Military scholars and practitioners often speak of a “boom and bust” cycle that characterizes the U.S. approach to, and investments in, irregular warfare (IW).[1] “Boom and bust” refers to the notion that the United States and its military have found themselves involved in warfare characterized as ‘irregular’ throughout history. When one generation begins to develop knowledge, expertise, and capability in fighting irregular conflicts; political, strategic, and budgetary pressures push back to a focus on conventional or traditional warfare while valuable lessons learned are pushed out of curricula and into the archives – or so goes the narrative.
Over the last five years, however, there have been some reasons to think that the country and the Department of Defense (DOD) might have taken measures to break this cycle. There is undoubtedly a renewed focus on conventional warfighting capability in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflicts once associated with the “Global War on Terror.”[2] However, there are also encouraging signs for IW, including the establishment of a DOD Irregular Warfare Center (IWC), a recognition of IW’s importance in the recent Defense strategies and other documents, and even a “Curriculum Guide” on IW for professional military education (PME).[3] Despite these efforts, the United States is still at risk of failing to maximize its potential for competing and campaigning through IW. Two related reasons for this risk stand out. First is the failure to correctly identify IW practitioners, and the second is a failure to educate them in a way that provides the concepts, perspectives, and wisdom to be effective.
This article explains who IW practitioners are and what key concepts they should be taught to make them better able to develop strategic and operational approaches to irregular conflict. The answers to both questions may surprise even those who have been active in the IW community of interest. Here’s a hint: The IW practitioner is not necessarily the soldier or even the special operator. Here’s another hint: The concepts that need to be taught and learned are not featured in DOD’s IW Curriculum Guide, though some of them are found in NATO’s new Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare Reference Curriculum.[4] Unfortunately, before these two big questions can be addressed, one must understand the definitions of IW and the controversy surrounding the different schools of thought. The first section explains the definitional controversy and uses that discussion to answer who IW practitioners are. The second section provides a perspective on what subjects and concepts these practitioners need to understand. The concluding section provides some thoughts on corrective action.
Identifying IW Practitioners: definitions of IW (apologies)
For those of us involved in IW education and research, we are a bit tired of this ongoing discourse. IW as a term has a long and sordid history.[5] Our NATO partners don’t seem to like the term and have preferred to substitute for IW terms such as ‘hybrid threats’ and ‘Hybrid Warfare’ though admittedly the overlap is not perfect.[6] Still other scholars would prefer the broader, less militarized term “competitive statecraft.”[7] While the definition of competitive statecraft doesn’t exactly match those of IW, the overlap is significant. Other scholars have even called into question the “categorical confusion” that can be generated by classifying activities or threats as “irregular.”[8] Last year, DOD updated the joint definition from one that had been mostly unchanged since 2008. That did not prevent others from offering their own definitions, including the Army whose current definition still differs from the joint definition. A sample of these definitions are listed in table 1 with key words highlighted for convenience.
| Source | IW definition |
| DOD Dictionary 2023[9] | A form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities. |
| JP 1-02 (2008–2023)[10] | A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). |
| Army[11] | The overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. |
| Marks and Ucko[12] | A coercive struggle that erodes or builds legitimacy for the purpose of political power. It blends disparate lines of effort to create an integrated attack on societies and their political institutions. It weaponizes frames and narratives to affect credibility and resolve, and it exploits societal vulnerabilities to fuel political change. As such, states engaged in, or confronted with, irregular warfare, must bring all elements of power to bear under their national political leadership. |
| Seth Jones[13] | Activities short of conventional or nuclear warfare that are designed to expand a country’s influence and legitimacy, as well as weaken its adversaries. |
The competing definitions make it hard to determine who conducts IW, what activities they are doing, and what objectives they are fighting over. Some definitions are focused on forces and actors; the “who”. Some definitions are focused on the character of actions or activities (covert, non-attributable, asymmetric etc.). Still other definitions, such as the Seth Jones’ definition, emphasize thresholds of conflict, i.e., avoiding escalation and keeping to activities that improve one’s position and don’t provoke conventional or nuclear warfare, commonly referred to as “grey zone.” But the most useful and foundational definitions are the ones, such as Marks and Ucko’s, that are focused on IW as an alternative theory of victory. In other words, rather than focusing on defeating an opposing armed force to achieve victory, coercion and influence are used to gain legitimacy with relevant populations to achieve victory through political power. These are the definitions (or the parts of definitions) that are much more helpful for informing us about who conducts IW and what they should learn.
