuania and Latvia, and connects to the Suwalki corridor, which is a natural geographic link running along the border region of Poland and Lithuania to Russia’s oblast of Kaliningrad.

The Suwalki corridor lies in the northeast corner of Poland and southwest part of Lithuania. It is a marshy, lightly populated lowland area along the sixty-mile border between Poland and Lithuania. It is a strategically situated, narrow pass of land connecting Kaliningrad to Belarus, through Lithuania. Belarus often cooperates with Russia, for example conducting joint military exercises.

As a port city, Kaliningrad’s sea lines of communication via the Baltic Sea provide its primary link to Russia, and it is Russia’s only Baltic port that does not freeze in the winter. A rail line running along the Suwalki corridor provides Russian land access facilitated by agreements with Lithuania. The rail link facilitates Russian ground transportation between

Kaliningrad and Belarus, based on the agreement with Lithuania. Russian control of the Suwalki corridor would allow it unfettered, year-round access along a direct land route from the Baltic Sea to Moscow. This would greatly enhance its ability to control the Baltic region, while granting it a significant military logistical advantage over NATO. Russian control of the corridor would physically cut off the Baltic states from the rest of NATO (Fetterman, 2018). The Baltics could then only be accessed by NATO by sea and air over the Baltic Sea, reversing the present situation, vis-a-vis Russian access to Kaliningrad (Fiala & Pettersson, 2020).

Russian forces in its Western Military District, bordering Estonia and part of Latvia, have performed large-scale exercises simulating an invasion of the Baltics and strikes on neighboring Poland. Future iterations could be used to mask an actual attack (Robin, 2019). Since 2015, Russia has been increasing its military presence in Kaliningrad, including a formidable layered air defense system, fighters, and strike aircraft. Its capabilities in Kaliningrad combined with its Western Military District give it a substantial anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability in the Baltic region; land, air and sea (Sukhankin, 2019). These forces could quickly turn the Baltic Sea region into a de facto no-fly zone (Majumdar, 2016). In 2016, a RAND study war-gamed a Russian attack in the Baltics. The study found inadequate conventional NATO forces forward positioned to stop such an attack, and that Russian forces could reach the outskirts of the Estonian and Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga in 60 hours (Shlapak & Johnson, 2016). Improvements in readiness and the ability to move forces quickly within Russia, combined with the dense A2AD capabilities (Sukhankin, 2019) provide Russia with a significant ability to relatively quickly project force into the Baltic Sea region.

The Russian Threat to NATO in the Baltics

Russia has a combined-arms force optimized for mobility and firepower while emphasizing large-scale combined-arms operations. This gives Russian forces an important advantage in mechanized conflicts close to their western border. Over the past decade, the quality of Russian forces has notably increased, evidenced by: a growing number of volunteer soldiers, fielding of modernized weapons, improvements to readiness, and experience gained from large-scale exercises and combat operations in Ukraine and Syria.

The highest density of Russia's most-capable ground and air forces is in its Western Military District, which borders Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Kaliningrad), which have comparatively very small conventional forces. Russia has demonstrated an ability to concentrate forces from elsewhere within its borders, by leveraging its internal rail and road networks. This gives it a significant time-distance advantage in generating combat forces in its Western Military District during the opening of a crisis (Boston, Johnson, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, & Crane, 2018).

Plugging the Dike

In 2014, in recognition of increasingly aggressive Russian behavior, the U.S. instituted the European Reassurance Initiative, renamed the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) in 2017 (Latici, 2018). It funded an increased military presence, exercises, pre-positioning of equipment, improved infrastructure and the building of partnership capacity. Additionally,

at NATO's 2016 summit in Warsaw, NATO adopted the American sponsored enhanced forward presence (EFP) program to expand the number of NATO forces in the allied Baltic nations on a rotational basis (Judson, 2019). The U.S. now has a battalion size Army presence in northeastern Poland, near the Suwalki Corridor, while the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany rotate similar-sized elements in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, respectively. These troops rotate heel-to-toe approximately every six months, resulting in continuous presence (Fiala & Pettersson, 2020). On 15 August 2020, in Warsaw, Secretary Pompeo and Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak signed the U.S.-Poland Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). It will include; a forward command post from the newly reactivated V Corps, a forward division headquarters, several combat training centers, an Air Force MQ-9 squadron, an aerial port of debarkation for loading and unloading troops and equipment, an area support group, a special operations forces facility to support air, ground and maritime operations, facilities for an armored brigade combat team, a combat aviation brigade and a combat sustainment support battalion (Meyers & Rempfer, 2020). This enhancement adds another 1,000 personnel for a rotating total of 5,500 US personnel (Zaryn, 2020). Though this is a significant increase as a percentage, this force will remain a relatively small and possibly ineffective tripwire presence (Reiter & Poast, 2021).

