ISBN: 978-1955055307, Lynne Rienner Publishers, September 2022, 329 pages, $98.50 (Hardcover)
Reviewed by: José de Arimatéia da Cruz, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, United States
The current conflict between Russia and Ukraine illustrates the likely future of war. Future conflicts are expected to occur in highly urbanized centers—the epicenters of a country’s economic and political power—and will involve a combination of symmetric and asymmetric forces seeking to subdue the enemy and destroy its will to fight. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, has stated, “If war is about politics, it is going to be fought where people live. It will be fought, in my opinion, in urban areas.”
Louise A. Tumchewicz, in her book Small Armies, Big Cities: Rethinking Urban Warfare, examines many issues that future warfighters must consider when operating in big cities with small armies, including drone warfare, surrogate warfare, mass and maneuver, influence operations, and civil-military relations. Tumchewicz, a senior research fellow at the British Army’s Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, aims to illustrate for future warfighters the myriad challenges inherent in urban operations. As she explains, the book’s “aim is to inform and stimulate thinking on how small armies have fought in cities, reflecting on the enduring nature and changing character of urban conflict through several case studies.”
Tumchewicz agrees with General Milley’s assessment that “future conflicts, whether counterinsurgencies, peer confrontations, or near-peer confrontations, are likely to incorporate an urban element.” Before proceeding to the book’s overall argument, a few operational definitions are in order. First, what constitutes small? While the term can mean different things to different people, Tumchewicz operationalizes small as both “a division of 10,000 or less” and, more broadly, in terms of an army’s “range of capabilities and budget.” Army, she argues, refers to “an organization armed and trained for war on land, though not specifically the armed force of a nation-state or political party,” which allows the book to include experiences of non-state armed groups. Tumchewicz does not fully explain how she arrived at this definition, beyond noting that “small is a relative term, particularly when it comes to armed forces.”
Another key characterization of future conflicts is the possibility that they “may not even exist geographically, in deserts, on plains or under jungle canopies, but instead, perhaps, in cyberspace, where its protagonists may not be soldiers but programmers, their weapons viruses and computer code.” As Tumchewicz notes, future conflicts will take place primarily within the world’s urbanized areas and reflect what Mary Kaldor referred to as “new wars,” in which “both conventional forces and irregular combatants, including militias, private security contractors, terrorists, paramilitary groups, warlords, and criminal gangs,” operate, and the urban space itself becomes a tool of war. As the urban terrain becomes the dominant battlespace, conflicts in cities increasingly result in urbicide—the deliberate and premeditated destruction of an urban area. Its purpose is often to eliminate the vestiges of an ethnic group or to symbolically attack a population’s identity. Tumchewicz highlights numerous examples across the 20th and 21st centuries, such as Russia’s destruction of Grozny and its ongoing missile and drone attacks against Kyiv.
The implosion of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, marked not the “end of history” but rather the beginning of a new era in international relations. Tumchewicz argues that the post–Cold War experience demonstrates that urban warfare continues to be shaped by a mixture of historically enduring dynamics and new features driven by technological, political, and social change. The conflict over Donetsk Airport exemplifies this evolving character. While the airport held little strategic value, its symbolism made it worth fighting for. It was “the most important gate into the city,” and it was defended by Ukrainian soldiers known as “cyborgs,” who became national symbols of resistance. The Ukrainian government later cemented this symbolism by declaring January 16 “Cyborg Commemoration Day” and issuing a commemorative stamp bearing the motto, “They [Cyborgs] withstood, the concrete didn’t.”
Another important element of future conflict, as illustrated in Small Armies, Big Cities, is the necessity of environmental intelligence. Sun Tzu’s dictum in The Art of War—“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles”—remains relevant. In the Battle of Marawi in the Philippines, Tumchewicz shows how the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) used influence operations to shape public opinion and persuade the local population of the legitimacy of their cause. “Shaping popular perceptions was key to winning the long-term battle for popular support and changing the political will of the larger population.” To win the “hearts and minds” of civilians, the AFP had to understand the roots of the conflict and portray the military as “more humane” than the insurgents. Cultural intelligence was therefore a decisive factor.
Marawi also illustrated a grim reality: in future mega-urban battles, the destruction of a city may become imperative to save it. “Destroying a city to save it” may be the new normal of 21st-century conflict. Social media now plays an essential role in legitimizing state violence—or delegitimizing it. Insurgents can weaponize online platforms to portray governments as oppressors. As Steve Tatham argues in Chapter 8, social media should be regarded “primarily as a media channel, as a way of communicating within an already established network or networks… and as a way of encouraging and deepening behaviors and attitudes that are already established.”