A key problem in defining IW is the word “warfare.” The new DOD definition makes the cringe-worthy tautological error of using part of a word to define itself. Surely “warfare” itself implies violence, or at least the threat of violence. That is often the presumption of any group of military professionals attempting to define IW. Yet the military’s understandable obsession with violence, far from being foundational in the definitional debate, is perhaps the biggest hindrance to deep understanding of operational approaches. Irregular warfare does NOT need to be violent, though it certainly can be and often is. It is probably coercive, though it need not be exclusively so. The essence of IW is not necessarily in the activities themselves; it is in relevant populations, influence, and legitimacy; coercion and violence are just important parts of the mix, characteristics of activities that become part of something based on why something is being done. They may be necessary, but they are rarely sufficient to characterize an approach or activity as IW. In IW the distinction between what is politics and what is warfare is non-existent. Insert your favorite Clausewitz quote here. If violence and coercion were both necessary and sufficient, we would be talking about conventional or traditional warfare and wouldn’t need IW.
The definitions of IW and even the current authoritative DOD texts bear this out. The Army (the service closest to IW activities) emphasizes that “non-military capabilities” and “methods other than military domination” in its definition. Marks and Ucko (two prominent IW scholars) emphasize “political power,” “political institutions,” “societal vulnerabilities,” and “political change.” Even DOD’s Curriculum Guide dances around this reality leaving lots of signals in the noise. It emphasizes that IW is done, “primarily in collaboration with interagency and other inter-organizational efforts” and dedicates a whole section to the need for “seamless integration of multiple elements of national power – diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, military etc.” The guide even admits that the military is rarely the main effort.
“DOD is not often the supported element in IW; rather, it is usually a supporting element in an ad hoc relationship coordinated between the various USG allies and partners. Interagency partners have different capabilities to apply to competition.”[14]
If IW is not characterized exclusively, or even primarily, by violence; if influence and legitimacy among relevant populations (as opposed to coercion) are the near objectives and political power the main objective; and if departments and organizations other than DOD and the military are the main effort, then we have an answer to the first question. Who are IW practitioners? Military personnel can and should certainly be included in the group, but they are just a small fraction of some significance; though often over estimated. The real IW practitioners are those who work in intelligence, covert operations, diplomacy, foreign aid, law enforcement, the private sector, the media etc. And yes, some military folks too. IW is more than an interagency effort; it is an inter (and intra) society endeavor.
What Should IW Practitioners Learn
If we begin with the new premise that the IW practitioner is not exclusively, or even primarily, a soldier or military officer, then it becomes easier to design curriculum for IW at different levels. Even a DOD-centric curriculum guide or reference should begin with theories and concepts that build a common framework for understanding societies, institutions, political power, influence and legitimacy. The DOD Curriculum Guide, however, begins with DOD’s 12 “IW activities” and lists learning objectives such as “Describe the character of IW, its core missions and enabling activities, and its impact on Service missions.” A more appropriate curriculum guide would start by identifying (1) the use of history with historical case studies and themes and (2) social science concepts that might be most valuable for understanding how state and non-state actors use coercion, influence, and legitimacy to pursue political power through relevant populations.[15]
The Use and Abuse of IW History
When it comes to the history portion of an IW curriculum, curriculum designers already have the benefit of the guidance that Sir Michael Howard provided in 1961 for military professionals studying war. Howard’s advice for the study of conventional war is equally applicable for the study of just about any other profession related to security whether it be diplomacy, finance, or policing. IW practitioners should follow Howard’s advice and study IW in width, depth, and context.[16]
To study IW in width, the practitioner must quickly dispel any juvenile notion that IW is somehow a new phenomenon and then observe the way in which IW has developed over a long historical period. For, as Howard said about warfare in general, “only by seeing what does change can one deduce what does not.”[17] There are continuities and discontinuities to be observed between deep studies of the counterrevolutionary rebellions in the Vendee (France) in 1793 and in the formation and activities of the Klu Klux Klan in the Southern U.S., circa 1867, where relevant populations instilled with narratives of relative deprivation organized and mobilized resources to conduct both violent and non-violent activities in pursuit of political power.