Even this increased capability under the EDCA may not be enough. An authoritative study in 2016 estimated that seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades, along with supporting air defense, air support, artillery and logistics would be necessary to present a force much more difficult to overcome and adjust Moscow's strategic calculus. That force would still not be enough to maintain a sustained defense, or even take the offensive to restore a member state's territorial integrity, but it could prevent a quick Russian victory and buy time for NATO reinforcements to arrive, thereby presenting a much greater measure of deterrence (Shlapak & Johnson, 2016).

Without adequate deterrence, Russia can quickly take all or some Baltic territory, reinforce quickly with large numbers of forces (22 battalions in its Western Military District), and create a strong defensive position. Then it could quickly politically integrate some or all conquered territory into Russia, as it did with Crimea, and threaten the use of tactical nuclear weapons if the newly expanded Russia is attacked, achieving a *fait accompli* (Shlapak & Johnson, 2016). Overcoming this situation would require an extraordinary amount of political will on the part of the US and fellow NATO states, and at that point may even be strategically ill-advised in light of the looming threat from China.

Enter The Dragon

China too has territorial claims beyond its terrestrial and maritime borders. Whereas Russian claims are typically based on the presence of ethnic Russians, China's claims are based on historical rule going back decades in the case of Taiwan and centuries in the case of the South China Sea (SCS). Yet, unlike Russia, China has global aspirations, as partially expressed in its Belt and Road Initiative and its various statements of overtaking the U.S.

Like the Russians, the PRC is also developing hypersonic missiles (Weston, 2018), and sophisticated A2AD capabilities. It may also be ahead of the U.S. in developing a fifth-generation stealth fighter (Osborn, 2021). Unlike the Russians, it is not using PMCs but rather has layers of armed forces, some of which give it deniability and the ability to



(Stefan Ertmann/Wikimedia Commons; https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Baltic_Sea.png)

obfuscate the information environment. Like Russia, it has also mastered influence operations in the information environment and the tools and methods of; propaganda, censorship, disinformation, and controlling content delivery systems (Cook, 2021).

Reclamations and Island Building

Over the past fifteen years, the PRC has behaved similarly to Russia regarding expansion into territories which were once part of China, but with more finesse and sometimes better legal claims. On its geographic periphery, the PRC has pushed out in several directions through challenges to its neighbors. The tool it uses is intimidation. It has become increasingly assertive of its interests and employed intimidation, often through low-level violence to make its point. It has carefully engaged in low level violence spearheaded by its Coast Guard and maritime militia to avoid the appearance

and reduce the likelihood of a military confrontation, while using the PLA Navy as a follow-on force, matchless against its SCS neighbors, to protect the gains from its Coast Guard and particularly its maritime militia (Erickson & Kennedy, 2016).

In 1997, the PRC regained Hong Kong from Great Britain, and in 1999 regained Macau from Portugal based on years-long negotiations and final written agreements. It gave written promises within the agreements to all parties to allow both Hong Kong and Macau to each retain internal self-rule for a period of fifty years under their respective Basic Laws that functioned as mini-constitutions of each of those city-states.¹ Yet it violated its pledges to allow for those Basic Laws to each function and rule internally for fifty years by subverting each with National Security laws that qualified much activity and speech opposed by the mainland government as subversive or treasonous, and authorized extradition of violators to the mainland for trial (Feng, 2020).


In the South China Sea, the PRC makes historical claims of “indisputable sovereignty” (Shukla, 2020) to “blue national soil” (Holmes, 2013) referencing a map of the SCS created by the Nationalist Kuomintang prior to WWII labeled the “nine-dash line” because it outlines the SCS with nine dashes (Shukla, 2020). In September 2015, President Xi Jinping, affirmed Chinese sovereignty over the SCS “since ancient times” (Page, Lee, & Lubold, 2015). Though the PRC has not stated specifically what it’s interpretation of “sovereignty” means.

The Philippines have challenged the PRC’s “nine-dash line” claims. In 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration upheld the Philippines’s claim to the Paracel Islands and rejected the PRC’s claim based on governing international law. In that same year, the court ruled that the Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea belong to the Philippines’s continental shelf and fall under its Exclusive Economic Zone. Yet, defying those legal judgments, China maintains a military base with anti-ship cruise missiles, long-range surface-to-air missiles, and other military systems on the Spratly islands (Page et al., 2015), operates a harbor, and has built a runway on the Mischief Reef atoll. Moreover, by deploying anti-ship cruise missiles, long-range surface-to-air missiles, and other military systems in the Spratly Islands, the PRC blatantly violates its 2015 public pledge that “China does not intend to pursue militarization” in the disputed areas (Page et al., 2015).

Islands belonging to the Philippines have not been China’s only target in the SCS. It intensified its maritime militarization by provoking a dispute in December 2019 regarding the sovereignty of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands. Then in June 2020, China sank a Vietnamese fishing trawler, and in the same year, engaged in a six-month standoff with Malaysia over hydrocarbon resources in the latter’s Exclusive Economic Zone (Grossman, 2020; Kwek & Ping-Hoo, 2020a and 2020b).