Small Armies, Big Cities also examines how drones have become integral to future conflict. In Chapter 10, Paul Lushenko and John Hardy address the still-unresolved question of how scholars and practitioners should understand the purpose and disadvantages of urban warfare. The utility of drones as substitutes for military personnel has become the norm among advanced forces as their troop numbers shrink and they rely increasingly on special operations forces. Lushenko and Hardy define drone warfare as “the use of armed drones in concert with expeditionary forces to achieve military and/or political objectives… across the continuum of competition and conflict.”
While drones are not a panacea for future conflicts, they are undeniable force multipliers, especially given the “tyranny of distance” inherent in many theaters. The Russia–Ukraine war illustrates this clearly. When Russian forces suffered heavy casualties in Kyiv, the military turned to drones manufactured in Iran. Scholars have even argued that we are experiencing a revolution in warfare known as “drone-a-rama.”
Lushenko and Hardy further show how transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are adopting drones for illicit purposes, using them to monitor police activities and protect clandestine networks. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, TCOs employ drones to surveil police movements approaching operations in the city’s favelas.
In conclusion, Small Armies, Big Cities is a vital book that deserves a place on the shelf of every scholar and practitioner of military science, as well as anyone interested in the future of armed conflict. It provides readers—experts and novices alike—with a wealth of insight. Most importantly, the contributing authors recognize that “winning in the cities” is “operational vital ground” and foundational to the nuanced tactical actions required to address local threat environments, urban dynamics, and population perceptions.
The current conflict between Russia and Ukraine illustrates the future of war. Future conflicts are likely to occur in highly urbanized centers, which are the epicenter of a country’s economic and political power. It will also be a combination of symmetric and asymmetric forces to subdue the enemy and destroy its will to fight. Former Joint Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley has stated that, “If war is about politics, it is going to be fought where people live. It will be fought in my opinion in urban areas.” Louise A. Tumchewics, in her book Small Armies, Big Cities: Rethinking Urban Warfare, examines many issues that future warfighters will have to consider when battling in big cities with small armies, such as drone warfare, surrogate warfare, mass and maneuvers, influence operations, and civil-military relations, to name a few. Tumchewics is a senior research fellow at the British Army’s Center for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research. Tumchewics’ goal with the publication of Small Armies, Big Cities is to illustrate to future warfighters the myriad challenges while operating in an urban environment. As Tumchewics explains, the book’s “aim is to inform and stimulate thinking on how small armies have fought in cities, reflecting on the enduring nature and changing character of urban conflict through several case studies.”
Tumchewics agrees with General Milley’s assessment that “future conflicts, whether counterinsurgencies, peer confrontations, or near-peer confrontations, are likely to incorporate an urban element.” Before proceeding to discuss the book’s overall argument, a few operational definitions are in order. First, what is the definition of small? While small can mean different things to different people, Tumchewics operationalizes small as both “a division of 10,000 or less” and in terms of the army’s “range of capabilities and budget.” Army, argues Tumchewics, refers to both “an organization armed and trained for war on land, though not specifically the armed force of a nation-state or political party, thus allowing us to explore the experiences of non-state actor groups.” Tumchewics does not explain how she arrived at that operational definitino of “small,” other than to state that “small is a relative term, particularly when it comes to armed forces.” One characterization of future conflicts is the fact that perhaps “future conflicts may not even exist geographically, in deserts, on plains or under jungle canopies, but instead, perhaps, in cyberspace, where its protagonists may not be soldiers but programmers, their weapons viruses and computer code.”[1]
As Tumchewicz points out, future conflicts, which will take place primarily within urbanized areas of the world, are part of what Mary Kaldor referred to as “New Wars.” Kaldor and Sassen referred to as the “new wars,” where “both conventional forces and irregular combatants, including militias, private security contractors, terrorists, paramilitary groups, warlords, and criminal gangs” strive, and the urban space becomes a new tool in their arsenal for war.”[2] As the urban terrain becomes the new war environment, conflicts in the city will lead to urbicide. Urbicide is the deliberate attempt by an enemy armed force to purposefully and premeditatedly destroy an urban area or city. The objective of such an action is the destruction of vestiges of an ethnic group within a geographic location. As Tumchewics points out, urbicide is increasingly identified as a strategy for the political aims of urban wars. In other words, the city is seen as a symbol, and its destruction represents the decline of that symbol. There are numerous examples of urbicide throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. For example, Russia’s destruction of Chechnya’s capital, Grozny. Or the invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces and its continued military and drone attacks against Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv.