As such, there is also value in studying the history of IW in depth, where IW practitioners might take a single campaign and examine it thoroughly, not just from official histories but from the many angles and perspectives provided by primary sources. It is a valuable thing to read Alistair Horne’s A Savage War of Peace[18], but it is a far more valuable thing to add to it Remy Mauduit’s, The Insurgent Among Us and perhaps the letters, correspondence, and records of some of those Algerians that made up the relevant populations and the source of political power.[19]
Finally, just as Howard advised military practitioners, IW practitioners must study IW history in context.[20] IW campaigns, even more so than conventional campaigns and battles, are not like games or sports matches. They cannot be detached from their political, social, and cultural contexts. In IW, these contexts do not just ‘influence’ the battlefield as they do in conventional warfare, these elements of context define the battlefields. To explain the collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist regimes in the late 20th century or to understand modern “color revolutions”, one must dive deep into the narratives, organization, communications, resource mobilization, and external support of opposition groups as they sought political power by eroding the legitimacy of regimes and their political leaders.
Just a little Social Science
If only history were enough. The inductive nature of historical inquiry is of immense value to the IW practitioner, however, most of those who need to be educated about IW approaches require the deductive tools of the social sciences to provide frameworks for understanding. The list of social science concepts and theories that have value for the IW practitioner are probably too numerous for this brief essay, but there are a few topic areas that stand out especially given the definitions of IW described in the first section. Unsurprisingly, none of them are found in DOD’s IW Curriculum guide, though a few of them (thankfully) are alluded to in NATO’s reference curriculum.[21] Any serious IW education that intends to focus on the diverse group of IW practitioners must address theories and subjects that are neglected in most PME while simultaneously being of the most value in IW campaigns. For simplicity, I label these topic areas as (1) Identity theory, (2) Regime typology and dynamics, (3) Resource mobilization, and finally (4) Legitimacy and non-violent action. I will discuss each of the four areas, describing key theories and highlighting scholarly works, while also identifying and describing both real and hypothetical situations where understanding these areas might aid (or have aided) the operational level IW practitioner. I will also add, where necessary, words of caution on the limitations of social science in general and of the particular theories in the topic areas.
Identity (Who are you? Who are ‘they’?)
All IW definitions refer—explicitly or implicitly—to “groups” or “relevant populations”, and most emphasize the importance of influence. Before the IW practitioner can hope to design strategies and operational approaches, she must understand the relevant population(s) and groups or other actors. Understanding and defining such populations or groups in any context requires a foundational understanding of identity and more importantly, collective identity. Who people are is based on how they define themselves and how others define them. The social sciences have a lot to teach us about collective identity and, without the benefits of such foundational knowledge, IW practitioners are likely to make the same kind of unforced errors that U.S. forces made in the early days of the Iraq war, where supposed intelligence professionals, trained in enemy orders of battle and conventional force doctrine, decided to define a complex and multifaceted insurgency with the useless and intellectually lazy aggregation, “Anti-Iraqi Forces.”[22]
Teaching concepts of identity to IW practitioners should begin with introductions to foundational works of social identity theory[23], self-categorization theory[24], and collective identity theory.[25] IW practitioners don’t need to be graduate level experts on these topics, but even a cursory understanding is enough to give them the mental models and the vocabulary they need to consult with experts and explore the literature through self-study. Once they understand the basics of how people collectively identify with each other, they can begin to understand the importance of narratives and stories for those identities and then begin to have a framework for understanding the directly practical concepts of narrative and cognitive warfare.[26] Just as important, the IW practitioner begins to understand that individuals and groups may have complex identity hierarchies and must cope with their own intersectionality of identities. Furthermore, budding IW practitioners begin to understand that identity is socially constructed and therefore can, with concerted effort and time, be changed.