Encroachments on Land

Since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, India and the PRC have been separated by a “Line of Actual Control (LAC),” which forms a 3,488-km long disputed border. In June 2020, in the Galwan Valley, which sits along that line, a brawl between Indian and Chinese Soldiers resulted in over a hundred casualties with dozens of deaths (Chang, 2020). Border confrontations along the LAC are usually triggered by some sort of infrastructure construction, usually a road, near the disputed border. Roads in the region are critical because they enable



(U.S. Central Intelligence Agency/Wikimedia Commons; https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:9_dotted_line.png)

mobility to rapidly concentrate and supply forces. Thus, new infrastructure facilitates military operations, and the side that can better mount those operations is more likely to prevail in a conflict. That was the military lesson from the Sino-Indian War some 58 years ago.

To the south of PRC dominated Tibet, is the small kingdom of Bhutan, bordering India to its south, with which it is allied. Since 2015, China has established three villages, seven roads, and at least five military or police outposts in Bhutan's Beyul province and the Menchuma Valley, as part of its larger strategic rivalry with India (Barnett, 2021).

The PLA's combat formations have become increasingly mechanized and capable. Aimed at India, it has conducted a series of large-scale and increasingly realistic exercises using its new high-speed railways and airports to transport tens of thousands of troops and their equipment between military regions. These exercises, utilizing newly built transportation infrastructure, have considerably improved the PRC's ability to marshal forces and maneuver against India on its Himalayan border (Chang, 2020).

Taiwan

Taiwan has kept itself separate from the mainland PRC and its ruling communists since the end of the Chinese communist revolution. Throughout that time, the CCP has insisted that the island is part of the PRC, while the U.S. has engaged in "strategic ambiguity" in response, entailing sales of arms to Taiwan but without recognizing it as an independent nation. On the periphery of the PRC, Taiwan has the largest free population under the greatest threat from the PRC.

In late March 2021, Japan and Taiwan experienced incursions into their respective air defense identification zones. One of the incursions was the largest ever into Taiwan's air defense zone, by 20 Chinese bombers and fighters (Donnelly, 2021). China's air force is now making almost daily forays into Taiwan's air defense identification zone (Blanchard & Lee, 2021). In further demonstration of aggressive intent, the PLA has conducted amphibious landing training exercises in waters near Taiwan (Huang, 2021) and in one exercise, used a PLA Navy carrier and warplanes to surround Taiwan in drills, to demonstrate their capability to cut off foreign intervention to assist Taiwan (Xuanzun, 2021). This could all add up to Beijing accelerating a timeline for a possible invasion of Taiwan (Fang, 2021).

On 4 March 2021, U.S. INDO-PACOM CDR Admiral Philip Davidson stated "China has modernized its military more than any other nation on the planet through the course of this century" (McIntyre, 2021). He warned that the military balance in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more unfavorable for the United States and its allies and may soon embolden China to act unilaterally before our forces are ready to deliver an effective military response (McIntyre, 2021).

Pacific Deterrence Initiative; a Drop in the Ocean

In 2020, in recognition of the threat from the PRC, Congress authorized the expenditure of \$2.2B through the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) within Section 1251 of the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The purpose was to prioritize "activities to enhance the United States deterrence and defense posture in the Indo-Pacific region, assure allies and partners, and increase capability and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region." It is intended to improve the U.S. joint force posture in the Indo-Pacific, specifically west of the international date line (Singleton, 2020).

The PDI focuses on five areas; force design and posture; exercises, experimentation, and innovation; joint force lethality; logistics and security enablers; and strengthening allies and partners. Specifically, it calls for joint investments beyond service solutions, such as an integrated Joint Force with precision-strike networks west of the International Date Line (IDL), integrated air missile defense, and a distributed force posture that provides the ability to preserve stability, and if needed, sustain combat operations for extended periods. Much like EDI, it requires forward-based, joint rotational forces to demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve west of the IDL (Shelbourne, 2021). The PDI may be authorized over \$5B for FY22.

The Situation

Over the past several years, Russia has strengthened its cooperation with the ever more aggressive China. China has subverted the agreed Basic Laws of the Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of both Macau and Hong Kong (Pepper, 2020) by imposing internal National Security Laws, and has ignored international court decisions (Phillips, Holmes, & Bowcott, 2016) against its activities in the South China Sea. It has become increasingly aggressive against much less powerful nations hosting its Belt and Road Initiative (Kuo & Kommenda, 2018) and has grown its annual military spending between 2012 and 2017 by almost 9.5% each year, and may exceed U.S. defense expenditure (Weitz, 2015) by 2025. Cooperation, or just a small degree of strategic coordination between Russia and China, could place the U.S. in an extraordinarily strategically perilous circumstance.

