ISBN: 978-0198902065, Oxford University Press, February 2025, 530 pages, $195.00 (Hardcover)
Reviewed by: James Horncastle, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada
In the field of conflict studies, analyses of special operations forces (SOF) and their capabilities are among the most problematic for scholars to address. SOF, by their very nature, often operate at the margins of warfare, and much of their work is deliberately obscured. This is a problem at the tactical level, but it is extremely difficult for scholars and practitioners to assess at the operational and strategic levels. Most analyses that have sought to establish a theory of SOF efficacy have, unfortunately, fallen into the trap of attempting to quantify their effect. In Special Operations Success, however, James Kiras moves beyond these past efforts and seeks to develop a theory of SOF efficacy. Although there are some concerns with the case studies that Kiras employs, Special Operations Success will remain a key text in assessing SOF efficacy well into the future.
For a work of such importance and difficulty, James Kiras is among the best-placed scholars for the task. Kiras has written extensively on SOF and modern warfare, with the excellence of his work recognized by a wide range of parties. Furthermore, Kiras firmly situates himself within Colin Gray’s approach to strategy; Gray was among the figures most responsible for developing the field of strategic studies in North America. This connection is made evident by Kiras’ dedication of the book to Gray. As we shall see, Kiras’ examination of SOF and their efficacy at the strategic level is a worthy addition to this legacy.
Kiras begins his work by identifying a problem that has troubled conflict scholars for over a century: assessing the efficacy of SOF. While assessing this efficacy is easier at the tactical level, it has proven elusive at the strategic level. In part, the social science turn in conflict studies has meant that scholars and practitioners, with Kiras using the poignant example of Admiral William McRaven, have attempted to quantify it. While quantitative measures have their place in analyzing special operations, they can fall into the trap of a “kill count.” Furthermore, when applied in the field, such measures can focus on the number of operations, enemies eliminated, and similar metrics, rather than SOF’s role in achieving a strategic outcome.
Instead, Kiras applies a more nuanced approach to determining SOF success. Specifically, he applies two matrices to determine SOF efficacy: capabilities and control. Each of these dynamics is more nuanced than it first appears and needs to be examined qualitatively rather than quantitatively. For example, the size of a SOF group does not necessarily correspond to its ability to conduct special operations aligned with the state’s strategic interests. Kiras provides, briefly, the excellent example of India’s SOF, whose skill set does not necessarily compare favorably with American SOF, but whose capabilities correspond to India’s needs. Furthermore, control is also a concept that is more fluid than it appears at first glance. The nature of SOF and the operators who compose them necessitate a certain degree of freedom from conventional and legal norms. That said, there is always a concern that such liberty may evolve to a point where SOF operate against the interests of the state. Kiras subsequently tests his theory using three case studies: the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa.
The three case studies Kiras examines demonstrate one weakness in the theory’s approach: the Western-centric focus of the analysis. While Kiras recognizes that the field of SOF is dominated by American and British approaches, his attempt to move beyond this focus does not reach a truly global level. Kiras includes an examination of South Africa’s SOF under apartheid to overcome the geographical and political limitations common in other assessments, which tend to focus on the United States and Britain as liberal democracies. Kiras’ inclusion of South Africa is laudable; Africa as a continent is chronically understudied in the literature on SOF and irregular warfare despite its significance to the field. The immediate issue, however, is that South Africa inherited many of its military and cultural norms from the British system. While there was a significant break between Britain and South Africa due to apartheid, the legacies of Britain within the military establishment should not be underestimated.
This issue with the case studies, however, is in many ways unavoidable. It is almost impossible for an individual to have the requisite language skills, let alone regional expertise, to examine SOF at a global level. The fact that Kiras went beyond the standard countries examined, the United States and the United Kingdom, is laudable, even if it does not completely overcome the issue he sought to address. It does, however, provide an area for other scholars to test Kiras’ theory on case studies that are more distant from American and British SOF traditions.
Overall, Kiras’ work is likely to remain the standard against which theories on SOF operational and strategic efficacy are tested for years to come. While the author’s intended audience is academics studying SOF, it is a text that would be useful to both practitioners and politicians in understanding SOF and their employment. It breaks away from the quantitative methods that dominate the field and provides a novel approach to assessing their strategic utility. The issue of limited diversity in the case studies notwithstanding, the theoretical insight that Kiras develops is likely to become the new standard in the field.