While the sheer volume of excellent works on this topic is too great to list, two works stand out as valuable for their ease of reading and suitability to academic environments. The first is a much-overlooked textbook by John M. Collins, Military Geography: For Professionals and The Public. Though this essay began with the argument that soldiers do not make up the bulk of IW practitioners, Collins’ book on ‘military’ geography has as much to say about identity, influence, and relevant populations as it does about physical terrain and maneuver. While part one of the book concentrates on physical geography as it might be relevant to the cavalry commander, parts two and three focus on cultural and political-military geography respectively.[27] The book needs an update but can be valuable in bringing military and non-military IW practitioners together with a common understanding and vocabulary for both conventional and irregular campaigns. A second book worth reading in its entirety and serving as a basis for discussion is Benedict Andersen’s classic, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.[28]Too many budding IW practitioners fall into the unfair trap of misusing the word “nation” in the IW context. Our entire national security and international relations discourse is working against them. Students are often surprised to realize that a ‘nation’ in its purest definition is not a geographic or even a geo-political entity. We often use it as shorthand for the idyllic concept of ‘nation-state.” DOD and other agencies use the clumsy term, “Partner Nation” to refer to the governments and administrations of foreign countries with whom they work. Yet, fundamentally, a nation is a group of people that share a socially constructed collective identity that can be, and often is, extremely fragile. Like all social constructions, nations require maintenance and reinforcement through narratives that build (or erode) their legitimacy. Grasping this concept and its dynamics can be critical to understanding more advanced IW topics, including resistance and resilience.[29]
Regime typology (The logic(s) of politics)
Most budding IW practitioners have an immature understanding of political power within states (not necessarily nations). The same can be said for the understanding of this incredibly large and diverse concept of so called, “non-state actors.” There is value in helping students understand the distinctions between terms such as state, country, nation, government, administration, and regime.[30] Of these key terms, regime is probably the most important. A regime, in political science, refers to the formal and informal structures and characteristics of political power or, more simply, it is the set of rules and norms that determine political power. States and non-state actors are organized and governed by leaders who emerge through some type of political regime. IW practitioners will be unable to develop successful IW approaches without a foundational understanding of the sources and distribution of political power in the countries and societies they wish to affect. Yet, neither the DOD Curriculum Guide nor the NATO curriculum reference say much about how students might understand political power and influence.
There are any number of valuable books, references and theories about how to observe, frame, and understand political power and influence. One excellent place to start is with the foundational framework of comparative politics known as Selectorate Theory or the logic of political survival.[31] Selectorate Theory and the logic of political survival are helpful for the IW practitioner, as they provide a framework for understanding the dynamics of power and legitimacy in different political systems. Selectorate theory, developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues, posits that the stability and policies of a regime are heavily influenced by the size and composition of its “selectorate” (those with a say in choosing the leader) and “winning coalition” (the subset whose support is essential for the leader’s survival).[32] Even dictators like Kim Jong-un have a selectorate and a winning coalition they must appease and reward if they are to survive. In IW, understanding the selectorate can help practitioners identify key power brokers and potential allies or adversaries, thus enabling more effective approaches to influence, while reinforcing or destabilizing the regime. Furthermore, the logic of political survival emphasizes that leaders prioritize their own political survival over national interest, often engaging in policies that favor their winning coalition to maintain power. This insight is helpful in IW, as it helps practitioners gain foresight and exploit the vulnerabilities and motivations of adversary or proxy leaders. By understanding that leaders may prioritize the demands of their winning coalition over broader public welfare, practitioners can design approaches that create political pressure or offer incentives to shift loyalties within the coalition. This knowledge can lead to a more nuanced and effective engagement in IW scenarios, where winning the right hearts and minds and influencing power dynamics are as critical as military victories.
There are certainly pitfalls of over reliance on this singular framework. Its simplicity and generalizability make it an attractive and helpful explanatory and exploratory theory. The IW practitioner must be cautioned to explore the cultural dynamics of such relationships and avoid the temptations of simple authoritarian teleology where every decision of a described dictator or single party system is one of survival and self-preservation.[33]
Resource Mobilization (> than Relative Deprivation)
Another critical topic area for which social science has tools to help explain and explore causality is the why and how of social movements. Social movement theory attempts to answer the complex questions of why and how people rebel and why some organizations or movements succeed while others do not. It’s a bit unsettling to find someone working in IW space that has never heard of Ted Robert Gurr and his theories of relative deprivation, but it is even more frustrating when such would be practitioners have no understanding of the criticality of resource mobilization.[34] Resource mobilization theory claims that all social movements (violent and non-violent) form when people who share grievances or other strong motivations can mobilize resources and act for the purpose of political power and influence. When we say resources, we are not exclusively talking about raw materials, but all the things, tangible and intangible, that are necessary for success. Non-state actors need a lot of the same resources that state actors need. People are almost always the most important resource, but money is probably a close second because it can purchase other resources such as weapons, ammunition, transportation, food etc. (including people). There are other intangibles like training, knowledge, communications, and intelligence. Depending on the context and the political opportunity space, non-state actors might need sanctuary or diplomatic support for international legitimacy. While context will determine what resources actors need, it is the nature of IW that resources and resource mobilization are always critical to the success or failure of IW approaches. The reason many counterinsurgency theorists emphasize separating the insurgent from the population is because of the resources (human and otherwise) that the population can provide. But even if you separate an insurgent from the population, the insurgency can still succeed if it can mobilize resources from abroad across a porous border.