Both China and Russia use propaganda and disinformation extensively and each conducts efforts to corrupt individuals, organizations, and government bodies to attain their ends (Zelikow, Edelman, Harrison, & Gventer, 2020). The Chinese have engaged in influence operations in Europe, most recently concerning the COVID-19 pandemic. These efforts resemble Russian use of disinformation, manipulation of social divisions, and propagation of conspiracies. This informal Sino-Russian partnership also contains a military component. Historically, Russia has been China's principal arms supplier and exercise partner. Recently, Russia enhanced the types of weapons that it sells to China, such as; the S-400 air-defense system, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (Kendall-Taylor, Shulman, & McCormick, 2020). Together, they have also conducted more sophisticated joint military exercises seemingly aimed at potential encounters with the United States and its allies and partners (Weitz, 2015). Their military cooperation also extends beyond conventional operational forces to include nuclear and strategic issues (Osborn & Lee, 2019; Yeo, 2019).

Though the PRC and Russia behave as strategic partners, there exist significant issues that make the establishment of a formal alliance unlikely (Isachenkov, 2020). Their national interests do not align in several areas, such as territorial claims and partnerships with countries that one or the other considers to be regional rivals." Moreover, Russia is in economic decline, while China is a rising global power, which combined with their existing differences can raise Russian concerns that the PLA will eventually become a military threat. Yet for now, mutual cooperation to weaken U.S. power and influence is in the interest of both.

If the U.S. had to reinforce its position in Europe due to a Russian threat to the Baltics, the U.S. would not have much capability to spare against Chinese aggression, if it were in the U.S. interest to oppose such aggression. Alternatively, if the U.S. had to first militarily reinforce its position somewhere along the southern China periphery due to Chinese aggression, there would not be much remaining in the U.S. inventory to respond to Russian opportunistic aggression against the Baltics or the Suwalki gap (Robin, 2019). This even accounts for the fact that a Baltic scenario would require more land power while a SCS scenario would require more maritime power, because both would demand most of our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms and capabilities, and much of our air power. Based on this developing situation, and while developing longer term increased military capacity, the U.S. and its NATO allies must invest more and faster in another layer of defense; Resistance.

RESISTANCE

"I have faith in our destinies; a country which is defending itself conquers the respect of all; such a country does not perish!" Albert I, King of Belgium, 1914

During WWII, many of the nations invaded by Nazi Germany developed resistance networks to fight the Germans and attempt to free their nations. Probably the most famous was the resistance of the French. Yet, a close examination of the French resistance yields the knowledge that it was not one unified resistance effort but rather was many networks throughout France (Trueman, 2015). The networks in and around Paris were mostly communist and were driven underground several years earlier by the French government, giving those networks a head start in clandestine activities. After the German invasion, other networks developed. Some were anti-communist and many were functionally designed to move people (allied airmen and escaped prisoners) or information abroad to Charles De Gaulle and his Free French Forces in London or to allied intelligence services (i. e.; SOE and OSS). In and around Lyon, initially under Vichy control, right wing anti-Vichy and anti-communist networks developed. Throughout France, these networks each sought the ouster of the German occupiers, but had no central governance among them. They were uncoordinated, independent operations fighting for a postwar France that some envisioned quite differently from others. In 1940, though he made an early, dramatic and powerful appearance, Charles De Gaulle was not the exiled government but rather, through British assistance, established himself as the provisional leader of what came to be the Free French Forces. He then deftly maneuvered himself into the embodiment of political leadership of a Free France and was able to gradually gain the allegiance of many resistance networks (Gildea, 2015).

This problem of lack of nationally organized and unified resistance efforts to oppose occupation and restore the nation to its pre-occupation regime existed in nations throughout Europe. Basically, an underground competition was at work within most of these nations, taking advantage of the crisis to determine who would rule the postwar nation and under what type of system. Only some of these underground resistance networks sought to restore the nation to its pre-war system and rule. They each gained varying

degrees of domestic and external support because it was much easier to agree on the common enemy and the common goal; rid the nation of Nazi occupation. What came afterward was the devil in the details.

National Resistance

Resistance is a form of warfare. In particular, resistance is a layer of defense, a deterrent against an adversary, and part of a larger total defense or comprehensive defense strategy. It can asymmetrically impose costs on an occupier by forcing him to devote substantial resources to his own security while also making his political consolidation of the occupied territory very difficult if not impossible. This form of organized and nationally authorized resistance is laid out in the *Resistance Operating Concept*, developed by Special Operations Command – Europe (SOCEUR) and published by the Joint Special Operations University and the Swedish Defense University. This concept calls for a nationally authorized, organized resistance capability prior to an invasion and occupation. It is the response of a sovereign government and its people when faced with a threat to their sovereignty and independence (Fiala, 2020). It is a proactive, government led planning and preparation effort across the whole of society to ensure that vital appropriate mechanisms are in place to conduct organized resistance against an occupier (Fiala, 2020). Its purpose is to continue to assert the right of the nation to control its destiny and to oust the occupier from the nation's sovereign territory. When Albert I, King of Belgium, spoke the above words before his Parliament, he embodied that nation's sovereignty and reminded them that even if the Germans successfully invaded, the Belgian nation would continue.