The implosion of the Union Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on December 25, 1991, marked not the “end of history,” but rather the beginning of a new phenomenon in the history of international relations. Tumchewics argues that the post-Cold War experience demonstrates that urban warfare will continue to be shaped by a mixture of elements that both reflect historical continuity and incorporate new features driven by its dynamics and ever-changing character. The conflict over Donetsk Airport exemplifies the ever-changing nature of conflict characterization in the post-Cold War era. While the airport had no strategic value from a military’s objectives, its symbolism was worth fighting for. The airport was “the most important gate into the city,” and it was defended by courageous soldiers known as “cyborgs.” The “cyborgs” became a national symbol of resistance against the invaders. The conflict over the control of Donetsk Airport was further established as a symbol of the national party by the Ukrainian government on January 16 as “Cyborg Commemoration Day” and the release by the Ukraine Post Office of a collaborative stamp with the motto “They [Cyborgs] withstood, the concrete didn’t.”
Another important characterization of conflict in the future, illustrated by Small Armies, Big Cities, will be the necessity for environmental intelligence writ large. Sun Tzu in his masterpiece The Art of War argued that “if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” In the Battle of Marawi, Philippines, Tumchewics examines how the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) employed influence operations to shape public opinion and persuade the local population of the righteousness of their respective causes. “Shaping popular perceptions was key to winning the long-term battle for popular support and changing the political will of the larger population.” To win the “hearts and minds” of the population, the AFP had to understand the underlying causes of the conflict and portray the military as “more humane” than the insurgents. Cultural intelligence was a deciding factor in the AFP’s victory over the rebel forces. In addition to cultural intelligence, the Battle of Marawi also established an unavoidable dictum: to save a city, in future battles of big cities or megacities, the destruction of it must be imperative first. “Destroying a city to save it” is the new normal in the 21st Century. Furthermore, in the conflicts of the 21st Century, social media will play an important role in legitimizing a state’s use of force, particularly in the brutality of war, or as an asset to insurgents who will portray the government as the enemy of the people, thus questioning the utility of force. Social media is the key to future influence. In chapter 8 “Influence Operations,” Steve Tatham argues that “social media should be regarded primarily as a media channel, as a way of communicating within an already established network or networks, as a near real-time sensor-to-sensor network, and as a way to encouraging and deepening behaviors and attitudes that are already established.”
Tumchewics’ Small Armies, Big Cities also addresses how drones have become an integral part of future conflicts. In Chapter 10, Paul Lushenko and John Hardy address the still-unsolved question of how scholars and practitioners should best understand the purpose of urban warfare and its disadvantages. The utility of drones as a surrogate for the use of military personnel has become the norm among advanced military forces as armed forces worldwide shrink in size and rely heavily on special operation forces. Lushenko and Herdy operationalize drone warfare as “the use of armed drones in concern with expeditionary forces to achieve military and/or political objectives, limited or maximal, across the continuum of competition and in conflict.” While the utility of drones as a weapon of choice in small wars, big cities is not a panacea to future conflicts; it will certainly be a force multiplier given the “tyranny of distance” involved in many conflicts. Again, the Russian-Ukraine conflict clearly illustrates the utility of drones as a force multiplier. When the Russian army forces began to suffer significant casualties in the conflict in Kyiv, the Russian military began to deploy drones manufactured in Iran. The use of drones as an alternative to the use of military personnel has led scholars to claim that we are experiencing a revolution in military known as “drone-a-rama.” Lushenko and Hardy also illustrated how transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are also using drones in their nefarious activities, including clandestine networks relying on social networks to manage their security-to-efficiency trade off, which is essential to avoid operation detection or monitoring by the police.[3] TCOs in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, are using drones to monitor police activities as they approach areas of operation in Rio’s notorious shantytowns.[4]
In conclusion, Small Armies, Big Cities is a vital book that should be on the bookshelf of every scholar or practitioner of military science, as well as anyone with an interest in the future of armed conflicts. The book provides both experts and novices in the field with an abundance of information. But most importantly, the contributing authors of this anthology recognize that “winning in the cities” is “operational vital ground and sets the conditions for a range of nuanced tactical military actions suited to the local threat situation, urban environment and population dynamics, aspirations, and perceptions.”
[1] Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham. Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People and Their Motivations Will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict. (Miliary Studies Press, 2011), 3
[2] Mary Kaldor and Saskia Sassen (Eds). Cities at War: Global Insecurity and Urban
Resistance. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 5
[3] John P. Sullivan, José de Arimatéia da Cruz, and Robert J. Bunker, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 42: Brazilian Gangs Utilize Human Shields, Explosives, and Drones in a New ‘Cangaço’ Style Urban Bank Raid in Araçatuba, São Paulo,” Small Wars Journal 09/05/2021. Available at https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-42-brazilian-gangs-utilize-human-shields
[4] Jose de Arimateia da Cruz , “The Not-So-Marvelous City: The Socioeconomic Roots of Rio de Janeiro’s Violence,” available at https://coha.org/the-not-so-marvelous-city-the-socioeconomic-roots-of-rio-de-janeiros-violence/ Access June 10, 2025