Once practitioners understand the criticality of resource mobilization to non-state actors, the world of IW opens. Suddenly and profoundly, practitioners recognize the importance of financial intelligence and counter threat finance to IW.[35] Far from being one activity of many, these activities become central to approaches to both proxies and threat organizations. Also, the study of proxy warfare becomes much more complicated and nuanced. Both the type and quantity of resources provided to non-state actors from external state and non-state sources becomes critical to success.
Unfortunately, there isn’t enough literature on this topic that is geared specifically toward the IW practitioner. This is in part because IW practitioners have been misidentified as primarily military personnel and the perhaps because the apolitical (or non-partisan) ethos of civil-military relations makes the study of the, highly political, social movement theory somewhat taboo. Nevertheless, there are two useful works that can illuminate the importance of resource mobilization and social movement theory for IW practitioners. The first is McCarthy and Zald’s famous article from the American Journal of Sociology, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.” The article was critical in focusing the field of sociology on resource mobilization and compelling scholars to disaggregate social movement sectors into industries and organizations to better understand why some groups succeed or fail.[36] The same logic is powerful in framing violent non-state actors and movements and organizations employing both violent and non-violent approaches. If sociology is a bit too much for students at certain levels, then Marks and Ucko’s free publication, Crafting Strategies for Irregular Warfare, provides some understanding of political opportunity space and the quest for key resources in IW strategies.[37] Although the book is written for PME, it does a great job of emphasizing whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches while emphasizing the importance of political opportunity structures in determining the feasibility and suitability of IW approaches.
Legitimacy and the Efficacy of Non-Violent Action
Finally, there is the social science behind the concepts of legitimacy and non-violence. Legitimacy itself is a concept that deserves more attention in the social sciences in general and as the term relates to IW in particular. Legitimacy is commonly defined in the social sciences as the belief that a rule, institution, or leader has the right to govern.[38]
There is a close relationship between non-violence and legitimacy. For most modern humans this seems intuitive and the body of scholarly research on this is clear.[39] Non-violent approaches within IW not only have a legitimacy advantage, but they also have a resource mobilization advantage. Studies of non-violent social movements show that non-violent resistance presents fewer obstacles to moral and physical involvement, information and education, and participator commitment.[40] It is a sad thing, but the military’s understandable focus on violence and coercion in defining IW has caused an intellectual diversion away from the most effective group of IW tools.
Educating the IW practitioner on the theory and tools of non-violence isn’t hard. The literature is well known. The research of Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan is very comprehensive and their book, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, has become a powerful resource for both researchers and activists. Military students of IW might feel a bit out of place in a classroom studying these concepts but the recognition of the greater utility of non-military approaches is likely to build knowledge and wisdom that can be valuable in encouraging strategic restraint and for developing better estimations of the risks of violent approaches. Military students might be inspired and enlightened by Thomas Ricks’ Waging a Good War: A Military History of the Civil-Rights Movement, 1954-1968. The book highlights the challenges of waging an IW campaign aimed at eroding the legitimacy of an adversary in the eyes of relevant populations for the purpose of political power. Identity, regime typology, resource mobilization, and the efficacy of non-violence toward legitimacy are all central themes, even though Ricks might not frame them in those terms.[41] Chenoweth and Stephan have also done groundbreaking work on understanding external support to civil resistance that clarifies the issues with supporting non-violent proxy efforts.[42] There are also valuable works of prescriptive theory, such as Gene Sharp’s classic work, From Dictatorship to Democracy, which has been a guide for many organizations and leaders trying to mobilize resources to erode or build legitimacy in the eyes of relevant populations for the purpose of political power.[43]
What is to be done?
The U.S. in general and the DoD in particular have already made impressive strides to break the “boom and bust” cycle of IW education and investment. There are several boutique PME programs that go beyond merely teaching about IW activities and dive into theory and history. The College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at the National Defense University (NDU) stands out for its curriculum and specific programs, as do some of the courses and programs at advanced service programs for operational planners.[44] These programs have a smattering of non-military students but exist for the military practitioner, not the bulk of the relevant population of IW practitioners as defined here.