Planning

A successful national resistance requires planning. Since national resistance can be understood as a form of warfare, such planning is best led by the military or ministry of defense. More specifically, that nations' special operations forces are likely the most competent entity when considering the tasks to be performed. Though led by such an organization, the planning and participation cannot be exclusive to that organization. As a whole of government effort, it must include other ministries, especially ministries of interior and foreign affairs for internal security and agreements with, combined with assistance from, allies and partners (Fiala, 2020).

This resistance entity must be organized and designed as any other government or military entity. It has a task and it has a purpose. It is tasked to use its resources to the purpose of assisting in the reestablishment of national sovereignty over occupied territory. As any other military organization, it must be structured hierarchically with a clear chain of command. In this arena, it can be broken into the traditional components of underground, auxiliary, and guerrillas. There is much open source literature that delineates and explains these components (*Unconventional Warfare*, 2016), including Army (*Army Special Operations*, 2019) and joint doctrine (*Special Operations*, 2014). Basically, the underground is the brains and spinal column of the organization, the auxiliary consists of part-time sympathizers who can be called on for specific tasks, and the guerrillas engage in raids and other types of direct action.

Whether during peacetime planning or while under occupation, legitimacy (Fiala, 2020) is critical to such an organization. To avoid the mistakes of the stay behind groups formed during the Cold War, transparent legal and policy frameworks must be authorized by a nation's national legislative body, written and implemented by an executive agency. The actual structure, membership, and capability of the organization must be kept secret for its own survivability. However, public knowledge of such an authorized organization not only adds to its legitimacy in the public mind, but can also add to public confidence in peacetime and the maintenance of public morale under occupation (Fiala, 2020).

Planning and preparation prior to crisis is also designed to co-opt political space from those who would take the opportunity to attempt a change of regime from what existed prior to occupation (Fiala, 2020). The World War II resistance organizations of Europe often competed within their nations (i.e., French communist versus French fascist) for the most contested objective; postwar governance. A resistance entity authorized, established, and organized by the sovereign government legitimizes such an organization and aligns it to the most appropriate and least contested political objective; return of the legitimate government. This objective should easily garner domestic political support within our at-risk democratic allies and partners. The restoration of these legitimate democratic governments should also garner sufficient political support from the nations that would assist such an effort, such as the U.S. and its NATO allies. This effort should impede and perhaps even prevent the development of any competitive organizations seeking political change either while under occupation or during post-occupation, especially the possibility of networks aligned with the occupier.

This planning effort, though led from within a ministry of defense due to the typical planning competence historically present within such an organization (training, schooling and practice), must not only be a whole of government effort but must extend itself to encompass a whole of society effort (Fiala, 2020). Such an effort sends a strong strategic message (Fiala, 2020) to a potential adversary by presenting a strong and unified society both willing and able to impose costs on an occupier as well as demonstrating a willingness to resist until national sovereignty is restored.

The Ministry of Justice can support the national legislature in the construct of a national legal framework to support the establishment, development, and material support of a resistance organization prior to and during occupation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs can secure agreements with allies and partners to ensure recognition and potential placement of an exiled government as well as securing agreements to support the capabilities of the resistance organization during its development and while under occupation. A Ministry of Communication can develop themes and a national narrative for domestic support as well as targeting international audiences prior to and during an occupation. The Ministry of Education or culture can develop patriotic education and events to strengthen national pride, confidence, and unity against an adversary, enhancing resilience. Nongovernment civil society organizations can be brought into the planning effort to support these goals. Furthermore, the government can distribute informational pamphlets to its citizens regarding how they can support such preparations. Such pamphlets have already been designed and distributed by the Baltic states (*Prepare to Survive Emergencies and War*, 2015) and Sweden (*If Crisis or War Comes*, 2018) and can be created and distributed by other governments as necessary.

Legal Framework

Definitive laws providing a legal framework must be promulgated regarding the national resistance organization and its activities both prior to and during an occupation. These laws must include funding and operational authorities, and the status of its personnel both prior to and during occupation. This is intended to completely legitimize the organization, its members and their activities, gain and retain domestic public trust and confidence in the organization, and provide international support.

The designated members of this organization, even if not members of the regular military, must receive education and training in that nation's military judicial system (e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice), and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) which is also known internationally as International Humanitarian Law (IHL), as do regular members of that nation's military. This is to ensure a responsible hierarchical organization that holds its members responsible for their actions and can enforce standards of behavior accountable to a judicial process within a military hierarchy during both peacetime and war, and LOAC during occupation (ICRC; Law of Armed Conflict).