Thus, while much has been done, there is much more to be done. The U.S. government and its allies could make two broad categories of related changes. First, they could focus on the real practitioners of IW, including interagency and whole-of-society actors. Second, they could advance education and build IW curricula based more on history and social science rather than on activities.
Recognition that the real IW practitioners are not necessarily soldiers is hard. If making that recognition requires not calling it ‘irregular warfare’ and coming up with a new name and adjusted definition, then perhaps that is necessary.[45] The term, ‘Competitive Statecraft’ is a good start because it clearly implies things that are outside of military power and violence. Perhaps irregular warfare then becomes just those activities led by the military within competitive statecraft.
To achieve this, the United States government could redirect funding from the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Irregular Warfare Center (or change its mission) to an interagency and whole-of-society center that prioritizes research, education, and training for a far broader range of practitioners.[46] Additionally, the DOD could reform its PME enterprise and focus more own outsourcing its degree programs to civilian institutions in joint ventures with other agencies and the private sector.
Once the country is focused on the right group of practitioners, the IW (or newly named) center should build a curriculum guide that is neither military nor activity-centric, but instead focused on the history and social science of IW and the societies where it is waged. This curriculum should include topics such as identity theory, regime typology, resource mobilization, and legitimacy and non-violent action and give a common IW vocabulary across the diverse groups that will implement such approaches.
In particular, the curriculum should help IW practitioners study the history of IW in width, depth, and context, using historical case studies and include social science concepts to understand the complex dynamics of IW. This includes understanding the importance of influence and legitimacy among relevant populations, as well as the role of non-state actors and proxy warfare.
By adopting a more comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach to IW education, we can ensure that practitioners are equipped to develop effective strategies and operational approaches that consider the complexities of IW. This will require a shift away from a military-centric focus and towards a more nuanced understanding of the social, political, and economic dynamics that drive IW.
Ultimately, breaking the “boom and bust” cycle of IW education and investment requires a commitment to building a more comprehensive and effective approach to IW that incorporates the expertise and perspectives of a broader range of practitioners. By redirecting funding and building a more inclusive curriculum, and if necessary, renaming IW, we can ensure that IW practitioners are equipped to succeed in this complex and dynamic field.
[1] Department of Defense, “Summary of The Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy” (U.S. Department of defense, 2020), https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF. Charles T. Cleveland and Daniel Egel, “The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir” (RAND Corporation, July 29, 2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA301-1.html.
[2] David Wilson, “Preparing for Large-Scale Combat in the Indo-Pacific,” AUSA, January 26, 2024, https://www.ausa.org/articles/preparing-large-scale-combat-indo-pacific.
[3] (Department of Defense 2020). “Curriculum Development Guide for Irregular Warfare” (Office of Irregular Warfare and Competition, Directorate for Joint force Development (J-7), The Joint Staff, June 3, 2022). Also see https://irregularwarfarecenter.org
[4] “Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare Reference Curriculum” (NATO Headquarters, June 2024), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/7/pdf/241007-hybrid-threats-and-hybrid-warfare.pdf.
[5] Jared M. Tracy, “From ‘irregular Warfare’ to Irregular Warfare: History of a Term,” Veritas 19, no. 1 (2023), https://arsof-history.org/articles/v19n1_history_of_irregular_warfare_page_1.html.
[6] “Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare Reference Curriculum” (NATO Headquarters, June 2024).
[7] Ryan Shaw, “In Defense of Competition,” Real Clear Defense, accessed July 19, 2024, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2021/11/11/in_defense_of_competition_803143.html.
[8] Colin S. Gray, “Categorical Confusion? The Strategic Implications of Recognizing Challenges Either as Irregular or Traditional:” (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, February 1, 2012), https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA559162.
[9] Catherine A. Theohary, “Defense Primer: What Is Irregular Warfare?,” In Focus (Congressional research Service, January 8, 2024), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12565#:~:text=Simply%20put%2C%20irregular%20forces%2C%20also,to%20occupying%20conventional%20military%20forces..
[10] Catherine A. Theohary, “Defense Primer: What Is Irregular Warfare?,” In Focus (Congressional research Service, January 8, 2024), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12565#:~:text=Simply%20put%2C%20irregular%20forces%2C%20also,to%20occupying%20conventional%20military%20forces.