Actions by resistance members while under occupation must comport with LOAC. This will assist it in retaining legitimacy among its domestic population and is essential for maintaining legitimacy under international law (i.e., Geneva Conventions of 1949). Additionally, adherence to such standards of behavior facilitates international support, particularly among its allies and partners by facilitating positive strategic messaging regarding its activities and goals. There is no guarantee that an occupier would extend Geneva Convention protections to resistance members, but it allows the resistance and its exiled government to occupy and retain the moral high ground in this contest. It is also important to remember that though the occupier would exercise de facto authority in the territory it occupies, international law would recognize the exiled government as retaining representative sovereignty and as the de jure representative of the people within the occupied territory (Hahn, 2012).

Policy Framework

To avoid the problems that beset the stay-behind organizations of the Cold War, a resistance organization must not only be conceived within a strict legal framework but also must not be used as an internal counterespionage or counterintelligence organization. Our allies have adequate internal security apparatus within their law enforcement and counterintelligence structures. Those structures are designed and designated to concern themselves with domestic adversarial espionage activities or other activities seeking to create adversary political leverage within the target nation. A resistance organization engaging in such activities in peacetime risks losing both domestic and international legitimacy and risks revealing the extent of its organization, membership, and capabilities to a potential adversary who may be engaging in probing activities.

The resistance organization should be authorized to act only during occupation and responsible through a chain of command to the (exiled) national leadership. During occupation is when it may expand its activities to include aspects of intelligence,

counterintelligence and possibly even aspects of law enforcement. These additional activities can be conducted by it within occupied territory as the designated agent or extension of the legitimate national government that holds *de jure* sovereignty in that territory.

An Indigenous Approach

We must encourage our Baltic allies, and perhaps other nations in Europe, to continue developing an authorized, planned and equipped resistance capability as part of their national defense structure. If they have not begun, then nations on the periphery of the PRC (land and sea) can be encouraged to do so as well. As explained above, such an organization is separate from their reserve or auxiliary forces as well as separate from their conventional and special operations forces, though soldiers from such units may have a role in a resistance organization. The organization has a place within the national defense hierarchy with a chain of command and control leading up to the national government, whether in peacetime or under occupation.

The tactics, techniques, equipment, and operations of the resistance organization are all under national domestic control. Many of its activities will be focused on maintaining popular morale, forcing the enemy to commit large resources to its own security, preventing political consolidation by the occupier, and dissuading the population from engaging in activities of benefit to the occupier (Fiala, 2020). It is not an organization generated or commanded by exogenous, such as U.S., forces. The nation under threat has and must take complete ownership of the organization and its purpose.

Having said that, the organization should coordinate training and equipment with its allies and partners most likely to use force to reestablish its national sovereignty. This has everything to do with intelligence and direct action. As resistance organizations in WWII acquired intelligence and sent it out of occupied territories to allies, today's resistance organizations must be prepared to do the same. This means having common or agreed methods of communication (techniques and equipment). In WWII, on the eve of and during the allied invasion of Normandy, French underground networks, with the assistance of Jedburgh teams, focused their efforts on slowing German reinforcement of Normandy (Jones, 2016). Similar activities will be conducted by a resistance organization in coordination with allies. The tactics and operations of the resistance are under national control but are most effective if closely coordinated with the efforts of critical allies.

Resistance Activities

Under occupation, the resistance organization has many tasks. These tasks can be divided into two major groupings. First, there are actions designed to maintain popular morale and resilience against the occupier. The second group of activities contains activities which assist U.S., allied, and partner nation forces to defeat the occupier and oust them from occupied territory.

National Morale in Occupied Territory

Historically, populations under occupation can be divided along a spectrum regarding their relationship to a foreign occupier. Their behavior can be divided into three categories; accommodation, resistance, and collaboration (Fiala, 2020). The overwhelming majority

will engage in accommodationist behaviors. They will attempt to get on with their lives while protecting their family and may engage in intermittent passive (Bos, Spitaletta, Molnar, Tinker, & LeNoir, 2013) and maybe even peaceful resistance activities. The resistance minded are more likely to directly support the resistance as often as they can with behaviors ranging from passive and peaceful resistance to direct aid to or membership in a resistance organization and may engage in anti-occupation acts of violence. The final group is that of collaborationist. These people perceive some sort of advantage for themselves and perhaps their families through intentional and more direct assistance to the occupiers, based on a range of reasons. Occupying forces tend to entice populations gradually from accommodationist to collaborationist behaviors.

To maintain popular morale and to reduce any inclination toward acceptance of the occupier's presence or collaborationist behaviors, the resistance organization will conduct activities to achieve and maintain awareness of its existence and its goal. Against a very competent and technically advanced enemy, these would likely not encompass gathering in forests in groups to conduct platoon to company size training and from which to conduct guerrilla actions. Such tactics are what eliminated an untold number of brave men and women who were members of the Forest Brothers (Morard, 2019) fighting the Soviet occupiers in the middle of the last century, and stand an even lesser chance of success today. Instead, many of these actions would be communicative. In the last phase of the existence of the Forest Brothers, their primary activities were printing and distributing pamphlets and books to inform people of the existence of resistance to Soviet occupation. Today, such activity is not where resistance would end, but rather where it would start. Old fashioned printing methods used by the Forest Brothers, and later by the Solidarity movement in Poland (Goodwyn, 1991), could be used to spread physical flyers and pamphlets. Poland's Solidarity organization also issued hundreds of styles of commemorative stamps with historical images contrasting and challenging Soviet domination (Polish Independent Press Review, 1987). In today's world of internet connectivity, similar messages of information and psychological operations could also make use of the internet, assuming the enemy allowed some connectivity. Cyber-attacks against the occupier inside occupied territory would likely come from outside occupied territory and in cooperation with the exiled government.