[11] “FM 1-02.1 Operational Terms” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2024), https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm1-02-1.pdf.
[12] David H. Ucko Marks Thomas A., “Redefining Irregular Warfare: Legitimacy, Coercion, and Power,” Modern War Institute, October 18, 2022, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/redefining-irregular-warfare-legitimacy-coercion-and-power/.
[13] Seth Jones, Three Dangerous Men (W.W. Norton, 2021), https://wwnorton.com/books/9781324006206.
[14] (“Curriculum Development Guide for Irregular Warfare” 2022).
[15] Weeks before the completion of this article, NATO produced a Curriculum reference that was far more useful for purpose. “Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare Reference Curriculum” (NATO Headquarters, June 2024) https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/7/pdf/241007-hybrid-threats-and-hybrid-warfare.pdf .
[16] Michael Howard, “THE USE AND ABUSE OF MILITARY HISTORY,” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 11, no. 1 (July 4, 1981), https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.1251.
[17] (Howard 1981)
[18] Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: NYRB Classics, 2006).
[19] Remy Mauduit, The Insurgent Among Us: My Life as a Rebel, French Officer, and Deserter (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2018).
[20] (Howard 1981)
[21] (“Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare Reference Curriculum” 2024)
[22] Emma Sky, The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq, Reprint edition (PublicAffairs, 2016).
[23] H. Tajfel and John Turner, “An integrative theory of intergroup conflict.” In W. G. Austin, & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (1979) (pp. 33-37). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole
[24] John C. Turner and Penelope J. Oakes, “The Significance of the Social Identity Concept for Social Psychology with Reference to Individualism, Interactionism and Social Influence,” British Journal of Social Psychology 25, no. 3 (1986): 237–52, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.1986.tb00732.x.
[25] Alberto Melucci, “The Process of Collective Identity,” in Social Movements And Culture (Routledge, 1996).
[26] Dr Ajit K. Maan and Paul L. Cobaugh, Introduction to Narrative Warfare: A Primer and Study Guide (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2018).
[27] John M. Collins, Military Geography: For Professionals and the Public (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012).
[28] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 2016).
[29] Brian Petit, “Can Ukrainian Resistance Foil a Russian Victory?” War on The Rocks, February 18, 2022.
[30] Peter Levine, “Defining State, Nation, Regime, Government,” Peter Levine (blog), May 19, 2023, https://peterlevine.ws/?p=29293.
[31] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival (New Haven: MIT Press, 2004), https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262524407/the-logic-of-political-survival/.
[32] (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004)
[33] Iza Yue Ding. The Performative State: Public Scrutiny and Environmental Governance in China, ( Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2022).
[34] Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New York: Routledge, 2011), https://www.routledge.com/Why-Men-Rebel/Gurr/p/book/9781594519147.
[35] Kevin D Stringer, Madison Urban, and Andrew Mackay, “Counter Threat Finance for Strategic Competition,” The RUSI Journal 168, no. 7 (November 10, 2023): 42–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2024.2323740.
[36] John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (May 1977): 1212–41, https://doi.org/10.1086/226464.
[37] Thomas Marks and David Ucko, Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Analysis and Action (2nd Edition) (National Defense University Press, 2022), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3163915/crafting-strategy-for-irregular-warfare-a-framework-for-analysis-and-action-2nd/https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F3163915%2Fcrafting-strategy-for-irregular-warfare-a-framework-for-analysis-and-action-2nd%2F.
[38] Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy,” The Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-Determination, accessed July 16, 2024, https://pesd.princeton.edu/node/516.
[39] Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (Columbia University Press, 2011).
[40] Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (Columbia University Press, 2011).
[41] Thomas E. Ricks, Waging a Good War: A Military History of the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2022).
[42] Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, “The Role of External Support in Nonviolent Campaigns” (Washington DC: International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, February 24, 2021), https://www.ericachenoweth.com/research/external-support-in-nonviolent-campaigns.
[43] Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy (Serpent’s Tail, 2012).
[44] CISA program produced the Marks and Ucko framework discussed in this article and runs the Joint Special Operations Master of Arts (JSOMA) program. Advanced PME schools and programs such as the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAAS) or the Naval Postgraduate School’s DA program have curricula that go way beyond just IW “activities”.
[45] Kevin Bilms, “What’s in a name? Reimagining Irregular Warfare Activities in Competition.” War on the Rocks. January 15, 2021.
[46] This is something the Center has already begun to do to some degree.