The resistance could also cooperate clandestinely with more public and peaceful methods of anti-occupation protests. Peaceful methods can be quite assertive and aggressive, as were the methods used by Otpor! (Resistance!) in 2000 against Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia (Kurtz, 2010). Those methods included marches, large protests, blockage of roads and satire. Naturally, the risk of such activity would be dependent on the tolerance level of the occupier, which should not be assumed.

Kinetic Activities

The other group of activities renders assistance to external allies and partners and concerns two primary areas; intelligence gathering and communication, and guerrilla style actions. The gathering and communication of intelligence usually requires a high level of skills and expertise resulting from training. The acquisition of these skills cannot be left to when an occupation occurs. These personal and technical skills must be trained and practiced prior to an occupation. Resistance members designated to engage in this activity need thorough training during peacetime when they can be more completely and safely trained to become

adept with such techniques and equipment. Technical equipment for communication with allies or their own exiled government must be acquired beforehand and compatible as necessary with allied organizations with whom they will communicate.

The guerrilla type skills encompassing this style of kinetic and violent actions are very similar to our doctrinally defined Direct Action skills (Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2021). Such activities can range from hit and run ambush style attacks to small scale assaults. These can involve automatic and semi-automatic firearms, mortars, explosive devices, rockets and even man-portable anti-aircraft missiles. The more sophisticated the weapon, the more necessary it becomes to train its users to proficiency prior to an occupation. This is because it may be necessary to competently employ such weapons in a matter of months following initial occupation, in support of incoming conventional allied forces. Training on such devices within occupied territory with few hidden or mountainous locations to conduct such training would be nearly impossible, and moving trainees in and out of the country for the purpose of training can entail an inordinately high risk. Such weapons and devices should also have more trained personnel than are likely to use them. This allows for members who have been killed, captured, compromised, or who are for whatever reason unavailable at the critical point in time when they are required. Such weapons can be surreptitiously stored in the state prior to hostilities or may be brought into the occupied territory clandestinely during occupation. The former method ensures availability but risks compromise if the enemy infiltrates the organization, and the second method risks discovery during clandestine transport into a denied area. Regular kinetic activities can be conducted to maintain public awareness and morale, to slow enemy movement due to their own security precautions, and to cause the enemy to commit extra resources to protect itself (installations and convoys). Perhaps the greatest value of these capabilities is to the allied and partner forces immediately prior and during entry into occupied territory, similar to the above-mentioned example of resistance forces in France during the Normandy invasion.

Strategic Messaging

Every public act of the resistance is a message with several audiences; domestic population, foreign supporters, and occupier (i.e.; armed forces, government and population). Therefore, every action must be tied to a messaging purpose and must account for these audiences (*Commander's Communication Synchronization*, 2013). Typically, the purpose will range from supporting the morale of the domestic population, to giving reason to foreign allies and partners to continue providing support, to negatively affecting occupier morale. The messaging methods and venues ranges from graffiti, to pamphlets, internet messages and cyber activity, sabotage, and violent attacks. Civil peaceful protests and similar activities by the populace should also be well targeted and synchronized with other activities to achieve successful strategic messaging. The substance of the messaging is support to continued resistance, instilling confidence in the resumption of national sovereignty, and the defeat of the occupier.

Exiled Government

To facilitate this effort under international law, the threatened nation should plan to exile some of its senior government officials. This is for the purpose of maintaining national sovereignty through the elected, legitimate government. This may not necessarily include the head of state. The head of state may stay behind to offer a focal point of national resolve to regain independence. Alternatively, an exiled head of state may be very effective in maintaining allied and partner support to restore national independence. This is a determination for each state based on these and other cultural and political factors.

In addition to the legal framework necessary to accommodate this, an ally or partner nation must also agree to host. This arrangement is best made prior to a crisis and will involve the political resolve of the host government, as well as the necessary support arrangements to secure and sustain these representatives abroad for the time necessary.

This exiled government, as the sovereign representative of its citizens in occupied territory, will conduct the political, diplomatic, and military decision making on behalf of its people as if it were still in its capital city. This is also the authority that will control the resistance organization and its activities in occupied territory. This chain of command and control will comply with international law and legitimize the actions of its forces, represented by the authorized resistance organization in occupied territory.

The occupying power is not likely to recognize resistance forces and their activities in the territory it occupies as legitimate and complying with international law, which would result in the granting to resistance actors of combatant privilege and prisoner of war status in case of capture. Yet, the positive strategic message offered by the exiled government and its resistance forces by clear compliance with international law can make it much easier to maintain the political support required for action by allies and partners. It seizes and retains the moral high ground and offers the offending occupier the choice of complying with or violating (again) international law.

Advantages of Establishing a Resistance Organization

Establishing a resistance organization prior to conflict has many advantages. It allows for careful vetting and selection of key leaders and personnel who will fulfill critical functions. It allows for extensive training in a secure environment. It allows for acquiring designated material, equipment and weapons to fulfill planning objectives. It allows for the secure caching and storage of those items. It allows for training to proficiency with those items. It allows for the development of coordination and communication methods within potentially occupied territory as well as with the potentially exiled government, allies and partners. It allows for the development of funding arrangements. Finally, it can increase deterrence with the adversary's knowledge of its presence.

The public knowledge of such an organization can add confidence and resiliency to the populace in peacetime with the knowledge that the presence of occupiers will not end the fight to restore sovereignty. It can also add confidence and resiliency to the population under occupation by inspiring and encouraging both peaceful and passive resistance to prevent the occupier's political consolidation of authority (Helvey, 2004).

Further, developing such an organization and capability, with U.S. assistance, also gives advantages to the U.S. through the ability to act clandestinely and exert influence within territory occupied by an adversary. This capability lends itself to U.S. options and policy formulation regarding the adversary, whether those options are short term, pending conventional force action, or long term where the interaction becomes more political warfare than kinetic, similar to the decades long Cold War (Riste, 2014).

The Domestic Political Sell

It may be difficult for national leaders to convince, or to desire to convince, their populations of the necessity of such an organization. This is simply because adding such a layer to their comprehensive defense is an admission, through preparation, that the other more conventional layers of defense may fail. From the perspective of the U.S. it is also difficult in that it serves as an admission that U.S. forces may not be able to deter and defeat enemy forces intent on occupying all or some territory it has agreed to protect. Yet, due to the force levels of U.S. forces abroad and its worldwide commitments, in some places, this is the reality (as demonstrated in the above noted RAND study).

The messaging to the threatened population and to the potential adversary is that this is a mechanism to prevent the occupier from achieving his goal of politically consolidating and ruling the occupied territory. It imposes costs on the occupier and prevents the occupier from ruling the territory without a large commitment of resources. The adversary turned enemy will not succeed in holding occupied territory, will face a defiant and confident population, will not be able to effectively govern the territory, and will ultimately fail in the endeavor, which brings its own attendant domestic political risk to the adversary.

CONCLUSION

Resistance is a form of warfare. It is another layer added to a threatened nation's comprehensive/total defense (Veebel, Ploom, Vihmand, & Zaleski, 2020) program to harden it as a target. To be of maximum value, it is used only against the occupation forces and not against the enemy's initial invasion forces. In the preparation phase prior to occupation, it cements its relationship with allies and partners. It supports popular morale, sends intelligence out of occupied territory to partners and allies and assists incoming friendly forces. It prevents the establishment of competitive forces with alternative political ends while under occupation. It acts on behalf of the exiled government to reestablish national sovereignty and return to the status quo ante bellum. It prevents enemy political consolidation of the occupied territories. It continues the struggle, resists, and prevents enemy victory by denying him the ability to govern the occupied territory.

During the Cold War in Europe, the stay behind program existed under the assumption that the large amount of Soviet forces would overwhelm NATO forces near the Iron Curtain and would then assist NATO conventional forces to take back overrun territory. Today we face a similar strategic circumstance in both the Baltics and the periphery of the PRC. In the Baltics we have NATO allies that we are committed to defend. Though this concept can be traced to the Cold War stay-behind organizations of the NATO alliance, the concept also has applicability outside of today's NATO alliance. In areas on the periphery of China we have multiple policy options with places we can choose to act in the absence of defense

treaty obligations. Facilitation of and connections to indigenous resistance organizations gives us options. Concurrently, the formation of indigenous resistance organizations allows those populations to increase their resiliency against foreign aggression and sustain their national identity and willingness to regain sovereignty if lost. Implementation of this option is low cost in U.S. resources and reliant mostly on the nation that seeks to defend itself against adversarial invasion. Absent the deterrent effect of heavy armored brigades or overwhelming maritime capability, or the willingness to use nuclear weapons, this viable option can enhance national resilience, and send the message of refusal to succumb to an adversary. It can assure the adversary of a long term and resource intensive fight in its attempt to exert control over occupied people. The time to make this option available – is now.

Note

1. The British return of Hong Kong (Hong Kong island, Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories) to China was under the terms of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration was functioned as treaty between the two states. In 1987, Portugal and China agreed to terms on the return of Macau in the Joint Declaration on the Question of Macau, also known as the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, or formally known as the Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Portuguese Republic.

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